Vallen v. Beau Plan et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting in part 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 10) is GRANTED IN PART and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3 ) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 2/4/2016. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
BARRY VALLEN,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-0703(JS)(ARL)

-againstDR. ROGER BEAU PLAN, DR. BILAL
KHAN, and DR. LEONICA CARLOTTA,

Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Barry Vallen, pro se
Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center
Bldg. 81, Ward 401
998 Crooked Hill Road
West Brentwood, NY 11717
For Defendants:

Lori L. Pack, Esq.
Office of the N.Y. State Attorney General
300 Motor Parkway, Suite 205
Hauppauge, NY 11788

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is a motion by Dr. Roger
Beauplan (“Dr. Beauplan”), Dr. Bilal Khan (“Dr. Khan”) and Dr.
Leoncia Carlotta (“Dr. Carlotta” and collectively, “Defendants”) to
dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).

(Docket Entry 10).

The motion is unopposed.

For the

following reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Barry Vallen commenced this action on February
9, 2015 alleging, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”),

that

Defendants

were

deliberately

indifferent

to

his

serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment Rights.
(See Compl. ¶ IV and at 6.)

Plaintiff is presently a patient at

Pilgrim State Psychiatric Hospital.1
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
argue

that

Plaintiff’s

the

Complaint

Section

1983

(Docket Entry 10.)

should
claims

be
are

dismissed
barred

by

Defendants

because:
the

(1)

Eleventh

Amendment; and (2) the Defendants have qualified immunity. (Defs.’
Br., at 1-4.)
THE COMPLAINT2
Plaintiff’s brief handwritten Complaint is submitted on
the Court’s Section 1983 complaint form and alleges the following
it its entirety:3
1

Plaintiff is an insanity acquitee having “bludgeoned his
parents to death while they slept” and “was charged with two
counts of Murder in the Second Degree but was found not
responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.” Vallen v.
Connelly, 99-CV-9947, 2004 WL 555698, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
2004); see also Vallen v. Miraglia, 10-CV-4225, 2010 WL 5491187,
at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2010); Defs’ Br., Docket Entry 10-1,
at 1.
2

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purposes of this Memorandum and
Order.
3

The excerpts from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as
they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation,
and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
2

On December 11, 2014 Dr. Beauplan - Dr. Khan
Dr. Carlotta came to me and showed me a Letter
stating concern from an agency about some of
my medications I take. From a severe back
injury from another patient and 2 surgeries
later I am on Soma - Celebrex - and Percoset.
De. Beauplan led the group t0 then call me an
addict, Dr. Khan and Dr. Carlotta also said
that to me.
When I stated I would be in
unbearable pain without them, they proceeded
to tell me they would be stopping all those
medications because I was an addict.
Dr.
Beauplan kept saying it over and over again
getting right up on me in the calming room.
This room is for quiet contemplation whereas
plaintiff
was
verbally
assaulted
and
humiliated by these so called doctors, Roger
Beauplan a so called keeper of sanity (a
psychiatrist) pushing plaintiff over the edge
delibertaly inflicting pain and suffering
causing catastophic fear of unknown health
problems. Dr. Khan having an oath not to do
harm to a patient, Dr. Carlotta the same what
was their point. Dr. Beauplan has regularly
been a bad doctor to plaintiff not speaking to
him for over one year, making him be in extra
pain by forcing him to walk further than he
has to laughing at his increased pain yelling
at me “you are a drug addict.”
My mind
reeling with the verbal assault my senses
appalled, shocked, to much for me to handle, I
am sent into another world of confusion and
fear, humiliated by their statements, what did
they think would be my reaction a mental
patient a chronic paranoid schyzophernic my
mind could have snapped. What if I had done
something physical becoming unaware of what
was going on. So many situations could have
developed, none of them good.
Can Dr.
Beauplan, Dr. Khan, and Dr. Carlotta actually
say they were trying to help me. . . .
(Compl. ¶ IV and at 6-7.)

3

These doctors telling me I must go to
programs. The deliberate infliction of pain,
unnecessary and wanton is a violation of my
Eighth Amendment Rights . . . .
(Compl. ¶ IV.A.)

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks to

recover $75,000 from Dr. Beauplan, $25,000 from Dr. Khan, and
$25,000 from Dr. Carlotta.

(Compl. ¶ V.)

In addition, Plaintiff

seeks “an end to the lowering of my medications [and] to see an
outside psychiatricst-psychologist medical doctor and social worker
trained in treating trauma.”

(Compl. ¶ V.)

DISCUSSION
The Court will first set forth the applicable legal
standards before turning to Defendants’ motion more specifically.
I.

Legal Standards
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court

applies a “plausibility standard,” which is guided by “[t]wo
working principles.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007));
accord Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009).

First,

although the Court must accept all allegations as true, this
“tenet” is “inapplicable to legal conclusions;” thus, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

4

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,

129 S. Ct. at 1949; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.

Second, only

complaints that state a “plausible claim for relief” can survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Ct. at 1950.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.

Determining whether a complaint does so is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.; accord Harris, 572
F.3d at 72.
While pro se plaintiffs enjoy a somewhat more liberal
pleading standard, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.
Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)), they must still comport with the procedural and
substantive rules of law, see Colo. Cap. v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181,
186 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
II. Defendants’ Motion
Defendants

argue

that

Plaintiff’s

claims

must

be

dismissed because they are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity
and/or qualified immunity.
A.

(Defs.’ Br. at 4-7.)

Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides:

5

The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

“‘The reach of the Eleventh Amendment has

. . . been interpreted to extend beyond the terms of its text to
bar suits in federal courts against states, by their own citizens
or by foreign sovereigns. . . .’”

State Emps. Bargaining Agent

Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (ellipses in
original) (quoting W. Mohegan Tribe & Nation v. Orange Cty., 395
F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 2004)).
1.

Claims Seeking Monetary Damages

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to suits against
state officials in their official capacities.

Will v. Mich. Dep’t

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45
(1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official
capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office.

As such, it is no different from a

suit against the State itself.”) (internal citations omitted).
Here, insofar as Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims seek
monetary damages against Defendants, all of whom are alleged to be
state actors sued in their official capacities, and because New
York state has not waived its sovereign immunity for suits under

6

Section 1983 (see, e.g., Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 F. App’x 191,
192 (2d Cir. 2010) (“It is well-established that New York has not
consented to § 1983 suits in federal court . . . .”) (citing
Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 38–40 (2d
Cir. 1977)), Defendants are immune from such suits in their
official

capacity.

Moreover,

“there

is

no

subject

matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief against
the [ ] defendants as the Supreme Court has stated that ‘neither a
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
persons under § 1983.’”

Casaburro v. Giuliani, 986 F. Supp. 176,

182 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at
2312)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims seeking
monetary damages are clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Accordingly, this prong of Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED
and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
2.

Claims Seeking Injunctive Relief

Suits

against

state

officials

in

their

official

capacities are permitted for prospective injunctive relief to stop
ongoing violations of federal law.

7

Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State &

Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 166 (2d Cir. 2013); see also
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n. 18, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3107,
87 L. Ed. 2d. 114 (1985) (Eleventh Amendment immunity does not
extend to injunctive or declaratory actions brought against state
officials in their official capacities.).

To the extent Plaintiff

seeks prospective injunctive relief against the Defendants to “end
the lowering of [his] medications” and to allow him to “see an
outside psychiatricst-psychologist medical doctor and social worker
trained in treating trauma” (Compl. ¶ V), such claims are not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Accordingly, the Court next

turns to the substance of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference
claims seeking injunctive relief.
3.

Deliberate Indifference Claims
Plaintiff

claims

that

the

Defendants’

“deliberate

infliction of pain, unneccessary [sic] and wanton is a violation of
my Eighth Amendment rights.”

(Compl. ¶ IV.A.)

Individuals

involuntarily committed to state custody, such as Plaintiff, have
constitutionally-protected liberty interests in adequate food,
shelter, clothing, medical care, and conditions of reasonable care
and safety.

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324, 102 S. Ct.

2452, 2458-59, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1982).

“The rights of patients who

are involuntarily committed have been likened to the rights of

8

detainees awaiting trial.”

James v. Morgan, 13-CV-0526, 2014 WL

841344, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2014) (citing Serna v. Goodno, 567
F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 2009) (“an involuntarily committed person’s
Constitutional claim ‘should be evaluated under the . . . standard
usually applied to . . . claims brought by pretrial detainees”);
quoting Buthy v. Comm’r of Off. of Mental Health of N.Y., 818 F.2d
1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1987) (“applying the levels of protection
afforded pre-trial detainees under the Due Process Clause to
persons confined due to an acquittal by reason of insanity or their
incompetence to stand trial”). Because Plaintiff was involuntarily
committed at the time of the challenged conduct, his deliberate
indifference claims are analyzed under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Eighth Amendment.
See

Groves

v.

New

York,

09–CV–0412,

2010

WL

1257858,

at

*6

(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010).4
To establish a constitutional violation arising out of
inadequate medical treatment, “a prisoner must prove ‘deliberate
indifference to [his] serious medical needs.’”
4

Johnson v. Wright,

Such distinction is of no moment because the same standard
applies to Fourteenth Amendment medical care claims involving
non-prisoners as to Eighth Amendment medical claims regarding
prisoners. See Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.
2009) (“Claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
condition or other serious threat to the health or safety of a
person in custody should be analyzed under the same standard
irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
9

412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed.
2d 251 (1976)).

“[T]he deliberate indifference standard embodies

both an objective and subjective prong.”
F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996).

Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99

The objective prong requires the

prisoner to allege a sufficiently serious injury.

Id.

The Second

Circuit has defined a sufficiently serious injury as “a condition
of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme
pain.”

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The

subjective prong requires the prisoner to show the charged official
acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Id.

The

United States Supreme Court has stated that the subjective element
“‘entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but] something
less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or
with

knowledge

that

harm

will

result.’”

Id.

(elipsis

and

alteration in original) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
835, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1978, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994)).
Importantly, “mere allegations of negligent malpractice
do not state a claim of deliberate indifference.”

Hathaway, 99

F.3d at 553; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. 285,
(“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing
or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of

10

medical

mistreatment

under

the

Eighth

Amendment.

Medical

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner.”)
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants lowered the
doses of his prescription medication because, in their medical
judgment, he was “an addict” and that such doses of medication were
no longer medically necessary.

(Compl. ¶ IV.)

Defendants

are

advised

programs”

(presumably

institution)
medication.

alleged

rather

to

have

treatment

than

continue

(Compl. ¶¶ IV, IV.A.)

Plaintiff

programs
with

In addition,

available

the

higher

Defendants

were

Plaintiff’s medical needs.

not

“go

to

at

the

doses

of

Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations

make clear that while he may have disagreed with the
treatment,

to

deliberately

course of

indifferent

to

See Cephas v. Nassau Cty. Corr. Ctr.,

No. 12–CV–1445, 2014 WL 537576, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2014)
(dismissing the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against
Armor because, even though the plaintiff may not have received the
medication he wanted, he did receive medication). Accordingly, the
Complaint fails to state a deliberate indifference claim and it is
thus DISMISSED pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).5
5

Given the dismissal of the Complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court need not
address Defendants’ argument that qualified immunity bars
Plaintiff’s claims.
11

III.

Leave to Replead
The Second Circuit has stated that “[w]hen a motion to

dismiss is granted, the usual practice is to grant leave to amend
the complaint.”

Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d

Cir. 1999); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”).

In

addition, leave to replead should be liberally granted to pro se
litigants. Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND his Complaint in
accordance with this Memorandum and Order.

Any Amended Complaint

shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of this
Memorandum and Order and shall be title “Amended Complaint” and
shall bear the same docket number as this Memorandum and Order, 150703(JS)(ARL).

Plaintiff is cautioned that his failure to timely

file an Amended Complaint will lead to the dismissal of his
Complaint with prejudice and this case will be closed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
(Docket Entry 10) is GRANTED IN PART and the Complaint is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum

12

and Order and shall be title “Amended Complaint” and shall bear the
same docket number as this Memorandum and Order, 15-0703(JS)(ARL).
Plaintiff is cautioned that his failure to timely file an Amended
Complaint

will

lead

to

the

dismissal

of

his

Complaint

with

prejudice and this case will be closed.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,

82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
DATED:

February
4 , 2016
Central Islip, New York

13