Trustees of Empire State Carpenters Annuity, Apprenticeship, Labor-Management Cooperation, Pension and Welfare Funds v. Sanders Construction, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER granting 15 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and confirms the arbitration award of July 27, 2013. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case. SO ORDERED. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bianco on 10/14/2014. (Gibaldi, Michael)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
No 13-CV-5102 (JFB)(ARL)
_____________________
TRUSTEES OF EMPIRE STATE CARPENTERS ANNUITY, APPRENTICESHIP, LABORMANAGEMENT COOPERATION, PENSION AND WELFARE FUNDS,
Plaintiffs,
VERSUS
SANDERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
October 14, 2014
___________________
JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
The Trustees (“plaintiffs”) of Empire
State Carpenters Annuity, Apprenticeship,
Labor-Management Cooperation, Pension
and Welfare Funds (the “Funds”)
commenced this action against Sanders
Construction, Inc. (“defendant” or “Sanders
Construction”) to confirm and enforce an
arbitration award. Before the Court is
plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for summary
judgment. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court grants the motion for summary
judgment and confirms the arbitration
award.1
A. Facts
The following facts are taken from the
declaration, exhibits, and Local Rule 56.1
statement of facts submitted by plaintiffs.
Upon consideration of a motion for
summary judgment, the Court construes the
Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241,
244 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]here the non-moving party
‘chooses the perilous path of failing to submit a
response to a summary judgment motion, the district
court may not grant the motion without first
examining the moving party’s submission to
determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating
that no material issue of fact remains for trial.’”
(quoting Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir.
2001))); see also Jackson v. Fed. Express, --- F.3d --,
No. 12-1475-CV, 2014 WL 4412333, at *3–4 (2d
Cir. Sept. 9, 2014). As set forth below, plaintiffs have
met that burden in this case based upon the evidence
submitted in connection with their summary
judgment motion.
1
The Second Circuit has clearly established that a
district court may not grant an unopposed summary
judgment motion without carefully analyzing the
moving papers to determine whether the moving
party satisfies its burden of demonstrating that there
are no material issues of fact for trial. See Vt. Teddy
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facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See, e.g., Capobianco v.
City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d
Cir. 2005). Unless otherwise noted, where
plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 statement is cited, that
fact is undisputed and supported by evidence
in the summary judgment record. Cf. Holtz
v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 73
(2d Cir. 2001) (noting that district court may
disregard an assertion in a Rule 56.1
statement that is unsupported by record).
concluded that Sanders Construction had
failed to report and make $30,651.30 in
contributions. (Id.) Sanders Construction
failed to pay these contributions to the
Funds, and the Funds demanded arbitration
in a Notice of Intention to Arbitrate dated
July 3, 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 8–9.)
Thereafter, a hearing was held before
arbitrator J.J. Pierson, Esq., on July 24,
2013. (Id. ¶ 10; Craven Decl. Ex. E,
Arbitration Order.) Charles R. Virginia,
Richard Craven, and Kyle Lagongero
appeared on behalf of the Funds; Tim
Sanders appeared on behalf of Sanders
Construction. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 10.) Three days
later, on July 27, 2013, the arbitrator issued
his award in an order dated July 27, 2013.
(Id. ¶ 11.) The arbitrator concluded that
Sanders Construction had failed to
contribute a total of $30,651.30 to the Funds
between July 1, 2012, and December 31,
2012. (Id.; Craven Decl. Ex. E, Arbitration
Order.) Accordingly, the arbitrator ordered
Sanders Construction to pay to the Funds the
following amounts: $30,651.30 in principal;
$1,985.49 in interest; $6,130.26 in
liquidated damages; $550.00 in attorneys’
fees; and $750.00 as an arbitrator’s fee. (Id.)
Sanders Construction entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (the
“CBA”) with the Northeast Regional
Council of Carpenters (the “Union”). (Pls.’
56.1 ¶ 1.) Among other provisions, the CBA
required Sanders Construction to make
contributions to the Funds for every hour of
work performed within the trade and
geographical jurisdiction of the Union. (Id.
¶ 3.) The CBA also vested the Funds with
the authority to audit Sanders Construction’s
books and payroll records, so that the Funds
could ensure Sanders Construction’s
compliance
with
its
contribution
requirements. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Disputes over contributions were subject
to arbitration pursuant to the Funds’
Collection Policy, a document incorporated
by reference in the CBA. (Id. ¶¶ 6–7.)
Specifically, the Funds could demand
arbitration of disputes over contributions by
sending a Notice to Arbitrate to the
employer. (Id. ¶ 7; Craven Decl. Ex. C,
Collection Policy at 2.2.) If the employer
received a Notice to Arbitrate and objected
to arbitration, then the Funds would instead
initiate legal action in a federal court. (Id.)
In other words, an employer had the right to
opt out of arbitration. (Pls.’ 56.1 ¶ 7.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs commenced this action on
September 12, 2013. Defendant answered
the complaint on November 14, 2013.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
on August 8, 2014. Defendant did not file an
opposition to the motion. This matter is fully
submitted, and the Court has fully
considered the submissions of the parties.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Funds conducted an audit of
Sanders Construction’s books and records
for the period from July 1, 2012, through
December 31, 2012. (Id. ¶ 5.) The auditor
The standard for summary judgment is
well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a
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motion for summary judgment only if “the
movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Gonzalez v. City
of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.
2013). The moving party bears the burden of
showing that he is entitled to summary
judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396
F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). “A party
asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including
depositions,
documents,
electronically
stored
information,
affidavits
or
declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or (B) showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1). The court “‘is not to weigh the
evidence but is instead required to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment, to draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of that
party,
and
to
eschew
credibility
assessments.’” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W.
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854
(2d Cir. 1996)); see Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
(summary judgment is unwarranted if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).
(2d Cir. 2002) (alteration and emphasis in
original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586–87 (1986)). As the Supreme Court
stated in Anderson, “[i]f the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations
omitted). Indeed, “the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the
parties alone will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary
judgment.” Id. at 247–48 (emphasis in
original). Thus, the nonmoving party may
not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or
denials but must set forth “‘concrete
particulars’” showing that a trial is needed.
R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751
F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting SEC v.
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33
(2d Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, it is
insufficient for a party opposing summary
judgment “‘merely to assert a conclusion
without supplying supporting arguments or
facts.’” BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir.
1996) (quoting Research Automation Corp.,
585 F.2d at 33).
III. DISCUSSION
“Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185,
provides federal courts with jurisdiction
over petitions brought to confirm labor
arbitration awards.” Local 802, Associated
Musicians of Greater N.Y. v. Parker
Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.
1998). “Confirmation of a labor arbitration
award under LMRA § 301 is ‘a summary
proceeding that merely makes what is
already a final arbitration award a judgment
of the Court.’” N.Y. Med. Ctr. of Queens v.
1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E.,
No. 11-CV-04421 (ENV) (RLM), 2012 WL
2179118, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012)
(quoting N.Y. City Dist. Council of
Once the moving party has met its
burden, the opposing party “‘must do more
than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts . . . . [T]he nonmoving party must
come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160
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Carpenters Pension Fund v. E. Millennium
Constr., Inc., No. 03-CV-5122, 2003 WL
22773355, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2003)).
Sanders Construction failed to pay
$30,651.30 in contributions to the Funds for
the period from July 1, 2012, through
December 31, 2012. Moreover, nothing in
the record suggests “that the arbitrator’s
award was procured through fraud or
dishonesty or that any other basis for
overturning the award exists.” Trustees for
the Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare
Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund &
Training Program Fund v. Odessy
Constructioncorp, No. 14-CV-1560-GHW,
2014 WL 3844619, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1,
2014) (granting unopposed motion for
summary
judgment
under
LMRA).
Accordingly, the Court confirms the
arbitration award of July 27, 2013.
The Supreme Court has recognized that
the LMRA expresses a “‘federal policy of
settling labor disputes by arbitration,’”
which “‘would be undermined if courts had
the final say on the merits of the awards.’”
United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)
(quoting Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
Accordingly, “the courts play only a limited
role when asked to review the decision of an
arbitrator.” Id.; see, e.g., Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S.
504, 509 (2001); First Nat’l Supermarkets,
Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale & Chain Store
Food Emps. Union Local 338, Affiliated
with the Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store
Union, AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d 892, 896 (2d Cir.
1997); Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. & Health
Care Employees Union, RWDSU, AFL-CIO
v. Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir.
1992). In this limited role, a court must
confirm an arbitration award as long as it
“‘draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement’ and is not the
arbitrator’s ‘own brand of industrial
justice.’” First Nat’l Supermarkets, 118 F.3d
at 896 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36).
“Courts are not authorized to review the
arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite
allegations that the decision rests on factual
errors or misinterprets the parties’
agreement.” Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 509. Indeed, “serious
error” and “improvident, even silly,
factfinding do[] not provide a basis for a
reviewing court to refuse to enforce the
award.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the
Court grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment and confirms the arbitration award
of July 27, 2013. The Clerk of the Court
shall enter judgment accordingly and close
this case.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________
JOSEPH F. BIANCO
United States District Judge
Dated: October 14, 2014
Central Islip, NY
*
*
*
Plaintiffs are represented by Charles R.
Virginia, Richard B. Epstein, and Michael
Howard Isaac of Virginia & Ambinder,
LLP, 40 Broad Street, 7th Floor, New York,
NY 10004. Defendant is represented by
Anthony Scott Poulin of Stephen Einstein &
Associates, 20 Vesey Street, Suite 1406,
New York, NY 10007.
In this case, there is no question that the
arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the
CBA, and that it is based upon evidence that
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