Coppens v. Aer Lingus Limited

Filing 23

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the R&R in its entirety. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, and the plaintiffs complaint is dismissed. Furthermore, the plaintiff is de nied leave to re-plead her claim, because any claims arisingfrom plaintiffs lost or damaged baggage have been settled, and are thus futile. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bianco on 6/22/2015. (Bollbach, Jean) cm by chambers to pro se by fcm on 6/22/15

FILED

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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SADE COPPENS,

JUN 212015

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LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiff,
ORDER
14-CV-6597 (JFB) (AKT)

-againstAER LIN GUS LIMITED,
Defendant.

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JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") from Magistrate Judge
Tomlinson, advising the Court to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the
thorough and well-reasoned R&R in its entirety, and dismisses the plaintiffs claims with prejudice.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district judge may accept, reject, or modifY, in whole or in part, the findings and
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1345 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Walker v. Hood, 679 F. Supp. 372, 374 (S.D.N. Y. 1988). As to those portions of a report to
which no "specific written objections" are made, the Court may accept the findings contained
therein, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings are not clearly erroneous. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). When a party submits a timely
objection to a report and recommendation, the district judge will review the parts of the report and
recommendation to which the party objected under a de novo standard of review. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(l)(C) ("A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
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report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made."); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3) ("The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's
disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.").

II. ANALYSIS
In her R&R, Magistrate Judge Tomlinson recommends that the Court grant the defendant's
motion for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6), on the grounds that plaintiff
accepted an accord and satisfaction of her claims. The recommendation was based upon Magistrate
Judge Tomlinson's finding that (I) plaintiffs claims were governed by the Montreal Convention,
and therefore all of plaintiffs claims for damages were subject to a maximum recovery cap of 1,131
SDR; and (2) plaintiff accepted a settlement of her claims by cashing a check from the defendant.'
Plaintiff filed timely objections to the R&R. (See ECF No. 20.) In large part, plaintiff repeats the
arguments set forth in her original briefing papers. First, plaintiff maintains that the Montreal
Convention does not apply here because her personal effects were stolen, and not lost. Second,
plaintiff argues that she accepted the settlement under protest, and therefore the endorsed check is
not an accord and satisfaction of her claims. To advance this argument, she points to an email she
sent before cashing the check, which inquires of the defendant whether the check represented a final

Although the issues before the Court are presented in the context of a motion to dismiss, it was
appropriate for Magistrate Judge Tomlinson to analyze documents outside the pleadings, such as the
defendant's offer of settlement. These documents were incorporated by reference in plaintiff's
complaint, which specifically addressed the defendant's letter offering a settlement. (Compl. ~II.)
In any event, plaintiff has not asserted any objection to the R&R on the grounds that it addressed
matters outside the pleadings.
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settlement offer. Finally, plaintiff argues that the check from the defendant did not resolve her claim
regarding damage to her son's stroller.
Having reviewed plaintiffs objections, the relevant law, and the R&R, the Court agrees with
Magistrate Judge Tomlinson's conclusion that plaintiff accepted an accord and satisfaction of all her
claims against the defendant, and that the Montreal Convention precludes the plaintiff from asserting
any other claims against the defendant. With respect to plaintiff's first two objections, those
arguments were squarely presented to Magistrate Judge Tomlinson, and the Court agrees that these
arguments lack merit. In brief, there is no dispute that the defendant offered the check as a "full and
final settlement," and that plaintiff endorsed the check without explicitly reserving her rights or
conveying her protest to accepting the funds in settlement of her claims. Whether or not plaintiff
believed she was settling her claims is irrelevant, and it makes no difference that plaintiff now asserts
that she was entitled to more than the amount of the settlement. What matters here is that plaintiff
was offered a settlement and accepted it by endorsing a check. As a result of those acts, plaintiff's
claims have been settled. Furthermore, the Montreal Convention precludes plaintiff from pursuing
any additional claims beyond the claims that plaintiff has already settled. As Magistrate Judge
Tomlinson explained, plaintiff's allegations of theft do not alter this conclusion, because employee
theft is not an exception to the Montreal Convention's liability cap. Finally, to the extent plaintiff
seeks compensation for the loss of her son's stroller, that claim cannot proceed. If the stroller
belonged to the plaintiff, that claim has been settled as part of her individual claim for lost property.
Alternatively, if the stroller belonged to plaintiff's son, Ms. Coppens cannot pursue that claim here
because she lacks standing to assert claims on her son's behalf. See Justice v. Kuhnapfel, No. 13-CV659 (MKB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58164, at *2 n.1 (E .. D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013) ("Plaintiff, as a lay
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person, cannot bring claims on behalf of her child or represent him in this action.") (citing Guest v.
Hansen, 603 F.3d 15,20 (2d Cir. 2010)). For these reasons, the Court fully adopts Magistrate Judge

Tomlinson's conclusion that dismissal of the plaintiffs claims is warranted.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the R&R in its
entirety. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, and the plaintiffs complaint is
dismissed. Furthermore, the plaintiff is denied leave to re-plead her claim, because any claims arising
from plaintiffs lost or damaged baggage have been settled, and are thus futile. The Clerk of Court
shall close the case.

SO,(')~RED.

K/JF1ii*

BlANC'&::_
1'ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: Jun~~2015
Central Islip, New York

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