Mendoza v. LAINESITA RESTAURANT CORP. et al
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 19 Motion to Amend/Correct/Supplement. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint is granted to the extent Plain tiff seeks to assert an additional cause of action under § 1981 against defendants, and a cause of action under Title VII only as against defendant Lainesita, and is otherwise denied. Ordered by Judge Denis R. Hurley on 7/25/2014. (O'Connor, Madeline) (Main Document 33 replaced on 7/25/2014) (Lundy, Lisa).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DORIS MENDOZA, on behalf of herself and
and all others similarly situated,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
12 CV 4188 (DRH)(ARL)
LAINESITA RESTAURANT CORP., d/b/a
MI TIERRITA RESTAURANT, MARCO.T.CORP.,
d/b/a MI TIERRITA RESTAURANT, FENICIA
RESTAURANT CORP., d/b/a MI TIERRITA
RESTAURANT, STEFITA CORPORATION,
d/b/a MI TIERRITA RESTAURANT, EDUARDO
PABON, FERNANDO PABON, STEPHANIE
PABON, JUAN CARLOS PABON,
Frank & Associates, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
500 Bi-County Blvd., 112N
Farmingdale, New York 11735
By: Neil M. Frank, Esq.
Peter A. Romero, Esq.
Andrea E. Batres, Esq.
The Law Offices of Andrew Presberg, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
100 Corporate Plaza, Suite B102
Islandia, New York 11749
By: Kevin J. Foreman, Esq.
HURLEY, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiff Doris Mendoza (“Plaintiff”) brings this action, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, against defendants Lainesita Restaurant Corp. (“Lainesita”), d/b/a Mi Tierrita
Restaurant (“Mi Tierrita”), Marco.T.Corp., d/b/a Mi Tierrita Restaurant, Fenicia Restaurant
Corp., d/b/a Mi Tierrita Restaurant, Stefita Corporation, d/b/a Mi Tierrita Restaurant, Eduardo
Pabon, Fernando Pabon, Stephanie Pabon, and Juan Carlos Pabon (collectively, “Defendants”),
alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), New
York Labor Law Article 19, § 650 et seq., New York State Department of Labor Regulations, 12
N.Y.C.R.R. Part 142 (“New York Labor Law”), and New York State Human Rights Law,
Executive Law § 290 et seq. (“New York State Human Rights Law”).
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15 to add causes of action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et
seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“§ 1981”). For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are taken from the Proposed First Amended Complaint (“Proposed
Amended Complaint”) and are presumed true for purposes of this motion.
Plaintiff, who is of Honduran origin, worked as a cook in Mi Tierrita, “a family owned
business of Colombian nationality,” for approximately one year, from August 2010 until August
2011. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16, 66, 68.) While employed at Mi Tierrita, Plaintiff was denied both
a promotion and a raise, paid a lower salary than other similarly situated employees, and
assigned less favorable assignments than other employees. (Id. ¶ 70.) Defendants “selectively
scrutinized her performance.” (Id.) Further, “Defendants tolerated, condoned and participated in
Plaintiff’s continual harassment and humiliation,” which no other employees faced, and which in
part consisted of derogatory comments. (Id. ¶ 71.)
On August 26, 2011, residents of Patchogue, New York, including Plaintiff, were
required to evacuate their homes as a result of Hurricane Irene. (Id. ¶ 72, 73.) Additionally,
Defendants’ restaurant in Patchogue, where Plaintiff was employed, closed on August 26, 2011
because of Hurricane Irene. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 72.) Plaintiff failed to report for work the day after the
hurricane, and Defendants subsequently terminated her employment. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 75.) By the end
of the year 2011, all other Honduran employees at Defendants’ Patchogue restaurant had been
fired. (Id. ¶ 77.) As a result of Defendants’ actions, “Plaintiff has suffered and continues to
suffer loss of employment, loss of income, loss of employment benefits, and has suffered and
continues to suffer emotional distress, humiliation, great expense, embarrassment and damage to
her reputation.” (Id. ¶ 111.)
Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights
(“NYSDHR”) on September 27, 2011, “alleging discrimination based upon national origin.” (Id.
¶ 11.) Plaintiff cross-filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). (Id. ¶ 12.) On July 17, 2012, Plaintiff requested the NYSDHR to annul
her election of remedies in order for Plaintiff to pursue all of her claims in a single forum. (Exh.
C to Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 1.) On August 21, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Robert M.
Vespoli issued a final agency decision for Plaintiff’s claim with the NYSDHR, to which he
attached a Recommended Order of Annulment of Election of Remedies concerning Plaintiff’s
election of an administrative remedy. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Exh. A to Am. Compl.; Exh. D to
Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n.) On August 22, 2012, Plaintiff commenced this action in the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York pursuant to the FLSA, New York Labor Law, and
New York State Human Rights Law. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4.)
On October 15, 2012, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue (“Right to Sue Letter”)
that was due to expire on January 13, 2013. (Am. Compl. ¶ 12; Exh. B to Am. Compl.; Pl.’s
Mem. in Supp. at 3.) On December 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a letter requesting a pre-motion
conference for purposes of filing a motion to amend her Complaint pursuant to this Court’s
Individual Practice Rule 3(A)(ii). (Doc. No. 13.) On January 9, 2013, the parties appeared
before Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay for an initial conference during which Plaintiff’s
request to file an amended complaint was discussed. (Doc. No. 15.) Plaintiff now seeks to
amend her original Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to add additional
causes of action for discriminatory employment practices in violation of Title VII and § 1981.
Standard of Review for Amendment of Pleadings
Under Rule 15(a)(2), a party seeking to amend its pleading first must obtain the court’s
leave, which is to “be freely given when justice so requires.” See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962). “If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Id.
“This permissive standard is consistent with our ‘strong preference for resolving disputes on the
merits.’ ” Williams v. Citigroup Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting New York v.
Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also Manigaulte v. C.W. Post of Long Island Univ.,
659 F. Supp. 2d 367, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]mendments are generally favored because they
tend to facilitate a proper decision on the merits” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). Therefore, leave to amend is to be freely given, in the District Court’s discretion,
absent an “apparent or declared reason[,] such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the
part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of
amendment.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see also Am. Med. Ass’n v. United Healthcare Corp.,
2006 WL 3833440, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006) (“Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend a
pleading shall be given freely when justice so requires . . . unless (1) the party seeking to amend
has unduly delayed; (2) the party seeking to amend is acting with a dilatory motive; (3) the
proposed amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (4) the proposed
amendment would be futile.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, there is no
assertion by Defendants that Plaintiff has acted in bad faith, with a dilatory motive, or unduly
delayed, nor has Plaintiff previously filed any amendments to the Complaint. Therefore, it need
be determined only whether Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Complaint is futile or is prejudicial to
Futility of Amendment
Although leave to amend is to be “freely given when justice so requires,” it is not an
abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is
unlikely to be productive,” such as when a proposed amendment is futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);
Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he standard for futility with respect to a motion to amend under
Rule 15 is identical to the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Crippen v. Town of
Hempstead, 2009 WL 803117, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addition, “[a] motion to amend the
complaint may be considered futile if the claims sought to be added are barred by the relevant
statute of limitations.” Sokolski v. Trans Union Corp., 178 F.R.D. 393, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
The Court will address the sufficiency and timeliness of the proposed amended claims in turn.
Plaintiff has Sufficiently Alleged Discrimination Claims Under § 1981 and Title
Title VII, in pertinent part, prohibits employers from discharging any individual, or
discriminating against any individual “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment,” on the basis of that individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 “provides a related remedy to Title VII for
private discrimination in employment.” Goss v. Revlon, Inc., 548 F.2d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 1976).
Section 1981(a) states: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.” “A 1991 amendment to § 1981 clarifies that ‘[t]he rights protected by this section are
protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of
State law.’ ” Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c)).
In this case, the pleading requirements for Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim are the same as for
Plaintiff’s Title VII claim. See Kao v. Scherl, 1989 WL 30443, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. March 20, 1989)
(“The pleading and proof requirements applicable to [a] § 1981 . . . claim[ ] are the same as [for]
a Title VII claim if they are brought in a single action.”); see also Ramirez v. Hempstead Union
Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2014 WL 3547374, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) (“Section 1981
claims based on employment discrimination are analyzed under the same standards used for Title
VII claims.”). Moreover, the extremely permissive pleading standard under Rule 8 applies to a
complaint alleging employment discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,
512-13 (2002). As the Supreme Court noted in Swierkiewicz, Rule 8(a)(2) provides (a) “that a
complaint must include only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” and (b) that “[s]uch a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 512 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2004)
(same). The Court in Swierkiewicz therefore held that “an employment discrimination plaintiff
need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination” so long as the complaint provides the
defendant with “fair notice of the basis for [the] claims.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15; see
also Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181 (D.D.C.
2002) (“To satisfy the pleading requirements for racial discrimination claims under either Title
VII or Section 1981, a plaintiff's complaint must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
and therefore must simply contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded valid causes of action under Title VII and § 1981
in the Proposed Amended Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that she is of Honduran origin and that
she was discriminated against because of her national origin. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66, 69.)
According to Plaintiff, the individual defendants are of Columbian origin and Mi Tierrita is “a
family owned business of Columbian nationality.” (Id. ¶¶ 67, 68.) Plaintiff claims that she was
given “less favorable assignments than other employees,” paid a lower salary than other similarly
situated employees, and denied a raise and promotion. (Id. ¶ 70.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges
that while she, and several other employees who were not of Honduran origin, failed to appear
for work at Defendants’ restaurant when it reopened after Hurricane Irene, only she was
discharged for failing to report to work. (Id. ¶¶ 72, 74, 75, 76.) Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that,
in that same year, Defendants terminated the employment of all other Honduran employees who
worked where Plaintiff worked. (Id. ¶ 77.) Thus, because Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended
Complaint contains a plain statement of her discrimination claims which provides Defendants
with notice as to what the claims are and the grounds upon which they rest, Plaintiff has
sufficiently pleaded valid causes of action under Title VII and § 1981. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz,
534 U.S. at 514 (finding petitioner’s allegations “that he had been terminated on account of his
national origin,” and “detail[ing] the events leading to his termination, [including] relevant dates,
. . . and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination,”
sufficient to provide fair notice and state a discrimination claim).
The Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim has expired as a matter of law. A
Plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies prior to pursuing a Title VII claim in federal
court. See Johnson v. Bryson, 851 F. Supp. 2d 688, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Plaintiff’s timely
filing of a complaint with the EEOC and timely filing of a complaint under Title VII following
receipt of a Right to Sue letter are thus integral to Plaintiff’s ability to pursue a Title VII claim
against Defendants in this Court. See Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d
683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001). Therefore, it must be determined whether Plaintiff complied with Title
VII’s applicable statutes of limitation when filing her motion to amend the Complaint.
Lainesita is the Only Defendant for Which Plaintiff Filed a Timely
Discrimination Complaint with the EEOC, as Required by § 2000e-5(e)(1)
The only defendant for which Plaintiff timely filed a discrimination complaint with the
EEOC is Lainesita. “Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) is a charge filing provision that ‘specifies
with precision’ the prerequisites that a plaintiff must satisfy before filing suit,” and requires that
the Plaintiff “file a charge [with the EEOC] within the statutory time period.” Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)). “In a State that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek
relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an employee who initially files a grievance
with that agency must file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the employment
practice.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109; see also Heller v. Consol. Rail Corp., 331 F. App’x 766,
768 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that appellant had 300 days from the date of discrimination to file an
EEOC complaint). If a complaint is not filed within these time limits, it is time barred. See
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109. Therefore, in order for Plaintiff to recover under her Title VII claim,
she would have had to file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged
discriminatory act by Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot assert a Title VII claim against
individual defendants. See Wrighten v. Glowski, 232 F.3d 119, 119 (2d Cir. 2000); Madray v.
Long Island Univ., 789 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
In this case, Plaintiff is precluded from amending her complaint to add a cause of action
under Title VII against any defendant other than Lainesita. The alleged termination of Plaintiff’s
employment by Defendants occurred on or about August 26, 2011, following her failure to report
to work due to Hurricane Irene.1 (Am. Compl. ¶ 75.) However, the only defendant named in
Plaintiff’s September 27, 2011 complaint with the NYSDHR, which was cross-filed with the
EEOC, was Lainesita. (See Exh. A to Am. Compl.) Notably, Plaintiff concedes that Lainesita is
the only defendant against which she seeks to assert a Title VII discrimination claim.2 (Pl.’s
The Court notes that Plaintiff alleges that she worked for Defendants from about August 2010 until August
2011, during which time the Defendants committed the additional discriminatory acts alleged in paragraphs 70 and
71 of the Proposed Amended Complaint. However, Plaintiff could “only file a charge to cover discrete acts that
‘occurred’ ” within 300 days before she filed her complaint with the EEOC on September 27, 2011. Morgan, 536
U.S. at 114. While it is possible that the alleged acts occurred within 300 days before September 27, 2011,
especially considering that the acts allegedly occurred during the year prior to the filing of the EEOC complaint, i.e.,
while Plaintiff was employed with Defendants from August 2010 until August 2011, Plaintiff has not alleged
specific dates to establish conclusively the timeliness of those acts for purposes of her Title VII discrimination
claim. Nevertheless, those allegations may remain in the Complaint in support of Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim.
Parenthetically, while the additional discriminatory acts alleged in paragraphs 70 and 71 could support a hostile
work environment claim under Title VII, Plaintiff apparently did not assert such a claim in its charge filed with the
EEOC nor has Plaintiff argued in support of such a claim upon the instant motion. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-21.
Although Plaintiff’s statement, i.e., that her “proposed amendment seeks only to assert discrimination
claims against Lainesita and no other Defendants” could be read as meaning that she seeks to limit both her Title VII
and § 1981 causes of action as stating claims only as against Lainesita, the Court notes that the Proposed Amended
Complaint asserts a Fourth Claim For Relief under Title VII against “Defendant,” and a Fifth Claim For Relief
under § 1981 against “Defendants.” (Compl. ¶¶107-119.) In addition, Plaintiff’s statement that her proposed
amendment seeks only to assert discrimination claims as against Lainesita is preceded by an argument that the
failure to name the other defendants in the EEOC complaint does not require dismissal of Plaintiff’s motion because
Reply at 1 (“Plaintiff’s proposed amendment seeks only to assert discrimination claims against
Lainesita and no other Defendants.”).) Therefore, Lainesita is the only defendant for which
Plaintiff filed a timely discrimination complaint with the EEOC, as required by § 2000e-5(e)(1).
Plaintiff Timely Filed the Motion to Amend Following Receipt of the EEOC’s
Right to Sue Letter
Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to add a cause of action under Title VII against Lainesita
is timely. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) provides that “within 90 days after the issuance of a rightto-sue letter ‘a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge.’ ”
Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 (1984) (quoting 86 Stat. 106, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). In the instant case, the EEOC notified Plaintiff on October 15, 2012
that the charge she had filed with the Commission had been dismissed, and that she had the right
to sue the respondent, Lainesita, in federal court. (Exh. C. to Declaration of Andrea E. Batres,
dated April 15, 2013.) Therefore, Plaintiff was required to file a complaint under Title VII
against Lainesita within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC’s Right to Sue Letter, i.e., by January
13, 2013.3 See Tiberio v. Allergy Asthma Immunology of Rochester, 664 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir.
2011) (“[T]he 90–day limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) begins to run on
the date that a right-to-sue letter is first received either by the claimant or by counsel, whichever
is earlier.”). However, while Plaintiff did not file a complaint under Title VII against Lainesita
by January 13, 2013, Plaintiff contends that she still satisfied the requirements of the statute by
filing a request for a pre-motion conference in accordance with this Court’s Individual Practice
Rule 3(A)(ii). Rule 3(A)(ii) states that before filing a motion to amend a complaint, “a pre-
§ 1981, unlike Title VII, “does not require exhaustion of any administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing suit.”
(Reply at 1.) Thus, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s motion as seeking to assert a § 1981 claim against all
defendants, and a Title VII claim only as against Lainesita.
Plaintiff acknowledges that January 13, 2013 was the applicable 90-day filing deadline. (See Reply at 7.)
motion conference with the Court must be requested.” Plaintiff asserts that by filing a request
for a pre-motion conference on December 20, 2012, prior to the expiration of the 90-day period
on January 13, 2013, the statute of limitations was tolled and Plaintiff’s proposed amendment
under Title VII was timely. (Pl.’s Reply at 7.)
Despite the Second Circuit’s generally strict enforcement of § 2000e-5(f)(1)’s time
limitation, see, e.g., Tiberio, 664 F.3d at 38 (holding that a claim was time-barred following
initiation of an action 93 days after receipt of a Right to Sue letter); Moscowitz v. Brown, 850 F.
Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Lauture v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 216 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that filing a complaint under Title VII even one day
after the 90-day period results in dismissal of the complaint), such a strict application, in the
instant case, would prove inequitable to Plaintiff. Notably, the 90-day filing is “not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as
tolling when equity so requires.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982).
This case presents circumstances in which equity requires a waiver or tolling of the 90-day filing
requirement, as evidenced by the discussion that follows.
Although Plaintiff did not actually file a motion to amend her Complaint to add a cause
of action under Title VII prior to January 13, 2013, the sole reason for Plaintiff’s delay was
Plaintiff’s compliance with the Court’s Individual Practice Rule 3(A)(ii). Plaintiff would have
been precluded from moving to amend her complaint had she not first requested a pre-motion
conference. Further, since Plaintiff’s motion to amend was discussed at the initial conference,
which was held within the 90-day time period, and the Order issued as a result of the conference
did not specify a time frame within which Plaintiff was to forward to defense counsel a copy of
the Right to Sue Letter and Proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff had no reason to believe that
her motion to amend the complaint would thereafter be time-barred. Thus, because it is by no
fault of Plaintiff that she was unable to directly file her Motion to Amend her Complaint in
accordance with § 2000e-5(f)(1), but, rather, was required to request a pre-motion conference
with the Court before filing her Motion to Amend, which she notably did within 90 days after the
issuance of the Right to Sue Letter, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is considered timely for purposes
of this motion, and Plaintiff has sufficiently exhausted her administrative remedies.
Prejudice to Defendants
Leave to amend is properly denied where allowing the amendment would unduly
prejudice the nonmoving party. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. In order to determine whether
granting Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint would unduly prejudice Defendants, the
Court must consider whether Defendants will have to “expend significant additional resources to
conduct discovery and prepare for trial” or whether resolution of the dispute will be
“significantly delay[ed]” by reason of granting leave to amend. Block v. First Blood Assocs.,
988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993).
Here, Defendants neither have to “expend significant additional resources” nor face a
“significant delay” in the resolution of this dispute by reason of the Court’s allowance of
Plaintiff’s additional cause of action under Title VII. Id. In Plaintiff’s original Complaint, the
Third Claim for Relief consisted of a claim of discrimination under the New York State Human
Rights Law on the basis of Plaintiff’s Honduran national origin, which gave Defendants notice
that Plaintiff sought to bring discrimination claims against them on her behalf. Since Defendants
are already required to expend resources in order to conduct discovery and prepare for trial by
reason of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law,
Defendants will not have to expend additional resources in conducting discovery for the Title VII
and § 1981 claims.4 See, e.g., Rikhy v. AMC Computer Corp., 2002 WL 1424596, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 2, 2002) (“[N]o further discovery would be warranted with respect to the
[plaintiff’s amended New York State Human Rights Law] claim, since [it] parallel[s] the
plaintiff’s existing Title VII claims.”). Thus, there will be no significant delay in the resolution
of this dispute. Accordingly, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Complaint to add causes of
action under § 1981 against Defendants, and Title VII only as against Lainesita.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff’s motion to amend the
Complaint is granted to the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert an additional cause of action under §
1981 against Defendants, and a cause of action under Title VII only as against Lainesita, and is
Dated: Central Islip, New York
July 25, 2014
Denis R. Hurley
Unites States Senior District Judge
As discussed in the decision supra, Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Complaint seeks to add a § 1981 claim
against all Defendants, and a Title VII claim only as against Lainesita.
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