Spagnuolo v. Suffolk County et al
Filing
117
MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 104 Motion to Substitute Party; granting 107 Motion to Substitute Party; granting 111 Motion for Summary Judgment; The Court GRANTS the County Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entry 111.) The Court also GRANTS Plaintiff's motions to substitute. (Docket Entries 104, 107.) The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption by substituting the Public Administrator of Suffolk County for Sharon Hubbard. With the exception of this party, the Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all other remaining Defendants. The only claims that remain are Plaintiff's claims against the Public Administrator of Suffolk County for (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (3) slander in connection with a 911 call. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 9/28/2017. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------X
PETER V. SPAGNUOLO,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
12-CV-4327(JS)(AKT)
-againstSUFFOLK COUNTY, SUFFOLK COUNTY
POLICE DEPARTMENT, RICHARD DORMER, former
police commissioner DETECTIVE MARLENE
TULLY, DETECTIVE DENNIS MURPHY, JAMES
RHOADS, commanding officer, JOHN DOE’S
NUMBERS 1-5, those Officers being
Officers who assisted in the arrest,
investigation and/or prosecution
of plaintiff, SUFFOLK COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, and SHARON
HUBBARD,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Peter V. Spagnuolo, pro se
120 E. Main Street
Mount Kisco, NY 10549
For Defendant:
Hubbard
Joseph DeDonato, Esq.
Morgan Melhuish Arvidson Abrutyn & Lisowski
39 Broadway, 35th Floor
New York, NY 10006
Kyle O. Wood, Esq.
H. Lee Dennison Building
100 Veterans Memorial Highway
P.O. Box 6100
Hauppauge, NY 11788
For Defendants:
Suffolk County,
Dormer, Tully,
Murphy, Rhoads
Kyle O. Wood, Esq.
Susan A. Flynn, Esq.1
Office of the County Attorney
H. Lee Dennison Building
The docket lists Ms. Flynn’s appearance for Suffolk County
only.
1
1
100 Veterans Memorial Highway
P.O. Box 6100
Hauppauge, NY 11788
SEYBERT, District Judge:
This case arises out of a stolen diamond ring.
plaintiff
Peter
Spagnuolo
(“Plaintiff”
or
Pro se
“Spagnuolo”),
an
interested buyer, had contacted Sharon Hubbard (“Hubbard”), the
seller, through Craigslist.
Hubbard was robbed, and Plaintiff was
misidentified as the perpetrator and then arrested.
Plaintiff
filed
this
lawsuit
against
Hubbard
Pertinently,
and
the
County
Defendants, which is a group composed of Suffolk County, the
Suffolk County Police Department, the Suffolk County Sheriff’s
Department, former police commissioner Richard Dormer, commanding
officer James Rhoads, Detective Marlene Tully, Detective Dennis
Murphy, and five John Does.
Three motions are pending. First, the County Defendants
move for summary judgment.
(Docket Entry 111.)
The remaining
motions concern Sharon Hubbard, who passed away after this lawsuit
was filed. Plaintiff seeks to substitute the Public Administrator
of Suffolk County, as the temporary administrator for the Estate
of Sharon Hubbard, in place of the deceased.
107.)
(Docket Entries 104,
For the following reasons, the Court grants all three
motions.
2
BACKGROUND
The Court begins with a general overview, adding greater
detail in the analysis to come.
But first, as an initial matter,
the Court notes that Spagnuolo failed to file a Local Rule 56.1
Counterstatement.
Nevertheless, “[a] district court has broad
discretion to determine whether to overlook a party’s failure to
comply with local court rules.”
Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc.,
258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001).
Pertinently, a court may review
the entire record even if one of the parties fails to file a Local
Rule 56.1 Statement.
Id.
The Court will do so here and cite only
the portions of the County Defendants’ 56.1 Statement supported by
admissible evidence.
In May 2011, Hubbard advertised a diamond ring she wished
to sell on Craigslist. (Hubbard’s Stmt. Defs.’ Ex. C, Docket Entry
111-5.) One month later, a prospective buyer named “Pete” met
Hubbard at her home, drew a gun, or what appeared to be a gun,
robbed her, and then fled. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt., Docket Entry 1112, ¶ 10–11.)
Two witnesses, including Corey Bonavia (“Bonavia”),
rented studio space from Hubbard and were present during the
robbery.
(Id. ¶ 9.)
For the ensuing analysis, the timeline of events is
critical:
3
May 9th:2 Hubbard provided “peterv@aol.com” (Spagnuolo) and
“petethompson13@yahoo.com” (an individual later identified as
Christopher Wolkoff) with her telephone number via email.
(Id. ¶¶ 3, 5; Pl.’s Br., Docket Entry 116, at 2–3 ¶ 6.)
May 10th: Hubbard received a telephone call from an individual
named “Pete.” (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 6.)
May 11th: Hubbard was robbed of her diamond ring.
11.)
(Id. ¶¶ 8,
May 12th: Hubbard selected Spagnuolo as the perpetrator in a
photo array. (Id. ¶ 15.)
May 31st: Spagnuolo was arrested after Hubbard and Bonavia
identified him in physical line-ups. (Id. ¶¶ 16–18.)
June 3rd: A grand jury indicted Spagnuolo for first-degree
robbery and third-degree robbery. (Id. ¶ 22.)
November 17th: Christopher Wolkoff confesses to the crimes.
(Id. ¶ 24.)
Following this timeline, the District Attorney’s Office moved to
dismiss the indictment pending against Spagnuolo.
(Id. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 28, 2012. (Docket
Entry 1.)
The County Defendants moved for summary judgment on the
federal-law false arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution claims as
well
as
the
state-law
battery
claim.
(Docket
Entry
111.)
Plaintiff seeks to substitute the Public Administrator of Suffolk
County, as the temporary administrator for the Estate of Sharon
Hubbard, in her place.
2
(Docket Entries 104, 107.)
Unless otherwise stated, all dates occurred in the year 2011.
4
DISCUSSION
I.
The County Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion
As an initial matter, the Clerk of the Court is directed
to terminate the Suffolk County Police Department and the Suffolk
County Sheriff’s Department.
These departments are non-suable
entities because it is an “administrative arm,” which does “not
have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality.”
Rose v. Cty. of Nassau, 904 F. Supp. 2d 244, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
A.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper only if the records reveals
no genuine issues of material fact.
Rodriguez v. Vill. Green
Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 39 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a)).
“Material facts are those which ‘might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law,’ and a dispute is
‘genuine’ if the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”
Coppola v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510,
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).
initial
burden,
the
If the moving party has satisfied this
opposing
party
“‘must
come
forward
with
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis
in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed. 2d
5
538 (1986)).
suffice.”
“Mere conclusory allegations or denials will not
Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1986).
Pro
construction,
violations.”
2004).
se
submissions
“particularly
generally
when
they
require
allege
flexible
civil
rights
McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.
Yet
Spagnuolo,
despite
his
pro
se
status,
is
an
“experienced attorney,” so the Court need not read his papers
liberally.
See Chira v. Columbia Univ., 289 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
B.
Qualified Immunity
Spagnuolo
raises
federal
false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims.
75.)
arrest,
false
(Compl. ¶¶ 154–
The County Defendants have invoked qualified immunity as an
affirmative
defense
on
behalf
of
the
individual
(Defs.’ Br., Docket Entry 111-19, at 14–15.)
defendants.
“Qualified immunity
shields government officials from civil damages liability unless
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was
clearly
established
at
the
time
of
the
challenged
conduct.”
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093, 182
L. Ed. 2d 985 (2012).
As the Supreme Court made clear, “qualified
immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’”
Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 154
(2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106
S. Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986)).
6
False arrest and imprisonment claims require, among
other things, evidence “that ‘the defendant intentionally confined
the plaintiff without his consent and without justification.’”
Jean v. Montina, 412 F. App’x 352, 353 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Amore
v.
Novarro,
624
F.3d
522,
532
n.13
(2d
Cir.
2010)).
Pertinently, a malicious prosecution claim requires proof that
“‘the defendant initiated a prosecution against the plaintiff,’”
“‘lacked probable cause to believe the proceeding could succeed,’”
and “‘acted with malice.’”
Id. (quoting Rohman v. N.Y. City
Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Probable cause
is a complete defense for false arrest and imprisonment claims,
and continuing probable cause is a complete defense for malicious
prosecution claims.
Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.
2014); see also Johnson v. Constantellis, 221 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d
Cir. 2007) (“If probable cause existed at the time of arrest, it
continues to exist at the time of prosecution unless undermined
‘by the discovery of some intervening fact.’” (quoting Kinzer v.
Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2003))).
But
continuing
immunity.
even
probable
if
the
cause,
officers
they
lacked
are
probable
entitled
to
cause
or
qualified
As the Second Circuit explained, the qualified-immunity
analysis “turn[s] on whether the defendant officers’ probable
cause determination was objectively reasonable--that is, whether
there was ‘arguable’ probable cause to arrest.”
7
Betts, 751 F.3d
at 83 quoting Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir.
2007).
“A police officer has arguable probable cause ‘if either
(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that
probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence
could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.’”
McCarthy v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., --- F. Supp. 3d ---,
2017 WL 4155334, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017) (quoting Figeuroa
v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2016)). The inquiry is “whether
any reasonable officer, out of the wide range of reasonable people
who enforce the laws in this country, could have determined that
the challenged action was lawful.”
Figeuroa, 825 F.3d at 100
(emphasis in original); see also Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737,
743 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he analytically distinct test for qualified
immunity is more favorable to the officers than the one for
probable cause.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest
Spagnuolo and charge him with robbery.
A person is guilty of
first-degree robbery “when he forcibly steals property and when,
in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight
therefrom, he or another participant in the crime . . . [d]isplays
what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun
or other firearm.”
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(4).
A person is guilty
of third-degree robbery “when he forcibly steals property.”
Penal Law § 160.05.
8
N.Y.
Before Spagnuolo was arrested, Hubbard identified him in
a photo array as the man that drew a gun, or what appeared to be
a gun, robbed her of a diamond ring, and the record contains no
evidence that the officers guided Hubbard to select him.
(Hubbard
EBT Tr., Def.’s Ex. D, Docket Entry 111-6, 51:11–24.)
Without
that evidence, “[a] positive photo identification by an eyewitness
is . . . sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest.”
Celestin v. City of N.Y., 581 F. Supp. 2d 420, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Before
Spagnuolo
was
charged,
Hubbard
identified him in a physical line-up.
and
Bonavia
separately
Fabrikant v. French, 691
F.3d 193, 216 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A] law enforcement official has
probable cause to arrest if he received his information from some
person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness, unless the
circumstances raise doubt as to the person’s veracity.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).
Spagnuolo has offered no evidence to show that the officers should
have doubted either Hubbard’s or Bonavia’s veracity. Cf. DiStefano
v. Sedita, No. 11-CV-1125, 2014 WL 349251, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
2014)
(“The
most
common
situation
in
which
such
doubts
[of
veracity] arise is when there exists a prior relationship between
the victim and the accused that gives rise to a motive for a false
accusation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In
other words, a “reasonable officer, out of the wide range of
reasonable people who enforce the laws in this country, could have
9
determined that the challenged action was lawful.”
See Figeuroa,
825 F.3d at 100 (emphasis in original).
None of the cited discrepancies affect this probablecause analysis, including “the height descriptions, which did not
match the plaintiff, and the existence of other suspects.”
See
Greene v. City of N.Y., No. 08-CV-0243, 2017 WL 1030707, at *20
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1920 (2d Cir.
June 16, 2017); Fogelman v. Donato, 111 F. Supp. 3d 282, 285
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Neither an arrestee’s protestations of innocence
nor
a
putative
victim’s
vitiate probable cause.”).
inconsistent
statements
necessarily
Thus, the Court concludes that it was
not “manifestly unreasonable” for the officers to arrest Spagnuolo
and charge him.
See Jean, 412 F. App’x at 354 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
One other point bears mentioning.
In the context of the
malicious prosecution claim, Spagnuolo contends that the officers
ignored
(“ADA”).
evidence
and
misled
the
Assistant
(Pl.’s Br. at 2 ¶ 6; 7 ¶ 14.)
District
Attorney
To set the stage, after
the real perpetrator confessed, a dismissal proceeding took place
in the County Court of Suffolk County.
Unfortunately,
the
relevant
portions
(Pl.’s Br. at 7 ¶ 14.)
of
that
transcript
are
redacted, (Pl.’s Br. Ex. J, Dismissal Tr., at 145–52), but they
are allegedly cited in Spagnuolo’s opposition papers, including
Officer Tully’s deposition transcript. (Pl.’s Br. at 7 ¶ 14; Pl.’s
10
Br. Ex. F, Tully Dep. Tr., at 38-121, at 197:23–199:19.)3
During
that proceeding, the ADA apparently stated:
The Suffolk County Police Department conducted
a deficient investigation.
***
Moreover, the Suffolk County Police Department
failed to thoroughly investigate all the
evidence available to them or provided to this
office.
***
Had the Suffolk County Police Department
conducted a complete investigation from the
outset, or provided this office with materials
that they had access to prior to the arrest
and indictment of Peter Spagnuolo, this
unfortunate situation would have been avoided.
(Tully Dep. Tr. at 198:14–16, 198:25–199:4, 199:9–15.)
To begin, Spagnuolo was indicted by a grand jury on
June 3, 2011. (Def.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22; see also Indictment, Def.’s
Ex. L, Docket Entry 111-14.)
In New York, an “‘indictment by a
grand jury creates a presumption of probable cause.’”
Creighton
v. City of N.Y., No. 12-CV-7454, 2017 WL 636415, at *35 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 14, 2017) (quoting Savino v. City of N.Y., 331 F.3d 63, 72
(2d. Cir. 2003)).
Pertinently, a plaintiff bears the burden of
rebutting that presumption only through evidence “‘that the police
witnesses have not made a complete and full statement of facts .
The relevant deposition excerpts are available on pages 88 and
89 of Spagnuolo’s opposition papers.
3
11
. . to the . . . District Attorney, that they have misrepresented
or
falsified
evidence,
that
they
otherwise acted in bad faith.’”
have
withheld
evidence
or
Id. (quoting Colon v. City of
N.Y., 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82–83, 455 N.E.2d 1248, 1250–51, 468 N.Y.S.2d
453 (1983)).
But this bad-faith analysis “cannot be satisfied by
a showing of mere negligence.”
Minott v. Duffy, No. 11-CV-1217,
2014 WL 1386583, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2014); cf. Manganiello
v. City of N.Y., 612 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a
qualified-immunity defense “given the ample evidentiary support”
that the officer “misrepresented the evidence to the prosecutors,
or failed to pass on material information, or made statements that
were false, and engaged in such misconduct knowingly”) (emphasis
added).
Despite the ADA’s statements, Spagnuolo has failed to
present evidence that the “petethompson13@yahoo.com” email address
was “intentionally withheld.”
absence
of
sufficient
Savino, 331 F.3d at 74.
evidence
that
defendants--or
“In the
any
other
officers--acted in bad faith, no reasonable juror could find that
[Spagnuolo] has overcome the presumption of probable cause that
arises from his indictment.”
For
all
these
imprisonment,
and
malicious
individual
defendants
do
See id. at 75.
reasons,
the
false
prosecution
not
withstand
claims
arrest,
against
summary
false
the
judgment.
Likewise, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state law false arrest
12
and false imprisonment claims on the same grounds.
See Kass v.
City of N.Y., 864 F.3d 200, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2017).
C.
Municipal Liability
“Qualified immunity applies only to individuals” and
thus does not insulate Suffolk County from liability.
City of N.Y., 686 F. App’x 66, 67 (2d Cir. 2017).
municipalities
may
be
held
liable
under
§ 1983
Pluma v.
“However,
only
if
the
plaintiff plausibly alleges that a city custom or policy caused
his injury.”
Id.
Spagnuolo has offered no evidence that Suffolk
County engaged in a systematic effort through a custom or policy
to violate his civil rights.
Thus, the Court GRANTS summary
judgment on any federal-law claims against Suffolk County.
D.
Remaining State-Law Claims
As for the state-law battery claim and any excessive-
force claims under Section 1983, Spagnuolo contends that the
officers used excessive force when they handcuffed him.
(Compl.
¶¶ 176–86,
of
204–08.)
In
evaluating
the
totality
the
circumstances, the Court must consider whether: “(1) the handcuffs
were unreasonably tight; (2) the defendants ignored the arrestee’s
pleas that the handcuffs were too tight; and (3) the degree of
injury to the wrists.”
Esmont v. City of N.Y., 371 F. Supp. 2d
202, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Tompkins v.
City of N.Y., 50 F. Supp. 3d 426, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“New York
courts analyze assault and battery claims against police officers
13
using the same standard applicable to excessive force claims under
Section 1983.”).
Spagnuolo concedes that he neither asked the
officers to loosen the handcuffs nor sought medical treatment.
(Pl.’s Dep. Tr., Defs.’ Ex. B, Docket Entry 111-4, 70:7–10, 143:16–
18.)
There are few, if any, “cases permitting a plaintiff to
establish an excessive force claim based on tight handcuffing in
the absence of a request to loosen them.”
at 215 (collecting cases).
Esmont, 371 F. Supp. 2d
At any rate, “[u]nsubstantiated claims
of nerve damage, in the absence of corroborating medical evidence,
are insufficient to support a claim of excessive force from
handcuffing.”
Id.
Thus, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on the
battery claim.
As for the County Defendants, four state-law claims
remain
against
Officers
Tully
and
Murphy:
(1)
intentional
infliction of emotional distress, (2) negligent infliction of
emotional distress, (3) slander, and (4) negligence and reckless
indifference.
Whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is a
discretionary decision for the Court.
Henning v. City of N.Y.,
No. 09-CV-3998, 2012 WL 2700505, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2012).
Generally, if “all federal claims have been dismissed before trial,
pendent state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice and
left for resolution by the state courts.”
Id.
Although the case
is nearing trial, the Court agrees with the County Defendants that
Spagnuolo has abandoned his state-law claims by failing to respond
14
to the County Defendants’ argument.
Entry 115, at 10.)
claims as abandoned.
(Defs.’ Reply Br., Docket
Thus, the Court DISMISSES these state-law
See Elmessaoudi v. Mark 2 Restaurant LLC,
No. 14-CV-4560, 2016 WL 4992582, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2016)
(“Federal courts have the discretion to deem a claim abandoned
when a party moves for summary judgment on one ground and the party
opposing summary judgment fails to address the argument in any
way.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
II.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute
While this action was pending, Sharon Hubbard died, and
the Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court then appointed the Public
Administrator of Suffolk County as a temporary administrator of
her estate.
(See Pl.’s Mot., Docket Entry 104, at 3.)
Plaintiff
seeks to substitute the Public Administrator in place of the
deceased.
As
discussed
below,
the
Court
grants
Plaintiff’s
request.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a deceased
party’s successor or representative may file a motion to substitute
when the party dies and the claims are not extinguished.
CIV. P. 25(a)(1).
FED. R.
In considering these motions, “the Court must
decide whether: (1) the motion was timely; (2) the claims survive
the decedent’s death; and (3) the party sought to be substituted
for the decedent is a proper party.”
Imported
Car
Corp.,
No.
10-CV-4993,
15
Badalamenti v. Country
2012
WL
6061639,
at
*9
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
First, the motion is timely. Generally, substitution
motions provide a ninety-day window, which begins after a notice
of death is served.
FED. R. CIV. P. 25(a)(1).
The statement of
death was put on the record on December 18, 2015.
Entry, Docket Entry 87.)
(See Minute
While it is true, as Hubbard’s lawyer
argues, that Plaintiff missed this deadline, he received five
extensions of time.
Dec. 18, 2016.)
(See docket entries between Dec. 28, 2015 and
“The Court is authorized to extend the time in
which to file a motion for substitution before or after the
expiration of the ninety-day period pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(b).”
2005).
Kernisant v. City of N.Y., 225 F.R.D. 422, 427 (E.D.N.Y.
Thus,
the
Court
exercises
its
discretion
and
deems
Plaintiff’s motion to be timely.
Second, the subject claims survives Hubbard’s death.
The Complaint asserts claims under Section 1983 and under New York
law
for
battery,
slander,
imprisonment,
malicious
indifference,
and
negligence,
prosecution,
intentional
and
false
negligence
negligent
arrest,
and
false
reckless
infliction
of
emotional distress. (Compl. ¶¶ 154–224.) Thus, they “set[ ] forth
claims of injury to person or property.”
Regalado v. Kohl’s Dep’t
Stores, Inc., No. 13-CV-5624, 2015 WL 8481881, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
16
Dec.
8,
2015)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted)
(collecting
sources).
Third, the Public Administrator of Suffolk County is a
property
party
because
the
Suffolk
County
Surrogate’s
Court
appointed it to be the temporary administrator of Sharon Hubbard’s
estate.
Roe v. City of N.Y., No. 00-CV-9062, 2003 WL 22715832, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2003) (explaining that proper parties include
the deceased party’s representative who is “lawfully designated by
state authority to represent the deceased’s estate” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
CONCLUSION
The
Court
summary judgment.
GRANTS
the
County
(Docket Entry 111.)
Plaintiff’s motions to substitute.
Defendants’
motion
for
The Court also GRANTS
(Docket Entries 104, 107.)
The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption by
substituting the Public Administrator of Suffolk County for Sharon
Hubbard.
With the exception of this party, the Clerk of the Court
is directed to terminate all other remaining Defendants.
[BOTTOM OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
17
The
against
the
intentional
only
Public
claims
that
remain
Administrator
infliction
of
of
emotional
are
Plaintiff’s
Suffolk
distress,
County
(2)
claims
for
(1)
negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and (3) slander in connection
with a 911 call.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
September __28___, 2017
Central Islip, New York
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?