FC Online Marketing, Inc. v. Burke's Martial Arts, LLC et al
Filing
62
OPINION & ORDER: SO ORDERED that (1) the branch of defts' motion seeking dismissal of plaintiffs trade dress claim pertaining to its Website pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is granted and so much of plaintiffs t rade dress claim as pertains to its Website is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief; (2) the branch of defts' motion seeking dismissal of plaintiffs trade dress claim as pertains to its Store Trade Dre ss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and summary judgment is granted dismissing plaintiffs trade dress claim as pertains to its Store Trade Dress in its entirety with prejudice; (3) defts' motion pursuant to Rule 12(b )(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is otherwise denied; and (4) plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502, 15 U.S.C. § 116 and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is denied in its entirety. Ordered by Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein on 7/8/2015. (Florio, Lisa)
FlLED
IN CLE:Rt'.'S OFf'ICE
U S DISTRICT COURT E D N Y
,!UL 08 Z015
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------)(
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
FC ONLINE MARKETING, INC.,
Plaintiff,
OPINION & ORDER
14-CV-3685 (SJF)(SIL)
-againstBURI
construction at the time of the inspection. (Cayer Decl., Ex. C; Glantz Aff., 'lf'lf5[n]-[r]).
5.
Analysis
a.
Distinctiveness of Store Trade Dress
"Trade dress traditionally refers to the packaging or labeling of a product, but may also
include the appearance of the product itself" Walt Disney Co. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp.,
830 F. Supp. 762,766 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); accord Innovative Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines
Ticketing Ctrs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 709, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Landscape Forms, 113
F.3d at 381 ("[T]rade dress may protect the 'overall look' of a product."); Maharishi Hardy
Blechman Ltd. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("The
scope of trade dress claims has expanded to include the totality of any elements in which a
product or service is packaged or presented." (quotations and citation omitted)). Accordingly,
the trade dress of a business may include the overall appearance of its business facilities, M, its
interior design, layout or decor. See, ~Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot
Camp, LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 489, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (fmding that the p1aintiffhad a
recognizable trade dress in the layout and interior decor of its indoor exercise facility);
Innovative Networks, 871 F. Supp. at 722 (involving a trade dress claim based upon the design
and constmction of the plaintiffs business centers to resemble ticket counters in an airport).
Since "a trade dress that seeks to protect an idea, a concept, or a generalized type of
appearance is generic, not distinctive, and therefore not subject to trade dress protection[,]"
47
Maharishi Hardy, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (quotations and citation omitted);~ also Pure Power,
813 F. Supp. 2d at 538 ("A generic trade dress is never protectable"), plaintiff must establish
"that the appearance of its several products
[~
its franchises] is sufficiently distinct and unique
to merit protection as a recognizable trade dress." Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 380; accord
Regal Jewelry Co., Inc. v. Kings bridge Int'l, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 477, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
"Initially, this burden requires the plaintiff to articulate a specific trade dress,* * *and then to
demonstrate that it has, in fact, consistently used that trade dress." Regal Jewelry, 999 F. Supp.
at 486. Thus, since plaintiff is claiming a trade dress based upon the appearance of its multiple
franchises, it must establish that the overall look in each of its franchises is consistent. See
Yunnan Design, 262 F.3d at 116 (quoting Walt Disney, 830 F. Supp. at 766 ); GTFM, Inc. v.
Solid Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Maharishi Hardy, 292
F. Snpp. 2d at 542 ("The broad category of distinctiveness incorporates three related doctrines*
* *: genericness, specificity, and consistency.
A trade dress which is either generic, non-specific,
or inconsistent among its products cannot be distinctive.") "If a plaintiff can not [sic] establish
that its [appearance] ha[ s] a consistent overall look, the trade dress that is allegedly infringed
does not exist." Casa Editrice Bonechi, S.R.L. v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 4008,
1997 WL 749388, at* 4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997).
"Although each element of a trade dress individually might not be inherently distinctive,
it is the combination of elements that should be the focus of the distinctiveness inquiry." Jeffrey
Milstein, 58 F.3d at 32; ~also Wine Made Simple, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 71 ("Because in the
48
context of trade dress the whole can be greater than, or at least different from, the sum of its
parts, it is necessary to consider the combined articulated elements of [the plaintiffs] trade dress
to detem1ine whether as an ensemble they fonn a distinctive presentation to consumers.")
Nonetheless, although "[a] unique combination of elements may make a dress distinctive,[] the
fact that a trade dress is composed entirely of commonly used or functional elements might
suggest that the dress should be regarded as unprotectible or 'generic,' to avoid tying up a
product or marketing idea." Yunnan Design, 262 F.3d at 118 (quotations and citation omitted);
see also Maharishi Hardy, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 543 ("Where the asserted trade dress extends to the
'overall look' of the combination of features comprising a product or product line, the Court
must evaluate the distinctiveness and functionality of those features taken together, not in
isolation.
* * * Nonetheless, the fact that a trade dress is composed exclusively of commonly
used or functional elements might suggest that that dress should be regarded as unprotectable or
'generic,' to avoid tying up a product or marketing idea." (quotations, emphasis and citations
omitted)).
Initially, as pleaded, five (5) of the nineteen (19) elements identified by plaintiff as
constituting its trade dress, i.e., the flooring, walls, layout of the floor mat, ceilings and product
on which the training floor lights are held, are not even required to be uniform throughout its
franchises. Moreover, it is clear from the submitted photographs that the "overall look" of
plaintiffs franchises vary widely and are not uniform. Even the photographs of plaintiffs "Full
Model" franchises, i.e., the Cranston and Seekonk franchises, reveal various inconsistencies
49
between the elements plaintiff claims constitutes its trade dress and the actual appearance of
those franchises, as well as between the stores themselves. Given the multiple variations in the
appearance of even the small sampling of plaintiffs franchises provided in the record, plaintiffs
Store Trade Dress claim is "more in the nature of an unprotectable 'generalized appearance[,]'"
than of the "overall look" of its stores. Casa Editrice, 1997 WL 749388, at* 4 (quoting Jeffrey
Millstein, 58 F.3d at 33). In other words, plaintiff cannot demonstrate "that it has consistently
applied any single avowed theme trade dress to [its multiple franchises]." Regal Jewelry, 999 F.
Supp. at 487. Since, inter alia, the elements of plaintiffs claimed trade dress are not consistent
in its franchises, plaintiff carrnot establish that its "overall look" is distinctive or constitutes a
protectable trade dress.
See,~
Maharishi Hardy, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 542; Regal Jewelry, 999 F.
Supp. at 486 (holding that the plaintiffs trade dress claim under the Lanham Act failed "because
it ha[d] not consistently defined the elements of, or pursued the use of, a theme trade dress.")
h1 any event, defendants have established that their Atomic K.ickboxing facility does not
infringe upon plaintiffs Store Trade Dress, insofar as, inter alia: (1) defendants' reception desk
and walls are painted a different color, i.e., Mesa Tan as opposed to Benjamin Moore "#1061
tan,"7 (Am. Compl., ~~ 41(a) and (e)); (2) defendants' reception desk has a different counter top,
i.e., black and gray speckled granite as opposed to "absolute black granite," (Tracey Aff., Ex. A);
(3) the lobby flooring in defendants' reception area is not "heron beige" ceramic tile as set forth
7
While plaintiff designates the color of its wall as "tan," the actual name of the
Benjamin Moore #1061 product is "Brunswick Beige,"~ www.benjaminmoore.com/enus/paint-color/, and it is described as "[t]imeless and traditional." Id.
50
in plaintiffs Facility Requirements, @.); ( 4) defendants do not have "red pendant lighting," @,
,; 41 (d)), over their reception desk; (5) defendants' merchandise area does not contain a "black
slat wall with tan framing[,]"@,_,,; 4l(f)), nor "black track lighting[,]" (!Q,,; 4l(h)); (6)
defendants' lobby area has, inter alia, (a) red vinyl couches with arms, (see Cayer Dec!., Ex. D),
not red fabric benches, (see Tracey Aff., Ex. A), and (b) a small green plant that appears to be
real in a tall pot or vase situated on an end table, (see Cayer Dec!., Ex. D), not a "green tall
bamboo style [silk] plant[]," (Am. Compl.,,; 4l(s)), in a fiberglass plant box, (see Tracey Aff.,
Ex. A); (7) defendants' training area has red and black floor mats, but they are not red with a
thirty-six-inch (36") black border and do not have a logo in the center as set forth in plaintiffs
Facility Requirements, (see Am. Compl.,,; 4l(j); Tracey Aff., Ex. A), nor is there any evidence
that the pattern in which they are situated is similar to any of the training areas in plaintiffs other
franchises; and (8) there are no "high bay acrylic [lights] hung to the 10" [sic] height on chain or
similar product[,]"@,,; 41(1); see Tracey Aff., Ex. A), in defendants' training area. In fact, the
only indistinguishable element between defendants' facility and plaintiffs claimed Store Trade
Dress is the "open ceiling painted black," (Am. Compl.,,; 4l(k)), which is generic, not set forth
in plaintiffs Facility Requirements, and is pleaded as an alternative to a drop ceiling.
ilil,,;
4l(k)). Otherwise, the overall look of defendants' facility is sufficiently dissimilar from the
appearance of all of plaintiffs franchises depicted in the record, as well as from the photographs
depicting plaintiffs Facility Requirements. In cases involving the general appearance of a
business, such as this one, "the trade dress is the overall look of the store, consisting of a
51
cumulation of interacting elements, and defendants do not infringe by appropriating the
marketing concept, or any particular element of plaintiff's design, unless the overall dress is
sufficiently similar to generate likely consumer confusion." Wine Made Simple, 320 F. Supp. 2d
at 72. Moreover, "competitors cannot be prevented from employing a trade dress that is similar
to but clearly different than [the plaintiff's], particularly when [the plaintiff] has failed to use that
dress on many of its products***." Regal Jewelry, 999 F. Supp. at 488.
Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the branch of defendants' motion
seeking dismissal of plaintiff's Store Trade Dress claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and summary judgment is granted dismissing plaintiff's Store
Trade Dress claim against defendants in its entirety with prejudice.
b.
Likelihood of Confusion
Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff's Store Trade Dress is distinctive, plaintiff
cannot establish a likelihood of confusion. In this Circuit, "likelihood of confusion means a
probability of confusion; it is not sufficient if confusion is merely possible." Estee Lauder, Inc.
v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1510 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotations and citation omitted); accord
Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 383 (2d Cir. 2005); ~also New York
Stock Exch., Inc. v. New York, New York Hotel LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 2002) ("To
support a fmding of infringement, a plaintiff must show a probability, not just a possibility, of
52
confusion."); accord Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1998).
Likelihood of confusion is determined by considering the following eight (8) factors set out in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961):
"the strength of the prior owner's mark, the degree of similarity between the two
marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap between the two products, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of
defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant's
product, and the sophistication of the buyers."
Nora Beverages II, 269 F.3d at 119 (quoting PolaroiQ, 287 F.2d at 495); accord Star Indus., 412
F.3d at 384.
"When conducting a Polaroid analysis, a court should focus on the ultimate question of
whether consumers are likely to be confused." Nora Beverages II, 269 F.3d at 119 (quotations
and citation omitted). "In making this determination, a court looks to the totality of the product."
Id. "Although no one factor is necessarily dispositive, any one factor may prove to be so." Id.
(emphasis added). "[T]he Lanham Act must be construed in the light of a strong federal policy in
favor of vigorously competitive markets[,]*** [and] courts must not lose sight of the
underlying purpose of the Lanham Act, which is protecting consumers and manufacturers from
deceptive representations of affiliation and origin." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
1.
Strength of the Trade Dress
"[T]he strength of a mark [or trade dress] is determined by its tendency to uniquely
identify the source of the product." Star Indus., Inc., 412 F.3d at 384; see also Patsy's Brand, Inc.
v. LO.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 218 (2d Cir. 2003) ("To determine the strength of a mark, a
53
court examines the mark's tendency to identifY the goods sold as emanating from a particular,
although possibly anonymous, source. * * * Strength of trade dress is similarly analyzed."
(quotations and citations omitted)); accord Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111
F. 3d 993, 1003 (2d Cir. 1997). "Determination of strength* * *begins with inquiry as to
whether the mark [or trade dress] has the inherent distinctiveness that would entitle it to
protection in the absence of secondary meaning[,]" Star Indus., 412 F. 3d at 384, k, whether the
trade dress is generic, descriptive, suggestive or arbitrary and fanciful. Id. at 3 84-85. "Arbitrary
or fanciful marks are ones that do not communicate any information about the product either
directly or by suggestion[,]" Id. at 385, and are inherently distinctive. Id.
"Once a mark [or trade dress] has been classified, the second step in determining strength
is to consider its degree of distinctiveness, au inquiry that concerns both the inherent
inventiveness of the mark itself and the amount of third-party usage of the term [or image] as a
mark [or trade dress], especially in the market in question." Star Indus., 412 F.3d at 385
(quotations and citation omitted).
Defendants have sufficiently established, inter alia, that other fitness and martial arts
facilities offering kickboxing classes that are not affiliated in any way with the parties herein
utilize many of the elements plaintiff claims constitutes its Store Trade Dress,~. faux brick
paneling and/or red and black color schemes in their businesses.' See,~
8
"[T]he existence of similar dresses used in connection with similar products," Best
Cellars Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431,454 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), is a factor
to consider in determining the strength of the trade dress with respect to the "likelihood of
confusion" element of a trade dress claim. See id. (holding that the strength of the plaintiffs
54
•
www.littleboxingclub.com (depicting a wall with similar faux brick paneling); www.9round.com
(depicting a wall with similar faux brick paneling and a red and black color scheme);
www.ufcgyrn.com (depicting a red and black color scheme). See Regal Jewelry, 999 F. Supp. at
489 ("An otherwise protectable trade dress can become generic within a particular market if the
design becomes a standard or custom for the industry); Kind LLC v. ClifBar & Co., No. 14 Civ.
770, 2014 WL 2619817, at* 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2014) ("[D]espite the tendency for trade
dresses to be inherently distinctive because the whole universe of materials and designs is
available for packaging, [p ]laintiffs very common packaging [i.e., interior] design is not
inherently distinctive." (quotations and citation omitted)); Conte v. Newsday, Inc., No. 06-cv4859, 2013 WL 978711, at* 19 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013) ("[T]he fact that a similar trade dress
is already being used by manufacturers of other kinds of products, may indicate that th[e] dress is
no more than a concept or idea." (quoting Jeffrey Milstein, 58 F.3d at 33)). Accordingly,
plaintiff cannot establish that upon consideration of its product, i.e., its kickboxing franchises,
and the market in which it competes, Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 378, the "overall look" of its
franchises served to identify the source of its product. "Notably, the only element of [plaintiffs]
packaging that indicates its source, [plaintiffs ILKB]logo, is not included in the trade dress
[plaintiff] seeks to protect[.]" Kind LLC, 2014 WL 2619817, at* 3. In sum, even assuming that
plaintiffs Store Trade Dress is inherently distinctive, it is not particularly strong because it "does
not primarily serve to identify the source of its product." Eastern America Trio Products, Inc. v.
trade dress "may be diminished by the existence of similar dresses used in connection with
similar products.")
55
Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395,411 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
ii.
Similarity of Trade Dress
"[T]he appropriate test for similarity of trade dress is the overall impression of the
products and the entirety of the trade dress, and [] a mark may not be dissected in order to prove
similarity." Nora Beverages II, 269 F.3d at 122. Although "[q]uestions regarding likelihood of
confusion are normally factual in nature," Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746
F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1984), summary judgment is "appropriate if the court is satisfied that the
products or marks [or trade dress] are so dissimilar that no question of fact is presented." Id.; ~
also Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[I]n an appropriate
case, the 'similarity of the marks' factor can be dispositive and will warrant summary judgment
for an infringement defendant if the court is satisfied that the ... marks are so dissimilar that no
question of fact is presented." (quotations and citation omitted)). The court's task on a motion
for summary judgment is "to determine whether any reasonable trier of fact could conclude that
confusion is likely." Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 960 (2d Cir.
1996) (quotations and citation omitted).
Although there are some similarities between the appearance of plaintiffs "full" franchise
and plaintiffs facility, their overall look is sufficiently different as to make the likelihood of
consumer confusion unlikely. See, ~ Eastern American Trio, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 411. In other
words, the "similarity of the marks" factor is dispositive in defendants' favor insofar as "[t]he
56
cumulative effect of the[] differences in the parties' commercial presentation of their trade dress
creates distinct marketplace impressions, thereby eliminating any likelihood of consumer
confusion." Conte, 2013 WL 978711, at* 21; see,"'-& Eastern American Trio, 97 F. Supp. 2d at
414 (finding that the plaintiffs claim for packaging trade dress infringement failed because
"[t]he strength of plaintiffs trade dress, the proximity of the products, and even plaintiffs
evidence of actual confusion [were] * * * far outweighed by the fact that the overall appearance
of the packaging at issue is so dissimilar.") Accordingly, and construing plaintiffs Store Trade
Dress claim in light of the "strong federal policy in favor of vigorously competitive markets[,]"
id., defendants have established their entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs
Store Trade Dress claim against them in its entirety with prejudice.
C.
Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
1.
Standard
"[A] court may issue a preliminary injunction in a copyright [or trademark] case only if
the plaintiff has demonstrated [1] either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b)
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation * *
*[,]"Salinger v. Colting, 607 F. 3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotations, alterations and citation
omitted);~
also Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Com., 571 F.3d 238,242 {2d Cir. 2009) (trademark
claim); "[2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction[,]"
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79-80 (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S. Ct.
57
365, 374, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008)); accord Zino Davidoff, 571 F.3d at 242; "[3] [that] "the
balance of hardships tips in the plaintiffs favor,***[;] and [4] ***that the public interest
would not be disserved by the issuance of a preliminary injunction." Salinger, 607 F.3d at 80
(quotations and citations omitted); see also WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir.
2012) ("In a copyright case, a district court may grant a preliminary injunction when plaintiffs
demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm in the absence of an
injunction; (3) a balance of the hardships tipping in their favor; and (4) non-disservice of the
public interest by issuance of a preliminary injunction.") Injunctive relief is "an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such
reliefl:,]" Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, and is "never awarded as of right." Id. at 24,
129 S. Ct. 365.
2.
Irreparable Harm
"A showing of irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction." Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118
(2d Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted); accord Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v.
Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2007). "[T]o satisfy the irreparable harm requirement,
plaintiffs must demonstrate that absent a preliminary injunction they will suffer an injury that is
neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent, and one that cannot be remedied if a
court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm." Faiveley Transport, 559 F.3d at 118
58
(quotations, brackets and citation omitted)); accord Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 408 F.3d
112, 114 (2d Cir. 2005); ~also Salinger, 607 F. 3d at 81 ("The relevant harm is the harm that
(a) occurs to the parties' legal interests and (b) cannot be remedied after a final adjudication,
whether by damages or a permanent injunction.") "Where there is an adequate remedy at law,
such as an award of money damages, injunctions are unavailable except in extraordinary
circumstances." Faiveley Transport, 559 F.3d at 118 (quotations, brackets and citation omitted)).
"Harm may be irreparable where the loss is difficult to replace or measure, or where
plaintiffs should not be expected to suffer the loss." WPIX, 691 F.3d at 285. "The court must not
* * * presume that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm[,] * * * and must actually consider
the injury the plaintiff will suffer if he or she loses on the preliminary injunction but ultimately
prevails on the merits, paying particular attention to whether the remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury." Salinger, 607 F.3d at 80
(quotations and citation omitted); see also WPIX, 691 F.3d at 285 ("[C]ourts may no longer
simply presume irreparable harm; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate that, on the facts of the
case, the failure to issue an injunction would actually cause irreparable harm.")
In assessing irreparable harm, courts should generally consider any undue delay by the
plaintiff in seeking the preliminary injunction. See Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't,
Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 39 (2d Cir. 1995); Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Recycle Green Servs., Inc., 7 F.
Supp. 3d 260, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Levola v. Fischer, 403 F. App'x 564, 565 (2d Cir.
Dec. 14, 2010) (summary order) (affirming the. district court's finding that the plaintiff failed to
59
show an immediate danger of irreparable harm based upon his delay in seeking preliminary
relief); Transcience, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 457-58 ("It is well-established in this Circuit that delays in
moving for injunctive relief to protect copyrights and trademarks from further unauthorized use
weigh heavily against the movant." (citing cases)); Bulman v. 2BKCO, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 551,
564 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("In the Second Circuit, delay in applying for a preliminary injunction is
one factor to be considered in determining whether a plaintiff will, in fact, suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction." (quotations and citation omitted)). "Delay in
seeking a preliminary injunction can weaken a claim of irreparable harm because 'the failure to
act sooner undercuts the sense of urgency that ordinarily accompanies a motion for preliminary
relief."' Juicy Couture, Inc. v. Bella Int'l, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 2d 489, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(quoting Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods., 60 F.3d 964,968 (2d Cir.l995)). The Second
Circuit has "found delays of as little as ten weeks sufficient to defeat [a finding] of irreparable
harm* * *[,]"Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Luigino's, Inc., 423 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2005),
except for when there is "good reason" for the delay, "as when a plaintiff is not certain of the
infringing activity or has taken additional time to examine the infringing product." Id. at 144-45;
see also Silber v. Barbara's Bakery, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 2d 432, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("While
delay does not always undermine an alleged need for preliminary relief, months-long delays in
seeking preliminary injunctions have repeatedly been held by courts in the Second Circuit to
undercut the sense of urgency accompanying a motion for preliminary relief." (citing cases));
VOX Amplification Ltd. v. Meussdorffer, 50 F. Supp. 3d 355, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that
60
while "delay generally destroys the presumption of irreparable harm that follows a showing of
likelihood of confusion in a trademark case, the presumption remains in cases where the
non-infringing party was unaware of its rights or was actively pursuing its rights." (quotations,
alterations and citation omitted)).
Plaintiff allegedly became aware of defendants' alleged copyright infringement on June 2,
2014, (Am. Compl., '1{'1{16, 24), and commenced this action against them on June 11, 2014, but
did not move for a preliminary injunction until Aprill8, 2015, more than ten (10) months later,
and only after defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint.' Even assuming, arguendo,
that some delay was initially justified while the parties attempted to settle the matter in August
2014, (see Notice of Pending Settlement filed August 6, 2014, Doc. No. 12; and Notice of
Settlement Impasse filed August 21, 2014, Doc. No. 15), plaintiffs still failed to seek injunctive
relief for approximately eight (8) months after their settlement negotiations broke down, thereby
undermining their claim of irreparable harm. See,
~Grout
Shield Distribs., LLC v. Elio E.
Salvo, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 389, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that the plaintiffs five (5) month
delay in moving for a preliminary injunction after settlement negotiations had broken down was
unreasonable and undercut its claim of irreparable harm); Marks Org., Inc. v. Joles, 784 F. Supp.
2d 322, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[D]iligent pursuit of settlement negotiations can justifY delay (but
9
Defendants served their motion to dismiss upon plaintiff on or about December 1,
2014, (Doc. No. 42), and plaintiff filed its response thereto on or about December 12, 2014,
(Doc. ·No. 43), yet plaintiff never indicated a need for, nor an intention to seek, a preliminary
injunction at that time. Likewise, in the six ( 6) pretrial conferences held before me in this case
between September 24, 2014 and March 18, 2015, plaintiff never indicated a need for, nor an
intention to seek, a preliminary injunction in this case.
61
* * * extensive delay after negotiations break down will still defeat [a finding of irreparable
harm]).")
Moreover, the withdrawal of defendants' counsel on August 22, 2014, and defendants'
subsequent delay in retaining new counsel on behalf of BMA and in filing an answer to the
complaint until October 28, 2014, does not excuse plaintiffs delay in seeking a preliminary
injunction. See, M:. Silber, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 442 (finding the five (5) month delay between the
commencement of the action and plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to be
unreasonable because the plaintiffs "were under no obligation to await defendant's answer before
moving.") In any event, plaintiff still unreasonably waited approximately six (6) months after
defendants retained new counsel and filed an answer before seeking a preliminary injunction.
Furthermore, plaintiffs delay cannot be attributed to defendants' filing of the motion to dismiss,
~'
M:. Environmental Servs., 7 F. Supp. 3d at 280, because, inter alia, plaintiff responded to
the motion on December 12, 2014, only eleven (II) days after the motion had been served upon
it, and more than four (4) months before it moved for a preliminary injunction. See, M:.
Vantone Grp. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Yangpu NGT Indus. Co., Ltd., No. 13-cv-7639, 2015 WL
1055933, at* 4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2015) ("Courts typically decline to grant preliminary
injunctions in the face of unexplained delays of more than two months." (quoting Gidatex, S.r.L.
v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 13 F.Supp.2d 417, 419 (S.D.N.Y.l998))).
In any event, plaintiff cannot establish irreparable harm with respect to its remaining
claims of copyright and trademark infringement, unfair competition and cybersquatting relating
62
to the parties' websites because, inter alia, (1) it is undisputed (a) that defendants' allegedly
infringing websites are no longer active and (b) that defendant has been operating a website since
at least November 2014 that plaintiff does not claim infringes upon any of its copyrights,
trademarks or trade dress; and (2) Burke has represented in a sworn declaration that he will not
operate the allegedly infringing websites during the pendency of this litigation. 10 See, ~
Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 510, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(fmding that the defendant's cessation of the allegedly infringing conduct and commitment not to
continue such conduct during the pendency of the lawsuit obviated the need for a preliminary
injunction because the plaintiff could not show any likelihood of irreparable injury without the
preliminary injunction); Kuklachev v. Gelfman, 629 F. Supp. 2d 236, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2008),
affd, 361 F. App'x 161 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009) (holding that the irreparable harm factor requires
a showing of a "real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again"); American
Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. MasterCard Int'l Inc., 776 F. Supp. 787,791 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) ("When a defendant revises an allegedly infringing commercial and represents that the
original commercial will not be broadcast in the future, the need for injunctive relief as to the
original commercial is moot.") Specifically, Burke avers, inter alia, (1) that "[j]ust a few weeks
after [he]launched []
* * * [p]laintiffsent a 'take down' notice to the host
ofth[at] []website, shutting the website down[,]" (Declaration of John Jacob Burke in
10
Burke also contends that "since it started this lawsuit, Plaintiff has also changed the
design and layout of its I Love Kickboxing website[,] [which] * * * looks nothing like the
website [it] claims is protected in its complaint," (Burke PI Dec!.,~ 15), further undermining
plaintiffs claim of irreparable harm.
63
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief ["Burke PI Dec!."], "jjlO); (2)
that "[t]he website remains shut down and is not operative[,]" (ish, "jj
11); (3) that "[p]laintiffalso sent a 'take down' notice to the host of the
website, shutting th[at] website down as well[,]" (ish, "i\12); (4)
that "[a]s a result, and given [p]laintiff s coercive position, for the pendency of this litigation, as
a sign of good faith [he] ha[ s] taken the step of temporarily using the website on which [he]
normally advertise[s] [his] martial arts training services, ,to host
the Atomic Kickboxing website and advertise the kickboxittg services[,]" (ish, "jj13) (emphasis
added); and (5) that "the Burke's Martial Arts website has a look and feel that is unquestionably
distinct from that of Plaintiffs I Love Kickboxing website* * *[and] the content on the Burke's
Martial Arts site, which is not in dispute, bears no similarity to the content on Plaintiffs
website." ili!,, "i\14). 11 Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction is denied in
11
During the pretrial conferences held before me on November 12, 2014 and February
25, 2015, plaintiffs counsel conceded that defendants' allegedly infringing websites are inactive
and represented that plaintiff has no issue with respect to defendants' present website. In
addition, in their memorandum oflaw in support of their motion for preliminary injunction,
plaintiff contends, inter alia, that"[ d]efendants' ILove2Kickbox.com website included content
consisting of original constituent elements of [plaintiffs] Work[,]" (Plf. PI Mem. at 6) (emphasis
added); that plaintiff"had the ILove2Kickbox.com website taken down* **[,]"(ish); that
"[ d]efendants' earlier infringing website ILove2Kickbox.com included literal copying of* * *
[plaintiffs Website Trade Dress]," (ish) (emphasis added); that "the trade dress Defendants
initially released on the second website, 'atomickickboxing.com' also mimicked completely the
trade dress of [plaintiffs] Work[,]" (ish at 7) (emphasis added); that "the Infringing Doman
[ILove2Kickbox.com] was taken down * * * [,]" (ish at 12); and that "[d]efendants' egregious
copying [is] demonstrated by the website previously located on the Internet at
www.atomickickboxi.ng.com * **[,]"(ish at 13) (emphasis in original).
64
its entirety. 12
Ill.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, (1) the branch of defendants' motion seeking dismissal of
plaintiffs trade dress claim pertaining to its Website pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is granted and so much of plaintiffs trade dress claim as pertains to its
Website is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief; (2) the
branch of defendants' motion seeking dismissal of plaintiffs trade dress claim as pertains to its
Store Trade Dress pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is treated as
a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
summary judgment is granted dismissing plaintiffs trade dress claim as pertains to its Store
Trade Dress in its entirety with prejudice; (3) defendants' motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is otherwise denied; and (4) plaintiffs motion for a preliminary
injunction pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502, 15 U.S.C. § 116 and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is denied in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Is!
Sandra J. Feuerstein
United States District Judge
Dated: July 8, 2015
Central Islip, New York
12
As plaintiffs trade dress claims have been dismissed in their entirety with prejudice,
plaintiff clearly cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits with respect those claims.
Thus, it is unnecessary to consider plaintiffs contentions with respect to those claims.
65
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