Sabeti v. Maron

Filing 5

ORDER - For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this Court, should he seek to appeal t his Order and apply for in forma pauperis status, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 6/4/12. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
SEAN SABETI,
Plaintiff,
-against-

ORDER
12-CV-2392(JS)(ARL)

EDWARD A. MARON,
Defendant.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff:
Sean Sabeti, Pro Se
3 Grace Avenue, Suite 400
Great Neck, NY 11021
For Defendant:

Marsha W. Yee, Esq.
NYS Office of the Attorney General
Nassau Regional Office
200 Old Country Road, Suite 240
Mineola, NY 11501

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Before the Court is the Complaint of pro se plaintiff
Sean Sabeti (“Plaintiff”) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42
U.S.C. § 1985 against the defendant, the Hon. Edward A. Maron,
Justice

of

New

(“Defendant”).

York

State

Supreme

Court,

County

of

Nassau

For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiff’s

Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is alleged to be “an attorney who was
representing a party in a Post-Matrimonial Relocation case” has
filed a civil rights action pursuant to Section 1983 wherein he
complains about the conduct of the presiding judge, Nassau County
Supreme Court Justice Maron.

According to the Complaint, Justice

Maron “improperly held the Plaintiff [] in Criminal Contempt of
Court

and

violated

a

number

[sic]

Constitutional

rights

of

Plaintiff, e.g., 5th, 6th, 7th and 14th Amendments as afforded by
the Due Process Clause.”

Compl. at p. 1.1

In support of this

claim, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant threatened Plaintiff to take the
witness stand and testify or else face sever
[sic] consequences. Another example was when
Defendant refused to adjourn the criminal
Contempt Trial so that Plaintiff could be
represented by counsel in the Criminal
Contempt trial. There are numerous other
examples of how improperly with such hatred
and anger, Defendant conducted himself as a
Justice of the New York State Supreme Court.
Id.

In addition, Plaintiff describes that, on July 15, 2009,

“after Plaintiff made an Objection, Defendant stopped the Court
Reporter and stated to Plaintiff in open court that ‘You better
have good Mal-Practice Insurance.” Id. at p. 2. Plaintiff alleges
that he “demanded that the comment be placed on the Record, at
which time Defendant told Plaintiff to ‘Shut up and Sit Down.’”
Id.
Plaintiff further claims that he is a
regular matrimonial attorney [who] has been
treated differently by most of the Justices,
court employees, staffs court reporters, [and]
court officers.
They often talk about my
bitter incident of Contempt Hearing, shoutings

1

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is not comprised of numbered
paragraphs as is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10
and Local Civil Rule 11.1, the Court cites to the relevant page
of the Complaint.
2

[sic] of the Defendant at Plaintiff and/or
Plaintiff’s client.
Defendant conducted
himself without any regards to his position to
uphold the U.S. Constitution.
Instead,
Defendant trampled on the Constitution in
every opportunity he got. Defendant without
holding a Contempt Hearing, first rendered a
Decision by which [he] directed Plaintiff to
pay the other attorney the sum of $4,500.
Additionally, the other attorney, Anthony A.
Capetola, Esq., owns and operates a luxury
catering hall in Nassau County where most of
[sic] Judicial fundraisings are held. Board
of Election Disclosure Report indicates that
Defendant in at least three instances held
events at the catering hall that is owned and
operated by Attorney Capetola in Plaintiff’s
Criminal Contempt Hearing.
Id. at p. 3.
According to the Complaint,
[t]here are many other instances [sic] the
Defendant repeatedly and without any regards
to the Rules of the Court, [sic] CPLR rendered
decisions and orders haphazardly. In total,
Defendant issued about twenty Orders during
the 17 month period that Plaintiff was
involved in the litigation . . . . Defendant
who had no knowledge of Matrimonial Law,
became a Supreme Court Justice at age 69.
Defendant
hardly
followed
the
Domestic
Relations Law or the CPLR because of lack of
familiarity and inability to learn complicated
divorce law such as Equitable Distribution of
marital assets, Custody, Visitations, etc.
Id.

Plaintiff

also

alleges

that

the

Defendant

has

filed

a

grievance against him with the Grievance Committee for the 10th
Judicial

District

and

that

the

Plaintiff

intends

to

file

a

Complaint against the Defendant with the New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct (Stern Commission).

3

Id.

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks to recover
an “aware [sic] of a money judgment in the amount of $10,000,000.”
Compl. at p. 4.
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
Although the Court is generally required to read a pro se

plaintiff’s complaint liberally and construe it to raise the
strongest arguments it suggests, see, e.g., McEachin v. McGuinnis,
357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), here, given that the Plaintiff is
a practicing attorney, his pleading is not entitled to the degree
of liberality ordinarily given to pro se plaintiffs.

See Dorfman

v. Bruno, No. 09–CV–4355, 2011 WL 197885, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,
2011) (citing Maloney v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (E.D.N.Y.
2007), aff’d, 554 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds,
561 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 3541, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1119 (2010)).
A district court has the inherent power to dismiss a
case, sua sponte, if it determines that the action is frivolous or
the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter regardless of whether
a plaintiff has paid the filing fee.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3);

Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362,
363-364 (2d Cir. 2000).

“An action is frivolous if it lacks an

arguable basis in law or fact--i.e., where it is ‘based on an
indisputably

meritless

legal

theory’

or

contentions [which] are clearly baseless.’”

4

presents

‘factual

Scanlon v. Vermont,

423 Fed. App’x. 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed.
2d 338 (1989).
II.

Absolute Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed because Judge Maron is

entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

It is well-established

that “[j]udges have traditionally enjoyed absolute immunity for
damages arising out of judicial acts performed in their judicial
capabilities.”

Rios v. Third Precinct Bay Shore, No. 08-CV-4641

(JFB)(ETB), 2009 WL 2601303, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2009) (citing
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d
9 (1991)).

The United States Supreme Court instructs that judges

are immune from civil suits for money damages, except when their
actions are taken in a non-judicial capacity or when their actions
are taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction.
11-12, 112 S. Ct. at 288.

Waco, 502 at

Moreover, “judicial immunity is not

overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice . . . .”

Id.

(citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 54, 87 S. Ct. at 1218
(“[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly”)).
Here, Justice Maron is absolutely immune from this civil
suit because it arises solely from actions he allegedly took from
the bench while presiding over various proceedings involving the
Plaintiff.

All of alleged wrongful conduct by Justice Maron falls

5

squarely

within

the

scope

of

absolute

judicial

immunity.2

Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and the
Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court

is directed to close this case.
Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this Court,
should he seek to appeal this Order and apply for in forma pauperis
status, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that
any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and
therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any
appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S.
Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

June 4, 2012
Central Islip, New York

2

The Court notes that although Plaintiff also alleges that his
claims are brought pursuant to Section 1985, he has named Justice
Maron as the sole Defendant and wholly fails to allege any
allegations sufficient to support a conspiracy claim, even if
absolute immunity did not bar his Complaint.
6