Chillemi v. The Town of Southampton et al
Filing
63
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER - For the reasons contained in this opinion, the Plaintiffs 60 motion to set aside the Underlying Order is denied. So Ordered by Judge Arthur D. Spatt on 10/7/2015. (Coleman, Laurie)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
CRAIG J. CHILLEMI,
Plaintiff,
FILED
CLERK
10/7/2015 10:41 am
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER
12-cv-3370(ADS)(AKT)
-againstTHE TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, ERIC
SICKLES, JAMES KIERNAN, and THOMAS
TULLY,
Defendant.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
APPEARANCES:
RUSKIN MOSCOU FALTISCHEK PC
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
1425 RXR Plaza
Uniondale, NY 11553
By: Thomas A. Telesca, Esq., Of Counsel
DEVITT SPELLMAN BARRETT, LLP
Attorneys for the Defendants
50 Route 111
Smithtown, NY 11787
By: David H. Arntsen, Esq.
SPATT, District Judge:
On July 9, 2012, the Plaintiff Craig J. Chillemi (the “Plaintiff” or “Chillemi”)
commenced this civil rights action against the Town of Southampton (the “Town”)
and several members of the Town’s Police Department, including Police Officer Eric
Sickles (“Officer Sickles”), Lieutenant James Kiernan (“Lieutenant Kiernan”), and
Detective Thomas Tully (“Detective Tully”). Presently before the Court is motion by
Chillemi, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 72(a),
1
seeking to set aside a pretrial order (the “Underlying Order”) of United States
Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.
I.
A.
Background
The Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from Chillemi’s complaint and the papers and
exhibits submitted in connection with the instant motion.
In or about December 2006, the Plaintiff allegedly began dating a woman
named Tara Tully (“Tara”). Tara is the daughter of the Defendant Detective Tully
and the Goddaughter of the Defendant Lieutenant Kiernan.
In 2007, the Plaintiff, Tara, and four other individuals were residing together
in a home on Hilltop Road in Southampton (the “Residence”). The Plaintiff neither
owned nor rented the Residence.
On or about August 5, 2007, the Residence was raided by the Street Crimes
Unit of the Southampton Police Department. Apparently, the raid was precipitated
by a sale of drugs from one of the four individuals living at the Residence to an
undercover Southampton police officer.
Lieutenant Kiernan and Officer Sickles
participated in the raid.
The complaint does not allege what contraband, if any, was found during the
raid. However, the Plaintiff was arrested. It is alleged that, during the raid, Officer
Sickles taunted him about his relationship with Tara and propositioned her for a
date.
2
Allegedly, Tara was placed in handcuffs. However, when Lieutenant Kiernan
observed her being apprehended, he removed her handcuffs and escorted her to his
car.
All of the Residence’s occupants, except for Tara, were arrested and charged
in connection with the raid. However, Tara allegedly made a video recording of the
raid on her cell phone.
When Lieutenant Kiernan learned that Tara possessed a video recording of
the raid, he arranged for her to meet him at the Hampton Bays Diner, a local
restaurant. Allegedly, Officer Sickles attended this meeting instead of Lieutenant
Kiernan.
Officer Sickles allegedly threatened Tara and offered to dismiss the
charges against her boyfriend, the Plaintiff, if she would go on a date with Officer
Sickles.
On or about March 28, 2008, the Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of four years after he pleaded guilty to the sale of a controlled
substance and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
In April 2009, the Plaintiff was paroled and entered a work release program
through the Lincoln Correctional Facility. In this regard, Chillemi earned $286 per
week working for an entity known as Malone Restoration in Douglaston, New York.
The Plaintiff alleges that between April 26, 2009 and July 8, 2009, he never missed
a day of work or a nightly curfew at Lincoln Correctional Facility. Allegedly, he also
never received a negative report from his parole officer.
3
Throughout this time, Chillemi continued to date Tara. Also throughout this
time, Officer Sickles allegedly continued to outwardly express his interest in
becoming romantically involved with Tara.
Chillemi alleges that each of the
individual Defendants was incensed by Tara’s continued romantic involvement with
him and conspired to end the relationship.
On July 8, 2009, Tara drove the Plaintiff from a restaurant in Riverhead to
the home of a friend in Hampton Bays, New York. It is alleged that, shortly after
Chillemi arrived, Officer Sickles also arrived in an unmarked police vehicle.
Although Chillemi alleges that he was riding in the passenger seat of the vehicle,
Officer Sickles allegedly stated that the conditions of his work release program
prohibit him from driving.
Officer Sickles issued a ticket to the Plaintiff for
aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle.
Chillemi alleges that Officer Sickles used this traffic ticket as a pretext to
conduct an illegal search of the Plaintiff’s person. In particular, the Plaintiff alleges
that Officer Sickles handcuffed him in connection with the ticket and then, without
actually searching any of the Plaintiff’s pants pockets, produced a small bag
containing a substance that appeared to be cocaine.
Allegedly, Officer Sickles
stated that he found the bag inside Chillemi’s pocket.
Officer Sickles arrested the Plaintiff for unlicensed operation of a motor
vehicle in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
seventh degree.
4
The Plaintiff alleges that Officer Sickles made various false sworn statements
in connection with these events. First, Officer Sickles allegedly stated in a General
Traffic Complaint that Chillemi, and not Tara, had been driving the subject vehicle
on the night of July 8, 2009.
Second, Officer Sickles allegedly stated in a
Misdemeanor Information that, at the time of Chillemi’s arrest for the traffic
violation, he possessed a zip-lock bag of cocaine in his pants pocket. According to
the Plaintiff, both of the charges against him were fabricated by the individual
Defendants as part of a concerted effort to end the relationship between him and
Tara. In this regard, Chillemi alleges that Lieutenant Kiernan and Detective Tully
knew that the statements made by Officer Sickles to support the charges were false
but failed to take any corrective action, thereby either ratifying or knowingly
acquiescing in Officer Sickles’ actions.
The Plaintiff was on probation at the time of his arrest. As a result, he was
ordered to serve three and one-half months at the Yaphank Correctional Facility
awaiting the disposition of the charges against him.
On or about October 29, 2009, the Plaintiff agreed to a plea bargain. The
charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree was
reduced to a violation for unlawful possession of marijuana. In addition, the charge
of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle was reduced to facilitating
aggravated unlicensed operation. The Plaintiff received no jail time; received no
points on his driver’s license; and was required to pay a $910 fine. However, as a
result of the incident, Lincoln Correctional Facility denied him re-entry into its
5
work release program.
Consequently, Chillemi served approximately fourteen
months at the Oneida Correctional Facility, a state penitentiary in Rome, New
York.
In or about May 2011, the Town hired one William Wilson, Jr. as the Police
Department Chief.
Several months later, Wilson allegedly conducted an
investigation into the Street Crimes Unit, which resulted in the unit’s dissolution.
In addition, the investigation allegedly resulted in Lieutenant Kiernan, the unit’s
Commander, being suspended without pay for thirty-two disciplinary charges in
connection with acts of misconduct or malfeasance. Separately, but at or about the
same time as Lieutenant Kiernan’s suspension, Officer Sickles allegedly was also
suspended and required to attend a drug rehabilitation center.
Based on these allegations, Chillemi asserts the following causes of action: (i)
violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (ii) conspiracy to interfere with his Constitutional rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
B.
Relevant Procedural History
On
August
30,
2012,
the
Defendants
moved,
pursuant
to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for an order dismissing the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
On December 7, 2012, United States Magistrate Judge E. Thomas Boyle
issued an order staying discovery in this matter pending the adjudication of the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
6
On May 4, 2013, this Court issued a Memorandum of Decision and Order,
inter
alia,
granting
the
Defendants’
motion
to
dismiss
the
Plaintiff’s
42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy claims; and denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
On May 23, 2013, the Defendants interposed an answer to the surviving
claims.
On July 17, 2013, upon Magistrate Judge Boyle’s retirement, this case was
reassigned to United States Magistrate Judge Gary R. Brown.
On October 29,
2013, Magistrate Judge Brown recused himself and the case was reassigned to
United States Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson.
1.
On
The Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
March
28,
2014,
the
Plaintiff
filed
a
motion,
pursuant
to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 34, and 37(a), and Local Civil Rule 37.3, seeking to compel
responses to certain interrogatories and the production of documents. On April 7,
2014, Judge Tomlinson ordered the Plaintiff to revise his motion papers to conform
to the format set forth in Local Civil Rule 37.1. On April 11, 2014, the Plaintiff filed
amended motion papers. The Court will now discuss the asserted basis for the
Plaintiff’s motion to compel.
Chillemi propounded the following interrogatories to the Defendants:
Interrogatory No. 2: Set forth each interruption in service for each
Officer, whether by administrative leave, suspension, or otherwise, and
describe the circumstances surrounding each interruption, including
the dates and basis and/or grounds for any such interruption.
7
Interrogatory No. 4: Have any of the Officers been disciplined as a
result of any internal investigation? If so, set forth in detail the
circumstances surrounding such investigation, including the date and
grounds for such investigation.
Interrogatory No. 5: Identify each and every disciplinary charge filed
against one or more of the Officers, including the date and grounds for
such charge(s).
Interrogatory No. 6: Identify each and every suspension of any one or
more of the Officers, including the date and grounds for such
suspension(s).
See Jan. 28, 2014 Decl. of Thomas A. Telesca, Esq. (“Telesca Decl.”), Ex. “B.”
In addition, Chillemi requested production of the following categories of
documents:
3. All documents concerning the employment of Eric Sickles, including,
but not limited to, training, performance reviews, complaints, internal
investigations, disciplinary charges, and any interruption in serve, as a
result of suspension, administrative leave, sick leave, or otherwise.
4. All documents concerning the employment of James Kiernan,
including, but not limited to, training, performance reviews,
complaints, internal investigations, disciplinary charges, and any
interruption in serve, as a result of suspension, administrative leave,
sick leave, or otherwise.
5. All documents concerning the employment of Thomas Tully,
including, but not limited to, training, performance reviews,
complaints, internal investigations, disciplinary charges, and any
interruption in serve, as a result of suspension, administrative leave,
sick leave, or otherwise.
7. All visual and/or audio recordings of any and all interviews
conducted in connection with internal investigations of Eric Sickles,
James Kiernan, and/or Thomas Tully.
8. All documents concerning internal investigations into the alleged
lack of oversight of the Street Crimes Unit.
8
9. All documents concerning the determination to disband the Street
Crimes Unit.
10. All documents concerning any complaints or internal investigations
against members of the Street Crimes Unit related to allegations of
false or fabricated evidence.
12. All documents concerning the stipulation of settlement reinstating
James Kiernan.
13. All documents concerning the stipulation of settlement reinstating
Eric Sickles.
See Telesca Decl., Ex. “C”.
Apparently, in responses to these various interrogatories, the Defendants
agreed to produce the following categories of documents: (i) those pertaining to the
ten years prior to the Plaintiff’s arrest; and (ii) those pertaining to any time after
the Plaintiff’s arrest, but only if the conduct underlying the interruption in service,
disciplinary charge or suspension was related directly to the Plaintiff’s previous
arrests.
At the heart of the parties’ discovery dispute was whether the Defendants
were required to produce documents or information concerning any other
interruptions in service, suspensions, disciplinary charges, or claims involving the
individual Defendants subsequent to the Plaintiff’s July 8, 2009 arrest, even if the
documents were unrelated to the Plaintiff’s prior arrests.
The Defendants also
allegedly did not produce documents relating to the now-dissolved Street Crimes
Unit.
The Plaintiff contended that such information is relevant to establish the
Defendants’ intent; to impeach their credibility; to support punitive damages; and to
9
prove municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978) (“Monell”). As Judge
Tomlinson noted:
Plaintiff argues that documents and information concerning alleged
misconduct by the individual Defendants and the now-defunct Street
Crimes Unit are “relevant and important to his case and are likely to
lead to admissible evidence.” Pl.’s Mem. at 7. Plaintiff notes that the
investigation and suspension of P.O. Sickles and Lt. Kiernan, as well
as the dissolution of the Street Crimes Unit, “were widely reported in
Newsday and other local media outlets, and some of the documents
sought by Plaintiff have become available on Newsday’s website.” Id.
at 2. According to Plaintiff, “[i]t has also been widely reported by
Newsday that the Suffolk County District Attorney has reviewed and
vacated a number of convictions in which defendants has a role in
securing.” Id. With this in mind, Plaintiff asserts that information
pertaining to internal investigations and disciplinary charges arising
out of P.O. Sickles’ alleged drug dependency and Lt. Kiernan’s failure
to supervise Sickles are relevant to establish Defendants’ intent, to
impeach their credibility, “and to prove municipal liability under
Monell.” Id. at 4. . . .
Underlying Order at 7.
The Defendants opposed the motion, arguing principally that documents and
information relating to investigations and disciplinary charges against Officer
Sickles and Lieutenant Kiernan several years after the Plaintiff’s arrest are outside
the scope of permissible discovery under Rule 26.
2.
The Underlying Order
Judge Tomlinson granted in part and denied in part the motion to compel,
largely adopting the same temporal cut-off that the Defendants had proposed –
namely, the Plaintiff is entitled to discover responsive documents and information
pertaining to the time period (a) prior to the Plaintiff’s July 2009 arrest, and (b)
10
subsequent to the arrest but only if the documents and information concerned the
Defendants’ conduct in connection with the Plaintiff’s previous arrests.
For example, the court denied the motion with respect to interrogatories
numbered 2, 4, 5, 6, which sought information concerning any interruptions in
service, suspensions, disciplinary charges, or claims involving the individual
Defendants subsequent to the Plaintiff’s July 2009 arrest, even if the documents
were unrelated to the Plaintiff’s prior arrests. In this regard, Judge Tomlinson
noted that, although records of disciplinary charges, internal investigations, and
complaints concerning prior instances of misconduct could lead to admissible
evidence, the Plaintiff in this case sought information about the Defendants’
subsequent misconduct. The court noted that Chillemi had not pointed to any legal
authority to support his assertion that subsequent instances of police misconduct
are relevant to prove an officer’s intent; that Chillemi had not demonstrated how
the information he sought could lead to admissible evidence; or how the requested
discovery would support a claim of municipal liability under Monell. “Simply put,”
wrote Judge Tomlinson, the “Plaintiff [did] not demonstrate[ ] how information
about the officers’ interruptions in service, disciplinary charges, and suspensions for
the time period after his July 2009 arrest are probative of the Town’s policies and
practices which were in place at the time of his arrest.” Underlying Order at 10-11
(emphasis in original).
The court reached similar conclusions with respect to each of the challenged
categories of documents and information. For example, as to document demands 3,
11
4, and 5, which sought personnel records relating to the individual Defendants,
including training, performance reviews, complaints, internal investigations,
disciplinary charges, and any interruption in service, Judge Tomlinson granted
partial relief.
In particular, the court held that the Defendants had already
produced information regarding the officers’ dates of hire, training, certifications,
and reviews, but, to the extent they possess responsive documents pertaining to the
ten years prior to the Plaintiff’s arrest and for the period subsequent to the
Plaintiff’s arrest, if the conduct concerned the Plaintiff’s previous arrests, such
documents must be disclosed.
As to document demand 7, Judge Tomlinson inferred from the Plaintiff’s
submissions that the “visual and/or audio recordings” he sought were “audio tapes
from the internal affairs investigation into Lt. Kiernan, which Plaintiff apparently
read about in Newsday.”
Underlying Order at 15.
Again, the court held that
Chillemi is not entitled to discover such information for the period subsequent to his
July 2009 arrest, but, to the extent the Defendants possess audiovisual evidence
concerning internal investigations which occurred prior to the Plaintiff’s arrest
and/or concern the Defendants’ conduct in connection with those arrests, they must
be produced.
Similarly, as to documents concerning: (i) internal investigations into lack of
oversight into the Street Crimes Unit; (ii) the decision to disband the Street Crimes
Unit; and (iii) any complaints or internal investigations against members of the
Street Crimes Unit, Judge Tomlinson held that the Plaintiff had not established the
12
relevance of such documents as they pertain to events post-dating the Plaintiff’s
arrest.
Further, as to the stipulations of settlement reinstating Lieutenant Kiernan
and Officer Sickles to the Town’s police department, Judge Tomlinson held that
Plaintiff had not demonstrated the relevance of such documents, “which are the
consequence of internal investigations and disciplinary charges which occurred
after the Plaintiff’s July 2009 arrest.” Underlying Order at 16.
To the extent that the Plaintiff relied upon publicity generated by Lieutenant
Kiernan’s suspension and Officer Sickles’ drug dependency to request additional
discovery, the court noted that the pleading failed to allege that the deprivation of
Chillemi’s constitutional rights was caused by or in any way connected to possible
drug abuse by Officer Sickles or by Lieutenant Kiernan’s purported failure to
properly supervise him while he was using drugs. Rather, the complaint alleges
simply that the Defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned the Plaintiff because
they disapproved of his relationship with Tara.
To the extent the Plaintiff contended that the information sought by these
discovery demands would lead to impeachment material, the court disagreed.
Explicitly exercising her discretion to manage the discovery process, Judge
Tomlinson determined that the risk of possible prejudice to the Defendants
resulting from the disclosure of information about subsequent police misconduct
unrelated to this litigation outweighs any prospect that the Plaintiff may discover
impeachment evidence that is actually admissible.
13
C.
The Instant Motion
In the present motion, Chillemi seeks to set aside Judge Tomlinson’s
Underlying Order on the grounds that it is clearly erroneous and contrary to
established law.
In particular, referring to the court’s determination that post-
arrest records are, for the most part, not discoverable, the Plaintiff asserts that
Judge Tomlinson “has drawn an unwarranted temporal line based upon what
appears to be confusion over what is relevant for purposes of discovery under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 as opposed to what may be admissible at trial to prove Plaintiff’s
false arrest claim under Fed. R. Evid. 403 or 404(b).” Pl. Memo of Law at 13. This
broad contention appears to encapsulate two more narrow arguments:
(i) the
Underlying Order erroneously concluded that post-arrest discovery does not satisfy
the standard for relevance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 when, in fact, it is relevant to
establish the Defendants’ intent, impeach their credibility; and prove Monell
liability; and (ii) the court improperly applied the balancing test found in Federal
Rule of Evidence (“Fed. R. Evid.”) 404(b) to determine that the risk of prejudice to
the Defendants in disclosing certain post-trial records outweighed the likelihood
that such disclosure would yield admissible impeachment material.
The Defendants oppose the motion and argue that the Underlying Order is
sound and should be upheld. The Court will now address the parties’ contentions.
14
II.
A.
Discussion
The Applicable Legal Standards
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense is
referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge
must promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when
appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision. A party may
serve and file objections to the order within 14 days after being served
with a copy. . . . The district judge in the case must consider timely
objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly
erroneous or is contrary to law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
As this statutory language makes clear, and as the Plaintiff in this case
acknowledges, “a magistrate judge’s ruling on non-dispositive pretrial matters
should not be disturbed by the district judge absent a determination that such
findings were ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’ ” Koumoulis v. Indep. Fin.
Mktg.
Grp.,
29
F. Supp. 3d
142,
145
(E.D.N.Y.
2014)
(citing
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)).
It has been recognized in this district that “[m]atters involving pretrial
discovery generally are considered nondispositive of the litigation and are subject to
the more lenient ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.”
United States v. 281 Syosset
Woodbury Rd., 862 F. Supp. 847, 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting Thomas E. Hoar, Inc.
v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846, 111
S. Ct. 132, 112 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990)), aff’d, 71 F.3d 1067 (2d Cir. 1995).
In this
regard, “[t]he Supreme Court has stated that ‘[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
15
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ”
281 Syosset Woodbury Rd., 862 F. Supp. at 851 (quoting United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed 746 (1948)).
The moving party’s burden under Rule 72 is a heavy one, and the highly
deferential standard “imposes a heavy burden on the objecting party and only
permits reversal where the magistrate judge abused h[er] discretion.” Ahmed v.
T.J. Maxx Corp., 10-cv-3609, 2015 U.S. 62001, at *15-*16 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2015)
(Spatt, J.). “Similarly, under the ‘contrary to law’ standard of review, a district
court may reverse a finding only if it finds that the magistrate ‘failed to apply or
misapplied relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.”
Id. (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Garcia v. Benjamin Grp. Enter.
Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)).
B.
As to Whether the Underlying Order is Clearly Erroneous or
Contrary to Law
The Plaintiff asserts that Judge Tomlinson’s decision to deny discovery into
post-arrest matters including suspensions, internal investigations, disciplinary
charges and related audiovisual evidence, constituted a clear error and was
contrary to law. This Court disagrees.
In reaching her decision in the Underlying Order, Judge Tomlinson utilized
the appropriate standard for determining the scope of pretrial discovery under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, specifically recognizing that this standard is “very broad” and
that “the information sought need not be admissible at trial to be discoverable.”
Underlying Order at 8-9 (internal citations omitted). Applying this standard, the
16
court relied upon a pair of cases originating in this district for the proposition that
records relating to prior instances of misconduct could lead to admissible evidence.
See Pacheco v. City of New York, 234 F.R.D. 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) and Frails v. City of
New York, 236 F.R.D. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). However, the Court noted that the
Plaintiff had failed to provide any authority to support his assertion that records
relating to subsequent instances of police misconduct are also relevant.
The Court’s independent research into this subject reveals that the question
of the discoverability of “subsequent acts” evidence in § 1983 cases is closer than the
Underlying Order might suggest.
For example, in Barrett v, City of New York, 237 F.R.D. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), a
court in this district held that documents and information relating to
“investigations that post-date the filing of the current action could be relevant [in a
civil rights] case and should be disclosed.” 237 F.R.D. at 41. The Court in that case
agree[d] with the defendants’ assertion that complaints which post-date the subject
incident would not be relevant to demonstrate notice to the defendant city,” but
nevertheless held that “post-incident investigations regarding a police officer
defendant in a section 1983 case may be ‘relevant to issues of pattern, intent, and
absence of mistake.’ ” Id. (quoting Moore v. City of New York, 05-cv-5127, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24307, at *1-*2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006)).
Accordingly, the court
concluded that “complaints [of officer misconduct] should not be barred from
discovery simply because they concern events that occurred after the subject
incident.”
Id.
However, although the date of the complaint alone should not
17
preclude the discovery of such evidence, the court held that such records are not
discoverable under Rule 26 if they are “wholly unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims” of
false arrest and related constitutional violations. Id. at *40.
A similar result was reached in Wisniewski v. Claflin, 05-cv-4956, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27850 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2007), where another court in this district
considered whether to compel the production of police officers’ discipline records
pertaining to events that occurred subsequent to the events at issue in that case. In
analyzing the relevance of such documents, the court specifically noted that they
“involve[d] similar allegations” to those at issue in the case and, therefore, were
discoverable under Rule 26. Id. at *13-*14.
These cases make clear that courts in this district have previously granted
civil rights plaintiffs discovery into similar acts of alleged misconduct, even if those
acts post-dated the events at issue in the case. In this regard, the Plaintiff’s point of
contention, namely, the “temporal line” drawn by Judge Tomlinson, is arguably
valid. As the court in Barrett explained, the simple fact that similar bad acts by the
Defendants allegedly occurred subsequent to the Plaintiff’s July 2009 arrest is, in
and of itself, insufficient to preclude discovery of such evidence.
However, the flaw in the Plaintiff’s reasoning is that the analysis does not
end there.
Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“Relevancy cannot be reduced to mere chronology; whether the similar act evidence
occurred prior or subsequent to the crime in question is not necessarily
determinative to its admissibility. Rather than adopt a rigid approach, we leave it
18
to the district court to exercise its discretion in reaching determinations about
relevancy . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
As the caselaw outlined above also
makes clear, Rule 26 precludes discovery into evidence of subsequent acts if they
are “wholly unrelated” to the events giving rise to the § 1983 claim. See Barrett,
237 F.R.D. at 40; Wisniewski, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27850, at *13-*14; see also
Malsh v. New York City Police Dep’t, 92-cv-2973, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4663, at
*6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1995) (permitting discovery into complaints and
disciplinary actions post-dating the incident at issue in the lawsuit where the
subject discovery involved the defendant police officer using the same racial epithet
on a subsequent occasion that he was alleged to have used with regard to the
plaintiff).
Relevant here, Judge Tomlinson appropriately noted that the scope of this
type of discovery “ ‘is determined in large measure by the allegations in the
pleading.’ ” Underlying Order at 11 (quoting 287 Franklin Ave Residents’ Ass’n v.
Meisels, 11-cv-976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72855, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2012).
With this principle in mind, the court determined that the nexus between the
subject matter of the discovery sought – namely, Lieutenant Kiernan’s suspension
for various acts of misconduct, including making false statements to Internal
Affairs, and Officer Sickles’ dependency on prescription drugs – and the facts giving
rise to the Plaintiff’s complaint – namely, that the Defendants falsely arrested and
imprisoned him because they disapproved of his relationship with Tara – was too
attenuated to pass Rule 26 muster. Therefore, in her discretion, Judge Tomlinson
19
found that the discovery the Plaintiff sought was not relevant to his claims in this
case, irrespective of the time period covered. See, e.g., Underlying Order at 11-12
(“There is no allegation that the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights was
caused by or in any way connected to possible drug abuse by P.O. Sickles or Lt.
Kiernan’s purported failure to properly supervise Sickles. . . . [Those acts] are not
similar to Plaintiff’s claims that he was falsely arrested due to his relationship with
Tara Tully”). This decision was well within the discretion of the magistrate judge.
The Court is not persuaded by the Plaintiff’s assertions, unaccompanied by
citations to legal authority, that “[e]vidence of Kiernan’s failure to supervise Sickles
in anyway [sic] and at any time is relevant” and that “[i]t does not matter whether
it was in connection with Sickles’ arrest of Plaintiff because he was dating Tara
Tully or while Sickles was abusing drugs on duty.” Pl. Memo of Law at 18. On the
contrary, Judge Tomlinson possesses broad discretion to determine whether, on the
facts and circumstances of this case, the subject of disciplinary charges, internal
investigations, and related activities post-dating the Plaintiff’s arrest are “wholly
unrelated” to the allegations in the pleading.
Moreover, the issue of whether this Court would have reached the same
conclusion is not relevant. In this posture, the province of this Court is not to
substitute its own judgment for that of the magistrate judge, but rather to apply the
highly deferential standard outlined above and determine whether Judge
Tomlinson abused her discretion. See Ahmed, 2015 U.S. 62001, at *15-*16. The
Court now answers that question in the negative, finding, based on the discussion
20
above, that Judge Tomlinson’s reasoning has appropriate support in the relevant
caselaw. The Plaintiff has not established otherwise and, therefore, his instant
motion is denied.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically rejects the Plaintiff’s
contention that the discovery sought here should be allowed because it is likely to
yield admissible impeachment evidence.
As noted above, Judge Tomlinson
concluded that “the risk of possible prejudice to the Defendants resulting from the
disclosure of information about subsequent police misconduct unrelated to this
litigation outweighs any prospect that Plaintiff may discover impeachment evidence
that is actually admissible.” Underlying Order at 12-13 (emphasis supplied). In
this regard, the Court’s discussion, above, applies with equal force. It is clear that
Judge Tomlinson exercised her discretion to disallow discovery into this potential
impeachment evidence because it was “unrelated to this litigation.” There is no
basis to disturb this determination. See Katt v. New York City Police Dep’t, 95-cv8283, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10014 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1997) (declining to permit
discovery into complaints of alleged police misconduct that differed in kind from
those involved in the civil rights lawsuit and specifically rejecting that such
discovery material might be relevant for impeachment purposes).
Accordingly, in the Court’s view, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the
Underlying Order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law, and his motion is now
denied.
21
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons contained in this opinion, the Plaintiff’s motion to set aside
the Underlying Order is denied.
SO ORDERED
Dated:
Central Islip, New York
October 7, 2015
/s/ Arthur D. Spatt___________________
ARTHUR D. SPATT
United States District Judge
22
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?