NKL Enterprises, LLC v. Oyster Bay Management Co., LLC
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER - It is hereby: ORDERED, that the Appellants motion to appeal the August 28, 2012 order from the Bankruptcy Court annulling the automatic stay nunc pro tunc is denied; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to mark this case as closed. Ordered by Judge Arthur D. Spatt on 4/25/2013. (Coleman, Laurie)
FILED
CLERK
4/25/2013 4:20 pm
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------X
NKL ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Appellant,
MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER
12-CV-5091 (ADS)
-againstOYSTER BAY MANAGEMENT CO., LLC,
Appellee.
---------------------------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES:
The Morrison Law Offices, PC
Attorneys for the Appellant
87 Walker Street
2nd Floor
New York, NY 10010
By: Lawrence F. Morrison, Esq., Of Counsel
Lewis W. Siegel, Esq.
Attorney for the Appellee
355 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017
SPATT, District Judge.
Presently before the Court is the Appellant’s appeal of an order entered by the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York, dated August 28, 2012, which
granted the motion of the Appellee seeking relief from the automatic stay, nunc pro tunc. For
the reasons set forth below, the appeal is dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 25, 2012 (the “Petition Date”), the Appellant NKL Enterprises, LLC (“NKL”)
filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. NKL’s sole asset was its purported
ownership of a certain piece of real property, located at 53-55 Main Street, Cold Spring Harbor,
1
New York (the “Cold Spring Harbor Property”). NKL had acquired this ownership from Clear
Blue Water LLC (“Clear Blue”) by a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
The bankruptcy petition was filed less than an hour before a scheduled foreclosure sale
on the Cold Spring Harbor Property. Thus, according to the Appellee Oyster Bay Management
Co., LLC (“OBM”), NKL’s bankruptcy petition was filed solely to improperly delay the
foreclosure sale of the Cold Spring Harbor Property. In support of this position, OBM explains
that the day before the bankruptcy filing, July 24, 2012, NKL had appeared in New York
Supreme Court, Suffolk County, seeking an Order to Show Cause to delay the foreclosure sale
on the ground that its interests as the second mortgagee on the Cold Spring Harbor Property
would be adversely affected if the foreclosure sale were permitted to be consummated. This
application was denied. Furthermore, the Appellee contends that NKL appears to have been
formed solely to work with Clear Blue to further delay the foreclosure of the Cold Spring Harbor
Property.
As stated above, on July 25, 2012, NKL filed for bankruptcy. On behalf of NKL, Steven
R. Hafner appeared at the foreclosure sale that occurred later that day. It is undisputed that he
provided notice to OBM’s representative of NKL’s bankruptcy. According to the Appellant,
Hafner also notified OBM of NKL’s interest in the real property. However, according to the
Appellee, the person who appeared at the foreclosure sale did not present any evidence that the
Cold Spring Harbor Property was owned by NKL. Thus, the referee for the foreclosure went
forward and conducted the auction. OBM made the sole bid––one million dollars––and was
declared the winning bidder.
On July 31, 2012, the Appellee OBM filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court seeking
to vacate the automatic stay, nunc pro tunc, to the Petition Date. If granted, this would permit
2
OBM to complete the foreclosure sale of the Cold Spring Harbor Property without the minimum
45 day delay that would have been required if OBM were forced to renotice the foreclosure sale.
On August 14, 2012, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on OBM’s motion. NKL’s
principals were unable to retain an attorney by this date, and therefore they appeared before the
Bankruptcy Court pro se. At the August 14, 2012 hearing, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Dorothy Eisenberg heard from both NKL’s principals and OBM’s counsel. Judge Eisenberg
observed during the course of this proceeding that NKL had improperly filed the bankruptcy
petition pro se by its principals without an attorney, and that the case could be dismissed on that
ground alone. She also took note of the fact that NKL had failed to file any opposition to OBM’s
motion. The Bankruptcy Court then explored NKL’s motivations for filing the bankruptcy
petition, concluding that the case was likely filed in bad faith for reasons of delaying the
scheduled foreclosure. She then granted OBM’s motion and directed OBM to submit a proposed
order to that effect.
On August 22, 2012, NKL filed an objection to the proposed order, again doing so pro se.
Although it was untimely, the Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on NKL’s objection.
On August 28, 2012, a second hearing was held by the Bankruptcy Court. At that time,
Lawrence F. Morrison, Esq. appeared on NKL’s behalf as its counsel. Morrison argued before
Judge Eisenberg that the relief from the stay should not have been granted on a nunc pro tunc
basis. He pointed out that the Bankruptcy Court indicated at the first hearing that NKL would
have an opportunity to bid on the foreclosure, but that this was actually inaccurate because the
sale had occurred on the day of the bankruptcy filing. He explained that he did not have any
further information with regard to NKL’s alleged bad faith, as he had only been very recently
retained. Finally, Morrison had no objection to the bankruptcy case being dismissed in its
3
entirety. Judge Eisenberg observed during the second hearing that NKL had failed to comply
with many Chapter 11 requirements, such as filing schedules, and that this was a further
indication that the case was brought in bad faith. She ultimately concluded that there was no
evidence presented that would provide a basis to support any action other than to enter an order
granting relief from the stay, nunc pro tunc. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court overruled NKL’s
objection and signed the order providing that the automatic stay was vacated, nunc pro tunc, to
the date and time the petition in the bankruptcy case was filed, so as to allow OBM to pursue its
rights, under applicable non-bankruptcy law, with respect to the Cold Spring
Property.
On September 11, 2012, the United States Trustee filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter
11 case, or convert the case to Chapter 7, on the grounds that NKL had failed to file schedules or
a statement of financial affairs, or to obtain court approval of its retention of an attorney, or
submit operating reports, or submit to an examination pursuant to Bankruptcy Code §341(a). On
October 16, 2012, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Trustee’s motion, which NKL did
not oppose. Thereafter, on October 18, 2012, the United States Trustee submitted a proposed
order dismissing the bankruptcy case with prejudice. NKL did not file an opposition or
otherwise appear to oppose this dismissal. On November 9, 2012, the dismissal order was
entered by the Bankruptcy Court, so that NKL’s Chapter 11 case was dismissed with prejudice.
NKL did not appeal from this order.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The Court is now faced with reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to grant relief
from the automatic stay nunc pro tunc. The Bankruptcy Court’s actions in this context are
4
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See In re Aquatic Dev. Group, Inc., 352 F.3d 671, 678 (2d Cir.
2003) (stating with respect to the review of a bankruptcy’s grant of nunc pro tunc relief, “we
review a bankruptcy court’s decision regarding such approval for abuse of discretion, which we
have defined as (i) a decision resting on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal
principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (ii) a decision that, though not necessarily the
product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding, cannot be located within the range
of permissible decisions.”) (citations omitted); In re Adomah, 368 B.R. 134, 137 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also In re Corto, No. 92 Civ. 365, 1992 WL 279257, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.
14, 1992) (“The decision to grant relief from an automatic stay is committed to the discretion of
the bankruptcy judge and, therefore, is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.”).
B. As to Nunc Pro Tunc Relief from an Automatic Stay
Section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy
petition creates an automatic stay against “the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial,
administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
The automatic stay provision is “one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws,” designed to relieve “the financial pressures that drove [debtors] into
bankruptcy.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 629697. “It affords debtors a ‘breathing spell’ from the collection process and enables them to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan to satisfy existing debt.” Eastern Refractories Co.
Inc. v. Forty Eight Insulations Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing In re Siciliano, 13
F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994)).
5
As the Second Circuit has noted, the automatic stay “is effective immediately upon the
filing of the petition, and any proceedings or actions described in section 362(a)(1) are void and
without vitality if they occur after the automatic stay takes effect.” Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v.
Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing, inter alia, In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 982
F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1992)). However, a bankruptcy court has the power to take measures that
grant relief from the automatic stay, including “terminating, annulling, modifying, or
conditioning” the stay, under certain circumstances. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
For example, an order from a bankruptcy court may terminate an automatic stay, but
“terminating” an automatic stay operates only from the date of entry of the order. See In re
Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 675 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing 2 Collier’s Bankruptcy Manual
¶ 362.06 (3d ed. 1983)). Alternatively, “bankruptcy courts have the plastic powers to modify or
condition an automatic stay so as to fashion the appropriate scope of relief.” Eastern
Refractories, 157 F.3d at 172. Finally, and particularly relevant here, a bankruptcy court may
enact an “annulment”—granting relief from the automatic stay nunc pro tunc, thereby
retroactively lifting the stay to permit a certain otherwise forbidden course of action, such as a
civil litigation or a foreclosure proceeding. See In re WorldCom, Inc., 325 B.R. 511, 519
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“When an action has been commenced in violation of the stay, that
action can only be made legitimate by an order retroactively validating the action.”); see also In
re Ebadi, 448 B.R. 308, 317 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“in appropriate circumstances stay
violations can be cured nunc pro tunc”). “Although granting retroactive relief from the stay
undisputedly falls within the powers of a bankruptcy court, courts should use this power
sparingly, and only under compelling circumstances.” In re Ebadi, 448 B.R. at 319.
6
C. As to Mootness
In response to NKL’s arguments, OBM contends that the appeal is in fact moot because
the Chapter 11 case was dismissed. Specifically, on November 9, 2012, the Bankruptcy Court
entered a dismissal order, finding that the actions of NKL “appear[ed] to be an abuse of the
Bankruptcy Code and its provisions”, and ruling that the case was dismissed with prejudice.
This order was entered in response to the Trustee’s motion to dismiss the case or convert it to a
case under Chapter 7. NKL did not respond to, or object to, this motion. Further, NKT did not
appear at the hearing on this motion to dismiss nor did it respond or object to the proposed order
by the Trustee to dismiss the case. Finally, the dismissal order entered by the Bankruptcy Court
on November 9, 2012 was not appealed by NKT within the required 14 day time frame.
The Appellee argues that because the underlying bankruptcy proceeding has been
dismissed with prejudice and has not been appealed, that even if this Court were to reverse the
Bankruptcy Court’s nunc pro tunc order, the automatic stay––which otherwise ends with the
dismissal of the bankruptcy case––would have no case to which it would apply. Put another
way, once the bankruptcy case was dismissed, any appeals related to its reorganization arguably
became moot.
The Court agrees with the Appellee that the present appeal is moot, though not
necessarily because of the simple fact that the underlying bankruptcy case has been dismissed.
Compare In re Walerstein, No. 07 Civ. 2746, 2008 WL 795327, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. March 24,
2008); Northland Assocs. v. United States, IRS (In re Abrantes Constr. Corp .), 160 B.R. 484,
488 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the dismissal of the bankruptcy proceeding rendered the issue
of the automatic stay provision moot) with In re Ebadi, 448 B.R. 308, 317 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
7
2011) (“The fact that the bankruptcy case was dismissed does not render the stay violation
moot.”).
Instead, this appeal is moot because of two interrelated reasons—first, because NKL did
not seek a stay of the foreclosure pending this appeal, and second, because this Court cannot
fashion an effective relief.
In certain situations, such as the one at hand, the “failure to obtain a stay pending appeal
will render the case moot.” In re Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle, Inc., 735 F.2d 1294, 1295 (7th
Cir. 1984). The so-called mootness rule urged by Appellee is a doctrine found in bankruptcy
appeals and can be succinctly stated as follows: a debtor’s failure to obtain a stay pending
appeal renders an appeal moot if assets in which the creditor had an interest are sold in
foreclosure. The mootness rule first appeared in former Bankruptcy Rule 805, when a sentence
was added to the existing rule mooting an appeal when a debtor failed to obtain a stay pending
appeal and the creditor sold to a good faith purchaser. Rule 805, however, did not survive the
1983 changes to the Bankruptcy Rules. Currently, the mootness rule is partially codified at 11
U.S.C. § 363(m), a successor in some respects to Rule 805, but that provision applies only to
sales by bankruptcy trustees. It does not apply to other foreclosure sales in bankruptcy
proceedings, such as those that may occur when the bankruptcy court lifts the 11 U.S.C. § 362
automatic stay, allowing the creditor to foreclose its lien. Nevertheless, even after the 1983
revisions to the Bankruptcy Rules, there is a judicially-created mootness rule that is not limited
to sales by trustees, but has a broader application.
This sort of stay requirement “‘is in furtherance of the policy of not only affording
finality to the judgment of the bankruptcy court, but particularly to give finality to those orders
and judgments upon which [innocent] third parties rely.’” In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania,
8
Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 14 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 11–62.03 at 11–62–
11 (14th ed. 1976)). “‘Finality is important because it minimizes the chance that purchasers will
be dragged into endless rounds of litigation to determine who has what rights in the property.
Without the degree of finality provided by the stay requirement, purchasers are likely to demand
a steep discount for investing in the property.’” In re Pisces Leasing Corp., 66 B.R. 671, 673
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 1986)). Thus, it is in the interest
of creditors that a sale of the kind at issue here––one that is made with court approval––can
assure a good faith purchaser that the sale is final unless stayed. “[G]enerally the courts have
held . . . that failure to obtain a stay moots any appeal if, pending appeal, the sale is made to a
good faith purchaser.” In Pisces, 66 B.R. at 673.
Accordingly, “[c]ourts have dismissed as moot appeals of orders lifting the automatic
stay where the property that was previously subject to the stay has already been sold pursuant to
the bankruptcy court’s order.” In re Watkins, 362 B.R. 568, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see also
Licensing by Paolo v. Sinatra ( In re Gucci), 105 F.3d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[R]egardless of
the merit of an appellant’s challenge to a sale order, we may neither reverse nor modify the
judicially-authorized sale if the entity that purchased or leased the property did so in good faith
and if no stay was granted.”); In re Baker, 339 B.R. 298, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Courts have
uniformly held that if a debtor fails to obtain a stay of a sale of properties, appeal of an order
authorizing the sale is rendered moot and must be dismissed once the sale to good faith
purchasers has taken place and has been approved.”). The fact that the relief from the automatic
stay here was granted nun pro tunc does not appear to alter this reasoning. Therefore, if the
debtor did not attempt to secure a stay, the order authorizing the sale cannot be reversed absent a
showing of bad faith by the third-party purchaser.
9
Here, once the Bankruptcy Court granted relief from the automatic stay nunc pro tunc,
NKL did not seek a stay of that order to preclude the final foreclosure sale pending this appeal.
Thus, the property was sold to the Appellee and the deed was executed and recorded pursuant to
the Bankruptcy Court’s order. Indeed, on November 14, 2012, the Supreme Court, Suffolk
County, entered an order confirming the sale of the Cold Spring Harbor Property by the referee
to OBM. Because the Appellant did not attempt to obtain a stay pending the appeal, and does
not now argue that the purchaser OBM acted in bad faith when purchasing the property,
Appellant’s appeal of the order granting the Appellee’s motion for nunc pro tunc relief from the
automatic stay is rendered moot. See In re Revere Copper and Brass Inc., 78 B.R. 17, 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“In the instant appeal, where the Lawrences ‘have failed and neglected
diligently to pursue the available remedies to obtain a stay’ of the Confirmation Order and
thereby ‘have permitted such a comprehensive change of circumstances to occur,’ it is
inequitable to hear the merits of their case.”) (quoting In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793,
798 (9th Cir. 1981).
Finally, even if this Court could conceivably fashion some form of effective relief, this
appeal is nonetheless moot. This is because “a bankruptcy appeal is rendered moot under the
equitable considerations of bankruptcy ‘when even though effective relief could conceivably be
fashioned, implementation of that relief would be inequitable.’” In re Burger Boys, Inc., 94 F.3d
755, 760 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 68 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1995)). As
the Appellee points out, the Bankruptcy Court granted the relief from the automatic stay
requested by OBM largely on the ground that NKL was tainted with fraud––as the prior owners
of the property had been involved with certain criminal proceedings relating to mortgage fraud
(see generally Clear Blue Water, LLC v. Oyster Bay Mgmt. Co., LLC, 476 B.R. 60 (E.D.N.Y.
10
2012) (Spatt, J.)––and that its actions had indicated a bankruptcy filed in bad faith. For this
additional reason, in the Court’s view, it would be inequitable to permit NKL to further benefit
by mandating that the entire foreclosure process to be reopened.
In sum, for the reasons stated above, the Appellant’s appeal of the order granting the
Appelle’s motion for nunc pro tunc relief from the automatic stay has been rendered moot and,
therefore, is denied.
D. As to the Bankruptcy Court’s Abuse of Discretion
Finally, the Court notes that even if it were to find that the appeal is not moot, the Court
would nonetheless deny NKL’s appeal, on the ground that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its
discretion. As set forth above, a district court may only overturn a decision of the bankruptcy
court to lift an automatic stay if the district court determines that the bankruptcy court has abused
its discretion. See In re Bogdanovich, No. 00 Civ. 2266, 2000 WL 1708163, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 14, 2000).
The Second Circuit has indicated that an abuse of the bankruptcy system or evidence of
bad faith may be sufficient to warrant an order lifting the automatic stay nunc pro tunc. The
Appellant argues that the Bankruptcy Court did not utilize specific factors to guide its decisionmaking process, and that such considerations are required to be made in order for the Bankruptcy
Court to act in this regard. Certainly, other circuits undoubtedly require the contemplation of
various factors. However, as NKL recognizes, consideration of certain factors––or any factors at
all for that matter––has not yet been explicitly mandated by the Second Circuit. Thus, there is no
binding precedent that would require the Bankruptcy Court in this case to expressly analyze each
and every factor other courts consider.
11
Furthermore, Judge Eisenberg plainly based her conclusion upon the bad faith bankruptcy
filing of NKL. When faced with an analogous factual scenario, other courts in this Circuit have
concluded that this finding alone may be sufficient to grant relief from an automatic stay, even
without the express consideration of other factors. See, e.g., Corto v. Nat’l Scenery Studios, 112
F.3d 503, at *1 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the bankruptcy court had issued an order lifting, nunc
pro tunc, an automatic stay, on the basis that there was a continual abuse of the bankruptcy
system and its stay provisions, and affirming this order); In re Plagakis, No. 03 Civ. 0728, 2004
WL 203090, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2004) (quoting the bankruptcy court’s observation that the
debtor had “filed a skeletal petition minutes before a foreclosure sale” with the plain intent to
prevent foreclosure “without the ability or the intention to reorganize”, and thus finding that the
“the Bankruptcy Court correctly found that Debtor’s bad faith in filing for Chapter 13 relief
justified dismissing his petition nunc pro tunc in order to validate the mortgage foreclosure
sale.”).
The fact that a debtor has acted in bad faith is plainly listed in the factors that many
courts take into consideration, usually referred to as the “Stockwell factors”. See, e.g., In re
WorldCom, Inc., 325 B.R. at 521–22 (“The relevant factors are: (1) if the creditor had actual or
constructive knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and, therefore, of the stay, (2) if the debtor has
acted in bad faith, (3) if there was equity in the property of the estate, (4) if the property was
necessary for an effective reorganization, (5) if grounds for relief from the stay existed and a
motion, if filed, would likely have been granted prior to the automatic stay violation, (6) if
failure to grant retroactive relief would cause unnecessary expense to the creditor, and (7) if the
creditor has detrimentally changed its position on the basis of the action taken.”). However,
12
there is no rule in this Circuit that requires a bankruptcy court to exhaustively consider every
factor.
The Second Circuit has clearly stated that the “‘facts of each request [to be granted a
relief from the stay] will determine whether relief is appropriate under the circumstances.’” In re
Mazzeo, 167 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Sonnax Indus., Inc., 907 F.2d 1285,
1286). Contrary to the Appellant’s contentions, the Second Circuit has never found that “some
framework must be used in granting retroactive stay relief.” (Appellant’s Mem. at 6.) Rather, in
In re Mazzeo (“Mazzeo”), 167 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 1999), it merely observed that it had listed a
number of factors (“Sonnax factors”) that may be relevant in deciding whether the stay should be
lifted, in order to permit litigation to continue in another forum. However, litigation in another
forum is not relevant whatsoever to the case at hand, and consequently neither are the “Sonnax
factors”. Further, while the Second Circuit in Mazzeo did remand to the bankruptcy court for
further findings because “the bankruptcy court did not mention Sonnax, or any doctrinal
framework,” it did so mainly because it was unclear whether that court considered any of the
Sonnax factors” and because the factual findings were sparse. Id. at 143. Here, Judge Eisenberg
made clear factual findings on the record to ensure to this Court that she did not abuse her
discretion. More importantly, it was clear from the transcripts of those proceedings that Judge
Eisenberg plainly based her conclusion on a finding of bad faith, a factor that is highly pertinent
in this context. The fact that NKL appeared without counsel at the first hearing falls squarely on
the principals of that company and does not warrant a different result.
Finally, the Court notes that while there was no written decision by Judge Eisenberg, she
made many findings during the two hearings on this issue. “The findings of fact and conclusions
of law need not be written but may instead be stated orally and recorded in open court.” In re
13
Mazzeo, 167 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). Further, they need not include “‘punctilious detail [ ]
or slavish tracing of the claims issue by issue and witness by witness.’” Krieger v. Gold Bond
Building Prods., 863 F.2d 1091, 1097 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Ratliff v. Governor's Highway
Safety Program, 791 F.2d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Therefore, even if this appeal were not moot, the Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court’s
August 28, 2012 order did not evince an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the appeal is also
dismissed on this ground.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Appellant’s motion to appeal the August 28, 2012 order from the
Bankruptcy Court annulling the automatic stay nunc pro tunc is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to mark this case as closed.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
April 25, 2013
____/s/ Arthur D. Spatt___________
ARTHUR D. SPATT
United States District Judge
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?