Hidalgo et al v. State of New York et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM & ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting in part 17 Report and Recommendation. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' objections are SUSTAINED, and Judge Lindsay's R&R is ADOPTED WITH MODIFICATION. Thus, Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 11/21/2011. C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------X
WALTER HIDALGO and MICHELLE HIDALGO,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
11-CV-5074(JS)(ARL)

-againstSTATE OF NEW YORK, ANDREW CUOMO, as
Governor of the State of New York,
SUFFOLK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, and GREGORY BLASS, as
Commissioner,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiffs:
John W. Ray, Esq.
Vesselin Venelinov Mitev, Esq.
John Ray & Associates
122 North Country Road
P.O. Box 5440
Miller Place, NY 11764
For Defendants:
State of N.Y. &
Governor Cuomo

Derrick Jeffrey Robinson, Esq.
New York State Office of the Attorney
General
200 Old Country Road, Suite 240
Mineola, NY 11501

Suffolk County Dep’t
of Social Services &
Gregory Blass

Drew W. Schirmer, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney’s Office
100 Veterans Memorial Highway
P.O. Box 6100
Hauggauge, NY 11788

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Presently
Walter

and

pending

Michelle

before

Hidalgo’s

the

Court

(“Plaintiffs”)

are

Plaintiffs

objections

to

Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay’s Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”).

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ objections

are

SUSTAINED,

and

the

Court

ADOPTS

WITH

MODIFICATION

Judge

Lindsay’s R&R.
BACKGROUND
The

Court

assumes

familiarity

with

the

factual

background of this case as detailed in Judge Lindsay’s R&R.
Briefly, Plaintiffs commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on
October 18, 2011, to challenge the constitutionality of New York
Social Services Law § 101 and New York Family Court Act § 415,
which state that stepparents are liable for the support of their
spouse’s

children

who

assistance or welfare.

are

receiving

or

have

received

public

Plaintiffs, in their Complaint, seek (i)

a declaratory judgment that these statutes are unconstitutional
as violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause; (ii) an injunction enjoining Defendants from
conducting

such

support

proceedings

against

stepparents;

and

(iii) attorneys’ fees and costs.
With the Complaint, Plaintiffs filed an application
for

a

temporary

injunction

restraining

enjoining

the

order

State

and

(“TRO”)

and

Defendant

a

preliminary

Suffolk

County

Department of Social Services from enforcing § 415 of the Family
Court

Act

and

§ 101

of

the

Social

Services

stepparents such as Plaintiff Walter Hidalgo.

Law

against

Such a support

proceeding against Mr. Hidalgo has been scheduled for November
22, 2011.

On October 18, 2011, the Court denied Plaintiffs’
2

application for a TRO and referred the motion for a preliminary
injunction to Judge Lindsay for an R&R.
Judge
denying

the

Lindsay

issued

preliminary

the

R&R

injunction

as

on

November

barred

Injunction Act (the “Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

by

17,
the

2011
Anti-

On November 18,

2011, Plaintiffs filed their objections to the R&R, arguing that
the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable to § 1983 claims.

The

Court agrees with Plaintiffs, but nonetheless denies Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction (i) as barred by the Younger
abstention

doctrine

and

(ii)

for

failing

to

establish

irreparable harm. 
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
“When evaluating the report and recommendation of a

magistrate judge, the district court may adopt those portions of
the report to which no objections have been made and which are
not facially erroneous.”

Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F. Supp. 2d

290, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted).

A party may serve

and file specific, written objections to a magistrate's report
and

recommendation

within

fourteen

days

of

receiving

recommended disposition. 1

See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2).

receiving

objections

any

timely

to

the

the
Upon

magistrate's

1

Given the exigency of the circumstances--the support proceeding
is scheduled for November 22, 2011--Judge Lindsay significantly
shortened the time for filing objections.
3

recommendation,

the

district

“court

may

accept,

reject,

or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations
made by the magistrate judge.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
recommendation

must

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also

A party that objects to a report and

point

out

the

specific

portions

report and recommendation to which they object.

of

the

See Barratt v.

Joie, No. 96–CV–0324, 2002 WL 335014, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
2002) (citations omitted).
When

a

party

raises

an

objection

to

a

magistrate

judge's report, the Court must conduct a de novo review of any
contested sections of the report.

See Pizarro v. Bartlett, 776

F. Supp. 815, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

But if a party “makes only

conclusory

or

original

or

general

arguments,

objections,
the

Court

simply

reviews

Recommendation only for clear error.”

reiterates

the

Report

his
and

Pall Corp. v. Entegris,

Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Barratt, 2002
WL 335014, at *1).
party's

specific

Furthermore, even in a de novo review of a
objections,

the

Court

ordinarily

will

not

consider “arguments, case law and/or evidentiary material which
could have been, but [were] not, presented to the magistrate
judge in the first instance.”
2006

WL

3704784,

at

*1

Kennedy v. Adamo, No. 02–CV–1776,

(E.D.N.Y.

quotation marks and citation omitted).

4

Sept.

1,

2006)

(internal

II.

Plaintiffs’ Objections and the Anti-Injunction Act
Plaintiffs

assert

that

Judge

Lindsay

incorrectly

concluded that the Act bars the Court from issuing an injunction
in

this

case.

The

Court

thus

reviews

Judge

Lindsay’s

application of the Act de novo.
The Act provides as follows:
A court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in the aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.
28

U.S.C.

§

2283.

Therefore,

as

Judge

Lindsay

correctly

concluded, this Court may not stay the Family Court proceeding
unless

one

of

the

three

exceptions

enumerated

in

the

Act

applies.
However, it is clearly established that § 1983 claims
fall within one of the exceptions.

The Supreme Court in Mitchum

v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243, 92 S. Ct. 2151, 32 L. Ed. 2d 705
(1972), held that Ҥ 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls
within the ‘expressly authorized’ exception of [the Act].”

See

also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 9, 107 S. Ct.
1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987) (“Because § 1983 is an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, the court also found that the AntiInjunction Act did not prevent the District Court from granting
[injunctive]

relief . . . .”

(citation

5

omitted));

Mussman

v.

Scalera, No. 03-CV-1068, 2003 WL 22299002, at *6 n.8 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2003) (“[T]he Mitchum Court concluded that 42 U.S.C. §
1983

of

the

authorization

Civil
under

Rights
the

Act

qualified

Anti-Injunction

as

Act.”);

an

express

McNeill

v.

N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233, 256 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(“As the Supreme Court held in Mitchum v. Foster, § 1983 is an
Act of Congress that falls within the ‘expressly authorized’
exception to the anti-injunction act.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ objections
assert that Judge Lindsay incorrectly concluded that the Act
barred their claims, their objections are SUSTAINED.
II.

Plaintiffs are Not Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction
To the extent that Plaintiffs’ objections assert that

they are otherwise entitled to a preliminary injunction, their
objections are OVERRULED.
A.

Younger Abstention Doctrine
“The mere fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes an

‘expressly

authorized’

exception

to

the

absolute

bar

against

federal injunctions directed at state proceedings provided by
[the Act] in no way qualifies ‘the principles of equity, comity,
and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to
enjoin a state court proceeding.’”

Bedrosian v. Mintz, 518 F.2d

396, 399 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243).
6

The

Court must still analyze whether it should abstain under the
principles of federalism enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971).
481 U.S. at 10.

See Pennzoil,

The Court may address the applicability of the

Younger abstention doctrine sua sponte.

See Catlin v. Ambach,

820 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 143 n.10, 96 S. Ct. 2857, 49 L. Ed. 844 (1976)); see
also Shelley v. Gulotta, No. 09-CV-4883, 2010 WL 309011, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010).
“As the Supreme Court emphasized in Younger v. Harris,
federal

courts

otherwise

should

interfering

generally
in

refrain

ongoing

state

from

enjoining

proceedings.

or
This

principle of abstention is grounded in interrelated principles
of

comity

and

federalism.”

Spargo

v.

N.Y.

State

Comm’n

on

Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted).

Younger abstention is mandatory when three conditions

are met:

“(1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an

important state interest is implicated in that proceeding; and
(3)

the

adequate

state

proceeding

opportunity

constitutional claims.”

for

affords
judicial

the

federal

review

of

plaintiff
the

an

federal

Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan,

282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Grieve v. Tamerin, 269
F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2001).

7

The Court finds that the Younger abstention conditions
are met here.
ongoing.

The

First, the state court proceedings are still
support

November 22, 2011.
in

the

proceeding

at

issue

is

scheduled

for

Second, the State has an important interest

administration

of

its

welfare

programs.

See,

e.g.,

Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444, 97 S. Ct. 1911, 52 L.
Ed.

2d

interest

486
in

(1977)
the

(stating

fiscal

that

integrity

the
of

state
its

has

an

public

important
assistance

programs); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S. Ct. 2317, 60
L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area
of state concern.”); see also Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457,
461 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[W]e should be especially careful to avoid
unnecessary

or

untimely

interference

administration of its domestic policies.”).

with

the

State's

Finally, the Family

Court proceeding provides an adequate forum for Plaintiffs to
adjudicate their federal constitutional claims.

See Reinhardt

v. Mass. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 715 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (“Clearly, the Family Court of New York is bound by the
Federal Constitution.

Thus, notions of comity and federalism

compel the assumption that the Family Court is competent to hear
and

thoughtfully

consider

the

plaintiff’s

constitutional

challenges.”); see also Thomas v. N.Y. City, 814 F. Supp. 1139,
1150 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Martinez v. Scopetta, No. 96-CV-7580, 1997
WL

316714,

at

*2

(S.D.N.Y.

June
8

10,

1997).

The

fact

that

Plaintiffs may be unable to recover attorneys’ fees from the
Family Court is of no merit.
227,

235

(2d

Cir.

2000)

See Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d
(holding

that

inability

to

obtain

attorneys’ fees would not render Younger inapplicable).2
Therefore, the Court finds that the Younger abstention
doctrine

applies

and

bars

this

Court

from

granting

the

Plaintiffs

have

preliminary injunction.3 
B.

Irreparable Harm
Additionally,

failed

to

preliminary

establish

the

that

injunction.

Court
they

“In

finds

that

otherwise

order

to

are

obtain

entitled
a

to

a

preliminary

injunction, the movant must show, inter alia, ‘that irreparable
injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.’”

Kraft Foods

Global, Inc. v. Starbucks Corp., 411 Fed. Appx. 428, 429 (2d

2

The Second Circuit in Kirschner also noted that “the Supreme
Court has held that attorneys’ fees are available in state court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 whenever § 1983 claims are
adjudicated.” 225 F.3d at 236 n.2 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 9, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980)).
3

 “Despite the strong policy in favor of abstention, a federal
court may nevertheless intervene in a state proceeding upon a
showing of ‘bad faith, harassment or any other unusual
circumstance that would call for equitable relief.’” Diamond
“D”, 282 F.3d at 198 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 54).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that one of these
exceptions applies. Id. (citing Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d
227, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiffs do not allege that any
of these exceptions apply here, nor do the facts asserted in the
Complaint and the preliminary injunction motion support the
application of one of these exceptions.  

9

Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S. Ct. 365,
375, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008) (emphasis in original)).
satisfy

the

demonstrate

irreparable
that

absent

harm
a

requirement,

preliminary

Plaintiffs

injunction

they

“To
must
will

suffer an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but
actual and imminent, and one that cannot be remedied if a court
waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm.”

Grand River

Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir.
2007)

(internal

quotation

marks

and

citations

omitted).

Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Hidalgo faces irreparable harm in the
form of “a) an order of support; b) loss of licenses[;] and c)
incarceration.”

(Pl. Reply 1.)

The Court finds that this is an

insufficient showing of irreparable harm.

First, “[m]onetary

loss alone will generally not amount to irreparable harm,” Borey
v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 934 F.2d 30, 34
(2d Cir. 1991), so any support order issued by the Family Court
requiring Mr. Hidalgo to pay does not justify a preliminary
injunction.
financial

“[W]hen
loss

by

a

a

party
money

can

be

fully

judgment,

there

compensated
is

simply

for
no

compelling reason why the extraordinary equitable remedy of a
preliminary injunction should be granted.”

Id. (citing Jackson

Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.
1979)).

Second, the penalties that Mr. Hidalgo faces if he

fails to comply with any support order--for example, driver’s
10

license
bank

suspension,

account

credit

seizure--are

irreparable harm.

bureau

referral,

too

speculative

passport
to

denial,

amount

to

No support order has been issued, so Mr.

Hidaldo does not know that he will be unable to afford it.

And

he only faces the above-mentioned penalties if he fails to pay
the

court-ordered

support.

This

“mere

possibility

of

irreparable harm is insufficient to justify the drastic remedy
of a preliminary injunction.”

Id.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ objections are
SUSTAINED, and Judge Lindsay’s R&R is ADOPTED WITH MODIFICATION.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

November 21, 2011
Central Islip, NY

11