Belton v. Rivera et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM & ORDER re: 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. The Court certifies that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. This case is CLOSED. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 8/6/2014.(C/M Plaintiff) (Nohs, Bonnie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X
DAVID C. BELTON,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-4193(JS)(WDW)

-againstSUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
HOMICIDE SECTION DECTECTIVES [SIC],
7TH PRECINT [SIC] POLICE DEPARTMENT,
DETECTIVE ANGEL RIVERA, Shield
#1324/3310/1, DETECTIVE RONALD
LELI, Shield #1262/3310/1, and
DETECTIVE MICHAEL A. MAHAN,
Shield #1233/3310/1,

Defendants.
-----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
David C. Belton, pro se
637060
Suffolk County Correctional Facility
110 Center Drive
Riverhead, NY 11901
For Defendants:

No appearances

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On July 8, 2014, incarcerated pro se plaintiff David
Belton (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the Suffolk County Police
Headquarters (“SCPD”), unidentified “Homicide Section Dectectives
[sic]” (“Homicide Detectives”), the “7TH Precint [sic] Police
Department”
#1324/3310/1

(“7th

Precinct”),

(“Det.

Rivera”),

Detective
Detective

Angel
Ronald

Rivera,

Shield

Leli,

Shield

#1262/3310/1 (“Det. Leli”), and Detective Michael A. Mahan, Shield
#1233/3310/1

(“Det.

Mahan”

and

collectively,

“Defendants”),

accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis.

Upon

review

of

the

declaration

in

support

of

the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of

the

filing

fee.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1914(a);

1915(a)(1).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED.
sua

However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is

sponte

DISMISSED

WITH

PREJUDICE

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff’s brief, handwritten Complaint, submitted on
the Court’s Section 1983 complaint form, alleges that Plaintiff’s
personal property was “confiscated in Police Headquarters” by Det.
Leli, Det. Mahan, and Det. Rivera on August 13, 2013.
¶ IV.)

(Compl.

More specifically, Plaintiff claims that his “expensive

jewelry, clothing, belt, shoes, Iphone & my wallet with my $1,127
cash, credit and debit cards as well as my licenses” were taken
from him by these Detectives.
Plaintiff,

Detective

Rivera

(Compl. ¶ IV.)

prepared

and

According to

signed

Plaintiff’s

property receipt, but did not include Plaintiff’s jewelry or $1,000
of Plaintiff’s cash on the receipt. (Compl. ¶ IV.)

Plaintiff

claims that his property has been “missing for almost 4 years” and
alleges that the “Defendants listed in this complaint all conspired
1

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purpose of this Memorandum and
Order.
2

together

in

belongings.”

the

stealing

or

disappearing

acts

of

my

.

.

.

(Compl. ¶ IV.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to have all of his property
returned to him or to be “fully reimbursted [sic]” for the alleged
loss of such property.

(Compl. ¶ V.)

Plaintiff alleges that the

lost property is valued at $26,817 and seeks to recover a damages
award in that sum.

(Compl. ¶ V.)
DISCUSSION

I.

In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fees.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from

such

1915A(b).

relief.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination.

See id. § 1915A(b).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
3

F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).

However, a complaint must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).

While

“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III.

Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Rehberg v. Paulk, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.
Ct. 1497, 1501–02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).
4

To state a claim

under

Section

1983,

a

plaintiff

must

“‘allege

that

(1)

the

challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person
who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States.’”

Rae v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 693 F. Supp. 2d

217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53
(2d Cir. 1999)).

In addition, Section 1983 claims are governed by

a three-year statute of limitations.

See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S.

235, 249-250, 109 S. Ct. 573, 102 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1989); Pearl v.
City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir.

2002).

A Section

1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know
of the harm.

Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir.

2009).
A.

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim
Although Plaintiff does not allege the specific federal

right allegedly violated by the Defendant, given the nature of
Plaintiff’s

allegations,

the

Court

liberally

construes

his

Complaint to allege a deprivation of property claim without due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

As a threshold matter,

given that Plaintiff alleges that his claim accrued nearly four
years ago, the statute of limitations would likely bar his claims.
Even assuming Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim was timely,
it is subject to dismissal because a due process claim arising from
a property deprivation is not cognizable under § 1983 if “‘adequate
5

state post-deprivation remedies are available.’” Davis v. State of
New York,

311 F. App’x 397, 400 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3204, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393
(1984)); see also Vogelfang v. Capra, 889 F. Supp. 2d 489, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[T]he loss of a prisoner’s property whether
intentional or negligent--will not support a due process claim
redressable

under

§

1983

if

adequate

state

post-deprivation

remedies are available.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

“‘New York in fact affords an adequate post-deprivation

remedy in the form of, inter alia, a Court of Claims action’
pursuant to N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 1700.3(b)(4).”
Davis, 311 F. App’x at 400 (quoting Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93,
96 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88 (2d
Cir.

1996)

(affirming

district

court’s

dismissal

of

inmate’s

Section 1983 claim because “the confiscation of [plaintiff’s] eyeglasses did not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation for
loss of property because of the availability of state court postdeprivation remedies”); Love v. Coughlin, 714 F.2d 207, 208-09 (2d
Cir. 1983) (finding New York’s post-deprivation remedies adequate
thereby precluding prisoner’s due process claim for lost personal
property). Accordingly, the existence of adequate post-deprivation
state remedies preclude Plaintiff’s due process claim under 1983.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the
Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
6

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is
sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,

82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to mark this case
closed.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

August
6 , 2014
Central Islip, New York

7