Zaken v. Jenny Craig, Inc.

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 4 Motion to Compel. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. In its discretion, the Court concludes that a stay --not dismissal-- is appropriate. The matter will be stayed pending arbitration. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 10/13/11. C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------X
FERN ZAKEN,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
11-CV-02465(JS)(WDW)

JENNY CRAIG, INC.,
Defendant.
------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff:
Stuart A. Jackson, Esq.
The S.A. Jackson Law Firm, P.C.
70 East 55th Street
New York, NY 10022
For Defendant:

Cheoma Maria Smith, Esq.
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart
521 Fifth Avenue, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10175
Peter O. Hughes, Esq.
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart
10 Madison Avenue, Suite 400
Morristown, NJ 07960

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff

Fern

Zaken

(“Plaintiff”)

sued

Defendant

Jenny Craig, Inc. (“Defendant”) for employment discrimination,
claiming that she was derided, denied certain benefits and fired
because

of

her

religion.

Pending

before

the

Court

is

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
compel

is

arbitration.

For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion to
GRANTED

and

this

matter

will

be

stayed

pending

BACKGROUND
Defendant hired Plaintiff in May 2010, at which time
Plaintiff signed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement
(“Agreement”).

(Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel 2; Cert. Valente

Supp. Mot. Compel ¶ 6.)

Under the Agreement, Plaintiff agreed

“to arbitrate any and all disputes, claims, or controversies
(“Claims”) [Plaintiff] may at any time have against [Defendant]
. . . .” (Cert. Valente Supp. Mot. Compel, Ex. 1 (“Arb. Agm’t”);
Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel. 2.)

Plaintiff alleged that during

her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s immediate supervisors
derided

her,

denied

her

a

discount

on

Jenny

Craig

food--a

benefit all other employees received--and fired her all because
of her religion.
Defendant

in

(Compl. ¶ 5.)

New

Supreme

violations

of

296(1)(a).

(Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6-7.)

the

suit

to

New

York

In April 2011, Plaintiff sued

this

York

Court

Court,

Nassau

County,

Human

Rights

Law

State’s

on

for

Section

In May 2011, Defendant removed

diversity

grounds.

(Def.

Not.

Removal. ¶ 12.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant
clause

requires

argues

Plaintiff

action should be dismissed.
8.)

that
to

the

Agreement’s

arbitrate

and

that

arbitration
her

entire

(Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel 5-7,

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claims fall within the

Agreement’s valid arbitration clause.
2

I. Legal Standard
Courts generally resolve four inquiries in determining
a

cause

of

action’s

arbitrability:

(1)

whether

the

parties

agreed to arbitrate; (2) the scope of the agreement; (3) if
federal

statutory

claims

are

asserted,

Congress’

intent

that

certain claims be nonarbitrable; and (4) if some, but not all,
of the claims are arbitrable, whether to stay the balance of the
proceeding

pending

arbitration.

JLM

Indus.,

Inc.

v.

Stolt-

Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Oldroyd v.
Elmira Sav. Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1998)); see
also Boey Chau v. W. Carver Med. Assocs., No. 06-CV-0526, 2006
WL 3780546, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2006) (granting motion to
compel

arbitration

claims).

for

federal

employment

discrimination

In this case, the Court need only address the first

and second issues.
The
strong

Federal

federal

policy

Arbitration
favoring

Act

(“FAA”)

arbitration.

expresses
Ragone

v.

the
Atl.

Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2010); see
also Washington v. William Morris Endeavor Entm’t, LLC, No. 10CV-9647,

2011

WL

3251504,

at

*10

(S.D.N.Y.

July

20,

2011)

(staying a lawsuit that alleged, among other things, employment
discrimination).

The FAA states that arbitration agreements are

valid, enforceable and irrevocable, unless such grounds exist
for the revocation of the contract.
3

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011); see

also Ragone, 595 F.3d at 121 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
with

this

policy,

arbitration

and

the

Court

enforces

resolves

doubts

in

privately-negotiated

agreements in accordance with their terms.

In keeping
favor

of

arbitration

Collins & Aikman

Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 19-20 (2d Cir.
1995).
II. Agreement and Scope of Agreement
The
Plaintiff
whether

Court

and

must

Defendant

Plaintiff’s

Agreement.

resolve

entered

claims

two

into

are

issues:

the

within

Agreement;
the

The Court answers “yes” to both.

and Defendant entered into the Agreement.

(1)

scope

whether
and

(2)

of

the

First, Plaintiff

Plaintiff signed the

Agreement with Defendant on May 20, 2010, as a condition to her
employment.
Def.

Mem.

(Arb. Agm’t; Cert. Valente Supp. Mot. Compel ¶ 6;
Supp.

Mot.

Compel

2.)

Second,

encompasses Plaintiff’s cause of action.
arbitration
doubts

in

clause
favor

of

as

broadly

as

arbitration.

the

Agreement

The Court construes an

possible

and

Collins,

58

resolves
F.3d

at

any

19-20

(quoting David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd.,
923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991)).

The Court focuses on the

factual allegations in the Complaint and will compel arbitration
if the allegations underlying Plaintiff’s claim “touch matters”
covered by the parties’ agreement.

Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi

& Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987).
4

Prototypical broad arbitration clauses are those “in
which the parties agree to arbitrate any dispute, controversy or
claim

arising

under

or

in

connection

with

the

parties’

Oldroyd, 134 F.3d at 76 (noting such clauses are

agreement.”

the kind of broad arbitration clauses that justify presumption
of arbitrability); see also McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa.
Power

&

Light

Co.,

858

F.2d

825,

832

(2d

Cir.

1988)

(distinguishing between broad and narrow arbitration clauses).
“[U]nless

it

may

be

said

with

positive

assurance

that

the

arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute,” the Court will compel arbitration.
Genesco, 815 F.2d at 847 (quoting S.A. Mineracao Da TrindadeSamitri

v.

Utah

Intern.,

Inc.,

745

F.2d

190,

194

(2d

Cir.

1984)).
Plaintiff
discriminatory

brought

employment

an

action

practices

in

against

Defendant

violation

of

New

for
York

State Human Rights Law, specifically § 296(1)(a) of the New York
Executive Law.

(Compl. ¶ 7.)

The Agreement’s language covers

“any and all disputes . . . [Plaintiff] may at any time have
against [Defendant . . . .”

(Arb Agm’t.)

This language is the

type of broad language that encompasses all disputes between
Plaintiff and Defendant.

See Collins, 58 F.3d at 20 (finding

similar language paradigmatic of broad clause); Boey Chau, 2006
WL

3780546,

at

*4

(stating

prototypical
5

broad

arbitration

provisions includes agreement to arbitrate any claims arising
from the parties’ agreement).

Plaintiff’s action, therefore,

falls within the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

compel arbitration is GRANTED.
concludes

that

a

stay--not

Defendant’s

motion

In its discretion, the Court

dismissal--is

appropriate.

matter will be stayed pending arbitration.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

to

October
13 , 2011
Central Islip, New York

6

The