Williams v. Geraci et al

Filing 136

MEMORANDUM & ORDER; For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Objections to Judge Lindsay's R&R are OVERRULED, the R&R (Docket Entry 41) is ADOPTED in its entirety, and Plaintiff's First Motion (Docket Entry 22) is DENIED. Plaintiff&# 039;s Second Motion, (Docket Entry 58), Third Motion, (Docket Entry 109), and Fourth Motion, (Docket Entry 132), are DENIED. Given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from th is Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for purposes of an appeal. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 12/19/2016. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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STOKER OLUKOTUN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-5742(JS)(ARL)

-againstDR. VINCENT GERACI, CHARLES EWALD,
DEPUTY ALLEN SHAPIRO, NURSE PAT DONNADIO,
NURSE LAIRD MERRDEL, NURSE KRISTEN
CERMINARO, MARION WEBSTER, OFFICER ROBERT
“BOB” KOCH, SUFFOLK COUNTY,
DEPUTY DOUGLAS MEHRMAN,

Defendants.
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APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Stoker Olukotun Williams, pro se
Inmate No. 494733
Suffolk County Correctional Facility
110 Center Drive
Riverhead, NY 11901
For Defendants:

Brian C. Mitchell, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney
100 Veteran’s Memorial Highway
P.O. Box 6100
Hauppauge, NY 11788

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Currently pending before the Court are the following
motions: (1) Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay’s Report and
Recommendation dated June 15, 2015 (the “R&R”), (R&R, Docket
Entry 41), and Plaintiff Stoker Olukotun Williams’ (“Plaintiff”)
objections

to

the

R&R,

(Pl.’s

Obj.,

Docket

Entry

43);

(2) Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause dated September 16, 2015
(“Plaintiff’s Second Motion”), (Pl.’s Sec. Mot., Docket Entry 58);

(3)

Plaintiff’s

Order

to

Show

Cause

dated

April

4,

2016

(“Plaintiff’s Third Motion”), (Pl.’s Third Mot., Docket Entry
109); and (4) Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause dated September 27,
2016 (“Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion”), (Pl.’s Fourth Mot., Docket
Entry 132).
BACKGROUND
On September 26, 2014, Plaintiff, an inmate at Suffolk
County

Correctional

Facility

(“SCCF”)

commenced

this

action

asserting claims for deliberate indifference to medical needs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(See generally Am. Compl, Docket

Entry 123.)
I.

The R&R
On April 22, 2015, the Court referred Plaintiff’s Order

to Show Cause dated April 16, 2015 (“Plaintiff’s First Motion,”
Docket Entry 22) to Judge Lindsay for a Report and Recommendation
(Referral Order, Docket Entry 25). The Court construes Plaintiff’s
First Motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction as seeking an Order directing Defendants to provide:
(1) a wheelchair and placement in a handicap cell, (2) treatment
by an orthopedist, (3) an MRI, and (4) physical therapy and pain
medication.
On

(Pl.’s First Mot. at 2-3.)
June

15,

2015,

Judge

Lindsay

issued

recommending that Plaintiff’s First Motion be denied.

her

R&R
Judge

Lindsay indicated that Plaintiff’s request for a wheelchair is
2

moot, as his correspondence dated June 1, 2015, (Pl.’s Ltr., Docket
Entry 40), states that he was provided with a wheelchair.
3.)

(R&R at

Additionally, Judge Lindsay concluded that Plaintiff has not

established that he is in imminent danger of suffering irreparable
harm, as the medical records before the Court do not demonstrate
that

Plaintiff’s

necessary.

proposed

(R&R at 3.)

treatment

options

are

medically

Judge Lindsay found that Plaintiff failed

to demonstrate that “defendants acted with deliberate disregard of
a serious medical need.”
concluded

that

the

(R&R at 4.)

record

does

not

Finally, Judge Lindsay
indicate

that

Plaintiff

exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his request that
SCCF be enjoined from issuing additional disciplinary charges.
(R&R at 4.)
On June 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R
(“Plaintiff’s Objections”).

(Pl.’s Obj.)

The Court construes

Plaintiff’s Objections as raising two specific objections to the
R&R: (1) Judge Lindsay erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s request
for

a

wheelchair

was

moot,

and

(2)

Judge

Lindsay

erred

in

concluding that the record did not demonstrate that Plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his request
that Defendants be enjoined from issuing additional disciplinary
charges.

(Pl.’s Obj. at 13-14.)

3

II.

Plaintiff’s Second Motion
Plaintiff’s Second Motion seeks a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction, and requests that the Court
enjoin Defendants from preventing Plaintiff from printing out
cases in the Law Library.

(Pl.’s Sec. Mot. at 1-2.)

Plaintiff

alleges that due to budgetary concerns, SCCF has disabled the
printers and directed inmates to copy information from the Law
Library computer by hand.

(Pl.’s Sec. Mot. at 2.)

Plaintiff avers

that he is only entitled to one hour in the Law Library every two
weeks and argues that he “should be able to use resources to fight
[his] criminal charges as if [he is] free.”

(Pl.’s Sec. Mot. at

2-3.)
III.

Plaintiff’s Third Motion
Plaintiff’s Third Motion seeks a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction, and requests that the Court
direct Defendants to provide: (1) a wheelchair, (2) orthopedic
sneakers selected by Plaintiff, (2) physical therapy, (3) an MRI
of Plaintiff’s entire spine, and (4) treatment by an orthopedist
of Plaintiff’s choosing.

(Pl.’s Third Mot. at 2.)

Plaintiff also

alleges that he has received five disciplinary tickets based on
false allegations that he refused to go to Court.
Mot. at 5.)

(Pl.’s Third

Plaintiff alleges that he is unable to walk through

the tunnel connecting SCCF to the courthouse due to back pain.
(Pl.’s Thihrd Mot. at 4.)

Plaintiff avers that he requires a
4

wheelchair, but notes that he was given a wheelchair on four
occasions during 2015 when SCCF was provided with an “Order to
Produce.”

(Pl.’s Third Mot. at 5.)

Plaintiff requests an Order

“restrict[ing] [Defendants] from issuing any more disciplinary
tickets related to refusing to go to Court.”

(Pl.’s Third Mot.

at 6.)
IV.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion
Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion seeks a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction, and requests that the Court
direct defendant Dr. Vincent Geraci (“Dr. Geraci”) to: (1) send
Plaintiff for an MRI of his “whole spine,” (2) provide physical
therapy three times per week, (3) schedule Plaintiff for surgery
to remove tumors from his “spinal canal,” and (4) permit Plaintiff
to use a wheelchair in the jail.
Plaintiff

alleges

lipomatosis.

that

he

has

(Pl.’s Fourth Mot. at 2.)
been

diagnosed

with

spinal

(Pl.’s Fourth Mot. at 4.)
DISCUSSION

A

party

seeking

a

preliminary

injunction

must

demonstrate “(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of
success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going
to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting
the preliminary relief.”
108 (2d Cir. 2010).

Johnson v. Connolly, 378 F. App’x 107,

However, where the movant seeks a “mandatory
5

injunction” that will “alter rather than maintain the status quo,”
he must satisfy the higher standard of establishing “a clear or
substantial likelihood of success on the merits.”

Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).
A prisoner asserting a claim for a violation of the
Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care must prove that
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998).

To

establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must demonstrate
the

following

subjective

and

objective

components:

(1)

“the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently
serious,” and (2) “the defendant must act with a sufficiently
culpable

state

of

citations omitted).

mind.”

Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

and

However, it is well-settled that “‘mere

disagreement’” regarding the appropriate treatment does not form
the basis for a constitutional claim, and “‘[s]o long as the
treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer
a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment
violation.’”

Funderburke v. Canfield, No. 13-CV-6128, 2016 WL

831974, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2016) (quoting Chance, 143 F.3d
at 704).
Each

of

Plaintiff’s

four

pending

motions

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

6

seek

a

The Court

will address Plaintiff’s motions in reverse chronological order
beginning with his most recent Fourth Motion.
I.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion
As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion requests

that the Court direct Dr. Geraci to provide an MRI of Plaintiff’s
entire spine, physical therapy three times per week, surgery to
remove spinal tumors, and access to a wheelchair while in the jail.
(Pl.’s Fourth Mot. at 2.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
First, “[w]hether an MRI should have been done is a
classic

example

of

a

matter

for

medical

judgment

as

to

the

appropriate course of treatment and is not actionable under the
Eighth Amendment.”
WL

3174060,

original).

at

*3

Fleming v. City of N.Y., No. 03-CV-0662, 2009
(E.D.N.Y.

Sept.

30,

2009)

(alteration

in

Furthermore, Plaintiff concedes that Dr. Geraci sent

him for an MRI of his lumbar spine and advised that an MRI of
Plaintiff’s entire spine will be ordered, if necessary, in the
future.

(Pl.’s Fourth Mot. at 3-4.)

Second, “[d]isagreements

over medications, diagnostic techniques, forms of treatment, the
need

for

specialists,

and

the

timing

of

their

intervention

implicate medical judgments, not the Eighth Amendment.”

Wright v.

Genovese, 694 F. Supp. 2d 137, 155 (N.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 415 F.
App’x 313 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges

that he had a consultation with a neurologist, an MRI of the lumbar
7

spine, and has been prescribed pain medication (albeit, medication
that Plaintiff alleges is ineffective).
6.)

(Pl.’s Fourth Mot. at 5-

While Plaintiff asserts that his spinal lipomatosis requires

surgery and questions Dr. Geraci’s determination that his tumors
are benign in the absence of a biopsy, “[a]n inmate does not have
the right to treatment of his choice.”

Wright, 694 F. Supp 2d at

155.
Third, Plaintiff concedes that he “ha[s] a court order
from [his] criminal Judge that forces the jail to give [him] a
wheelchair for court trips.”

(Pl.’s Fourth Mot. at 7.)

Plaintiff

asserts that he needs a wheelchair on a daily basis because there
are no benches in the yard and he cannot stand for an hour during
recreation.

(Pl.’s Fourth Mot. at 7.)

Plaintiff’s cited reason

for requiring a wheelchair at all times--that it would provide him
with a place to sit during recreation rather than sitting on the
ground--is not compelling and constitutes a disagreement as to the
appropriate medical treatment for his condition.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not
established

his

entitlement

Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion.

to

injunctive

relief

and

DENIES

See, e.g., Neary v. Naqvi, No. 14-CV-

1631, 2015 WL 5116727, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 28, 2015) (denying the
prisoner’s

motion

for

a

preliminary

injunction

directing

the

defendants to surgically remove a growth in his chest where “the
evidence

produced

thus

far

is
8

tantamount

to

a

prisoner’s

disagreement with a medical doctor about the proper course of
treatment”).
II.

Plaintiff’s Third Motion
Plaintiff’s Third Motion is duplicative of his Fourth

Motion to the extent it requests an Order directing Defendants to
provide a wheelchair, physical therapy, and an MRI of Plaintiff’s
entire spine.

(Pl.’s Third Mot. at 2.)

The Court similarly finds

that Plaintiff’s requests for orthopedic sneakers and treatment by
an orthopedist of his choosing relates to his disagreement with
his medical treatment and does not support a likelihood of success
on the merits.
To the extent that Plaintiff requests an Order enjoining
Defendants from issuing disciplinary tickets with respect to false
allegations of Plaintiff’s refusal to go to Court, (Pl.’s Third
Mot. at 6), that request relates to matters outside of the Eighth
Amendment

deliberate

indifference

claims

in

this

lawsuit

cannot support Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief.

and
See,

e.g., Lopez v. McEwan, No. 08-CV-0678, 2009 WL 179815, at *2 (D.
Conn. Jan. 23, 2009) (“[b]ecause the plaintiff’s allegations and
request

for

relief

relating

to

grievance

restrictions

are

unrelated to the claims in the Complaint . . . the request for
injunctive relief as to claims subsequent to the Complaint is
inappropriate”);
4415197,

at

*2

Suarez

v.

(W.D.N.Y.

Keiser,
Sept.
9

No.
24,

04-CV-6362,
2008)

2008

WL

(“[p]laintiff’s

application for injunctive relief must be denied, since it involves
matters

that

lawsuit”).

are

unconnected

to

the

specific

claims

in

this

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Third Motion is DENIED.

III. Plaintiff’s Second Motion
As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Second Motion requests
that Defendants be directed to provide a working printer at the
SCCF Law Library.

(See Pl.’s Second Mot.)

However, Plaintiff

does not assert any claim regarding law library access in this
action.

See Van Gorder v. Workman, No. 03-CV-6409, 2006 WL

3375075, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2006) (“[w]ithout a claim in his
complaint that he is being denied access to the law library,
logically plaintiff cannot meet two of the requirements to obtain
injunctive

relief

under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

65:

likelihood of success on the merits, or sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits”). Indeed, Plaintiff’s Second Motion
expressly seeks this injunctive relief to enable Plaintiff to
litigate his criminal case, without reference to the case at bar.
(Pl.’s Second Mot. at 3-4.)
In any event, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits for a claim of lack of access
to an adequate law library.

The Supreme Court has held that “the

fundamental constitutional right of the courts requires prison
authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
10

libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.
Ed. 2d 72 (1977).

However, “[t]he Constitution does not require

unlimited and unrestricted access to a prison law library, and
prison officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the use of
the law library.”

Bain v. Hofmann, No. 06-CV-0189, 2010 WL

1403954, at *2 (D. Vt. Apr. 5, 2010) (denying the plaintiff’s
motion for a preliminary injunction where he alleged that he was
“unable to open files he ha[d] stored on CD . . . not allowed to
be in the library without a librarian present . . . [and] many of
the law library computer functions [we]re blocked or inoperable”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Colon v.
Goord, No. 05-CV-0129, 2007 WL 81922, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2007)
(holding that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a likelihood of
success on his claim regarding access to the law library where he
did not establish that the contents of the law library were
inadequate and “merely complain[ed] about the efficiency of the
law clerk assigned to assist [involuntary protective custody]
inmates and the expediency in which he receives legal supplies and
the materials he requests from the law library”).

Here, Plaintiff

appears to have access to the books and computers in the law
library and does not argue that the contents of the library are
inadequate. The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff would likely

11

succeed on a claim based solely on SCCF’s failure to provide
inmates with a working printer.
Additionally,

Plaintiff

has

not

established

that

he

suffered an actual injury based on his inability to print cases.
Colon, 2007 WL 81922, at *2.

Plaintiff alleges that he is only

entitled to one hour of library time every two weeks and will be
at a disadvantage in litigating his criminal case if he is forced
to “copy by hand” rather than printing out cases.
Mot. at 3.)

(Pl.’s Fourth

However, this claimed injury is speculative, as

Plaintiff does not allege how his inability to print cases has
impacted his ability to litigate his pending cases.
Gorder, 2006 WL 3375075, at *3.

See Van

See also Colon, 2007 WL 81922, at

*2 (holding that the plaintiff did not demonstrate an actual injury
where he failed to “establish[ ] that he has been hindered in his
pursuit of the claims in this or any other action”).

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Second Motion is DENIED.
IV.

Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R
“When evaluating the report and recommendation of a

magistrate judge, the district court may adopt those portions of
the report to which no objections have been made and which are not
facially erroneous.”

Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F. Supp. 2d 290, 291

(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations omitted).

A party may serve and file

specific, written objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation within fourteen days of being served with the
12

recommended disposition.
receiving

any

timely

See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2).

objections

to

the

magistrate

Upon
judge’s

recommendation, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.”
72(b)(3).
must

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P.

A party that objects to a report and recommendation

point

out

the

specific

portions

recommendation that they are objecting to.

of

the

report

and

See Barratt v. Joie,

No. 96-CV-0324, 2002 WL 335014, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2002)
(citations omitted).
When a party raises an objection to a magistrate judge’s
report, the Court must conduct a de novo review of any contested
sections of the report.
815, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
or

general

objections,

See Pizarro v. Bartlett, 776 F. Supp.
But if a party “makes only conclusory
or

simply

reiterates

his

original

arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only
for clear error.”

Walker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court construes Plaintiff’s Objections as raising
two specific objections to the R&R: (1) Judge Lindsay erred in
concluding that Plaintiff’s request for a wheelchair was moot, and
(2) Judge Lindsay erred in concluding that the record did not
demonstrate that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies
with respect to his request that SCCF be enjoined from issuing
13

additional disciplinary charges.

(Pl.’s Obj. at 13-14.)

As

addressed more fully above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits regarding his request for a
wheelchair.

Additionally, the Court need not determine whether

Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies, as Plaintiff’s
request

for

an

injunction

barring

Defendants

from

issuing

disciplinary charges does not relate to the claims at issue in
this action.
any

The balance of Plaintiff’s Objections fail to raise

objections

to

specific

reiterate prior arguments.

portions

of

the

R&R

and

(See generally Pl.’s Obj.)

instead

The Court

reviews the remainder of the R&R for clear error and finds none.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Objections to
Judge Lindsay’s R&R are OVERRULED, the R&R (Docket Entry 41) is
ADOPTED in its entirety, and Plaintiff’s First Motion (Docket Entry
22) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Second Motion, (Docket Entry 58), Third
Motion, (Docket Entry 109), and Fourth Motion, (Docket Entry 132),
are DENIED.
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court certifies
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore
in forma pauperis status is DENIED for purposes of an appeal.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8
L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
14

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of
this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

December _19__, 2016
Central Islip, New York

15