Griffin v. New York State Board of Parole et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM & ORDER - For the reasons set forth above, the Amended Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii), 1915A (b)(1). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff at his last known address and to mark this case CLOSED. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 1/7/2016. C/M (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
RAYMOND GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-2440(JS)(GRB)

-againstANDREA EVANS, NEW YORK STATE BOARD
OF PAROLE CHAIRWOMAN, in her
individual capacity, and JOHN DOE
and JANE DOES, in their individual
and official capacities,

Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Raymond Griffin, pro se
1160661
Wake County Detention Center
P.O. Box 2479
Raleigh, NC 27602
For Defendants:

No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On April 23, 2015, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Raymond
Griffin (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the New York State Board
of Parole (“NYBOP”); Andrea Evans, Chairwoman, New York Board of
Parole

(“Chairwoman

Evans”;

and

two

unidentified

individuals

described as subordinates of Evans (“John and Jane Doe” and
collectively, “Defendants”)1, accompanied by an application to
proceed in forma pauperis. By Memorandum and Order dated August 6,
2015 (the “M&O”), Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application was

1

Plaintiff sought to sue the individual Defendants in their
individual and official capacities.

GRANTED, but the Complaint was DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against
the New York State Board of Parole, Chairwoman Evans in her
official

capacity

and

the

John/Jane

Does

in

their

official

capacities for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii), 1915A(b)(1) and Plaintiff was GRANTED
LEAVE TO AMEND his Complaint within thirty (30) days therefrom.
(See M&O, Docket Entry 7.)
On August 24, 2015, Plaintiff timely filed an Amended
Complaint against “Andrea Evans, New York State Board of Parole
Chairwoman, in her individual capacity” (“Evans”); and John/Jane
Does, in their individual and official capacities.
Compl., Docket Entry 9.)

(See Am.

Because Plaintiff’s allegations as set

forth in his Amended Complaint do not allege a plausible Section
1983

claim

against

any

Defendant,

the

Amended

Complaint

is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
(B)(ii)-(iii), 1915A(b).
DISCUSSION
The

allegations

set

forth

in

Plaintiff’s

Amended

Complaint are largely the same as those alleged in the original
Complaint.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint again challenges his

incarceration following his arrest on a parole warrant and seeks to
recover a monetary damages award in total sum of one million
dollars ($1,000,000.00). (Am. Compl. at 4-5.) Notwithstanding the
guidance

set

forth

in

the

M&O
2

explaining

that

the

Eleventh

Amendment bars Section 1983 claims for monetary damages against
state employees sued in their official capacities (M&O at 4-6),
Plaintiff again seeks to sue two employees of the New York State
Division of Parole in their official capacities for exclusively
money damages.
Amendment.

Thus, such claims are barred by the Eleventh

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S. Ct. 2932,

2939, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986);

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 906-08, 79 L. Ed.
2d 67 (1984); see also Darcy v. Lippman, 356 F. App’x 434, 436-37
(2d Cir. 2009) (“Eleventh Amendment likewise bars [plaintiff] from
pursuing a claim for damages against the individual defendants in
their official capacities.”). Moreover, because “[n]either a state
nor one of its agencies nor an official of that agency sued in his
or her official capacity is a ‘person’ under § 1983”, Spencer v.
Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct.
2304, 2312,

105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989), Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims against the John and Jane Doe defendants in their official
capacities must be dismissed.

Accordingly, for these reasons and

as was set forth in the M&O, Plaintiff’s claims against the John
and Jane Does in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii),

1915A(b).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue Chairwoman Evans and
3

the John and Jane Doe defendants in their individual capacities,
the Amended Complaint is bereft of any facts from which the Court
can

reasonably

construe

conduct

undertaken

by

Defendants in their individual capacities.

any

of

these

Indeed, given the

absence of any allegations of conduct attributable to Chairwoman
Evans, it is clear that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability against
her solely because of the position she holds. Accordingly, because
“an individual cannot be held liable for damages under Section 1983
‘merely because he held a high position of authority,’. . .”

Back

v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d
Cir. 2004) (quoting Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir.
1996)), Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Chairwoman
Evans is implausible. Moreover, because the “‘personal involvement
of

defendants

in

alleged

constitutional

deprivations

is

a

prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983’”, Farid v. Ellen,
593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449
F.3d

470,

484

(2d

Cir.

2006)),

Plaintiff’s

claims

against

Defendants in their individual capacities fail as a matter of law.
See also Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendants in
their individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

4

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Amended Complaint is
sua

sponte

DISMISSED

WITH

PREJUDICE

pursuant

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii), 1915A (b)(1).

to

28

U.S.C.

The Court certifies

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal.

See Coppedge v.

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21
(1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this
Order to the pro se Plaintiff at his last known address and to mark
this case CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: January
7 , 2016
Central Islip, New York

5