Vallen v. Beau Plan et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 20 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket Entry 20) is GRANTED and the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants' req uest for an order barring Plaintiff from filing additional lawsuits against Pilgrim or its employees is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff. Given Plaintiff& #039;s pro se status, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for purposes of an appeal. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mark this case CLOSED. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 2/14/2017. C/M; C/ECF (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------X
BARRY VALLEN,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-0703 (JS)(ARL)

-against–
DR. ROGER BEAU PLAN, DR. BILAL KHAN,
and DR. LEONCIA CARLOTTA,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Barry Vallen, pro se
Pilgrim Psychiatric Center Hospital
Ward 401
998 Crooked Hill Road
W. Brentwood, NY 11717
For Defendants:

Lori L. Pack, Esq.
Office of the New York State Attorney General
300 Motor Parkway, Suite 205
Hauppauge, NY 11788

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Currently pending before the Court in this section 1983
action is a motion filed by

Dr. Roger Beau Plan (“Dr. Plan”), Dr.

Bilal Khan (“Dr. Khan”), and Dr. Leoncia Carlotta (“Dr. Carlotta”
and collectively “Defendants”) to dismiss for failure to state a
claim (Docket Entry 20).

For the following reasons, Defendants’

motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The

Court

assumes

familiarity

with

the

factual

and

procedural background of this case, which is set forth in its

Memorandum and Order dated February 4, 2016.

See Vallen v. Plan,

No. 15-CV-0703, 2016 WL 482026 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016).
Briefly, Plaintiff is a patient at Pilgrim Psychiatric
Center (“Pilgrim”) and commenced this action on February 9, 2015.
(Compl.,

Docket

Entry

1.)

He

alleged

that

Defendants

were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in connection with
a severe back injury.

(Compl. ¶ IV.)

Specifically, he alleged

that Defendants, after determining that he was addicted to certain
pain medications, decided to stop prescribing those medications.
(Compl.

¶

IV.)

He

further

maintained

that

“unbearable” pain without the pain medications.

he

would

be

in

(Compl. ¶ IV.)

He sought $75,000 from Dr. Plan, $25,000 from Dr. Khan, and $25,000
from Dr. Carlotta to compensate him for the alleged violations of
his Eighth Amendment rights.

(Compl. ¶ V.)

Additionally, he

sought injunctive relief directing Defendants “to end the lowering
of

[his]

medications”

and

to

allow

him

to

see

“an

outside

psychiatrist-psychologist[,] medical doctor[,] and social worker
trained in treated trauma.”

(Compl. ¶ V.)

On August 11, 2015,

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

(Docket

Entry 10.)
On February 4, 2016, this Court granted Defendant’s
motion in part.

Vallen, 2016 WL 482026, at *4.

The Court held

that Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants in
2

their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity and
dismissed those claims.

Id. at *3.

The Court further held that

Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to state a claim and dismissed the
Complaint with leave to amend.

Id. at *4.

While Plaintiff may

have disagreed with the course of treatment, the Court found that
the

allegations

were

indifference claim.

insufficient

to

state

a

deliberate

See id. at *4.
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT1

On April 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff makes similar allegations in his Amended Complaint,
including that: (1) Defendants were “deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff[’s] [p]sychiatric and medical need[s];” (2) Plaintiff
suffers from a deteriorating “hip condition” which is “well known
to Defendants;” (3) Plaintiff “never asked for narcotics . . .
[and] would rather have had bed rest;” (4) Defendants and nurses
teased Plaintiff; (5) “Due to the Staff[’]s deliberate infliction
and wanton and vicious abuse of [Plaintiff] . . . Plaintiff even
with the medications could not leave a psychological and physical

The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint (Am.
Compl., Docket Entry 17) and are presumed to be true for the
purposes of this Memorandum and Order. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1975, 167 L. Ed. 2d
929 (2007) (“[A] judge ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss
a complaint must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
1

3

state of pain;” and (6) “Defendants were obviously together in a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, not being kind or even trying
to be kind to Plaintiff.”
original.)

(Am. Compl. at 1-3)2 (emphasis in

Plaintiff contends that he has “silently suffered with

vicious and wanton infliction [of pain]” and requests that the
Court order an evaluation by an outside doctor as soon as possible.
(Am. Compl. at 4.)

Finally, he states that he intends to proceed

against Defendants in their individual capacities in light of the
Court’s prior ruling.

(Am. Compl. at 5.)

The Court construes the

Amended Complaint as seeking unspecified monetary damages against
Defendants and an order directing that Defendants allow him to be
examined by an outside doctor.
DISCUSSION
Defendants
pursuant

to

move

Federal

to

Rule

dismiss
of

Civil

the

Amended

Procedure

Complaint
12(b)(6).

Specifically, they argue that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to
state a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
(Defs.’ Br., Docket Entry 20-2, at 2-3.) Alternatively, they argue
that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

(Defs.’

Br. at 3-6.) Defendants also request an order precluding Plaintiff

The Court will use the page numbers assigned by the Electronic
Case Filing System when referring to the Amended Complaint.
2

4

from filing additional lawsuits against Pilgrim, or members of its
staff, without permission of this Court.
I.

(Defs.’ Br. at 6-7.)

Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that dismissal is appropriate if

the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

A claim is plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

Although the

Court must accept all allegations in the Amended Complaint as true,
this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Id.

Thus,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
(citation

omitted).

determination

is

a

Ultimately,

the

“context-specific

Court’s

task

that

Id.

plausibility
requires

the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”

Id. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be construed

liberally and “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
5

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
See also Hiller v. Farmington Police Dep’t, No. 12-CV-1139, 2015
WL 4619624, at *7 (D. Conn. July 31, 2015) (noting that the
dismissal of a pro se complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not
appropriate “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Nevertheless, a pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for
relief and comply with the minimal pleading standards set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Hiller, 2015 WL 4619624, at *7.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is generally
confined to “the allegations contained within the four corners of
[the] complaint.”

Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d

67, 71 (2d Cir. 1998).

However, the Court may consider “any

written instrument attached to [the complaint] as an exhibit,
materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that,
although

not

complaint.”

incorporated

by

reference,

are

integral

to

the

Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
II.

Deliberate Indifference Claim
When a prisoner alleges inadequate medical treatment, he

must show “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs”

6

to establish a constitutional violation.3

Johnson v. Wright, 412

F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed.
2d 251 (1976)). Deliberate indifference has an objective component
and a subjective component.

Bolden v. Cty. of Sullivan, 523 F.

App’x 832, 833 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99
F.3d

550,

553

(2d

Cir.

1996)).

“‘Objectively,

the

alleged

deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a
condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration or
extreme pain exists.’”

Bolden, 523 F. App’x at 833 (quoting

Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 553).

To satisfy the subjective component,

“the charged official must act with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind, i.e., something more than mere negligence and akin to
criminal recklessness.”
(quoting

Hathaway,

99

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
F.3d

at

553).

The

Court

notes

that

disagreement with a course of treatment or allegations of medical
malpractice do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Id.; Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 553.

As the Court previously held, “[b]ecause Plaintiff was
involuntarily committed at the time of the challenged conduct,
his deliberate indifference claims are analyzed under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the
Eighth Amendment.” Vallen, 2016 WL 482026, at *3. However,
courts apply the same standard for deliberate indifference
claims brought by non-prisoners under the Fourteenth Amendment
and prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at *3 n.4 (citing
Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)).
3

7

Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s pain constitutes
a sufficiently serious injury, the Court finds that the Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s medical needs.

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff

alleged that Defendants decided to stop prescribing certain pain
medications after they determined that he may have become addicted
to those medications.

(Compl. ¶ IV.)

This Court held that

although those allegations “ma[d]e clear that . . . he may have
disagreed with the course of treatment,” the allegations failed to
state a claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical
needs.

Vallen,

2016

WL

482026,

at

*4.

Plaintiff’s

Complaint contains substantially similar allegations.

Amended

Plaintiff

alleges that he has a hip condition that causes serious pain and
appears to disagree with Defendants’ initial decision to prescribe
pain medications.

(Am. Compl. at 2.)

However, as set forth above, simply disagreeing with a
course of treatment does not demonstrate deliberate indifference
by Defendants.

See Bolden, 523 F. App’x at 833; see also Joyner

v. Greiner, 195 F. Supp. 2d 500, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“It is
well established that a difference of opinion between a prisoner
and prison officials regarding medical treatment does not, as a
matter of law, constitute deliberate indifference.

Nor does the

fact that an inmate might prefer an alternative treatment, or feels
that he did not get the level of medical attention he preferred.”)
8

(internal

citations

omitted).

Additionally,

Plaintiff’s

allegations of teasing by medical staff, including that they were
“not even trying to be kind” to him, also do not rise to the level
of deliberate indifference.

See, e.g., Sanchez v. Graham, No. 12-

CV-1646, 2016 WL 5854551, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2016), R&R
adopted, 2016 WL 5852511 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2016) (“[A]llegations
regarding the bedside man[ner] of medical staff do not amount to
a

constitutional

violation.”).

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claim is DISMISSED.4
III. Defendants’ Request for an Order Concerning Future Lawsuits
Defendants seek an order barring Plaintiff from filing
additional lawsuits against Pilgrim and its employees without
leave of court.

However, Defendants have failed to provide the

Court with adequate information regarding, inter alia, Plaintiff’s
history of litigation and the outcome of his other cases. A review
of the Electronic Case Filing System reveals that Plaintiff has
filed six cases in this district, four of which remain pending.
As such, the Court finds that the requested order is unwarranted
at this time, and Defendants’ request is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Because Plaintiff’s underlying claim lacks merit, the Court
need not determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.
4

9

IV. Leave to Amend
The Second Circuit has held that “[w]hen a motion to
dismiss is granted, the usual practice is to grant leave to amend
the complaint.”

Hayden v. Cty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d

Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002).

See also FED. R. CIV.

P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when
justice

so

requires.”).

However,

“the

district

court

has

discretion whether or not to grant leave to amend,” and “[w]here
it

appears

that

granting

leave

to

amend

is

unlikely

to

be

productive . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to
amend.”

Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir.

1993).

Additionally, a district court may deny leave to amend

where “there is no indication from a liberal reading of the
complaint that a valid claim might be stated.” Perri v. Bloomberg,
No. 11-CV-2646, 2012 WL 3307013, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2012).
In light of the fact that Plaintiff was previously
granted

leave

to

amend

his

Complaint

and

the

fact

that

his

disagreement with Defendants’ treatment plan cannot give rise to
a constitutional violation under well-established precedent, leave
to amend is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
(Docket Entry 20) is GRANTED and the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED
10

WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ request for an order barring Plaintiff
from filing additional lawsuits against Pilgrim or its employees
is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The Clerk of the Court is directed

to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff.
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court certifies pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Memorandum and
Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma
pauperis status is DENIED for purposes of an appeal. Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21
(1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mark this case
CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

February
14 , 2017
Central Islip, New York

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