Parker v. City of Long Beach et al
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. SO ORDERED that defts motion for summary judgment [Docket Entry No. 23] is granted. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this case. Ordered by Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein on 2/15/2013. (Florio, Lisa)
V\r
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------)(
JESSE PARKER,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
11-CV-5412 (SJF) (WOW)
-againstCITY OF LONG BEACH,
LONG BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT,
JAMES CANNER,
MICHAEL BULIK, KARL HAYES,
and BRUCE AZUETA,
Defendants.
FILED
IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U S DISTRICT COURT E 0 N Y
:~:3
*
1 5 2013
LONG C />.1'0 OFFICI
----------------------------------------------------------)(
FEUERSTEIN, J.
On November 4, 2011, Jesse Parker ("plaintiff'') commenced this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") against the City of Long Beach, the Long Beach Police
Department (the "Police Department"), and several Long Beach police officers (collectively,
"defendants"), alleging that his civil rights were violated in the course of an encounter with
police officers on November 4, 2010. [Docket Entry Nos. l, 17].
Plaintiff asserts claims for: (I) false arrest; (2) the use of excessive and unreasonable
force in violation of plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment; (3) violation of plaintiff's
right to equal protection under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) municipal
liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); and (5) negligence,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law.
Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. [Docket Entry No. 63]. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
I.
Factual Background
In November 2010, Antonio Webb ("Webb") was a primary suspect in the Police
Department's investigation of an armed robbery. Defendant's Statement of Uncontested Material
Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 [Docket Entry No. 23-2] ("Def. 56.1 St.") at~ I. Detective
Lieutenant James Canner ("Detective Canner") had seen Webb numerous times and was familiar
with Webb's appearance. !d. at~ 3. On November 4, 2010, Detective Canner saw an individual
he believed to be Webb in the vicinity of 99 East Pine Street and instructed Detective Michael
Bulik ("Detective Bulik"), who was accompanied by Police Officer Bruce Azueta ("Officer
Azueta"), to respond to the area, identify Webb, and arrest him. !d. at~~ 3-8.
Detective Bulik and Officer Azueta arrived in the vicinity of 99 East Pine Street in an
unmarked police vehicle minutes later, at approximately 3:45p.m. !d. at~ 10; Complaint
[Docket Entry No. I] at~ 20. Detective Bulik incorrectly identified Jesse Parker ("plaintiff'),
Webb's brother, as Webb, and approached him upon exiting the vehicle. Def. 56.1 St.
at~~
II-
13. 1 Detective Bulik and Detective Canner have testified that the brothers possess similar facial
features and thin builds. !d.
at~
13. Detective Bulik and Officer Azueta were wearing plain
clothes and had their badges displayed. !d. at~~ 9-1 o.Z
According to defendants, Officer
Plaintiff characterizes Detective Bulik's and Officer Azueta's approach as a "jog[]," while
Detective Bulik testified that their "gait ... was a briskly-paced walk." BulikAffidavit [Docket
Entry No. 23-5] ("Bulik Aff.") at~ 13.
2
Plaintiff contradicts himself by admitting in his response to defendants' Rule 56.1
Statement that the officers were wearing badges, Pl. 56.1 St. at~ 9, but then stating that they
"were not wearing badges to identify themselves" in his own statement of facts. See Plaintiff's
Counterstatement of Material Facts ("Pl. 56.1 Ctr. St.") at~ 16. Whether plaintiff immediately
recognized that Detective Bulik and Officer Azueta were police officers is irrelevant because
flight may give rise to reasonable suspicion whether the suspect is fleeing from strangers or
police officers. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1967) ("[D]eliberately furtive actions
and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea .... ")
(emphasis added).
2
Azueta said to plaintiff, "Hey Tony, come here" (referring to Webb), and plaintiff responded,
"What for?'' !d. at '1[14. Plaintiff alleges that Detective Bulik and Officer Azueta did not address
him as they exited the vehicle. Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts [Docket Entry No. 23-27]
("Pl. 56.1 St.") at '1[14.
Plaintiff and his cousin, Anthony Rogers ("Rogers"), turned and ran into 93A East Pine
Street, a nearby residence which Detective Bulik knew to belong to Mary Mann ("Mann"). Def.
56.1 St. at '1['1[15-20; Pl. 56.1 St. at '1[17. Detective Bulik testified that at the time he feared for
Ms. Mann's safety. Bulik Affidavit [Docket Entry No. 23-5] ("Bulik Aff.") at '1[17. According to
defendants, Detective Bulik and Officer Azueta verbally identified themselves as police officers
and directed plaintiff and Rogers to stop when they began to run. Def. 56.1 St. at '1[16. Plaintiff
alleges that he did not know that Detective Bulik and Officer Azueta were police officers "until
after [plaintiff! entered Ms. Mann's apartment and locked the front door." Pl. 56.1 St. at '1[21.
Detective Bulik and Officer Azueta entered the Mann residence and encountered plaintiff
in the kitchen. Def. 56.1 St. at '1['1[22-24. According to defendants, Detective Bulik and Officer
Azueta handcuffed plaintiff while remaining in the standing position and conducted a safety pat
down. !d. at '1[25; Azueta Affidavit [Docket Entry No. 23-5] ("Azueta Aff.") at '1[23; Bulik Aff.
at '1[25. Plaintiff alleges that Detective Bulik "slammed" him to the floor and that, after applying
handcuffs, Officer Azueta "choked" him for "three seconds." Pl. 56.1 St. at '1[26.
Plaintiff was then driven to police headquarters by Officer Azueta and Sergeant Karl
Hayes ("Sergeant Hayes"). !d. at '1[27. On the way to headquarters, plaintiff told the officers
that he was "not Tony," which prompted Sergeant Hayes to turn around from the front seat of the
vehicle and see that plaintiff was not Webb. !d. at '1['1[29-30. Officer Azueta confirmed plaintiff's
identity by inspecting his wallet. .!Q,_ at '1[31.
3
The vehicle was stopped in front of police headquarters and plaintiff's handcuffs were
removed. !d. at '1['1[32-33. 3 Plaintiff was taken to a holding room where he was asked questions
about his health and whether he needed medical attention. !d. at '1[34. Plaintiff indicated that he
did not need medical attention and signed a physical condition questionnaire certifYing his good
physical health. !d.
Plaintiff's encounter with the police began at 3:45p.m. and, according to defendants,
plaintiff was escorted into police headquarters at 3:53p.m. and departed at 3:59p.m. !d. at
'1['1[33, 35. The video surveillance footage submitted by defendants corroborates this timeline and
contradicts plaintiff's allegation that he was kept in the back of the police vehicle for twenty (20)
minutes before being driven to police headquarters and that he was kept in police headquarters
for one (l) to one and one-half(l.5) hours. Pl. 56.1 St. at '1['1[33, 45. 4
Plaintiff also alleges that the officers would not allow him to leave until he signed a
physical condition questionnaire indicating that he did not need medical attention and that he did
not tell the officers that he was injured "because [he] knew if he stated he was hurt, [d]efendants
would take him to Long Beach Hospital where [he] did not want to go." !d. at '1['1[46-48.
Plaintiff went to Mercy Medical Center hospital two (2) days after the incident, on November 6,
2010, to seek treatment for injuries to his back allegedly "caused by Defendant Bulik slamming
3
According to plaintiff, the handcuffs were not removed until after he entered police
headquarters. Pl. 56.1 St. at '1[33. This assertion is contradicted by video surveillance footage.
4
As discussed in further detail below, because plaintiff's allegations are clearly
contradicted by video surveillance, they do not create a genuine issue of material fact precluding
the granting of summary judgment. See Cameron v. Citv ofN.Y., 598 F.3d 50,60 (2d Cir. 2010)
("When a movant presents '[i]ncontrovertible evidence ... such as a relevant videotape whose
accuracy is unchallenged,' we will grant the movant's motion for [summary]judgment ... if that
evidence 'so utterly discredits the opposing party's version that no reasonable juror could fail to
believe the version advanced by the moving party.") (quoting Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d
344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007)).
4
[p ]laintiff into the ground." Plaintiff's Counterstatement of Material Facts [Docket Entry No.
23-27] ("Pl. 56.1 Ctr. St.")
at~
103. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a "back strain" and "muscle
strain." Declaration of Robert M. Agostisi [Docket Entry No. 23-23] Ex. K. Plaintiff's counsel
in this case referred plaintiff to a physical therapist for back treatment and a licensed social
worker for mental health treatment. Def. 56.1 St.
at~~
40-42.
On November 20, 20 I 0, Webb was arrested for the armed robbery and other charges and
was convicted upon a plea of guilty on July 14, 201 I. Id.
II.
at~
36.
Summary Judgment Standard
"Summary judgment must be granted where the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show 'that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."' Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d
347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( a)). "In ruling on a summary judgment
motion, the district court must resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences that could
rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and determine whether
there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, raising an issue for trial." McCarthy v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corn., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and
an issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party." Ramos v. Baldor Specialtv Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554, 558 (2d Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). "There is no genuine issue of material fact where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party."
Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 205 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
Although summary judgment should generally not be decided upon the basis of
credibility assessments, Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 725 (2d
Cir. 2010), "where the plaintiff relies almost exclusively on his own testimony, much of which is
contradictory and incomplete, it will be impossible for a district court to determine whether 'the
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff,' and thus whether there are any 'genuine' issues of
material fact, without making some assessment of the plaintiff's account," Jeffreys v. City of
N.Y., 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
252 ( 1986)). In such circumstances, "when the facts alleged are so contradictory that doubt is
cast upon their plausibility" and it is determined that "no reasonable person would undertake the
suspension of disbelief necessary to give credit to the allegations made in the complaint,"
summary judgment against the plaintiff is appropriate. !d. at 555 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted); see also Anderson, 4 77 U.S. at 252 ("The mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.").
III.
Analysis
A.
False Arrest
"In analyzing § 1983 claims for unconstitutional false arrest, [courts] ... look[] to the law
ofthe state in which the arrest occurred." Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a claim for false arrest under New York law,
plaintiff must show that: (l) defendants intentionally confined plaintiff; (2) plaintiff was
conscious of the confinement; (3) plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the
confinement was not otherwise privileged. See Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir.
2003); Harris v. Cnty. ofNassau, 581 F.Supp.2d 351,354-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Ifthe seizure
6
was proper under Fourth Amendment standards, it is privileged and cannot sustain a false arrest
claim. Gil v. Cntv. of Suffolk, 590 F. Supp.2d 360, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Martinez v. City of
N.Y.. 340 F. App'x 700, 70 I (2d Cir. 2009). Therefore, the existence of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion (in the context of a stop-and-frisk, see Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968))
constitutes a complete defense to a false-arrest claim. See Covington v. City of N.Y., 171 F.3d
117, 122 (2d Cir. 1999).
According to defendants, "[p ]laintiff's fifteen-minute encounter with Long Beach Police
on November 4, 20 I 0 amounted to a Terry stop, which was both reasonable and justifiable under
the circumstances." Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket Entry No.4] ("Def. Memo.") at 4. Alternatively, defendants argue that even if
the incident amounted to an arrest, defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff.
An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, briefly detain an individual for
questioning "if the officer has a reasonable suspicion 'that criminal activity may be afoot."'
United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Th!:!x, 392 U.S. at 30). "In
evaluating whether an investigative stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the
reviewing court must determine 'whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place."' United States v. Alexander, 907 F.2d 269,272 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 20). Under this standard, "the detaining officers must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." United States v.
Cortez. 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981). During an investigatory stop, "[t]he investigating officer
may also frisk an individual for weapons if the officer reasonably believes that person to be
armed and dangerous." Colon, 250 F.3d at 134.
7
I.
Reasonable Suspicion
Detective Bulik and Officer Azueta had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting that plaintiff was Webb, a suspect in an armed robbery, and therefore had a lawful
basis for conducting an investigative stop. Both Detective Canner and Detective Bulik were
familiar with Webb's appearance and have testified that plaintiff and Webb bore a strong physical
resemblance, and nothing in the record indicates that the officers were not acting in good faith or
that their mistake was not reasonable. See Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, I 02 (2d Cir.
I 994) ("Probable cause can exist even where it is based on mistaken information, so long as the
arresting officer acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on that information."'); Hill v.
California, 40I U.S. 797, 803-04 (197I) ("[T]he officers in good faith believed Miller was Hill
and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith belief would
not in itself justifY either the arrest or the subsequent search. But sufficient probability, not
certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and on the record
before us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the
situation facing them at the time.").
Plaintiff argues that differences in hair style and height should have alerted the officers
that plaintiff was not Webb and that the only characteristic the brothers share in common is their
race. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket Entry No. 29] ("Pl. Memo.") at 7 ("Mr. Webb and Plaintiff's only physical
similarities were their race and color, as African Americans."). This argument fails, as it is clear
that Detective Bulik and Detective Canner focused their suspicion on plaintiff due to his
resemblance to Webb and were not stopping African American men in the neighborhood at
random. See Ortiz v. Village of Monticello, N.Y., No. 06-CV-2208, 20I2 WL 5395255, at *9-IO
8
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2012) (rejecting the assertion of plaintiffs who were arrested upon the basis of
mistaken identity that they were arrested merely because they "looked hispanic," noting that the
evidence "demonstrate[ d] that police were looking for a Hispanic male in his twenties who was
specifically believed to reside" in a particular apartment, and that there was no evidence
"indicating that police were searching [the area] for Hispanic males" generally). Plaintiff also
asserts that "[p]laintiffand Webb's clothing were[] dissimilar, as [p]laintiffwas wearing a black
cotton !-shirt, while Defendant Canner reported that the person he observed was wearing a grey
hooded sweatshirt and pants." Pl. Memo. at 8. In fact, the video surveillance footage of plaintiff
arriving at police headquarters clearly shows him wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt, further
indicating that plaintiff was not targeted for an investigative stop due to his race alone.
Even if plaintiff's physical resemblance to Webb alone was not a sufficient basis to
conduct an investigative stop, when combined with plaintiff's flight, the officers had the requisite
objective basis to pursue plaintiff and detain him for questioning. See United States v. Shame,
470 U.S. 675, 682 n.3 (1985) ("Perhaps none of these facts, standing alone, would give rise to a
reasonable suspicion; but taken together as appraised by an experienced law enforcement officer,
they provided clear justification" for an investigatory stop); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66
(1967) ("[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are
strong indicia of mens rea .... "); United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 125 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) ("The defendants' flight in this case was the crest of a rising wave of suspicion. It justified
the agents' decision to chase defendants and detain them for questioning."); United States v.
Campbell, No. 06-CR-6025L, 2006 WL 3151032, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. I, 2006) (holding that
where the suspect fled, unprovoked, from officers and attempted to remove a metallic object
9
from his pocket "it was entirely reasonable for [the officer] to follow [the suspect] into the foyer
to apprehend him").
2.
Scope of Investigative Stop
Although justified at its inception, the Court must also determine whether plaintiff's
detainment exceeded the proper scope of an investigative stop. United States v. Tehrani, 49 F. 3d
54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If an investigative detention is properly premised upon articulable
suspicion, the next inquiry is whether its scope and duration are reasonable ... , bearing in mind
the circumstances that gave rise to the suspicion."). "If an investigative stop based on reasonable
suspicion continues too long or becomes unreasonably intrusive, it will ripen into a de facto
arrest that must be based on probable cause." United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d I 004, I 0 II (2d
Cir. 1992). "In determining whether an investigatory stop is sufficiently intrusive to ripen into a
de facto arrest, the Second Circuit considers the 'amount of force used by the police, the need for
such force, and the extent to which an individual's freedom of movement was restrained, and in
particular such factors as the number of agents involved, whether the target of the stop was
suspected of being armed, the duration of the stop, and the physical treatment of the suspect,
including whether or not handcuffs were used."' United States v. Vargas, 369 F.3d 98, I 0 I (2d
Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633,645 (2d Cir.1993)). The Court must
also consider "the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop [and] the time reasonably
needed to effectuate those purposes" to determine "whether the police diligently pursued a means
of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it
was necessary to detain the defendant." Shame. 470 U.S. at 686. "There are no hard and fast
rules for evaluating the conduct oflaw enforcement agents conducting investigative stops."
Alexander, 907 F.2d at 272. "Much as a 'bright line' rule would be desirable, in evaluating
10
whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human
experience must govern over rigid criteria." Shame, 470 U.S. at 685.
Under the facts presented here, the scope of the detention was reasonable and did not
ripen into an arrest. The use of a reasonable amount of force, including the application of
handcuffs, is permissible during an investigative stop if justified by the circumstances and
necessary to ensure the safety of the detaining officers and bystanders. See Vargas, 369 F.3d at
102 ("[A]lthough '[u]nder ordinary circumstances, drawing weapons and using handcuffs are not
part of a Terry stop[,] intrusive and aggressive police conduct' is not an arrest 'when it is a
reasonable response to legitimate safety concerns on the part of the investigating officers."')
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The officers' reasonable suspicion that
plaintiff was Webb, a suspect in a violent crime, and plaintiff's flight into a third-party's
residence justified the officers' application of handcuffs to perform a pat-down for weapons. Jd.
(holding that the officer's placing of plaintiff on the ground to handcuff him and conduct a pat
down was reasonable in the circumstances of a Th!!y stop where the officers "had reliable
information that [the suspect] was carrying a weapon[, and the suspect] had demonstrated his
unwillingness to cooperate with the officers' investigation by fleeing from them when originally
approached and continuing to struggle ... following the stop"). Plaintiff's allegation that he was
taken to the ground and briefly "choked" while he was being handcuffed, even if true, does not
demonstrate that the detainment ripened into an arrest under these circumstances.
The placement of plaintiff in a police vehicle and his brief transport to police
headquarters also does not transform the stop into an arrest. Although the movement of a suspect
generally must be justified by the needs of the investigation, see Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239,
245 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
II
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed
should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verity or dispel the officer's suspicion
in a short period of time."), there is no ill
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