Carr v. North Shore Long Island Jewish Health Systems, Inc.
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting in part and denying in part 28 Motion to Dismiss; For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 28) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert discr imination claims separate and apart from her failure to hire allegations, Plaintiff's "unlawful discrimination" claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, Defendant's motion is otherwise DENIED and Plaintiff's failure to hire claims shall proceed to discovery. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 6/23/2016. C/ECF (Valle, Christine)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
TINA M. CARR,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-3257(JS)(SIL)
-againstNORTH SHORE – LONG ISLAND JEWISH
HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Lance D. Simon, Esq.
Simon Law Group, PLLC
120 Court Street
Riverhead, NY 11901
For Defendant:
Peter D. Stergios, Esq.
McCarter & English, LLP
245 Park Avenue, 27th Floor
New York, NY 10167
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Tina M. Carr (“Plaintiff”) commenced this
action against defendant North Shore – Long Island Jewish Health
System, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging unlawful discrimination and
failure to hire on the basis of sex and religion in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§
2000e
et
seq.;
and
the
New
York
(“NYSHRL”), N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 et seq.
is
Defendant’s
motion
to
dismiss
State
Human
Rights
Law
Pending before the Court
Plaintiff’s
Second
Amended
Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).
(Docket Entry 28.)
For the reasons that follow,
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff is a transsexual female and a member of the
Unitarian Universalist Church.
(SAC, Docket Entry 26, ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff was a student of the Sanford Brown Institute in Melville,
New York (“Sanford Brown”), and was working toward her Associates
degree in Applied Sciences.
(SAC ¶ 7.)
In the summer of 2012,
Plaintiff was among a group of students proposed by Sanford Brown
to Defendant for a medical assistant extern position.
10.)
(SAC ¶¶ 9-
On August 13, 2012 Defendant selected Plaintiff for an
externship without having an in-person interview.
(SAC ¶¶ 12-13.)
Before her externship began, Plaintiff interviewed for
a full-time, position with Christine Torre (“Torre”), an employee
of Defendant.
(SAC ¶ 14.)
During the interview, Torre explained
that the successful completion of the externship program would
culminate in an offer of employment with Defendant. (SAC ¶ 15.)
In subsequent correspondence, Plaintiff continued to express her
interest in Defendant as an employer. (SAC ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff began her externship on August 27, 2012 under
the supervision of Christine Demers (“Demers”).
(SAC ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff alleges that even though Demers was typically cordial
with Plaintiff one-on-one, she harbored discriminatory animus
The following facts are taken from the SAC and are presumed to
be true for the purposes of this Memorandum and Order.
1
2
against Plaintiff based upon her gender and religion.
31-32.)
(SAC ¶¶ 18,
Plaintiff alleges that despite their friendly one-on-one
interactions,
Demers
presence of others.
consistently
(SAC ¶ 18.)
demeaned
Plaintiff
in
the
For example, on one occasion,
Demers asked Plaintiff to assist in the collection of blood from
a patient. (SAC ¶ 19.)
As Plaintiff conducted the procedure,
Demers ‘“huffed and puffed’ and acted noticeably annoyed with
[Plaintiff] despite the fact that [Plaintiff] did nothing wrong.”
(SAC ¶ 19.)
In addition, Demers yelled at [Plaintiff] numerous times
while she assisted Demers with patients.
Demers would often ask
Plaintiff to hand her medical instruments by pointing to the
instruments rather than articulating which instrument she wanted.
(SAC ¶ 20.)
If Plaintiff retrieved the wrong instrument, Demers
would scream “‘what is wrong with you.’”
(SAC ¶ 20.)
Plaintiff
similarly claims that Demers “belittled” her by assigning her to
package dog treats for a pet fair.
(SAC ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff also alleges that she was repeatedly locked
out of the bathroom used by Defendant’s female employees.
¶ 25.)
(SAC
Several times when she attempted to access the bathroom
she heard “chatter,” and was subject to “stares” from unnamed
employees.
(SAC ¶ 25.)
On one occasion, after encountering a
locked ladies room, Plaintiff asked Demers why the bathroom was
locked and Demers replied that Plaintiff “was to use the public
3
restroom, and not the restroom designated for the female employees
in the unit where she served as an extern.”
(SAC ¶ 27.)
Plaintiff
also alleges that Demers called Plaintiff’s sex into question on
another occasion.
Specifically, prior to an examination of a
female patient, Plaintiff was “left behind a closed door” and told
by Demers that “only females were permitted beyond this point.”
(SAC ¶ 28.)
Despite the adversity Plaintiff complains of, she had a
positive meeting with Torre on September 14, 2014, during which
Torre informed her that she was “performing as expected.”
(SAC
¶ 30.)
On September 25, 2012, however, Plaintiff participated
in a conversation with Demers and other staff members.
During the
conversation, Ms. Demers inquired about Plaintiff’s religion, and
Plaintiff
told
her
that
alternative lifestyles.”
her
“church
(SAC ¶ 31.)
catered
to
people
of
In response, “Demers told
[Plaintiff] that Jesus did not recognize such a religion -- citing
her own background as a preacher’s daughter from the South.”
(SAC
¶ 31.) That same day, Plaintiff recounts that she overheard Demers
telling a patient’s mother that the “Unitarian Universalist is not
a religion that is recognized by Jesus and people like her, and
the he-shes, . . . and the gays will need to answer to Jesus some
day.”
(SAC ¶ 32.)
The following morning, Plaintiff received an email from Torre
4
asking her not to return to her externship.
Affirm., Docket Entry 21, Ex. 4.)
email
the
following
mistreatment.
(SAC ¶ 34; Schmid
Plaintiff responded to Torre’s
morning,
discussing
(SAC ¶¶ 35, 37.)
Demers
alleged
Plaintiff did not receive a
response from Torre until Plaintiff received a copy of Demers’
evaluation of her, dated on October 3, 2012.
(SAC ¶ 38.)
Based upon these facts, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
failed to hire her based upon sex and religion in violation of
Title VII and the NYHRL.
(SAC ¶¶ 43-43.)
Plaintiff alleges that
“all, or nearly all,” of Plaintiff’s peers at Sanford Brown that
completed an externship with Defendant were offered and accepted
permanent positions with Defendant. (SAC ¶ 40.) Plaintiff further
claims
that
it
is
Defendant’s
custom
and
practice
to
offer
permanent positions to externs upon successful completion of the
externship program.
(SAC ¶ 41.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 27, 2014.
Memorandum
&
Order
dated
July
30,
2015
the
Court
By
dismissed
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, finding that “Plaintiff did not
adequately plead that Defendant’s ejection of her candidacy for
full-timeemployment arose under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discriminatory animus.”
Jewish
Health
Sys.,
No.
(E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015).
Carr v. N. Shore-Long Island
14-CV-3257,
2015
WL
4603389,
at
*4
However, the Court allowed Plaintiff to
amend her Complaint and Plaintiff filed the SAC on August 29, 2015.
5
On September 28, 2015, Defendant again moved to dismiss and
Defendant’s
motion
is
currently
pending
before
the
Court.
Defendant argues that: (1) Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed as
speculative, (2) Plaintiff’s unlawful discrimination claims fail
because
Plaintiff
was
not
Defendant’s
employee,
and
(3)
Plaintiff’s failure to hire claim is still deficient because
Plaintiff has not alleged that she was denied permanent employment
with Defendant because of her sex and religion.
Docket Entry 30, at 6-11.)
(Def.’s Br.,
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s
state law claim is barred by the election of remedies doctrine.
(Def.’s Br. at 11-12.)
DISCUSSION
The
Court
will
first
address
the
applicable
legal
standards before turning to Defendant’s motion more specifically.
I.
Legal Standard
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
applies a “plausibility standard,” which is guided by “[t]wo
working principles.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007); accord Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2009).
First, although the Court must accept all allegations as true,
this
“tenet”
is
“inapplicable
to
legal
conclusions;”
thus,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
6
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678, 127 S. Ct. at 1949; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at
72.
Second, only complaints that state a “plausible claim for
relief” can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
Iqbal, 556
Determining whether a complaint
does so is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id.;
accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.
II.
Defendant’s Blanket Assertion
“Speculative” is Meritless
Defendant
first
argues
that
that
Plaintiff’s
Plaintiff’s
Case
is
allegations
should be dismissed as “speculative” because Plaintiff questioned
in her final email to Torre whether or not she was fired because
of her gender, stating in the email, “was it my Gender, I’m not
sure.” (Def.’s Br. at 8.) However, Plaintiff’s subjective comment
about Defendant’s intent is irrelevant.
Rather, the relevant
inquiry is whether the SAC plausibly alleges that “plaintiff is a
member of a protected class, was qualified, suffered an adverse
employment action, and has at least minimal support for the
proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory
intent.”
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d
Cir. 2015).
Whether or not Plaintiff subjectively believed at the
time she was terminated that she was the victim of discrimination
is not dispositive with respect to the element of intent.
7
III. Plaintiff’s Failure to Hire Claims Shall Proceed to Discovery
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to hire her
because of her gender in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions,
or
privileges
of
employment,
because
of
such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
42
The NYSHRL contains a similar provision.
See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.
Thus, in order to state a claim for
failure to hire under either Title VII or the NYSHRL, a plaintiff
must allege that she (1) applied for a position, (2) that she was
qualified for that position, and (3) that she was rejected under
circumstances
giving
discrimination.
rise
to
an
inference
of
unlawful
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).
The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s failure to
hire claims, holding that “Plaintiff did not adequately plead that
Defendant’s rejection of her candidacy for full-time employment
arose
under
circumstances
discrimination.”
Plaintiff
only
giving
rise
submission
an
inference
Carr, 2015 WL 4603389, at *4.
alleged
that
Demers
made
implicating Plaintiff’s sex and religion.
the
to
of
Plaintiff’s
SAC,
8
a
Previously,
single
Id. at *3.
Defendant
of
again
comment
Following
moves
to
dismiss, arguing that the SAC still does not contain sufficient
evidence of discriminatory intent.
Although
a
single
(Def.’s Br. at 11.)
stray
mark
does
not
support
an
inference of discriminatory intent, multiple comments showing that
a
decision-maker
harbored
discriminatory
animus
against
the
plaintiff can provide enough evidence to allow the plaintiff’s
discrimination claim to proceed to discovery.
Vega v. Hempstead
Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining
that the plaintiff “need only give plausible support to a minimal
inference of discriminatory motivation” to survive a motion to
dismiss) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Compare
Jowers v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 09-CV-2620, 2010 WL
3528978, at *1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2010) (noting that the single
statement that “black people are lazy and incompetent” just eight
days prior to the plaintiff’s termination was a stray remark
insufficient to establish an inference of discrimination on its
own), aff’d, 455 F. App’x 100 (2d Cir. 2012); with Chavez v. Credit
Nation Auto Sales, LLC, --- F. App’x ----, 2016 WL 158820, at *6
(11th Cir. 2016) (finding that numerous minor comments about and
employee’s
failure
to
transgender
follow
its
status,
own
coupled
progressive
constituted sufficient evidence to
with
the
disciplinary
process
create an issue of material
fact regarding the employer’s discriminatory intent).
9
defendant’s
Unlike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the SAC provides
enough circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent to allow
Plaintiff’s failure to hire claim to survive Defendant’s motion.
Although much of the conduct described in the SAC lacks a tangible
link
to
a
discriminatory
purpose,
Plaintiff
claims
that
her
supervisor made specific negative comments about her gender on
three separate occasions.
Specifically, Demers (1) told Plaintiff
she could not use the women’s restroom, (2) refused to allow her
to participate in an examination, stating “only females are allowed
beyond this point”; and (3) told Plaintiff that Jesus does not
recognize her religion, and told others that “he-shes . . . and
the gays will needs to answer to Jesus some day.”
Moreover,
Plaintiff was terminated via email on the same day Demers made her
last comments about Plaintiff’s gender and religion.
Smith v.
Tuckahoe Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 03-CV-7951, 2009 WL 3170302,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (finding that a supervisors use of
a racial slur the day before he recommended the plaintiff be
terminated
constituted
evidence
of
racial
animus).
Demers’
comments, combined with the circumstances under which Plaintiff’s
externship was abruptly ended, collectively provide circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory animus sufficient allow Plaintiff’s
failure to hire claims to proceed to discovery.
IV. Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claims Fail
In
addition
to
Plaintiff’s
10
failure
to
hire
claims
brought pursuant to Title VII and the NYSHRL, Plaintiff also
asserts a separate allegations for “unlawful discrimination.”
(SAC
¶¶
35-36.).
But
since
Plaintiff
was
never
actually
Defendant’s employee, but rather an unpaid extern, she cannot
maintain a claim for discrimination separate and apart from her
failure to hire allegations.
See Carr, 2015 WL 4603389, at n.3;
Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d
527, 532–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that an unpaid intern is not
considered an employee because compensation is the “threshold
issue in determining the existence of an employment relationship
under both Title VII and NYSHRL”); O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d
112, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that there is an “essential
condition of remuneration” that has been recognized in the Second
Circuit and that an unpaid intern is not an “employee” under Title
VII) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tadros v. Coleman, 898
F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that as a visiting lecturer,
plaintiff received no salary, and was not an employee under Title
VII).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s “unlawful discrimination” claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.2
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims should be
dismissed based upon the election of remedies doctrine. (Def.’s
Br. at 11-12.) However, the Court need not consider Defendant’s
election of remedies argument on a motion to dismiss, since the
argument relies upon documents outside of the pleadings.
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2002);
Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d
2
11
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
(Docket Entry 28) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
To the
extent
claims
that
separate
Plaintiff
and
apart
seeks
from
to
her
assert
failure
discrimination
to
hire
allegations,
Plaintiff’s “unlawful discrimination” claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
However, Defendant’s motion is otherwise DENIED and
Plaintiff’s failure to hire claims shall proceed to discovery.
SO ORDERED
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Date: June
23 , 2016
Central Islip, New York
Cir. 1991); Hoo-Chong v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 15-CV-4051,
2016 WL 868814, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2016)
12
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