Brojer et al v. Kuriakose et al

Filing 6

ORDER granting Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is directed to submit an Amended Complaint with Annamma's signature or to obtain counsel within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order. If no Amended Complaint is filed or counsel fails to file a notice of appearance on her behalf within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order, Annamma's claims shall be dismissed without prejudice. Should Plaintiff wish to proceed with his due process claims against the Fede ral Defendants, he shall file an Amended Complaint as set forth above within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order. If no Amended Complaint is filed, Plaintiff's claims shall be dismissed and judgment shall enter. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 7/20/11. C/M (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X
MICHAEL BROJER and ANNAMMA BROJER,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER
11-CV-3156 (JS)(WDW)

-againstGEORGE KURIAKOSE, ANNE KURIAKOSE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, USCIS
HOMELAND SECURITY AND ICE DIVISION,

Defendants.
-----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff:
Michael Brojer, Pro Se
307 Vanderbilt Blvd.
Oakdale, New York 11769
Annamma Brojer, Pro Se
Manthottathil House
Eranakulam Kalloorkad
Kerala, India 686668
For Defendants:

No appearances

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff,

Michael

Brojer

(“Plaintiff”),

filed

this

action pro se on May 11, 2011 in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, purportedly on behalf of his
wife, Annamma Brojer (“Annamma”), alleging that defendants Anne and
George Kuriakose (together, the “Kuriakose Defendants”) trafficked
Annamma and held her against her will at their home in Suffolk
County.1

By Order dated June 27, 2011, the action was transferred

from the Southern District of New York to this Court.

(See

Transfer Order, dated June 27, 2011, Preska, D.J.).

1

The Complaint is signed only by Plaintiff who is alleged to
reside in Oakdale, New York. Annamma is alleged to reside in
India.

Plaintiff also alleges that the other Defendants, the
offices

of

the

U.S.

Department

of

State,

the

United

States

Department of Homeland Security’s Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) and ICE Division (collectively, the “Federal
Defendants”), failed to respond to his requests for prosecution of
the Kuriakoses. He seeks to have his wife’s visa violation removed
and “to see if my rights of due process was block[ed] by state
dep[ar]t[ment] and USCIS and ICE.”

(Compl. at ¶ V).

Accompanying the Complaint is an application to proceed
in forma pauperis.

Upon review of the Plaintiff’s declaration

supporting the application, Plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis
solely for the purpose of this Order. For the reasons that follow,
an Amended Complaint or a notice of appearance by counsel must be
filed within sixty (60) days of this Order.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s sparse Complaint concerns his wife, Annamma.

Plaintiff alleges that the Kuriakose Defendants contracted with a
trafficker named “Cutchimon” located in Elmont, New York to traffic
Annamma to the United States from India. (Compl. at ¶ III).
Plaintiff claims that Annamma was held her against her will at the
Kuriakose Defendants’ home in Suffolk County from October 1996 to
December 2002.

(Id.).

According to the Complaint, Annamma’s

passport was returned to her “after the contract was fulfilled.”
Id.

Although Plaintiff does not describe what next occurred,

presumably Annamma was deported to India in June 2003.
2

(Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that the U.S. State Department advised him that
the “immigration papers are not ours” and that he has been told by
“two senators office[s]” that “your wife has no rights.” (Id.) He
states that “every time I ask where to report the crime no answer
and no response.”

(Id.).

Plaintiff

claims

no

injuries

in

his

Complaint,

but

requests the following relief: “If Court can have VISA violation
pulled on wife due to trafficking and being held in servitude and
to see if my rights of due process was block[ed] by state dept. and
USCIS and ICE.”
II.

(Compl. at ¶ V).

Discussion
A.

In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of the Plaintiff’s application, this Court

finds that Plaintiff’s financial status qualifies him to commence
this action without prepayment of the filing fees.
§ 1915(a)(1).

See 28 U.S.C.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s application to proceed in

forma pauperis is granted.
B.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). The Court
is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a
determination.

See id.

Section 1915(e), as amended by the Prison
3

Litigation Reform Act of 1995, applies to both prisoner and nonprisoner in forma pauperis actions.

See Burns v. Goodwill Indus.

of Greater New York, No. 01-CV-11311, 2002 WL 1431704, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2002).

In reviewing the Complaint, the Court is

mindful that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and that his pleadings
should be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.

Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed
Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008).

Nevertheless,

a plaintiff’s pro se status “does not exempt [him] from compliance
with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. . . .”
Traguth

v.

Zuck,

710

F.2d

90,

95

(2d

Cir.

1983)

(internal

quotations and citation omitted).
In addition, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides, in relevant part, that a complaint “shall
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “[e]ach averment of a
pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Essentially, Rule 8 ensures that a complaint provides a defendant
with sufficient notice of the claims against him. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

With these standards in mind, the Court

considers the Complaint.
C.

Standing
As

a

threshold

matter,
4

the

Court

addresses

the

Plaintiff’s standing to pursue this Complaint.

Under Article III

of the United States Constitution, federal courts have jurisdiction
only over “cases” and “controversies.”

U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2;

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d
556

(1984).

Art.

III

doctrine

requires

a

litigant

“standing” to invoke the power of a federal court.

to

have

Id.; see also

United States v. Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1990)
("[w]hether a party has standing in the federal courts is always
considered within the framework of Article III, Section 2, cl.1,
that

extends

federal

judicial

power

to

all

'cases'

and

'controversies,' and which first asks whether the challenged action
has caused a plaintiff injury in fact").

As stated by the Supreme

Court:
The requirement of standing . . . has a core
component
derived
directly
from
the
Constitution.
A plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested
relief.
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 472-75 (1982)).

Standing requires that (1) plaintiff has

suffered an injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136,
119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992); see also Lee v. Board of Governors of the
5

Fed. Reserve System, 118 F.3d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff

alleges no facts which afford him standing to challenge the
Kuriakose Defendants’ actions.

He makes no allegations against

them, the allegations only concern his wife.

He does, however,

have standing to bring claims on his own behalf against the State
Department and immigration authorities.2
D.

Pro Se Status
Litigants in federal court have a statutory right to act

on their own behalf.

28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the

United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel . . .”).

However, the statute has been

consistently construed to permit parties to only represent their
own rights and interests and not the rights and interests of others
or of organizations.

See, e.g., Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553,

558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A person must be litigating an interest
personal to him.”)

Thus, a lay person may not represent a

corporation, pursue a shareholder’s derivative suit, represent a

2

While he may have standing, Plaintiff’s allegations may not
state a claim on which relief may be granted. To the extent he
seeks to have the Kuriakose Defendants prosecuted, that is
outside this Court’s authority and rests squarely with the
prosecuting authorities. Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85-86
(1981) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973) (“‘a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.’”).
Additionally, there is “no constitutional right to an
investigation by government officials.” Stone v. Dep't of
Investigation, No. 91-CV-2471 (MBM), 1992 WL 25202, *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 4, 1992); accord Lewis v. Gallivan, 315 F. Supp. 2d 313,
316-17 (W.D.N.Y.2004).
6

partnership, appear on behalf of her or his minor child (except in
social security cases, see Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.
2002)) and may not proceed pro se as administrator or executor of
an estate where the estate has beneficiaries or creditors other
than the litigant. Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir.
1997) (citing cases).

In determining whether a non-attorney

individual is attempting to bring an action on behalf of another,
the “threshold question” is “whether a given matter is plaintiff’s
own case or one that belongs to another.”

Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at

558.
Here, Plaintiff attempts to bring suit against private
individuals,

the

State

Department

and

federal

immigration

authorities, on behalf of his wife who is alleged to reside in
India.

Plaintiff cannot appear on her behalf in this Court unless

he is an attorney licensed to practice law.

As such, the

Complaint, insofar as it alleges claims against Defendants by
Plaintiff, a non-attorney individual on a matter that belongs to
another, must be dismissed.

E.

Claims Against the Federal Defendants
Although

Plaintiff

names

as

Defendants

the

U.S.

Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security’s USCIS
and

ICE

division,

he

fails

to

allege

a

plausible

claim.

Plaintiff’s bare allegation that he seeks “to see if my rights of
due process was block[ed] by State DEPT. and USCIS and ICE” is
7

insufficient to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s
requirements.
plead

The Supreme Court instructs that a complaint must

sufficient

facts

plausible on its face.”

to

“state

a

claim

to

relief

that

is

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows

the

court

to

draw

the

reasonable

inference

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

that

the

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)
(citations omitted).

While “detailed factual allegations” are not

required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1955).

If a liberal reading of the complaint “gives any indication that a
valid claim might be stated,” courts must grant leave to amend the
complaint.
2000).

See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.

Given that all complaints, even those that are brought pro

se, must contain at least “some minimum level of factual support
for their claims,” Alfaro Motors, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987)
together with Rule 8's directive that a complaint must provide a
defendant with sufficient notice of the claim against it, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint as against the Federal Defendants
does not comport with Rule 8, is not plausible as pled and is
therefore dismissed.

Plaintiff is afforded leave to file an

Amended Complaint as set forth below.
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F.

Leave to Obtain Representation or Proceed Pro Se
The Court affords Plaintiff an opportunity to obtain

counsel to represent his wife or to obtain his wife’s signature so
that her claims may proceed pro se.

In order to maintain this

action, Annamma must notify the Court of her intention to proceed
pro se by amending the Complaint to reflect her signature and
claims within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order.

Annamma

must sign the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and she must be prepared to appear at
court conferences, telephonically or in person, and to conduct this
matter for herself.
Plaintiff is further afforded leave to file an Amended
Complaint within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order that
complies with Rule 8's requirements should he wish to purse his due
process claim against the Federal Defendants.

It must be titled

“Amended Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this Order,
No. 11-CV-3156 (JS)(WDW).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended

Complaint within the time allowed, his claims shall be deemed
dismissed and judgment shall enter.
Alternatively, Plaintiff may obtain counsel to represent
both himself and his wife in this action.

Should Plaintiff decide

to obtain counsel, counsel must file a notice of appearance within
sixty (60) days of the date of this Order.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff is directed to submit an Amended
9

Complaint with Annamma’s signature or to obtain counsel within
sixty (60) days of the date of this Order.

If no Amended Complaint

is filed or counsel fails to file a notice of appearance on her
behalf within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order, Annamma’s
claims shall be dismissed without prejudice. Should Plaintiff wish
to

proceed

with

his

due

process

claims

against

the

Federal

Defendants, he shall file an Amended Complaint as set forth above
within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order.

If no Amended

Complaint is filed, Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed and
judgment shall enter.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in
good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the
purpose of any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

July
20 , 2011
Central Islip, New York

10