Taylor v. Wilde et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 9) is DENIED. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 7/10/12. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------X
ANTOINE L. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
11-CV-3608(JS)(ETB)

-againstCORRECTIONAL OFFICER MICHAEL WILDE,

Defendant.
--------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Antoine L. Taylor, pro se
11-A-5178
Sing Sing Correctional Facility
354 Hunter Street
Ossining, New York 10562
For Defendant:

Peter A. Laserna, Esq.
Office of the Nassau County Attorney
One West Street
Mineola, New York 11501

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Incarcerated

pro

se

Plaintiff

Antoine

L.

Taylor

(“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on July 22, 2011 against
Correctional Officer Michael Wilde, the Nassau County Sheriff’s
Department, Acting Sheriff Michael Sposato, and Sergeant Lettman
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting claims of excessive force
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Pending before the Court

is Defendant Wilde’s motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Wilde’s motion is DENIED.

For the following reasons, Defendant

BACKGROUND1
According

to

the

brief,

handwritten

Complaint

submitted on the Court’s civil rights complaint form, on July 2,
2010, Plaintiff was being escorted from the Nassau University
Medical

Center

(“NUMC”)

Correctional Center.

Prison

Ward

(Compl. ¶ IV.)

to

the

Nassau

County

Plaintiff claims that he

“asked the officer if he could take off the leg armor and the
handcuffs b/c [they] were in the facility now,” and alleges that
Defendant Wilde refused.

(Compl. ¶ IV.)

Plaintiff asserts that

he was in “a lot of pain from [his] surgery” and he began to
complain about “the body gear still being on even in medical.”
(Compl.

¶

IV.)

Plaintiff

describes

what

occurred

next

as

follows:
The officer then told me to “shut up” before
he sticks me in the medical pins [sic].
I
then replied by saying something that he
(Mr. Wilde) didn’t like, he told me to head
to the pins [sic], I said “for what,” the
officer then tried to grab me from behind
b/c at that point I was holding on to
something on the wall.
When his grab was
not successful he picked me up from behind
and slammed me into a vacant office. Where
I hit my head on a desk and the floor real
hard, cut my finger, and a staple from my
surgery had fell [sic] out.
(Compl. ¶ IV.)
unspecified

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks

“monetary

damages”

1

for

his

claimed

injuries,

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purposes of this Memorandum and
Order.
2

including pain and suffering and mental anguish.

(Compl. ¶ V.)

Plaintiff also seeks to have “immediate action taking [sic] out
on

the

Officer

(Michael

inappropriate behavior.”

Wilde)

for

his

unacceptable,

(Compl. ¶ V.)

Plaintiff filed his Complaint and a motion for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis on July 22, 2011.
1-2.)

(Docket Entries

On September 2, 2011, this Court granted Plaintiff's

request to proceed in forma pauperis but sua sponte dismissed
the claims against Sheriff Sposato, Sergeant Lettman, and the
Nassau

County

Sheriff's

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b).

Department

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

(Docket Entry 7.)

On November 4, 2011, Defendant Wilde moved to dismiss
the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

(Docket Entry 9.)

Plaintiff, after being

granted multiple extensions of time, filed his opposition to
Defendant Wilde’s motion on May 14, 2012 (Docket Entry 34), and
Defendant Wilde filed his reply on May 21, 2012 (Docket Entry
35).
DISCUSSION
Defendant Wilde moves to dismiss on two grounds:

(1)

because his use of force was justified and (2) because he is
entitled to qualified immunity.

The Court will first describe

the standard of review on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion before turning
to the merits of Defendant Wilde’s motion.

3

I.

Standard of Review under Rule 12(b)(6)
In

Court

deciding

applies

a

Rule

12(b)(6)

“plausibility

“[t]wo working principles.”

motions

standard,”

to

which

dismiss,
is

the

guided

by

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Harris v. Mills,
572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

First, although the Court must

accept all of a complaint's allegations as true, this “tenet” is
“inapplicable

to

legal

conclusions;”

thus,

“[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
(alteration
(internal

in

original)

quotation

marks

(quoting

Harris, 572 F.3d at 72

Iqbal,

omitted).

556

Second,

U.S.
only

at

678)

complaints

that state a “plausible claim for relief” survive a motion to
dismiss.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Determining whether a complaint does so is “a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.”
citation omitted).

Id. (internal quotation marks and

While pro se plaintiffs enjoy a somewhat

more liberal pleading standard, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (“[A] pro se
complaint,

however

inartfully

pleaded,

must

be

held

to

less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), they must still

4

comport with the procedural and substantive rules of law.

Colo.

Capital v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is confined
to “the allegations contained within the four corners of [the]
complaint.”

Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67,

71 (2d Cir. 1998).
any

document

documents

This has been interpreted broadly to include

attached

to

the

complaint,

incorporated

in

the

any

complaint

by

statements
reference,

or
any

document on which the complaint heavily relies, and anything of
which

judicial

notice

may

be

taken.

See

Chambers

v.

Time

Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002); Kramer v.
Time

Warner

Inc.,

937

F.2d

767,

773

(2d

Cir.

1991).

Consideration of matters beyond those just enumerated requires
the conversion of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to one for
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If,

summary judgment under Rule 56.
on

a

motion

under

Rule

12(b)(6) . . . ,

matters

outside

the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56.”); see also Kramer, 937 F.2d at 773.
II.

Defendant Wilde’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Wilde argues that the Complaint should be

dismissed because (1) his use of force was justified and (2) he
is shielded from suit on the grounds of qualified immunity.
Court will address each argument in turn.

5

The

A.

Whether Wilde’s Use of Force Was Justified
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at
least in part to a person who was acting under color of state
law

and

(2)

the

conduct

deprived

the

plaintiff

of

guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.”
v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999).

a

right
Snider

Defendant Wilde does

not dispute that he was acting under color of state law; at
issue is whether Plaintiff has adequately pled the deprivation
of a constitutional right.
Here,
excessive

Plaintiff

force

Amendment.

against

The

Constitution

asserts
him

Eighth

prohibits

in

that

violation

Amendment

the

Defendant

infliction

to
of

of

the

Wilde

used

the

Eighth

United

States

“cruel

and

unusual

punishments,” including the “unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain.”

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S. Ct. 2909,

49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976).

To state a claim of cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must
“allege[] facts from which it could be inferred that prison
officials

subjected

him

to

excessive

maliciously and sadistically.”
(2d Cir. 2000).

force,

and

did

so

Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22

In other words, Plaintiff must show that (1)

the alleged use of force was “objectively sufficiently serious
or harmful enough,” United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 50 (2d

6

Cir. 1999) (citing Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S. Ct.
995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992)), and (2) that the force was
applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” rather than
“in

a

good-faith

effort

to

maintain

or

restore

discipline,”

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has done that here.
First, Defendant Wilde’s act of “slamm[ing]” a handcuffed and
shackled Plaintiff into a vacant office causing, inter alia, a
staple

from

his

recent

surgery

to

fall

out

is

“objectively

sufficiently serious” to state a claim for relief.

Hudson, 503

U.S. at 8; see also, e.g., Charlton v. New York, No. 03-CV-8986,
2006 WL 406315, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006) (finding the
act of vehemently and repeatedly slamming an inmate against a
wall sufficient to satisfy the objective prong of his excessive
force claim); Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F. Supp. 116, 129 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (stating that “the unprovoked slapping of a handcuffed
prisoner while under custody in a police car is an example of an
amount of force which is excessive as a matter of law”).
second,

although

the

Court

can

infer

that

Plaintiff

And,
was

attempting to defy Defendant Wilde’s order to “head to the pins”
by “holding on to something on the wall” (Compl. ¶ IV), it can
also

infer

retaliation

that
for

Defendant

Wilde’s

Plaintiff’s

“saying

use

of

something

force
that

was
he

in
(Mr.

Wilde) didn’t like” (Compl. ¶ IV) and was thus “malicious[] and

7

sadistic[]

to

cause

harm,”

Hudson,

503

U.S.

at

7.

Thus,

although it is far from clear whether Plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, the Court cannot conclude at this early stage of the
litigation

that

Plaintiff

has

failed

to

assert

a

legally

plausible claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment.
e.g.,

Griffin

v.

Crippen,

193

F.3d

89,

91

(2d

See,

Cir.

1999)

(reversing district court’s dismissal of an inmate’s excessive
force claim because there were “genuine issues of material fact
concerning . . . whether

the

guards

maliciously

used

force

against him”); Charlton, 2006 WL 406315, at *7 (denying motion
to

dismiss,

in

part,

because

there

was

a

question

of

fact

whether the defendant’s conduct was malicious and sadistic as
opposed

to

a

good

faith

effort

to

maintain

or

restore

discipline); cf. Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 127-28 (2d
Cir. 2005) (“When reviewing pro se submissions, a district court
should look at them with a lenient eye, allowing borderline
cases to proceed.”)
Defendant Wilde argues that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim because:
The physical force used by Officer Wilde, as
alleged by Plaintiff, was in response to
Plaintiff’s refusal to obey a direct order.
Officer Wilde’s force was no more than
necessary
to
maintain
the
order
and
discipline of the inmate at the Nassau
County Correctional Center, and was thus,
justified under [N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10(2) and

8

the Nassau County Correctional Center Inmate
Rules and Regulations].
(Wilde Mot. 6-7.)
Wilde’s

There are multiple issues with Defendant

argument.

misplaced,

as

prosecution.

First,

this

is

his
a

reliance

civil

on

the

action,

Penal

not

a

Law

is

criminal

Second, the Court may not consider the Nassau

County Correctional Center Inmate Rules and Regulations, as they
were neither attached to the Complaint nor referenced therein.
See

Helprin

v.

Harcourt,

Inc.,

277

F.

Supp.

2d

327,

330-31

(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“To be incorporated by reference, the Complaint
must make a clear, definite and substantial reference to the
documents.”).

And,

finally,

the

Court

is

confined

to

the

allegations in the Complaint, which, construed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, states a claim for relief.

See infra

pages 7-8.
B.

Qualified Immunity
Defendant

dismissal

on

the

also
basis

asserts
of

that

qualified

he

is

entitled

immunity.

to

Qualified

immunity protects a government official sued in his official
capacity:
(1) if the conduct attributed to him was not
prohibited by federal law; or (2) where that
conduct
was
so
prohibited,
if
the
Plaintiff’s right not to be subjected to
such conduct by the defendant was not
clearly established at the time it occurred;
or (3) if the defendant’s action was
objective[ly] legal[ly] reasonable[] . . .

9

in light of the legal rules that were
clearly established at the time it was
taken.
Manganiello v. City of N.Y., 612 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 2010)
(alterations

in

original)

citations omitted).
from

the

use

of

(internal

quotation

marks

and

Because “[i]t is indisputable that freedom
excessive

force

is

a

clearly

established

constitutional right,” Jeanty v. Cnty. of Orange, 379 F. Supp.
2d 533, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the issue here is whether it was
objectively reasonable for Defendant Wilde to believe that his
acts did not violate Plaintiff’s right to be free from the use
of excessive force.
The Second Circuit has held, however, that whether a
government official’s actions were objectively reasonable “turns
on factual questions that cannot be resolved at this stage of
the proceedings.”

Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768,

793 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013,
1018 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Usually, the defense of qualified immunity
cannot support the grant of a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”); Maloney v.
Cnty.

of

(“Because

Nassau,
this

623

F.

defense

Supp.

2d

necessarily

277,

292

involves

(E.D.N.Y.
a

2007)

fact-specific

inquiry, it is generally premature to address the defense of
qualified

immunity in

a

motion

to

dismiss.”).

Thus,

“any

adjudication as to the applicability of the qualified immunity

10

affirmative defense would be premature since ‘[r]esolution of
qualified

immunity

depends

on

the

determination

of

certain

factual questions that cannot be answered at this stage of the
litigation.’”
987374,

at

Hamilton

*19

(N.D.N.Y.

v.

Fisher,

Feb.

29,

No.

10-CV-1066,

2012)

(quoting

McKee, 332 F. Supp. 2d 659, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).

2012

WL

Denton

v.

Accordingly,

the Court will not dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity
at this time.
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Defendant's

motion

to

dismiss (Docket Entry 9) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

July
10 , 2012
Central Islip, New York

11