Jefferson v. Chicara et al
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM & ORDER denying 27 Motion for Discovery; terminating 28 Motion to Dismiss; granting 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 17 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; For the foregoing reasons, the Sta te Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 17) is GRANTED, and the County Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 16) is GRANTED; Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's cross-motion for expedited dis covery (Docket Entry 27) is DENIED. As discussed in footnote two, the Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the State Defendants' Letter Motion (Docket Entry 28.) The Clerk of the Court is directed to mark this case CLOSED and mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 3/26/2015. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------X
KEVIN L. JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
13-CV-5649(JS)(ARL)
-againstJUDITH CHICARA, JOHN ERICKSEN,
ANTHONY COTOV, STEVE SISINO,
EDWARD FRANKS, MATTHEW GARRETT,
DAVID CAHILL, CHRISTOPHER CUMMINGS,
and THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK,1
Defendants.
-------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Kevin L. Jefferson, pro se
8 Candlewood Road
N. Bay Shore, NY 11706
For Defendants
The State:
The County:
Dorothy O. Nese, Esq.
Office of the New York State Attorney General
200 Old County Road, Suite 460
Mineola, NY 11501
Brian C. Mitchell, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney’s Office
100 Veterans Memorial Highway
P.O. Box 6100
Hauppauge, NY 11788
At the commencement of this action, Plaintiff named certain
defendants as unidentified, John Doe defendants. The individual
whom Plaintiff sued as “Will Woe,” has been identified as
defendant Cotov. The remaining John Doe defendants have been
identified as Christopher Cummings, Steve Sisino, Edward Franks,
Matthew Garrett, and David Cahill. Accordingly, the Clerk of
the Court is DIRECTED to amend this case’s caption to substitute
the fictitious names of Gary Goe, Noel Noe, Carl Coe, Jack Joe,
and Pete Poe, with defendants listed above, respectively.
1
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Kevin L. Jefferson (“Jefferson” or
“Plaintiff”) commenced this 42 U.S.C § 1983 action on October 8,
2013 against defendants Judith Chicara (“Chicara”), John Ericksen
(“Ericksen”), and Anthony Cotov (“Cotov” and together with Chicara
and Ericksen, the “State Defendants”), Suffolk County (“Suffolk”),
Christopher Cummings (“Cummings”), Steve Sisino (“Sisino”), Edward
Franks (“Franks”), Matthew Garrett (“Garret”) and David Cahill
(“Cahill” and together with Suffolk, Cummings, Sisino, Franks, and
Garret, the “County Defendants”).
Plaintiff alleges violations of
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with his
March 22, 2011 arrest and detention in Suffolk County.
(Compl.,
Docket Entry 1, at 3.)
Pending before the Court are: (1) the motion of the State
Defendants to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)2 (Docket
Entry 17); (2) the motion of the County Defendants for judgment on
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)3 (Docket Entry 16); and
By letter to the Court, the State Defendants have also moved to
dismiss the Complaint as unopposed. (Ltr. Mot., Docket Entry
28.) By letter to the Court dated August 5, 2014, the State
Defendants have withdrawn that motion. (Aug. 5, 2014 Ltr.,
Docket Entry 33.) Accordingly the Clerk of the Court is
directed to terminate the State Defendants’ Letter Motion.
2
Suffolk represents that although it has identified all of the
individuals that would have interacted with Plaintiff on the day
3
2
(3) Plaintiff’s cross-motion against the State Defendants for
expedited discovery (Docket Entry 27).
For the following reasons,
the County Defendants’ motion is GRANTED,4 the State Defendants’
Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND5
On
or
about
March
22,
2011,
questioned Plaintiff in Mastic, New York.
After
he
learned
Plaintiff’s
identity,
Defendant
Cummings
(Compl. at 3, ¶ 1.)6
Cummings
contacted
his claim arose, it has been unable to identify precisely which
of these individuals correspond to each John Doe defendant named
in the Complaint. (County’s Br., Docket Entry 16-7, at 1.) As
discussed more fully in text, however, the Court does not need
to identify with any more specificity each defendant in order to
assess the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims.
4 Though the County Defendants have moved for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule 12(c), a 12(c) motion is
improper because the pleadings in this case have not yet closed.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) (“After the pleadings are closed . . . a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” (emphasis
added)). Nonetheless, the substance of the County Defendants’
motion mirrors that of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the legal
basis of the Complaint. Indeed, in briefing, the County
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.
(See County’s Br. at 2.) Accordingly, the Court considers the
County Defendants’ motion as brought under Federal Rule
12(b)(6). See, e.g, Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly
Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The standard for
granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is
identical to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state
a claim.” (citations omitted)).
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s complaint, and
are assumed true for the purposes of the instant motions.
5
The numbered paragraphs in Plaintiff’s Complaint restart three
times. Therefore, the Court’s citation to the Complaint gives
both the numbered paragraph and the page number generated by the
Electronic Case Filing System.
6
3
Plaintiff’s parole officer, Defendant Chicara.
¶ 21.)
(Compl. at 6,
Chicara informed Cummings that Plaintiff was wanted for a
parole violation.
(Compl. at 6, ¶ 21.)
statement, Cummings arrested Plaintiff.
Based on Chicara’s
(Compl. at 3, ¶ 1.)
Soon
after, one of the County Defendants transported Plaintiff to the
Suffolk County Jail.
(Compl. at 4, ¶ 6.)
When Plaintiff and the
County Defendant arrived at the Suffolk County Jail, a third County
Defendant informed the transporting officer that the facility
could not receive Plaintiff because his corresponding paperwork
was missing a parole retaking and temporary detention warrant.
(Compl. at 5, ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff was placed in a segregated holding
cell while the County Defendants attempted to locate the warrant
that authorized his arrest.
(Compl. at 5, ¶ 14.)
Shortly after he was placed in the segregated holding
cell, the County Defendants agreed to receive Plaintiff.
at 6, ¶ 15.)
(Compl.
Prior to his admittance, Plaintiff asked whether his
parole retaking warrant had been located, and a County Defendant
indicated that although it had not, he would bring the warrant to
the jail on the following day.
(Compl. at 6, ¶ 17.)
Believing that he was arrested in the absence of a
warrant, Plaintiff petitioned the New York State Courts for habeas
relief.
(Compl. at 7, ¶ 24.)
At his hearing, the Suffolk County
Assistant District Attorney produced a certified copy of the
warrant authorizing Plaintiff’s retaking.
4
(Compl. at 7, ¶ 26;
State’s Br., Docket Entry 18, Appx. 12.)
The warrant was issued
on March 18, 2011 by Defendant Erikson, and the copy of the warrant
offered was certified by Defendant Cotov on March 23, 2011.
(Compl. at 7, ¶ 26; State’s Br. Appx. 12.)
A timestamp on this
copy of the warrant indicates that the Suffolk County Jail received
it on March 23, 2011 at 3:55 PM.
(State’s Br. Appx. 12.)
In light
of the March 23 timestamp, Plaintiff argued that this copy of the
warrant could not serve as the basis for his arrest or detention,
because he was arrested on March 22, 2011.
adjourned to a later date.
At
his
second
Plaintiff’s matter was
(Compl. at 8, ¶ 28.)
habeas
hearing,
the
Suffolk
County
Assistant District Attorney offered a different certified copy of
the same warrant authorizing Plaintiff’s arrest.
¶ 30.)
11.)
This copy was certified March 22, 2011.
(Compl. at 8,
(State’s Br. Appx.
According to Plaintiff, the fact that Defendants produced
this earlier-certified copy of the warrant at the second habeas
hearing conclusively evidences some impropriety by the County
Defendants.
(Pl.’s Cross Mot., Docket Entry 27, at 16-17.)
Plaintiff’s petition for habeas relief was ultimately denied.
On May 4, 2011, Plaintiff’s parole hearing was held.
Based on Chicara’s testimony that Plaintiff failed to report as
directed, the hearing officer found that probable cause existed to
believe that Plaintiff had violated the terms of his parole.
(State’s Br. Appx. 15.)
Later, Plaintiff’s parole was revoked and
5
he was returned to the custody of the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision.
According
to
Plaintiff,
the
fact
that
the
warrant
authorizing his arrest was issued three days before his arrest, on
March 18, 2011, is of no moment.
He argues that because Cummings
apparently did not have a copy of the warrant at the time he
arrested Plaintiff, and because the Suffolk County Jail did not
have a copy of the warrant at the time it received Plaintiff, both
the State Defendants and the County Defendants falsely arrested
him.
(Compl. at 3.)
Finally and in summary fashion, Plaintiff states that
his alleged injuries resulted from both Suffolk County’s and New
York State’s “widespread practice, custom and policy of deliberate
indifference
prisoners.”
to
the
fundamental
constitutional
rights
of
(Compl. at 9, ¶¶ 32-33.)
DISCUSSION
The Court will first consider the State Defendants’
jurisdictional challenge before assessing whether Plaintiff has
stated
a
claim
upon
which
relief
Defendant.
6
can
be
granted
as
to
any
I.
The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction
The State Defendants contend that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine divests the Court of subject matter jurisdiction because
Plaintiff’s state-court habeas petition was denied.
A.
Legal Standard
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.”
United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
Makarova v.
In resolving a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court may consider affidavits and other materials beyond the
pleadings.
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167,
170 (2d Cir. 2008).
Though the court must accept the factual
allegations contained in the complaint as true, it will not draw
argumentative inferences in favor of plaintiffs; subject matter
jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively.
See id.; Atl. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Int’l Ltd., 968 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir.
1992); Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d
Cir. 1998).
“A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
it exists.”
B.
Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
7
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests a federal district
court of subject matter jurisdiction “over suits that are, in
substance, appeals from state-court judgments.”
Hoblock v. Albany
Cnty. Bd. of Elecs., 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150,
68 L. Ed. 362 (1923).
The doctrine precludes a district court
from hearing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries
caused
[federal]
by
district
state-court
court
judgments
proceedings
rendered
commenced
before
and
the
inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.
Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005).
The doctrine
therefore applies where: (1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in
state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the
state-court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites district court
review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state-court
judgment
was
commenced.
rendered
before
the
district
court
proceedings
Murphy v. Riso, No. 11-CV-0873, 2012 WL 94551, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2012) (citing Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85).
Here,
Plaintiff
complains
that
he
was
wrongfully
detained when he was arrested by Cummings March 22, 2011.
Because
the detention of which he complains began prior to the state-court
habeas proceeding, he is not complaining of an injury that was
“caused by” a state-court judgment.
8
See, e.g., McKithen v. Brown,
481 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] party is not complaining of
an injury ‘caused by’ a state-court judgment when the exact injury
of which the party complains in federal court existed prior in
time to the state-court proceedings, and so could not have been
‘caused by’ those proceedings.”).
Though the state-court habeas
proceeding ratified Plaintiff’s allegedly unlawful detention after
it commenced, the mere ratification is insufficient to trigger the
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See Hoblock, 422 F.3d
at 88 (requiring that the injury be “produced by a state-court
judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished
by it” (emphasis added)).
Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff alleges a violation of
his constitutional rights and because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
is inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims, the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
II.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The County Defendants and the State Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Because Plaintiff’s claims against the County Defendants
and the State Defendants suffer from the same defects, the Court
conducts a singular analysis.
A.
Legal Standard
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
applies a “plausibility standard,” which is guided by “[t]wo
9
working principles.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Harris v. Mills, 572
F.3d 66, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2009).
First, although the Court must
accept all allegations as true, this “tenet” is “inapplicable to
legal conclusions;” thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50;
Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.
Second, only complaints that state a
“plausible claim for relief” can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
Determining
whether a complaint does so is “a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.”
Id.; Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is confined
to “the allegations contained within the four corners of [the]
complaint.”
Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F. 3d 67,
71 (2d Cir. 1998).
However, this limitation has been interpreted
broadly to include any document attached to the complaint, any
statements
or
documents
incorporated
in
the
complaint
by
reference, any document on which the complaint heavily relies, and
anything of which judicial notice may be taken.
See Chambers v.
Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted); Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir.
1991).
10
Finally, although the Court is mindful of its obligation
to read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and to
interpret the complaint “to raise the strongest arguments that
they suggest,” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994),
the Court notes that Plaintiff is no stranger to litigation in
this Court.
He is currently a plaintiff in six active cases.
So
while the Court reads the Complaint with the required leniency, it
does so while observing that because Plaintiff is indeed familiar
with the applicable formalities and pleading requirements, the
Court’s
inclination
someday wane.
to
construe
his
pleadings
liberally
may
See Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding an “extremely litigious” pro se litigant not entitled to
having his pleadings construed liberally); c.f. Lerman v. Bd. of
Elections in City of N.Y., 232 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the liberal pleading standard is afforded to pro
se litigants because “most pro se plaintiffs lack familiarity with
the formalities of pleading requirements”).
B.
False Arrest
Plaintiff’s claims sound in false arrest.
“Claims for
false arrest . . . brought under § 1983 to vindicate the Fourth
and
Fourteenth
seizures,
are
Amendment
right
substantially
arrest . . . under state law.”
to
the
be
free
same
as
from
claims
unreasonable
for
false
Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128,
134 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
11
To state a claim for false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff
must allege that: “(1) the defendant intended to confine him,
(2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the
plaintiff
did
not
consent
to
the
confinement
confinement was not otherwise privileged.”
and
(4)
the
Broughton v. State of
N.Y., 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 335 N.E.2d 310, 314, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87
(1975); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 853 (2d Cir. 1996).
In
Heck
v.
Humphrey,
the
Supreme
Court
added
an
additional hurdle to a prisoner seeking civil damages under § 1983
for false arrest.
512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372,
129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994).
Due to the overlap between § 1983 and
the federal habeas corpus statute and the “hoary principle that
civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging
the validity of outstanding criminal judgments,” the Court held
that a § 1983 action for false arrest that would necessarily
implicate the invalidity of an underlying conviction or sentence
is not actionable unless the underlying conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.
2372.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at
Specifically, the Supreme Court explained:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal
authorized
to
make
such
12
determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is
not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a
state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,
the district court must consider whether a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence; if it would, the
complaint must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction
or sentence has already been invalidated.
Id. at 486-87; 114 S. Ct. at 2372.
Additionally, “[f]ederal courts have held that Heck
applies to Section 1983 actions that challenge the fact or duration
of confinement based on the revocation of parole.” Davis v. Cotov,
214 F. Supp. 2d 310, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (collecting cases); Lee
v. Donnaruma, 63 F. App’x 39, 41 (2d Cir. 2003); Pugh v. Wright,
No. 13-CV-7350, 2014 WL 639421, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014).
Accordingly, Plaintiff must allege that his arrest and
detention has been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid, for a
civil action before this Court is not the appropriate vehicle to
challenge, in the first instance, the validity of that action.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372.
Plaintiff does not
allege that he has succeeded in establishing the invalidity of his
arrest and detention during the parole hearing process in an
appropriate state or federal proceeding.
As a consequence, the
Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a cognizable § 1983
13
claim.
McClinton v. Henderson, No. 13-CV-3335, 2014 WL 2048389,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014); Davis, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
Even assuming Plaintiff could somehow avoid Heck’s bar,
Plaintiff
has
not
suffered
a
constitutional
injury.
While
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants did not have a valid copy of
the warrant with them at the time of his arrest and detention,
Plaintiff’s contention does not change that a warrant was issued.
Cummings’ knowledge of the issued warrant amounts to probable
cause.
See Omar v. City of N.Y., No. 13-CV-2439, 2015 WL 857587,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2015) (“Probable cause exists to arrest
when an officer learns of an open arrest warrant.”); Martinez v.
City of N.Y., 340 F. App’x 700, 702 (2d Cir. 2009). Thus, Plaintiff
cannot state a § 1983 because Cummings had probable cause to arrest
him.
Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.
1995) (“There can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest
where the arresting officer had probable cause.”); see also United
States v. Jackson, 22 F.R.D. 38, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (explaining
that the a arrest of a defendant for parole violation pursuant to
a warrant is a lawful arrest even though arresting officers did
not have a warrant or a copy thereof in their possession).
Plaintiff appears to argue in his cross motion that the
warrant offered by Defendants is a fraudulent document.
Such
allegations are not in the Complaint, and even if they were,
Plaintiff’s claims still fail for lack of a constitutional injury.
14
Arresting an individual for a parole violation without a warrant
does not run afoul of the United States Constitution.
United
States v. Bernacet, 724 F.3d 269, 278-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 806, 187 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2013).
In People v. Bratton,
the New York Court of Appeals held that New York State’s parole
scheme prohibited the arrest of parolee for a violation of his
parole without a valid retaking warrant.
8 N.Y.3d 637, 640, 870
N.E.2d 146, 148, 838 N.Y.S.2d 828 (2007).
This legislation,
however, does not create a constitutional cause of action for a
warrantless parole retaking.
See id. (The legislation has changed
since 1978, but the constitutional analysis has not.”).7
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants’ motion
to dismiss (Docket Entry 17) is GRANTED, and the County Defendants’
motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 16) is GRANTED; Plaintiff’s claims
are
DISMISSED
WITH
PREJUDICE.8
Plaintiff’s
cross-motion
for
expedited discovery (Docket Entry 27) is DENIED.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s action is barred by
Heck v. Humphrey and, in any event, Plaintiff has not alleged a
constitutional injury, the Court does not reach Defendants’
remaining arguments, such as qualified immunity and the lack of
a municipal custom or policy under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 611 (1978).
7
Although the disposition of a case on Heck grounds generally
warrants only dismissal without prejudice, because the suit may
be reinstituted should the plaintiff’s conviction be
invalidated, Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1999),
8
15
As discussed in footnote two, the Clerk of the Court is
directed to terminate the State Defendants’ Letter Motion (Docket
Entry 28.)
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mark this case
CLOSED and mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
March
26 , 2015
Central Islip, New York
as discussed supra, Heck is not the only fatal infirmity in
Plaintiff’s claim, and a dismissal with prejudice is therefore
warranted.
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?