Merchant v. Long Island Newsday LLC et al
Filing
7
MEMORANDUM & ORDER re: Plaintiff's 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED and Plaintiff's 6 Motion to Permit Access to law library and subpoenas is DENIED AS MOOT. However, the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. The Court certifies that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. This case is CLOSED. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 5/28/2014. (C/M Plaintiff w/copy of Westlaw case 2010 WL 3419659) (Nohs, Bonnie)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
JERRY MERCHANT,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-1674(JS)(AKT)
-againstLONG ISLAND NEWSDAY LLC, KEVIN
DEUISCH, and HOWARD SCHNAPP,
Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Jerry Merchant, pro se
1006880
Nassau County Correctional Center
100 Carman Avenue
East Meadow, NY 11554
For Defendants:
No appearances
SEYBERT, District Judge:
On March 12, 2014, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Jerry
Merchant (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Long Island Newsday, LLC
(“Newsday”),
(“Schnapp”)
Kevin
Deuisch
(collectively,
(“Deuisch”),
“Defendants”),
and
Howard
accompanied
Schnapp
by
an
application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Upon
review
of
the
declaration
in
support
of
the
application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of
the
filing
fee.
See
28
U.S.C.
§§
1914(a);
1915(a)(1).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED.
sua
However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is
sponte
DISMISSED
WITH
PREJUDICE
pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff’s brief, handwritten Complaint, submitted on
the Court’s Section 1983 complaint form, complains about an article
written by Deuish with a photograph taken by Schnapp, concerning
Plaintiff
that
specifically,
ran
in
Newsday
Plaintiff
was
on
September
named
in
an
22,
2013.
article
More
about
the
arraignment of six people, including Plaintiff, the day after a
courtroom fight broke out between supporters of a murder suspect
and those of the victim at the District Court in Hempstead, New
York.
Plaintiff
was
one
of
several
photographs accompanying the article.
people
pictured
in
the
According to Plaintiff, the
Newsday article “intentionally promoted fraudulent news” because
Plaintiff was not arraigned for felony rioting as was reported.
Rather, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was arraigned for “Criminal
Contempt,
Riot
in
the
Second
[Degree],
Resisting
Obstructing of Government Admin. and Disorderly conduct.”
Arrest,
(Compl.
at 5.)
As a result, Plaintiff seeks to recover “millions”.
(Compl.
¶
Plaintiff’s
V.)
name
Plaintiff
also
and
by
image
demands
printing
that
a
Newsday
“complete
clear
article
explaining [its] errors, and Plaintiff’s talents and business.”
1
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purpose of this Memorandum and
Order.
2
(Compl. ¶ V.)
DISCUSSION
I.
In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the
application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fees.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Therefore,
Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.
Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to
dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from
such
1915A(b).
relief.
See
28
U.S.C.
§§
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),
The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as
it makes such a determination.
See id. § 1915A(b).
Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).
However, a complaint must plead sufficient
facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
3
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).
The
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).
While
“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at
Iqbal, 556 U.S.
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III.
Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Rehberg v. Paulk, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.
Ct. 1497, 1501–02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).
under
Section
1983,
a
plaintiff
must
To state a claim
“‘allege
that
(1)
the
challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person
who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States.’”
Rae v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 693 F. Supp. 2d
217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53
4
(2d Cir. 1999)).
A.
State Action
Section 1983 “constrains only state conduct, not the
‘acts of private persons or entities.’”
Hooda v. Brookhaven Nat’l
Lab., 659 F. Supp. 2d 382, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2769, 73 L. Ed.
2d 418 (1982)).
Accordingly, “a litigant claiming that his
constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that
the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Fabrikant v. French, 691
F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff pressing a claim of
violation of his constitutional rights under Section 1983 is . . .
required to show state action.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Indeed, “the under-color-of- state-law element
of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S. Ct. 977, 985, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130
(1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Private actors, such as the Defendants, may be considered
to be acting under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983 if
the private actors were “‘willful participant[s] in joint activity
with the State or its agents.’”
Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau,
292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
5
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1606, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1970)). Section 1983 liability may also extend to a private party
who
conspires
with
a
constitutional rights.
state
actor
to
violate
a
plaintiff’s
Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323-24.
In order
to state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege:
“(1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to
act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an
overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”
Id.
at 324-25 (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.
1999)).
Here,
Plaintiff
does
not
allege
that
any
of
the
Defendants acted under color of state law or acted jointly with a
state actor.
Nor are there any facts from which the Court could
reasonably construe a conspiracy claim.
Thus, in the absence of
any state action, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the
Defendants are not plausible as a matter of law.
Ciambriello, 292
F.3d at 325; see also Sanders v. Long Island Newsday, 09-CV-2393,
2010 WL 3419659, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (dismissing Section
1983 claims against Newsday finding that “actions by journalists in
publishing a newspaper article, even if those actions include
interviewing prosecutors or police officers, do not constitute
state action . . . .”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983
claims against the Defendants are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
6
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is
sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
Plaintiff’s
motion
seeking
an
order
permitting
law
library access and subpoenas (Docket Entry 6) is subsequently
DENIED AS MOOT.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,
82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to mark this case
closed.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
May
28 , 2014
Central Islip, New York
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