Mathie v. Womack, M.D.
Filing
5
MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however Plaintiff's HIPAA claim is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim, and it is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to being refiled in state court. The Court certi fies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to mark this case CLOSED. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 1/29/2015. C/M (Valle, Christine)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
MICHAEL M.J. MATHIE, IV,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-6577(JS)(GRB)
-againstDR. LAWRENCE WOMACK, MD.,
Defendant.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Michael M.J. Mathie, IV, pro se
63 Otis Road
Islip Terrace, NY 11752
For Defendant:
No appearance
SEYBERT, District Judge:
On November 6, 2014, pro se plaintiff Michael M.J. Mathie
IV (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court pursuant to the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (“HIPAA”) and N.Y. Public Health Law
§ 18 against Dr. Lawrence Womack (“Defendant”), accompanied by an
application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Upon review of the declaration in support of Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of
the
filing
fee.
See
28
U.S.C.
§§
1914(a);
1915(a)(1).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED.
However, for the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s HIPAA
claim is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim, and it is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to being refiled in state court.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to recover monetary damages
pursuant to HIPAA and N.Y. Public Health Law § 18 for alleged
violations
thereof
by
the
Defendant,
who
is
alleged
to
be
Plaintiff’s primary care physician at all times relevant to the
Complaint.
(Compl. ¶¶ II.A, IV.1.)
Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant “failed to provide [P]laintiff’s health insurance company
with the appropriate documentation to allow
the [P]laintiff to be
reimbursed for his out of pocket prescription cost(s) or to
prescribe an alternative medication that [P]laintiff’s insurance
company would pay for in the alternative, without requesting prior
authorization from the insurance company.”
(Compl. ¶ IV.2.)
The
Complaint then details Plaintiff’s efforts to get the Defendant to
communicate with Plaintiff’s insurance company during the period
May 2014 through August 2014.
(Compl. ¶¶ IV.3-6.)
Plaintiff
claims that Defendant did not comply with Plaintiff’s repeated
requests that Defendant contact Plaintiff’s insurance company on
Plaintiff’s behalf.
(Compl. ¶¶ IV.7-9.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that he sent written
requests to Defendant on August 7, 2014 and August 19, 2014
1
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purpose of this Memorandum and
Order.
2
requesting copies of Plaintiff’s entire medical records to be
personally picked up by Plaintiff and that Defendant did not
respond to either request.
(Compl. ¶¶ IV.6-9, 14.)
As a result of the Defendant’s failure to provide the
requested
information
to
Plaintiff
or
his
insurance
company,
Plaintiff claims that he is now foreclosed from being reimbursed
for prescriptions totaling $2,700.00. (Compl. ¶ IV.10.) Plaintiff
also claims to have suffered “extreme emotional distress” as a
result of Defendant’s non-compliance with his requests for his
medical records.
that
the
(Compl. ¶¶ IV.11-12.)
Defendant’s
inaction
has
Plaintiff further claims
caused
Plaintiff’s
medical
treatment to be delayed and has interfered with the continuity of
medical care for Plaintiff’s unspecified ailment.
12.)
(Compl. ¶ IV.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks to recover an unspecified sum of
compensatory and punitive damages.
(Compl. ¶ VI.)
DISCUSSION
I.
In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of his
application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fees.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore,
Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.
Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to
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dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
The
Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a
determination.
Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).
However, a complaint must plead sufficient
facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).
The
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).
While
“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
4
Iqbal, 556 U.S.
III.
HIPAA Claim
Insofar as Plaintiff seeks relief under HIPAA, such
reliance is misplaced.
of
confidential
affirmative
HIPPA protects the unauthorized disclosure
medical
obligation
information
on
a
and
medical
does
not
provider
impose
to
any
disclose
information at the request of an individual. Thus, given the facts
presented in the Complaint, HIPAA has no application.
Moreover,
even if Plaintiff’s allegations implicated HIPAA, there is no
private right of action under the HIPAA law.
See, e.g., Warren
Pearl Constr. Corp., et al. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 639
F. Supp. 2d 371, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (collecting cases across
numerous circuits standing for that proposition).
Rather, HIPAA
enforcement actions are in the exclusive purview of the Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services.
See
42
U.S.C.
§
300gg–22(a)
(explaining that “the Secretary” shall enforce HIPAA); Ames v.
Group Health Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(finding that case law is “clear that plaintiffs cannot bring a
HIPAA enforcement action due to improper disclosures of medical
information.”).
Thus, Plaintiff’s HIPAA claim is not plausible
and is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
(2)(B)(ii).
IV.
N.Y. Public Health Law Claim
Since the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s HIPAA claim,
there
is
no
longer
a
basis
for
5
federal
jurisdiction
over
Plaintiff’s state law claim.
Under Carnegie Mellon University v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988),
a federal court should generally decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims if, as is the case here, the
complaint asserts federal question jurisdiction but not diversity
jurisdiction, and the complaint’s federal claims are dismissed in
the litigation’s ‘early stages.’” See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Tops Marks, Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 103 (2d
Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen all federal claims are eliminated in the early
stages of litigation, the balance of factors generally favors
declining
to
exercise
supplemental
pendent
jurisdiction
over
remaining state law claims and dismissing them without prejudice.”
(emphasis in original)).
Accordingly, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state
law claim, and it is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to being refiled
in state court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however Plaintiff’s HIPAA
claim is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim, and it is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to being refiled in state court.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
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that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,
82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to mark this case
CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
January
29 , 2015
Central Islip, New York
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