France v. Nassau County Jail et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. SO ORDERED that plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted; the claims against the Jail are sua sponte dismissed in their entirety with prejudice purs uant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l) for failure to state a claim for relief; the Section 1983 claims against the Jail Officers, and as construed to be against the County, are sua sponte dismissed in their entirety without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l) for failure to state a claim for relief, provided that plaintiff file an amended complaint in accordance with this Order on or before June 9, 2014, or the claims against the Jail Officers, and as construed to be against the County, will be deemed dismissed in their entirety with prejudice; and any state law claims asserted in the complaint are dismissed in their entirety without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), unless plaintiff files an amended complaint pleading a viable federal claim against defts in accordance with this Order. The Clerk of the Court shall serve notice of entry of this Order upon plaintiff in accordance with Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and record such service on the docket. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. CM to pro se plaintiff. Ordered by Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein on 5/6/2014. (Florio, Lisa)

;

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FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MR. SIDNEY FRANCE,

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U S DISTRICT COURT E D NY

*

MAY C6 2014

*

LONG ISLAND OFFICE
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-2547(SJF)(GRB)

-againstNASSAU COUNTY JAIL,
NASSUA (SIC] JAIL OFFICERS,
Defendants.

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FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

On April21, 2014, incarcerated prose plaintiff Sidney France ("plaintiff') filed a
complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against the Nassau County
Jail ("the Jail") and unidentified "Nassua [sic] Jail Officers" ("the Jail Officers") (collectively,
"defendants"), accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Since plaintiff's
financial status, as set forth in his declaration in support of his application to proceed in forma

pauperis, qualifies him to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee, see 28
U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) and 1915(a)(l), his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
However, for the reasons set forth below, the complaint is sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l) forfailure to state a claim for relief.

I.

Background1
The complaint alleges, in its entirety:
"To Whom This my [sic] Concern

1

All material allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purposes of this Order, see,
~. Rogers v. Citv of Troy. New York, 148 F .3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a pro se
complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court is required to accept the material allegations in the
complaint as true), and do not constitute findings of fact by the Court.

I conduct myself properly doing [sic] my visit. I was not in
possetion [sic] of any contraband doing [sic] my short visit when
the officer take me in handcluff [sic] as soon as I set [sic] down,
they came in grab [sic] me in srip [sic] me for my closes [sic].
They sent me back to my Dorm. I only had one person that comes
in [sic] visit me. They take [sic] that from me. The person that
came had no contraband, nother [sic] did I. So I have Booth Visit
for nothing. I didn't get a wright [sic] up so why am I in Booth
Visit for something I didn't do. I feel all my right [sic] been
violated in [ sic] my visiter [sic] as well."
(Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff does not allege any injury or seek any relief. (/d. at~~ IV.A-V, and at 6.)

II.

Discussion
A.

Standard of Review

Under both the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the in forma
pauperis statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and
1915(e)(2)(B). See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding both Section
1915 and Section 1915A to be applicable to a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis).
It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally,

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (citation
omitted), and to construe them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Gerstenbluth
v. Credit Suisse Securities CUSA) LLC, 728 F.3d 139, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotations and
citations omitted). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the
truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d Ill, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), affd- U.S.----, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185

2

'

L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009)); see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. ofEduc, 544 U.S. 167, 171, 125 S. Ct. 1497, 161

L. Ed. 2d 361 (2005).
Nevertheless, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to "state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Bell At!. Com. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167

L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). While the plausibility standard "does not require detailed factual
allegations," it "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937. "A pleading that offers 'labels and
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."' Id.
(quoting Twombly. 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
'naked assertion[s)' devoid of 'further factual enhancement."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557, 127 S. Ct. 1937); accord Pension Benefit Guar. Com. ex rei. Saint Vincent Catholic Med.
Ctr. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc, 712 F.3d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 2013).

B.

Section 1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and Jaws, shall be liable to the party injured."
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (I) that the
challenged conduct was "committed by a person acting under color of state Jaw," and (2) that
such conduct "deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws ofthe United States." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)
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(citing Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Rehberg v. Paulk,--- U.S.
----, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501-02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012); see also Ahlers v. Rabinowitb 684
F.3d 53, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 466, 184 L. Ed. 2d 261 (2012).

1.

Claims against the Jail

'"Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a
municipality, do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue
or be sued."' Burbar v. Incorporated Village of Garden Citv. 961 F. Supp. 2d 462,471 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (quoting Hall v. Citv of White Plain~ 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)); see also
Robischung-Walsh v. Nassau Countv Police Dep'!, 699 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 2010),
affd, 421 F. App'x 38 (2d Cir. 2011). Since the Jail is an administrative arm of the County of
Nassau ("the County"), see,~ Jones v. Nassau Countv Correctional Inst., Nos. 14-cv-1217, 14cv-1562, 2014 WL 1277908, at* 4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014) (holding that the Nassau County
Jail is merely an administrative arm of the County ofNassau and "lack[s] any independent legal
identity apart from Nassau County"); Thomas v. Armor ofMedicill, No. 13-cv-5786, 2014 WL
112374, at* 3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2014) (dismissing claim against the Nassau County Jail because
it "has no legal identity separate and apart from Nassau County"); Hawkins v. Nassau County
Corr. Facility, 781 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 at n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), it lacks the capacity to be sued.
Accordingly, the claims against the Jail are sua sponte dismissed in their entirety with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l) for failure to state a claim for relief.
However, since plaintiff is proceeding prose, his Section 1983 claims against the Jail will be
construed as being brought against the County.

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2.

Municipal Liability

"(A] municipality [or municipal entity] can be held liable under Section 1983 if the
deprivation of the plaintiffs rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy,
or usage of the municipality [or municipal entity]." Jones v. Town of East Have!], 691 F.3d 72,
80 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 125, 187 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2013). "Absent such a
custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for
the tort of its employee." Id.; see also Connick v. Thompso!J,- U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359,
179 L. Ed. 2d 4 I 7 (20 II) (holding that under Section 1983, governmental bodies are not
vicariously liable for their employees' actions); Los Angeles County. California v. Humphrie:;;U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. 447, 452, 178 L. Ed. 2d 460 (2010)("[A] municipality cannot be held liable
solely for the acts of others,~ solely because it employs a tortfeasor." (emphasis in original)
(quotations and citation omitted)); Monell v. Department of Social Services of City ofNew York,
436 U.S. 658,691,98 S. Ct. 2018,56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim
against a municipal entity, a plaintiff must show: "(1) actions taken under color of law; (2)
deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an
official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury." Roe v. City ofWaterburv,
542 F.3d 31,36 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Connick,-U.S. -,131 S. Ct. at 1359 ("Plaintiffs who
seek to impose liability on local governments under Section 1983 must prove that 'action
pursuant to official municipal policy' caused their injury." (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691,98 S.
Ct. 2018)); Humphries,- U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. at 452 ("[A] municipality may be held liable when
execution of a government's policy or custom . .. inflicts the injury." (emphasis in original)
(quotations and citation omitted)). "A municipal policy may be pronounced or tacit and reflected
in either action or inaction." Cash v. County ofEri!l, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). "Official

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municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its
policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force
oflaw." Connick,- U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. at 1359.
In addition, municipal liability can be established "by showing that a policymaking
official ordered or ratified the employee's actions- either expressly or tacitly." Jones, 691 F.3d
at 81. "Thus, a plaintiff can prevail against a municipality [or municipal entity] by showing that
the policymaking official was aware of the employee's unconstitutional actions and consciously
chose to ignore them." Id. To establish such deliberate indifference, "a plaintiff must show that
a policymaking official was aware of constitutional injury, or the risk of constitutional injury, but
failed to take appropriate action to prevent or sanction violations of constitutional rights." Id.
"Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Id. (quotations and citation
omitted). "[D]eliberate indifference requires a showing that the official made a conscious choice,
and was not merely negligent." Id.; see also Cash, 654 F.3d at 334.
To state a claim for municipal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege more
than that a municipal policy or custom exists. See Triano v. Town of Harrison. N.Y., 895 F.
Supp. 2d 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Santos v. New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). "Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts tending to support, at least
circumstantially, an inference that such a municipal policy or custom exists." Santos, 84 7 F.
Supp. 2d at 576; see also Triano, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (accord).
The complaint is devoid of any factual allegations from which it may reasonably be
inferred that a municipal policy or custom caused the conduct of which plaintiff complains.
Plaintiff has not alleged: (I) the existence of a formal policy which is officially endorsed by the

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County or the Jail; (2) actions taken or decisions made by County or Jail policymaking officials
which caused the alleged violation of his civil rights; (3) a County or Jail practice so persistent
and widespread as to practically have the force of law; or (4) a failure by County or Jail
policymakers to properly train or supervise their subordinates, amounting to "deliberate
indifference" to the rights of those who come in contact with their employees. Accordingly,
plaintiffs Section 1983 claims as construed to be against the County are dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l) for failure to state a claim for relief.

3.

Claims against the Jail Officers

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain, inter alia, "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), and "a demand for the relief sought •

* *,"Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).

A complaint must

contain factual allegations that are sufficient to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Anderson News. L.L.C. v. American
Media. Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 182 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied by Curtis Circulation Co. v. Anderson
News. L.L.C, 133 S. Ct. 846, 184 L. Ed. 2d 655 (2013). "Fair notice is that which will enable
the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata, and
identifY the nature of the case so it may be assigned the proper form of trial." Simmons v.
Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83,86 (2d Cir. 1995). "Rule 8(a) contemplates the statement of circumstances,
occurrences, and events in support of the claim presented and does not authorize a pleader's bare
averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it." Anderson News, 680 F.3d at 182 (quotations,
brackets and citations omitted).
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"For a complaint to be sufficient, the claim asserted must be one that, in light of the
factual allegations, is at least 'plausible."' Anderson News, 680 F.3d at 182. To present a
plausible claim, the complaint "must allege facts that would be sufficient to permit a reasonable
inference that the defendant has engaged in culpable conduct: 'A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."' Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
S.Ct. at 1949).
When a complaint fails to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading standard, a district court may
dismiss the complaint on motion or sua sponte. Simmons, 49 F.3d at 86; see also Kalderon v.
Finkelstein, 495 F. App'x 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[T]he District Court would have acted well
within its discretion in dismissing the complaint (with leave to replead) for failure to comply with
Rule 8(a)(2) and (d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.") However, "if the court
dismisses the complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8, it should generally give the plaintiff
leave to amend •
nonfrivolous."

* • especially • * * when the complaint states a claim that is on its face

Simmon~

49 F.3d at 86-87.

Plaintiff's complaint, even liberally read, does not meet the pleading requirements of Rule
8(a), since, inter alia, it cannot be discerned from the complaint when or where the acts of which
plaintiff complains occurred so as to enable the County to even identify any of the unnamed Jail
Officers, much Jess file an answer or prepare a defense on their behalf, and it does not seek any
relief, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3). Accordingly, plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the Jail
Officers are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l) for failure to
state a claim for relief.

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4.

Leave to Amend

Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party shall be given
leave to amend "when justice so requires." "[W]hen addressing a prose complaint, a district
court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of
the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Thompson v. Carter, 284
F.3d 411,416 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Grullon v. Citv ofNew
Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2013) (accord). Accordingly, plaintiff's Section 1983
claims against the Jail Officers, and as construed to be against the County, are dismissed without
prejudice, provided that plaintiff file an amended complaint against the Jail Officers and the

County in accordance with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Order
on or before June 9, 2014, or the claims against the Jail Officers, and as construed to be against
the County, will be deemed dismissed in their entirety with prejudice. If plaintiff chooses to file
an amended complaint, he must set forth the factual allegations to support his claim(s) against
defendant(s), including all relevant dates, times, locations and any other facts from which the
identity of the unidentified defendants may be ascertained. If plaintiff is unable to identify the
Jail Officers he seeks to sue within the time allowed, he may include them as "John Doe" or
"Jane Doe" in the amended complaint. The amended complaint must be captioned as an
"Amended Complaint" and bear the same docket number as this Order.

C.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

Although the dismissal of state law claims is not required when the federal claims in an
action are dismissed, a federal court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Carlsbad Technology. Inc. v. HIF Bio,
Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1866-1867, 173 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2009) (holding that a district

9

court's decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over
which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary); Pension Benefit, 712 F.3d at 726 ("It is
a truism of federal civil procedure that in providing that a district court 'may' decline to exercise
[supplemental] jurisdiction,§ 1367(c) is permissive rather than mandatory." (quotations, brackets
and citation omitted)). The court must "consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of
the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to
decide whether to exercise jurisdiction" over the pendent state law claims. Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,350, n. 7,108 S. Ct. 614,98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988);see also Lundy
v. Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc, 71 I F.3d 106, I I 7-18 (2d Cir. 2013) (accord).
Generally, where all of the federal claims in an action are dismissed before trial, the balance of
factors will favor declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims. See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n. 7, 108 S. Ct. 614; Lundy, 7Il F.3d at liS ("Once all
federal claims have been dismissed, the balance of factors will usually point toward a
declination."); Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, I 13-14 (2d Cir. 2010)("[I]f a plaintiffs
federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.")
Insofar as the complaint can be read to assert any state law claims against defendants, in
light of the dismissal of all federal claims in this action prior to service of summonses and the
complaint upon defendants, and upon consideration of all relevant factors, i.e., judicial economy,
convenience, fairness and comity, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.
Accordingly, any state law claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3), unless plaintiff files an amended complaint pleading a viable federal claim against
defendants in accordance with this Order.

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III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted; the claims against the Jail are sua sponte dismissed in their entirety with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l) for failure to state a claim for relief;
the Section 1983 claims against the Jail Officers, and as construed to be against the County, are
sua sponte dismissed in their entirety without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l) for failure to state a claim for relief, provided that plaintiff file
an amended complaint in accordance with this Order on or before June 9, 2014, or the claims
against the Jail Officers, and as construed to be against the County, will be deemed dismissed in
their entirety with prejudice; and any state law claims asserted in the complaint are dismissed in
their entirety without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), unless plaintiff files an
amended complaint pleading a viable federal claim against defendants in accordance with this
Order. Pursuant to Rule 77(d)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Clerk of the Court
shall serve notice of entry of this Order upon plaintiff in accordance with Rule 5(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and record such service on the docket.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d
21 (1962).
SO ORDERED.

s/ Sandra J. Feuerstein
Sandra J. Feuerstein
United States District Judge

Dated: May 6, 2014
Central Islip, New York

II