Campbell v. Sposato et al
Filing
34
OPINION and ORDER denying 29 Motion to Amend; For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is denied; defendants application to dismiss plaintiffs clai ms in their entirety is granted; and plaintiffs claims are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice as moot. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of defendants; close this case; and, pursuant to Rule 77(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, serve notice of entry of this order in accordance with Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith an d therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed.2d 21 (1962). So Ordered by Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein on 4/11/2016. c/m pro se pltff; c/ecf Judgment Clerk. (Coleman, Laurie) Modified on 4/11/2016 to note c/ecf Judgment Clerk. (Coleman, Laurie).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SANDINO CAMPBELL,
FILED
CLERK
4/11/2016 9:49 am
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
Plaintiff,
-against-
15-CV-0871 (SJF)(GRB)
JOE BONIFACE, CORPORAL, SHIELD # 338, et al.,
OPINION and ORDER
Defendants.
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FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:
On February 12, 2015, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Sandino Campbell (“plaintiff”) filed a
complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Michael Sposato
(“Sheriff Sposato”), the Nassau County Sheriff; Corporal Joe Boniface, Shield # 338 (“Cpl.
Boniface”); and four (4) unidentified corrections officers (the “‘John Doe’ defendants”)
designated by plaintiff as “Boniface’s cadre of correction officers” (collectively, “defendants”),
accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. By order dated April 28, 2015,
inter alia, plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted; plaintiff’s claims
against Sheriff Sposato were sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relief; and the Nassau County Attorney was directed to
attempt to ascertain the full names and service address(es) of the “John Doe” defendants
allegedly involved in the incident described in the Complaint and to provide such information to
the Court and plaintiff. The April 28, 2015 order further provided, inter alia, that “[o]nce the
information is provided to the Court by the Nassau County Attorney, plaintiff’s complaint shall
be deemed amended to reflect the full names of the ‘John Doe’ defendants. . . .”
1
By letter to the Court dated May 27, 2015, the Nassau County Attorney’s Office, inter
alia, provided the names of three officers, in addition to Cpl. Boniface, “whose names appear in
the roster for the sector and time of the alleged incident. . . ,” i.e., Corrections Officer Kane,
Shield # 3034; Corrections Officer Oakes, Shield # 2968; and Corrections Officer Reid, Shield #
3030. (Docket Entry [“DE”] 11). Pursuant to the Court’s April 28, 2015 order, inter alia,
plaintiff’s complaint was deemed amended to substitute those named officers for the “John Doe”
defendants.
Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint pursuant
to Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to add the County of Nassau (“the
County”) as a defendant. Defendants oppose the motion on the basis that any amendment would
be futile because plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(a), and request that plaintiff’s
claims against them be dismissed for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. For the
reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motion is denied and his claims are dismissed in their entirety
with prejudice.
I.
Background
A.
Original Complaint
In his original complaint, plaintiff alleged, inter alia, (a) that he is a “practicing
[R]astafarian of the Church of Haile Selassie,” (Compl. at 7, ¶ 4); (b) that when he was
transferred into the Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCCC”) from a New York state prison
in “December 2013 [sic],” an unidentified corrections officer at the NCCC confiscated one (1) of
2
his two (2) religious “crowns” that his religion requires him to wear, (id. at 6-7, ¶¶ 3, 5); (c) that
when he requested to attend Rastafarian services “in and about January 2014 [sic],” the NCCC’s
“chaplin” informed him that the NCCC “does not permit, nor acknowledge [R]astafarian
services” and that he “must change his religion to go to services [t]here,” (id. at 7-8, ¶ 6); (d) that
shortly thereafter, when he attempted to receive a visitor to the NCCC wearing his remaining
religious crown, Cpl. Boniface “and his cadre of officers” stopped him, (id. at 8, ¶ 7), and Cpl.
Boniface ordered him “not to wear [his] [R]astafarian crown at any time in or around the
[NCCC][,]” (id. at 8-9, ¶¶ 8-9); (e) that when he objected and advised Cpl. Boniface that he is an
“approved and recognized [R]astafarian” and “has [a] right to [] express his religious freedom[,]”
(id., at 9, ¶ 10), Cpl. Boniface demanded that he remove the crown and “put it back in [his]
cell[,]” (id. at 9-10, ¶ 11); (f) that “under menace and threat of direct order [he] had no choice but
to return to his cell and remove his [crown][,]” (id. at 10, ¶ 12); (g) that upon returning from his
visit, he requested a grievance form, but Cpl. Boniface “and his cadre” informed him that “there
are ‘no’ grievance forms and he cannot grive [sic] the issue * * *[,]” (id. at 10-11, ¶ 14); and (h)
that his grievance nevertheless “came to the attention of the grievance office[,]” (id. at 11, ¶ 15),
and on January 29, 2015, he received “legal mail correspondence from the grievance unit that had
been opened without his presence * * * [and that] was dated several days prior indicating [his]
grievance will be denied in abscence [sic] of [a] timely response when * * * such time had
expired[,]” (id. at 11-12, ¶¶ 15-18).
Plaintiff seeks: (1) “to enforce his civil rights, (Compl. at 13, ¶ 23); and (b) to recover
compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of two million dollars ($2,000,000.00). (Id.)
3
B.
Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Complaint
Plaintiff’s allegations in the proposed amended complaint regarding Cpl. Boniface’s
purported conduct are essentially consistent with his allegations in the original complaint, except
that he alleges that the incident occurred on or about January 20, 2105,(Amended Complaint
[“Am. Compl.”], ¶ 10); and that Cpl. Boniface also “harassed and prevented [him] from
attending Rastafarian services in retaliation for the grievance” he filed. (Id., ¶ 20). In addition,
plaintiff alleges, inter alia, (1) that Correction Officers Oakes, Reid and Kane were all “present
during [the] incident . . . and did nothing to protect [his] constitutional rights,” (id., ¶¶ 11-13);
and (2) that the County of Nassau “developed and maintained policies or customs exhibiting
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons in the [NCCC], which cause [sic]
the violation of [his] rights[,]” (id., ¶ 23), including (a) “inadequately and improperly
investigat[ing] detainees’ complaints of correction officer misconduct,” (id., ¶ 24), and (b)
“inadequately supervis[ing] and train[ing] its correction officers, including the defendant officers,
. . . [and] not requir[ing] appropriate in-service training or re-training of correction officers who
were known to have engaged in . . . misconduct[,]” (id., ¶ 25).
Plaintiff seeks “compensatory damages” in an unspecified amount, costs and “reasonable
attorney’s fees.” (Am. Compl. at 7).
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2), “and a pro se litigant in particular should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to
4
demonstrate that he has a valid claim.” Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014)
(quotations and citation omitted). Nonetheless, leave to amend may properly be denied on the
grounds of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment[.]” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 1234 (1962); see also TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc.,
758 F.3d 493, 505 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Leave may be denied for good reason, including futility, bad
faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” (quotations and citation omitted)).
“Proposed amendments are futile if they would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Thea v. Kleinhandler, 807
F.3d 492, 496-97 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotations and citation omitted). “Thus, the standard for
denying leave to amend based on futility is the same as the standard for granting a motion to
dismiss.” IBEW Local Union No. 58 Pension Trust Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Bank of
Scotland Grp., PLC, 783 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d 117, 134
(2d Cir. 2014) (“The adequacy of a proposed amended complaint to state a claim is to be judged
by the same standards as those governing the adequacy of a filed pleading.” (quotations and
citation omitted)).
The standard of review on a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is that a plaintiff plead sufficient facts “to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
5
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id.
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557,
127 S. Ct. 1955). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1959.
In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must liberally construe the
claims, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff. See Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., L.P., 737 F.3d 166,
176 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotations and citation omitted); Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d
133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013). However, this tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937. “While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679, 129 S. Ct.
1937. “In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth.” Id.; see also Ruston v. Town Bd. of Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55,
59 (2d Cir. 2010).
6
Nonetheless, a plaintiff is not required to plead “specific evidence or extra facts beyond
what is needed to make the claim plausible.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120-1
(2d Cir. 2010); accord Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret.
Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 729-30 (2d Cir. 2013). “When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Court must limit itself to the facts alleged in the complaint, which are accepted as true; to any
documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference therein; to matters
of which judicial notice may be taken; or to documents upon the terms and effect of which the
complaint “relies heavily” and which are, thus, rendered “integral” to the complaint.1 Chambers
v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002); see also ASARCO LLC v. Goodwin,
756 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 715, 190 L. Ed. 2d 441 (2014).
Moreover, although a pro se complaint “must be construed liberally to raise the strongest
arguments it suggests[,] * * * [it] must state a plausible claim for relief.” Nielsen, 746 F.3d at 93
(quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citations, quotation marks,
and brackets omitted)).
B.
The PLRA
Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to
1
Accordingly, in deciding this motion, I have considered only plaintiff’s allegations in his
complaint, proposed amended complaint and motion papers, see, e.g. Nielsen, 746 F.3d at 63, as
well as the documents attached thereto.
7
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Accordingly, the PLRA does not require the
exhaustion of all administrative remedies, but only those that are ‘available’ to the inmate.”
Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 788 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2015). “To be ‘available’
under the PLRA, a remedy must afford the possibility of some relief for the action complained
of.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “Whether an administrative remedy was available to
a prisoner in a particular prison or prison system is ultimately a question of law, even when it
contains factual elements.” Id.
“[E]xhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and * * * unexhausted claims cannot be
brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007);
see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 86, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2006). “[T]he
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S. Ct. 983, 152 L. Ed. 2d 12
(2002); accord Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 2012). “The PLRA attempts to
eliminate unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons, and thus
seeks to afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before
allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (alterations,
quotations and citation omitted); see also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37-38, 92 S. Ct. 815,
31 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1972) (“The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an
administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence– to make a factual
8
record, to apply its expertise, and to corrects its own errors so as to moot judicial
controversies.”); Matter of Gould Publ’g Co., 934 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1991) (“the principal
reasons for requiring exhaustion include protecting administrative autonomy by allowing
agencies an opportunity to assert their policy preferences, apply their expertise, develop the
factual record and correct their own errors, and conserving judicial resources by barring
piecemeal review of cases that may in any event be mooted if the agency grants the relief
sought.”)
“The PLRA also was intended to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner
suits.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93, 126 S. Ct. 2378; see also Porter, 534 U.S. at 524-25, 122 S.
Ct. 983. “Proper exhaustion reduces the quantity of prisoner suits because some prisoners are
successful in the administrative process, and others are persuaded by the proceedings not to file
an action in federal court.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 94, 126 S. Ct. 2378.
“[T]he PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion,” Woodford, 548 U.S.
at 93, 126 S. Ct. 2378; see also Johnson, 680 F.3d at 238, “that is, using all steps that the agency
holds out, and doing so properly.” Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quotations and citation omitted); see also Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; 122 S. Ct. 983 (“All
‘available’ remedies must * * * be exhausted.”); Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“[T]o satisfy the PLRA a prisoner must * * * procedurally exhaust his available administrative
remedies.” (emphasis omitted)). “This entails both completing the administrative review process
in accordance with the applicable procedural rules * * * and providing the level of detail
necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures.” Amador, 655 F.3d at 96
(alterations, quotations and citations omitted). “The exhaustion inquiry * * * requires that [the
9
court] look at the state prison procedures and the prisoner’s grievance to determine whether the
prisoner has complied with those procedures.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.
2009).
“[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and * * * inmates are not
required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at
216, 127 S. Ct. 910; see also Hubbs, 788 F.3d at 59 (“Because failure to exhaust is an affirmative
defense, . . . defendants bear the initial burden of establishing, by pointing to legally sufficient
sources such as statutes, regulations, or grievance procedures, that a grievance process exists and
applies to the underlying dispute[.]” (quotations, alterations and citations omitted)). Like other
affirmative defenses, failure to exhaust may be grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the defense appears on the face of the complaint. See
Kucharczyk v. Westchester County, 95 F. Supp. 3d 529, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Butler v. Suffolk
County, 289 F.R.D. 80, 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Sewell v. Bernardin, 795 F.3d 337, 339 (2d
Cir. 2015) (“Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a defendant raises a
statutory bar, * * * as an affirmative defense and it is clear from the face of the complaint, and
matters of which the court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff’s claims are barred as a
matter of law.” (quotations and citation omitted); Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 308
(2d Cir. 2013) (“Affirmative defenses may be adjudicated at th[e] [pleadings] stage in the
litigation * * * where the facts necessary to establish the defense are evident on the face of the
complaint.”)
Moreover, “the affirmative defense of exhaustion is subject to estoppel.” Ziemba v.
Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170,
10
178 (2d Cir. 2006). “A prisoner may invoke the doctrine of estoppel when defendants took
affirmative action to prevent him from availing himself of grievance procedures.” Amador, 655
F.3d at 103 (quotations and citation omitted); see also Ruggiero, 467 F.3d at 178. “[V]erbal and
physical threats of retaliation, physical assault, denial of grievance forms or writing implements,
and transfers constitute such affirmative action.” Amador, 655 F.3d at 103.
The Second Circuit formulated the following three (3)-part test in determining a failure to
exhaust affirmative defense:
“Depending on the inmate’s explanation for the alleged failure to exhaust, the
court must ask whether administrative remedies were in fact available to the
prisoner. The court should also inquire as to whether the defendants may have
forfeited the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise or preserve
it, or whether the defendants’ own actions inhibiting the inmate’s exhaustion of
remedies may estop one or more of the defendants from raising the plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust as a defense. If the court finds that administrative remedies
were available to the plaintiff, and that the defendants are not estopped and have
not forfeited their non-exhaustion defense, but that the plaintiff nevertheless did
not exhaust available remedies, the court should consider whether special
circumstances have been plausibly alleged that justify the prisoner’s failure to
comply with administrative procedural requirements.”
Macias, 495 F.3d at 41 (quoting Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004)); see
also Amador, 655 F.3d at 102. “If any of the three parts is satisfied, the prisoner is deemed to
have exhausted internal procedures for purposes of the PLRA.” Amador, 655 F.3d at 102.
1.
The NCCC’s Inmate Grievance Procedure
The rules and regulations of the New York State Commission of Correction, applicable to
the NCCC, see http://www.scoc.ny.gov/jailaddre.htm#Nassau, provide a three (3)-step process
11
for the handling of inmate grievances.2 To initiate the process, “[a]n inmate must file a grievance
within five days of the date of the act or occurrence giving rise to the grievance[,]” N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 7032.4(d), with the grievance coordinator designated by the chief
administrative officer. Id., § 7032.4(e). A “grievance” is defined, in relevant part, as “a written
inmate complaint concerning either written or unwritten facility policies, procedures, rules,
practices, programs or the action or inaction of any person within the facility.” N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs., tit. 9, § 7032.2(a). “[A] grievance that is too vague to understand or fails to
set forth supporting evidence or information may be returned to the inmate.” Id., § 7032.4(f).
“Within two business days after receipt of the grievance coordinator’s written determination, the
grievant may appeal to the chief administrative officer or his designee.” Id., § 7032.4(j).
“Within three business days of the receipt of the chief administrative officer’s determination, any
grievant may appeal any grievance denied by the facility administrator, in whole or in part, to the
[Citizen’s Policy and Complaint Review Council of the New York] State Commission of
Correction [“CPCRC”] by indicating his/her desire to appeal on the inmate grievance form in the
space provided for such purpose.” Id., § 7032.5. Thus, it is clear that administrative remedies
were available at the NCCC.
2.
Plaintiff’s Grievances
Plaintiff attached to his complaint, inter alia, copies of his grievances, one handwritten
2
Pursuant to the applicable regulations, “[t]he chief administrative officer of each local
correctional facility shall ensure the development and implementation of written policies and
procedures consistent [therewith].” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 9, § 7032.3. The NCCC
has done so. (See Am. Compl., Ex. E).
12
and one on a grievance form, dated January 20, 2015; an Inmate Grievance Receipt dated January
21, 2015; the Grievance Unit’s request for more information dated January 23, 2015; and a copy
of the NCCC’s Inmate Handbook. On the grievance form dated January 20, 2015, plaintiff
indicated that he was “[d]enied the right to express [his] religion” and requested “[t]hat the
officer be told that [he is] allowed to express [his] Freedom of Religion and wear [his]
Rastafarian ‘crown,’ and so this type of thing does not happen any more.” (Am. Compl., Ex. A).
In his handwritten grievance, plaintiff wrote:
“On 3 separate occasions, I was told that I can not [sic] [wear] my Rastafarian
‘crown’ in or around [NCCC]. At that time I told [Cpl.] Boniface, that I am a
Rastafarian and I am expressing my freedom of religion. The officer stated take
‘it’ off, the thing on [my] head, or you don’t go to your visit![] I took off my
crown and went to my attorney visit[.] When [I] come [sic] back to the dorm, I
ask [sic] for an [sic] Grievance Form and I was told no[.] [T]his all happen
between 8 and 9 AM on January 20, 2015[.]”
(Id.)
In his reply to defendants’ opposition to his motion to amend, plaintiff asserts, inter alia,
(1) that his grievance was investigated; (2) that “[t]he grievance investigator confirmed that [he]
was denied [his] First Amendment right to practice [his] Rastafarian religion[,]” (Reply at 2); (3)
that “[t]hereafter, the investigating officer corrected the violation of [his] First Amendment right
by ordering supervisor of defendants and the corporals to allow [him] to practice [his] religion
approximately three weeks after[] [he] filed the grievance[,]” (id.); and (4) that he “signed and
accepted the Grievance Coordinator’s decision which was favorable too [sic] [him].” (Id.)
Plaintiff contends, in essence, that administrative remedies were not available to him because,
having received a favorable decision on his grievances, “there was nothing left to appeal[] [and]
the Chief Administrative Officer . . . could not provide any additional administrative remedy.”
13
(Id.) Plaintiff does not allege a failure to implement the Grievance Coordinator’s decision, nor
challenge any conduct occurring after he received a favorable resolution of his grievances.
Since, inter alia, the NCCC corrected its own errors during the administrative process
and granted plaintiff the relief he sought in his grievances, i.e., “by ordering [the] supervisor of
defendants and the corporals to allow [him] to practice [his] religion” and wear his religious
headgear in the NCCC, (Reply at 2), and plaintiff does not allege a failure to implement the
Grievance Coordinator’s decision, nor challenge any conduct occurring after he received a
favorable resolution of his grievances, judicial review of his claims is moot. See, e.g. Parisi, 405
U.S. at 37-38, 92 S. Ct. 815 (holding that one of the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine is to
allow an administrative agency “to correct[] its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies.”);
Gould Publ’g, 934 F.2d at 460 (“the principal reasons for requiring exhaustion include protecting
administrative autonomy by allowing agencies an opportunity to . . . correct their own errors, and
conserving judicial resources by barring piecemeal review of cases that may in any event be
mooted if the agency grants the relief sought.”); Wheeler v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir.
1983) (holding that under “the normal standards of mootness,” “judicial review of favorable
decisions [at the administrative level] is generally unavailable.”) Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion
to amend his complaint is denied as futile; defendants’ application to dismiss plaintiff’s claims in
their entirety is granted; and plaintiff’s claims are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint pursuant to
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is denied; defendants’ application to
14
dismiss plaintiff’s claims in their entirety is granted; and plaintiff’s claims are dismissed in their
entirety with prejudice as moot. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of
defendants; close this case; and, pursuant to Rule 77(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, serve notice of entry of this order in accordance with Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed.2d
21 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
___________/s/____________
Sandra J. Feuerstein
United States District Judge
Dated: April 11, 2016
Central Islip, New York
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