Schoenhals v. Dowling College Chapter, New York State United Teachers, Local #3890 et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION & ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Dowling's 61 Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. It also notes that the Courts previous dismissal of the Plaintiffs proposed NYSHRL claim was without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case. SEE ATTACHED DECISION for details. It is So Ordered by Judge Arthur D. Spatt on 2/19/2020. (Coleman, Laurie)

FILED 
CLERK 

2:16 pm, Feb 19, 2020

U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
LONG ISLAND OFFICE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------X
MARTIN SCHOENHALS,

MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION & ORDER
2:15-cv-2044 (ADS) (ARL)

Plaintiff,
-againstDOWLING COLLEGE CHAPTER, NEW
YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, LOCAL
#3890, NEW YORK STATE UNITED
TEACHERS, AFT, AFL-CIO and DOWLING
COLLEGE,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES:

Advocates for Justice, Chartered Attorneys
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
225 Broadway, Suite 1902
New York, NY 10007
By:
Arthur Z. Schwarz, Esq.,
Laine Alida Armstrong, Esq., Of Counsel.
Law Office of Rachel J. Minter
Attorney for the Plaintiff
345 Seventh Avenue, 21st Fl.
New York, NY 10001
Ingerman Smith, L.L.P.
Attorneys for Defendant Dowling College
167 Main Street
Northport, NY 11768
By:
Christopher J. Clayton, Esq.,
David Ferdinand Kwee, Esq., Of Counsel.
SPATT, District Judge:
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Martin Schoenhals (the “Plaintiff”) a former professor at Dowling College
(“Dowling”), sued Dowling; Dowling’s Chapter of the New York State United Teachers Union
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(the “Union”); and the New York State United Teachers Union (“NYSUT”), under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185. All of the Defendants other
than Dowling have been dismissed from the action. Dowling now moves under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (“FED. R. CIV. P.”) 12(c) for a judgment on the pleadings.
While this opinion references the other Defendants in the action, the opinion primarily
recounts the action as it pertains to Dowling. For the following reasons, the Court grants
Dowling’s motion and dismisses the case.
A. Underlying Dispute and the Plaintiff’s Employment History
The Plaintiff alleged that he was hired by Dowling in 1993 as a full-time, tenure-track
assistant professor and chair of Dowling’s Anthropology Department, later achieving tenure and
becoming a full professor. ECF 1 at 2. The Plaintiff also alleged that Dowling had experienced
financial turmoil during his time at the college, much of it because of improper conduct by
Dowling’s Board of Trustees. Id. at 3–4. In addition, the Plaintiff alleged that between 2012 and
2014, Dowling’s administration and the Union entered into multiple collective bargaining
agreements (“CBAs”), replacing them with Memoranda of Agreement (“MOAs”) that drastically
reduced faculty benefits and pay.
The second MOA was, according to the Plaintiff, “a wholesale abrogation of union rights
and protections,” and it included an Early Retirement Incentive Program (“ERIP”) that provided
financial benefits to faculty members who submitted a resignation letter by November 17, 2014.
Id. at 8. However, Dowling informed the Union that it would announce which faculty members
would be terminated on November 18, 2014, meaning that “members who elect the ERIP must
gamble[—]not knowing if they are to be terminated, but losing the opportunity for the ERIP if
not elected by the cut-off date.” Id. The MOA further provided that individuals who learned of
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their termination could, by November 21, 2014, elect an ERIP with much less favorable financial
terms (“ERIP II”).
The second MOA contained an appendix that provided a methodology for determining
layoffs. Id. at 8–9. That methodology included an analysis of “enrollment trends by department,
utilizing a formula of students enrolled against number of faculty, number of students majoring
and minoring in this subject and number of classes and class size.” Id. at 9. Based on this
appendix, the Plaintiff believed he would not be laid off because the anthropology department
had strong enrollment and one of the highest number of majors per full-time faculty at Dowling.
Id. Accordingly, the Plaintiff did not elect an ERIP by November 17. Id.
The Plaintiff alleges that on November 19, 2014, Dowling’s administration scheduled an
appointment with him for the following day. Id. at 9–10. At the meeting, the Plaintiff claimed
that his metrics from the appendix should have saved him from termination. Id. Dowling’s
administration agreed to “stop the clock” and “recheck their calculations.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thinking that he had prevented his termination, the Plaintiff let the following
day, November 21, pass without electing ERIP II. Id. at 10–11. On December 5, 2014, the
Plaintiff received a letter dated November 21, 2014, stating that he had been terminated. Id. at
11.
B. The Plaintiff’s Complaint and Procedural History
The Plaintiff brought this action in April 2015 and raised three claims: (1) for breach of
the duty of fair representation, against the Union; (2) for breach of the duty of fair representation,
against NYSUT; and (3) breach of the CBA, against Dowling. Id. at 11–14. Regarding the CBA
claim, the Plaintiff asserted that Dowling failed to properly apply its own metrics in deciding to
terminate the Plaintiff, “while retaining junior, less-accomplished faculty with less service at
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Dowling and lower metrics, in departments with declining enrollments and fewer majors than
Anthropology.” Id. at 13. The Plaintiff further claimed that his termination caused him the loss
of back pay; front pay; and benefits that he would have received if he had either remained at
Dowling or selected the initial ERIP. Id. at 14. The Plaintiff asked for $450,000 in damages, or,
in the alternative, the amount the Plaintiff would have received had he elected the initial ERIP;
interest; attorneys’ fees; and costs. Id.
The Defendants Union and NYSUT moved to dismiss the complaint in October 2015 for
failure to state a claim. ECF 18. In February 2016, the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint.
With regard to Dowling, the Plaintiff sought to file three new claims: (1) a New York breach of
contract claim; (2) an age discrimination claim pursuant to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (the “ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.; and (3) an age discrimination
claim under the New York State Human Rights Law (the “NYSHRL”). ECF 27. While both
motions were pending, the Plaintiff informed the Court that the parities intended to resolve the
case through private mediation. ECF 4/7/16 entry. The Court thus stayed proceedings pending
the outcome of the mediation and administratively terminated the pending motions, without
prejudice. Id.
In August 2016, the Plaintiff and the Defendants Union and NYSUT reached a settlement
and then filed a stipulation of dismissal. ECF 42, 43. The Court then granted the Plaintiff’s
request to reinstate the motion for leave to amend the complaint, and the parties briefed that
motion. ECF 9/23/16 entry. However, before the Court ruled on the motion, it stayed the case
pending the outcome of Dowling’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York. ECF 54.

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In January 2018, the Plaintiff informed the Court that the Bankruptcy Court had lifted the
stay because Dowling had insurance coverage. ECF 55 at 1. The Plaintiff attached a copy of the
Bankruptcy Court’s order, which lifted the stay “for the sole purpose of allowing [the Plaintiff’s]
Federal and State age discrimination and breach of contract claims (the ‘Action’) to proceed to
judgment or settlement.” Id. at 3–4. That order also provided as follows:
(a) any recovery by the Movant in the Action against the Debtor, or any entity or
person that may have an indemnification claim against the Debtor, shall be
limited solely to any available insurance coverage of the Debtor; (b) Movant
waives and release[s] any and all claims solely as against the Debtor’s bankruptcy
estate; provided however this shall in no way be deemed or construed as a waiver
and/or release of the Movant’s rights to pursue and recover damages awarded in
connection with the Action from any applicable insurance policies maintained by
the Debtor.
Id. at 3. The Court then restored the case to the active docket. ECF 56.
The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. ECF 60. The Court
ruled that the Plaintiff failed to allege specific provisions of a contract that Dowling had
breached. Id. at 14–15. It also ruled that the ADEA claim was time-barred, and in any event,
was without merit. Id. at 7–14. The Court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the NYSHRL claim. Id. at 16–17.
Dowling now moves under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) for a judgment on the pleadings. ECF
61. That motion is presently before the Court.
II.

DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard For a Judgment on the Pleadings
Courts apply the same procedure to evaluate motions for judgment on the pleadings

under Rule 12(c) as for motions to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Altman v. J.C.
Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 786 F.3d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40,
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43 (2d Cir. 2009). In so doing, courts “draw all reasonable inferences in [the non-movant’s]
favor, ‘assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they
possibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Faber v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104
(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The non-movant is entitled to relief if she alleges “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007); see also In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (“While Twombly
does not require heightened fact pleadings of specifics, it does require enough facts to nudge [the
non-movant’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
On a Rule 12(c) motion, the court considers “the complaint, the answer, any written
documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the
factual background of the case.” Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam). “A complaint is [also] deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an
exhibit, materials incorporated by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by
reference, are ‘integral’ to the complaint.” Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.
2002)).
B. Application to the Facts of This Case
In its Rule 12(c) motion, Dowling asks that the Court take judicial notice of the Plaintiff’s
motion to lift the stay in Bankruptcy Court; Dowling’s insurer’s coverage position in Bankruptcy
Court, where the insurer denied coverage for all claims set forth in the original complaint;
Dowling’s Faculty agreement; both MOAs; the Bankruptcy Court’s order lifting the automatic
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stay; and the order denying the Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint. ECF 63 at 12–15. It
submits a copy of the insurer’s coverage position, which provides that “in no event shall the
term ‘Claim’ include any labor or grievance proceeding which is subject to a collective
bargaining agreement.” ECF 62-6 at 4.
As to the merits of the Rule 12(c) motion, Dowling asserts that the Plaintiff has waived
all rights to pursue his claims from the original complaint, because the Bankruptcy Court’s order
lifting the stay confined the Plaintiff’s recovery to claims covered by insurance. Id. at 16. Here,
it argues, the insurance policy in question only offers coverage for employment discrimination
claims, and not employment breach of contract claims. Id.
The Plaintiff does not oppose the Rule 12(c) motion and he agrees that the breach of the
CBA claim is not covered by Dowling’s insurer. ECF 64 at 1. Accordingly, the Plaintiff argues,
the Court should grant the Rule 12(c) motion. Id. However, the Plaintiff asks that the Court
issue an order establishing that he has preserved his right to bring an NYSHRL discrimination
claim in state court. Id. The Plaintiff notes that when the Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to
amend, it denied the NYSHRL claim without prejudice. Id. The Plaintiff attaches a proposed
order granting the Rule 12(c) motion and noting that the NYSHRL claim dismissal was without
prejudice. Id. at 2. Dowling does not file a reply.
The Court agrees with both parties that a dismissal under Rule 12(c) is appropriate in this
case. However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court considers whether Dowling has met
the Rule 12(c) standard.
An unopposed Rule 12(c) motion permits the Court to accept Dowling’s factual
assertions as true. Scordino v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-4620, 2019 WL 1362555, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019) (Spatt, J.) (citing Wellington v. Astrue, No. 12-CV-3523, 2013 WL
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1944472, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013)). However, this does not merit the granting of that
motion, because “[w]here . . . the pleadings are themselves sufficient to withstand dismissal, a
failure to respond to a 12(c) motion cannot constitute ‘default’ justifying dismissal of the
complaint.” McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000). Courts must review unopposed
Rule 12(c) motions to determine whether the moving party has met the standard for judgment as
a matter of law. James v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-2492, 2014 WL 4793451, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2014) (citing Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246
(2d Cir. 2004)).
Here, however, Dowling’s Rule 12(c) motion is more than simply unopposed. It is
supported by Dowling’s adversary, the Plaintiff, who concedes that the Bankruptcy Court’s
lifting of the automatic stay does not include the CBA claim. In addition, the Court takes
judicial notice of the bankruptcy court proceedings to which the parties have specifically
referred: the order lifting the automatic stay, and Dowling’s insurer’s coverage position, as
further proof that the Plaintiff waived the right to bring the CBA claim. See TechnoMarine SA v.
Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 2014) (“A court may consider a res judicata defense
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where the court’s inquiry is limited to . . . materials
appropriate for judicial notice.”); Campos v. Aegis Realty Mgmt. Corp., No. 19-Civ-2856, 2020
WL 433356, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2020).
These documents establish that Dowling’s insurer does not cover the breach of the CBA
claim, and thus, that the Plaintiff has waived the right to bring the claim here. See ECF 55 at 3–4
(limiting claims “solely to any available insurance coverage of the Debtor”); ECF 62-6 at 3
(denying coverage for any cause of action pertaining to a CBA). The Court also credits the
Plaintiff’s concession that the Rule 12(c) motion is meritorious. Accordingly, The Court grants
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Dowling’s Rule 12(c) motion and dismisses the case. In addition, the Court affirms that it
dismissed the Plaintiff’s proposed NYSHRL claim without prejudice. See Reid ex rel. Roz B. v.
Freeport Public Sch. Dist., 89 F. Supp. 3d 450, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (Spatt, J.); EskenaziMcGibney v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 84 F. Supp. 3d 221, 238 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (Spatt, J.).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Dowling’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on
the pleadings. It also notes that the Court’s previous dismissal of the Plaintiff’s proposed
NYSHRL claim was without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.

It is SO ORDERED.

__________/s/ Arthur D. Spatt__________

____February 19, 2020____

Arthur D. Spatt, U.S.D.J.

Date

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