Singh v. Badwal et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 5 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 9 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 2 Motion for Order to Show Cause for the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf on 4/24/2015. (Mauskopf, Roslynn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------------------------------X
SUJIT SINGH,
Plaintiff,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
15-CV-2196 (RRM)(RLM)

- against RAMANDEEP BADWAL,
AVTAR S. BADWAL,
MICHAEL A. MONTESANO, THE RECEIVER,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------------------X
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sujit Singh, through his attorney, filed this civil action against defendants
Ramandeep Badwal, Avtar S. Badwal, and Michael A. Montesano, along with an application for
a temporary injunction. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1); Appl. for Order to Show Cause (Doc. No. 2).)
For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s request for temporary injunctive relief is denied.
Plaintiff is the adult child of defendants Ramandeep and Avtar Badwal. (Compl. at ¶ 2.)
As alleged, on September 19, 2014, in divorce proceedings in the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of Nassau, between his parents, Judge Margaret C. Reilly ordered
appointment of a receiver, defendant Montesano, to sell the property at which plaintiff claims he
now resides along with his father, Avtar. (Id.; Order Appointing Receiver (Doc. No. 5 at 9).)
On April 4, 2015, the New York City Office of the Sheriff issued a five-day eviction
notice to Avtar indicating that a judgment had been made awarding Ramandeep possession of the
premises and that “a warrant/order of eviction ha[d] been issued commanding the Sherriff to
remove [Avtar] and [his] belongings.” (Eviction Notice (Doc. No. 2-1 at 7).) Plaintiff now seeks
immediate, temporary injunctive relief preventing defendants “from removing him without

notice and hearing . . . in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the
[Fourteenth Amendment of the] United States Constitution.” (Aff. Supp. Order to Show Cause
(Doc. No. 2-1 at 1) at ¶¶ 6–8.)
DISCUSSION
A party seeking injunctive relief must show “(1) irreparable harm and (2) either (a)
likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party seeking the injunctive relief.”
See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d
Cir. 2010). The Court need not reach the issue of irreparable harm, as plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits nor sufficiently serious questions going the
merits to warrant injunctive relief.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138,
159 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). Private parties are not
proper defendants in a Section 1983 action unless acting under color of state law. Jae Soog Lee
v. Law Off. of Kim & Bae, PC, 530 F. App’x 9, 9 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999)). “[A] private actor acts under color of state law when
the private actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Likewise, private defendants are “immune from the restrictions of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . [which] applies only to state action.” Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349
(1974)) (also citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).

2

In arguing that he is likely to succeed on the merits, plaintiff states only, in a conclusory
fashion that “[d]efendants’ conduct . . . is a wholesale abdication of their legal obligations under
a statutory regime.” (Pl.’s Mem. Law (Doc. No. 2-2) at 4.) Plaintiff fails to identify the
“statutory regime” on which he relies. Nor does he indicate how a statutory violation in and of
itself gives rise to an actionable claim. To the extent that plaintiff relies on statutory provisions
governing notice in an eviction proceeding, he has failed to demonstrate how these defendants –
his parents and a court-appointed receiver – have any statutory obligation to provide him such
notice, or how these individuals fall within the “color of state law” for purposes of Section 1983
liability. Based on plaintiff’s own allegations, it appears that it is the responsibility of the New
York City Sheriff, a non-party to this action, to provide whatever notice is required and to
carrying out the eviction.1
Moreover, there appear to be valid reasons for this Court to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over this action, where, as here, federal review would disrupt state proceedings that:
(1) are pending; (2) implicate important state interests; and (3) provide the plaintiff an adequate
opportunity to litigate federal claims. See Hansel v. Town Ct. for Town of Springfield, 56 F.3d
391, 393 (2d Cir. 1995).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff has failed to raise a likelihood of success on the
merits of his claims, or any serious questions on their merits that tip in plaintiff’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff’s application for temporary injunctive relief, and for an
order to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not issue during the pendency of
this action.

1

Each of these issues also raise concerns as to whether plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a proper claim.

3

SO ORDERED.
Roslynn R. Mauskopf
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
April 24, 2015

____________________________________
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF
United States District Judge

4