Romanello v. Suffolk County Correctional Facility

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM & ORDER ORDER granting 7 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the Jail pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND his Complaint in accordance with this Order. The Court certifi es pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 12/3/2014. C/M (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
STEPHEN KIRK ROMANELLO, JR.,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-5607(JS)(ARL)

-againstSUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

Defendant.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Stephen Kirk Romanello, Jr., pro se
395751
Suffolk County Correctional Facility
110 Center Drive
Riverhead, NY 11901
For Defendant:

No appearance.

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On September 22, 2014, incarcerated pro se plaintiff
Stephen Kirk Romanello (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the
Suffolk County Correctional Facility (“the Jail” or “Defendant”),
accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Upon

review

of

the

declaration

in

support

of

the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of

the

filing

fee.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1914(a);

1915(a)(1).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED.

However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is

sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the Jail and WITH
LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT as set forth herein pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff’s brief, handwritten Complaint, submitted on
the Court’s Section 1983 Complaint form, alleges in its entirety:
On June 26, 2014 while I was incarcerated in
Suffolk County Correctional Facility located
at 110 Center [D]rive in Riverhead, NY 11901 I
was assaulted [by] an officer on the above
date at that location on the 3rd floor in the
pods yoused [sic] abusive force.
(Compl. ¶ IV.)
As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff claims to have
sustained “injury to my left wrist when my hands were cuffed behind
my back.

There are lacerations that left scars . . . .”

Plaintiff

also alleges that he suffered “nerve damages[,] most likely from a
pinched nerve that has made my left thumb and index finger numb,
and the lower part of my hand and wrist with shooting pains.”
(Compl. ¶ IV.A.)
relief.

Plaintiff does not allege any particular form of

Rather, seeks unspecified relief for “pain and suffering,

medical expenses, [and] negligence by medical staff and officers.”
(Compl. ¶ V.)
DISCUSSION
I.

In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the

1

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purpose of this Memorandum and
Order.
2

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fees.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from

such

1915A(b).

relief.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination.

See id. § 1915A(b).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).

However, a complaint must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
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a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).

While

“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III.

Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Rehberg v. Paulk, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.
Ct. 1497, 1501–02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).
under

Section

1983,

a

plaintiff

must

To state a claim

“‘allege

that

(1)

the

challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person
who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States.’”

Rae v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 693 F. Supp. 2d

217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53
(2d Cir. 1999)).
A.

Claims Against the Jail
It

is

well-established

that

“under

New

York

law,

departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality
4

do

not

have

a

legal

identity

separate

and

apart

municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”

from

the

Davis v.

Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002);
see also Hawkins v. Nassau Cnty. Corr. Fac., 781 F. Supp. 2d 107,
109 at n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing claims against Nassau
County Jail because it is an “administrative arm[] . . . of the
County of Nassau, and thus lacks the capacity to be sued as a
separate entity” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original)); Trahan v. Suffolk Cnty. Corr. Fac.,
12–CV–4353,

2012

WL

5904730,

*3

(E.D.N.Y.

Nov.

26,

2012)

(dismissing claims against the Suffolk County Jail because it “is
an administrative arm of Suffolk County, without an independent
legal identity.”).

Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the Jail are

not plausible because the Jail has no legal identity separate and
apart from Suffolk County.

See McKoy v. Suffolk Cnty. Corr., 14-

CV-0249, 2014 WL 824516, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014).

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims against the Jail are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B.

Claims Against Suffolk County
Given

Plaintiff’s

pro

se

status

and

affording

his

Complaint a liberal construction, the Court next considers whether
he

has

alleged

a

plausible

Section

municipality, Suffolk County.

1983

claim

against

the

It is well-established that a

municipality such as Suffolk County cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
5

See Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56
L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d
Cir. 2008).
To

prevail

on

a

Section

1983

claim

against

a

municipality, a plaintiff must show “that ‘action pursuant to
official

municipal

policy’

caused

the

alleged

constitutional

injury.”

Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011)

(quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d
417 (2011)); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91.

“[L]ocal

governments . . . may be sued for constitutional deprivations
visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom
has not received formal approval through the body’s official
decisionmaking channels.”

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–691 (internal

citation omitted).
To establish the existence of a municipal policy or
custom, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a formal
policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality, see
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359; (2) actions taken or decisions made by
municipal

policymaking

officials,

i.e.,

officials

with

final

decisionmaking authority, which caused the alleged violation of the
plaintiff's civil rights, see Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford,
361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 57
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Cnty. of Schenectady v. Jeffes, 531
U.S. 813, 121 S. Ct. 47, 148 L. Ed. 2d 16 (2000); (3) a practice
6

“so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of
law,” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359; see also Green v. City of N.Y.,
465 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2006), or that “was so manifest as to
imply

the

constructive

acquiescence

of

senior

policy-making

officials,” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 226
(2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); or
(4)

that

“a

indifference

policymaking
to

official

constitutional

exhibit[ed]

deprivations

deliberate
caused

by

subordinates.” Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); see also Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall–on–Hudson
Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009) (A municipal custom
may be found when “‘faced with a pattern of misconduct, [the
municipality] does nothing, compelling the conclusion that [it] has
acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its subordinates’ unlawful
actions.’” (quoting Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d
Cir. 2007) (second alteration in orginal)).
Here, even affording the pro se Complaint a liberal
construction, there are no factual allegations from which the Court
could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 cause of action
against Suffolk County.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims, to the extent they are construed as against Suffolk County,
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

However, because a district

court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting leave
to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint
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gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” Chavis v.
Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010), Plaintiff is GRANTED
LEAVE TO AMEND his Complaint in accordance with this Order.

Any

Amended Complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the
date of this Order, shall be titled “Amended Complaint,” and shall
bear the same docket number as this Order, No. 14-CV-5607(JS)(ARL).
Plaintiff is cautioned that an Amended Complaint supercedes the
original

Complaint.

Therefore,

all

claims

and

allegations

Plaintiff wishes to pursue should be included in the Amended
Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is
sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the Jail pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

Plaintiff is GRANTED

LEAVE TO AMEND his Complaint in accordance with this Order.

Any

Amended Complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the
date of this Order, shall be titled “Amended Complaint,” and shall
bear the same docket number as this Order, No. 14-CV-5607(JS)(ARL).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,

82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
8

The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy
of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: December
3 , 2014
Central Islip, New York

9