Trustees of Empire State Carpenters Annuity, Apprenticeship, Labor-Management Cooperation, Pension and Welfare Funds v. Arbor Interiors, Inc.
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. For the reasons set forth herein, petitioners' motion to confirm the arbitration award in the amount of $42,993.57 is hereby granted. Further, the Court awards the petitioners $480.00 in attorneys fees and $475.00 in costs. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bianco on 5/4/2016. (Dolecki, Lauren)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
No 15-CV-2969 (JFB)(AKT)
TRUSTEES OF EMPIRE STATE CARPENTERS ANNUITY, APPRENTICESHIP, LABORMANAGEMENT COOPERATION, PENSION AND WELFARE FUNDS,
ARBOR INTERIORS, INC.,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
May 4, 2016
JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:
Petitioners, Trustees of Empire State
Carpenters Annuity, Apprenticeship, LaborManagement Cooperation, Pension and
Welfare Funds (hereinafter, the “petitioners”
or the “Funds”) commenced this action to
confirm an arbitration award obtained
against Arbor Interiors, Inc. (hereinafter, the
“respondent” or “Arbor”). The petitioners
also move to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs in connection with this action. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court grants the
petitioners’ motion to confirm the arbitration
award and grants the petitioners’ motion for
fees and costs.
The following facts are taken from the
Funds’ Petition to Confirm an Arbitration
Award (“Pet.”) and accompanying exhibits.
(ECF No. 1.)
Arbor entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) with the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America (the “Union”). (Pet. ¶
7.) The CBA required Arbor to make
contributions to the Funds for all work
performed within the trade and geographical
jurisdiction of the Union. (Id. ¶ 10.) The
Funds also established a Joint Policy for
Collection of Delinquent Contributions (the
“Collection Policy”). (Id. ¶ 12; Ex. C.) The
Collection Policy requires that the employer
submit to a payroll audit upon request of the
confirmation of the arbitrator’s award as
well as costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in
the instant action. (ECF No. 1.) This Court
issued an Order on June 29, 2015, directing
Arbor to respond to the petitioners’ motion
by July 31, 2015. The petitioners served a
copy of this Order on the respondent on July
2, 2015. (ECF No. 8.) On August 13, 2015,
this Court issued an Order granting the
respondent one final opportunity to respond
to the petition and directing that respondent
submit such a response by September 8,
2015. The respondent has failed to submit a
response or otherwise appear in the action.
The matter is fully submitted and the Court
has fully considered the submissions.
Funds. (Id. ¶ 13; Ex. C, art. 4.1.) The
Policy further provides that disputes over
contributions shall be subject to arbitration.
(Id. ¶ 18; Ex. C, art. 2.2.) If the employer is
found deficient in its contributions, the
Collection Policy awards, in addition to the
deficiency, interest (id. Ex. C, art 2.1(C)),
liquidated damages (id. Ex. C, art 6.1),
attorneys’ fees (id. Ex. C, arts. 1.1(C)(4),
6.2, 6.3), arbitrator’s fees (id. Ex. C, art.
6.3), and the costs of the audit (id. Ex. C,
arts. 1.1(C)(4), 6.3).
The petitioners initiated arbitration,
pursuant to the Collection Policy, claiming
that the respondent failed to remit
contributions to the Funds. (Id. ¶ 19.) The
petitioners provided Arbor with a Notice of
Intent to Arbitrate Delinquency dated March
18, 2015. (Id. Ex. D.) The arbitrator
conducted a hearing, at which the
respondent failed to appear. (See id. Ex. E.)
On April 16, 2015, the arbitrator issued his
findings, concluding that the respondent was
in violation of the terms of the CBA by
failing to make the required contributions
during the period from July 1, 2011 through
September 30, 2014. (Id. Ex. E, ¶ 6.) The
arbitrator ordered the respondent to pay the
Funds a sum of $42,993.57, consisting of the
deficiency in the amount of $27,995.37,
interest in the amount of $5,439.13,
liquidated damages in the amount of
$5,599.07, audit costs in the amount of
$2,310.00, attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$900.00, and the arbitrator’s fee in the
amount of $750.00. (Id. ¶ 21; Ex. E, ¶ 11.)
The respondent has failed to abide by the
award, and it has not been vacated or
modified, nor is there an application for
relief currently pending. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23).
II. CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD
A. Standard of Review
A motion to confirm an arbitral award
should be “treated as akin to a motion for
summary judgment.” D.H. Blair & Co. v.
Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir. 2006).
The standard of review at the summary
judgment stage is well-settled. A court may
grant a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(a) only if “the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d
149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). The moving party
bears the burden of showing that he is
entitled to summary judgment.
Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d
Cir. 2005). “A party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by: (A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record,
electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only),
B. Procedural History
On May 21, 2015, the petitioners filed
their petition in this Court, seeking
a trial is needed.” R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn &
Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984)
(quoting SEC v. Research Automation
Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978)).
Accordingly, it is insufficient for a party
opposing summary judgment “‘merely to
assert a conclusion without supplying
supporting arguments or facts.’” BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77
F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d at
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or (B) showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1). The court “‘is not to weigh the
evidence but is instead required to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment, to draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of that
assessments.’” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W.
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854
(2d Cir. 1996)); see Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
(summary judgment is unwarranted if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).
“Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185,
provides federal courts with jurisdiction
over petitions brought to confirm labor
arbitration awards.” Local 802, Associated
Musicians of Greater N.Y. v. Parker
Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.
1998). “Confirmation of a labor arbitration
award under LMRA § 301 is ‘a summary
proceeding that merely makes what is
already a final arbitration award a judgment
of the Court.’” N.Y. Med. Ctr. of Queens v.
1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E.,
No. 11–CV–04421 (ENV)(RLM), 2012 WL
2179118, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012)
(quoting N.Y. City Dist. Council of
Carpenters Pension Fund v. E. Millennium
Constr., Inc., No. 03–CV–5122, 2003 WL
22773355 (DAB), at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
Once the moving party has met its
burden, the opposing party “‘must do more
than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. .
. . [T]he nonmoving party must come
forward with specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160
(2d Cir. 2002) (alteration and emphasis in
original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586–87 (1986)). As the Supreme Court
stated in Anderson, “[i]f the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal
Indeed, “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties alone will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for
Id. at 247–48
(emphasis in original).
nonmoving party may not rest upon mere
conclusory allegations or denials but must
set forth “‘concrete particulars’ showing that
The Supreme Court has recognized that
the LMRA expresses a “‘federal policy of
settling labor disputes by arbitration,’”
which “‘would be undermined if courts had
the final say on the merits of the awards.’”
United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL–CIO
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)
(quoting Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
Accordingly, “the courts play only a limited
role when asked to review the decision of an
arbitrator.” Id.; see, e.g., Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S.
504, 509 (2001); First Nat’l Supermarkets,
Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale & Chain Store
Food Emps. Union Local 338, Affiliated
with the Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store
Union, AFL–CIO, 118 F.3d 892, 896 (2d
Cir. 1997); Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. &
Health Care Employees Union, RWDSU,
AFL–CIO v. Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d 22,
25 (2d Cir. 1992). In this limited role, a
court must confirm an arbitration award as
long as it “‘draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement’ and is not
the arbitrator’s ‘own brand of industrial
justice.’” First Nat’l Supermarkets, 118
F.3d at 896 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36).
“Courts are not authorized to review the
arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite
allegations that the decision rests on factual
errors or misinterprets the parties’
Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 509. Indeed,
“serious error” and “improvident, even silly,
factfinding do[ ] not provide a basis for a
reviewing court to refuse to enforce the
Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 39).
Pension Fund, Annuity Fund & Training
Program Fund v. Odessy Constructioncorp,
No. 14–CV–1560 (GHW), 2014 WL
3844619, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2014)
(granting unopposed motion for summary
judgment under LMRA). Accordingly, the
Court confirms the arbitration award of
April 16, 2015.
III. PETITIONERS’ ENTITLEMENT TO
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
The petitioners also assert that they are
entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs
expended in preparing the instant action to
confirm the arbitration award. (Pet. ¶ 25.)
“The general rule in our legal system is
that each party must pay its own attorney’s
fees and expenses.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex
rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010).
Neither Section 301 of the LMRA, nor the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.,
authorize the award of attorneys’ fees in an
action to confirm an arbitration award. See,
e.g., Trustees of N.Y.C. Dist. Council of
Carpenters Pension Fund v. TNS Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., No. 13–CV–2716 (JMF), 2014
WL 100008, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2014);
Trustees of N.Y.C. Dist. Council of
Carpenters Pension Fund v. Dejil Sys., Inc.,
No. 12–CV–005 (JMF), 2012 WL 3744802,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012); N.Y.C. Dist.
Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v.
Angel Constr. Grp., LLC, No. 08–CV–9061
(RJS), 2009 WL 256009, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 3, 2009) (citing Int’l Chem. Workers
Union, Local No. 227 v. BASF Wyandotte
Corp., 774 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Moreover, although Section 502(g) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) requires the award of attorneys’
fees to a plan that prevails in an action to
recover delinquent contributions pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement, see 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D), “this does not
Here, the Court concludes that the
arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the
CBA and that it is based upon
uncontroverted evidence that Arbor failed to
pay $27,995.37 in contributions to the Funds
for the period from July 1, 2011 through
September 30, 2014. The Collection Policy
also entitles the Funds to recover the
additional amounts for interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys’ fees, the arbitrator’s fee,
and audit costs. Finally, nothing in the
record suggests “that the arbitrator’s award
was procured through fraud or dishonesty or
that any other basis for overturning the
award exists.” Trustees for the Mason
Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund,
necessarily mean that a successful party is
also entitled to its costs and attorney’s fees
in bringing a petition to confirm an
Abondolo v. Jerry
WWHS Co., Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 120, 130
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that ERISA
authorizes award of costs, but not attorneys’
proceedings); accord TNS Mgmt. Servs.,
2014 WL 100008, at *4; Dejil Sys., 2012
WL 3744802, at *4. Nonetheless, “because
a court may, in the exercise of its inherent
equitable powers, award attorney’s fees
when opposing counsel acts in bad faith,
attorney’s fees and costs may be proper
when a party opposing confirmation of
arbitration award ‘refuses to abide by an
arbitrator’s decision without justification.’”
N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension
Fund v. E. Millenium Constr., Inc., No. 03–
CV–5122 (DAB), 2003 WL 22773355, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2003) (quoting Int’l
Chem. Workers Union, Local No. 227, 774
F.2d at 47); see, e,g., TNS Mgmt. Servs.,
2014 WL 100008, at *4 (citing cases);
Trustees of Nat’l Org. of Indus. Trade
Unions Ins. Trust Fund v. Davis Grande
Co., No. 03–CV–6229 (NG)(SMG), 2006
WL 1652642, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 9,
justification in refusing to comply with the
arbitrator’s ruling is irrelevant, however,
because the Agreement itself requires [the
defendant] to pay attorneys’ fees incurred by
the Trustees in seeking confirmation. . . .
Since the parties bargained for the awarding
of attorneys’ fees in this precise
circumstance, the Court respects their
agreement and orders [the defendant] to pay
the costs incurred by the Trustees in seeking
confirmation of the arbitrator’s award.”); see
also Trustees of N.Y.C. Dist. Council of
Carpenters Pension Fund, Welfare Fund,
Journeyman Retraining, Educ. & Indus.
Fund v. Alliance Workroom Corp., No. 13–
CV–5096 (KPF), 2013 WL 6498165, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (holding that CBA
authorized award of attorneys’ fees and
costs in action to confirm arbitration award).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
petitioners are entitled to recover attorneys’
fees and costs.
A. Attorneys’ Fees
The Court uses the “lodestar figure,”
which is determined by multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended on a
case by a reasonable hourly rate, to calculate
reasonable attorneys’ fees. See Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see
also Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111,
115 (2d Cir. 1997). “Both [the Second
Circuit] and the Supreme Court have held
that the lodestar . . . creates a ‘presumptively
reasonable fee.’” Millea v. Metro–N. R.R.
Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens
Neighborhood Assoc. v. Cnty. of Albany,
522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008). “‘[T]he
lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of
the relevant factors constituting a
‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee.’” Perdue, 559
U.S. at 553 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del.
Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478
Here, the Court need not decide whether
the respondent refused to abide by the
arbitrator’s award without justification
because the Collection Agreement obligates
employers who fail to make timely
contributions to the Funds to pay attorneys’
fees and costs incurred in recovering the
delinquent contributions. (See Pet. Ex. C,
arts. 1.1(C)(4), 6.2, 6.3.) The parties’
agreements are a sufficient basis upon which
to award attorneys’ fees and costs. See
N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension
Fund v. Dafna Constr. Co., Inc., 438 F.
Supp. 2d 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“Whether [the defendant] had no
U.S. 546, 566 (1986)). Thus, the Supreme
Court has recognized that “the lodestar
method produces an award that roughly
approximates the fee that the prevailing
attorney would have received if he or she
had been representing a paying client who
was billed by the hour in a comparable
case.” Id. at 551 (emphasis in original).
“The burden is on the party seeking
attorney’s fees to submit sufficient evidence
to support the hours worked and the rates
claimed.” Hugee v. Kimso Apartments,
LLC, 852 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) the time limitations
imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount
involved in the case and the results
obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the “undesirability”
of the case; (11) the nature and
relationship with the client; and (12)
awards in similar cases.
Id. at 186 n.3 (quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at
717–19). Finally, a district court should also
consider “that a reasonable, paying client
wishes to spend the minimum necessary to
litigate the case effectively,” and “that such
an individual might be able to negotiate with
his or her attorneys, using their desire to
obtain the reputational benefits that might
accrue from being associated with the case.”
Id. at 190. “The burden rests with the
prevailing party to justify the reasonableness
of the requested rate,” and a plaintiff’s
attorney “should establish his hourly rate
with satisfactory evidence—in addition to
the attorney’s own affidavits.” Hugee, 852
F. Supp. 2d at 298 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
“The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a
paying client would be willing to pay.”
Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190. The Second
Circuit’s “‘forum rule’ generally requires
use of ‘the hourly rates employed in the
district in which the reviewing court sits in
calculating the presumptively reasonable
fee.’” Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office of
Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr.,
652 F.3d 277, 290 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d
170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009)). The Second
Circuit also instructed district courts to
consider the factors set forth in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other
grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 92–93 (1989). See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d
Courts in this district have concluded
that approximately $200 to $325 is a
reasonable hourly rate for senior associates,
and that $100 to $200 is a reasonable hourly
rate for more junior associates. See, e.g.,
Pall Corp. v. 3M Purification Inc., No. 97–
CV–7599 (RRM)(ETB), 2012 WL 1979297,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012). Of course,
“the range of ‘reasonable’ attorney fee rates
in this district varies depending on the type
of case, the nature of the litigation, the size
of the firm, and the expertise of its
attorneys.” Siracuse v. Program for the
Dev. of Human Potential, No. 07–CV–2205
The twelve Johnson factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2)
the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the level of skill
required to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of
employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the
attorney’s customary hourly rate; (6)
(CLP), 2012 WL 1624291, at *30 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 30, 2012).
Jan. 13, 2014) (citing Cruz v. Local Union
No. 3 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d
1148, 1160 (2d Cir. 1994)). “Applications
for fee awards should generally be
documented by contemporaneously created
time records that specify, for each attorney,
the date, the hours expended, and the nature
of the work done.” Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 173.
“Hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary,’ are to be excluded,
and in dealing with such surplusage, the
court has discretion simply to deduct a
reasonable percentage of the number of
hours claimed ‘as a practical means of
trimming fat from a fee application.’” Id.
(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; N.Y.
Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983)); see
also Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131,
134 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We do not require that
the court set forth item-by-item findings
concerning what may be countless
objections to individual billing items.”).
Here, the petitioners request an hourly
rate of $225 for Virginia & Ambinder, LLP
associates, Elina Burke and Nicole
Marimon. Ms. Burke is a 2011 graduate of
Fordham University School of Law and
avers that she “regularly represent[s]
multiemployer employee benefit plans in
(Pet. ¶ 27.)
Marimon is a 2014 graduate of Fordham
University School of Law. (Pet. ¶ 28.)
Petitioners further state that the requested
hourly rate is “similar to or lower than the
rates typically charged by attorneys of
commensurate skill and experience in
similar actions [in the district].” (Id. ¶ 30.)
In light of the prevailing hourly rates in
this district and all other factors set forth in
Arbor Hill and Johnson, the Court concludes
that $225 is a reasonable rate for Ms. Burke.
However, petitioners have offered no
justification for awarding the same hourly
rate to Ms. Marimon, an associate with three
years less experience than Ms. Burke, who
was not indicated as having any experience
benefit plans in ERISA litigation. Thus, the
Court concludes that $150 is a reasonable
rate for Ms. Marimon.
The petitioners have submitted a printout
of an invoice sent by Virginia & Ambinder,
LLP to the Union for professional services
rendered in connection with the case at bar.
(See Pet. Ex. F.) This invoice shows that
Ms. Burke billed 1.4 hours on this litigation
and that Ms. Marimon billed 1.1 hours on
this litigation. (See id.)
2. Reasonable Hours
At the outset, the Court concludes that
contemporaneous records requirement.
Courts accept the printout of an invoice that
provides “a clear description of the work
performed, the time spent on the respective
matter, the attorney who rendered services,
and the date the services were performed.”
Big R Food Warehouses v. Local 338
RWDSU, 896 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D.N.Y.
1995); see, e.g., Home Loan Inv. Bank,
F.S.B. v. Goodness & Mercy, Inc., No. 10–
CV–4677 (ADS)(ETB), 2012 WL 1078963,
Having determined a reasonable hourly
rate for the petitioners’ counsel, the Court
must determine the reasonable number of
hours expended by the petitioners’ counsel
in this litigation.
“The party seeking attorney’s fees also
bears the burden of establishing that the
number of hours for which compensation is
sought is reasonable.” Custodio v. Am.
Chain Link & Const., Inc., No. 06–CV–7148
(GBD), 2014 WL 116147, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL
1078886 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012); Fuerst
v. Fuerst, No. 10–CV–3941, 2012 WL
1145934, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012);
New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. v. St. Pierre, No.
02–CV–981 (FJS)(RFT), 2007 WL 655603,
at *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007); Boster v.
Braccia, No. 06–CV–4756 (JG)(RER), 2007
WL 4287704, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4,
2007). The time record submitted by the
petitioners provides this information in
sufficient detail, as it includes a description
of the work performed by Ms. Burke and
Ms. Marimon, the date on which they
performed the work, and the amount of time
they spent on the various projects (see Pet.
Ex. F), and Ms. Burke avers that this
information was entered contemporaneously
as the work was performed (see id. ¶ 26).
(RRM)(RML), 2011 WL 2945825, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2011) (quoting LeBlanc–
Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d
Cir. 1998)). “The fee applicant bears the
burden of adequately documenting and
itemizing the costs requested.” Id.; see also
First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v.
Schlesinger Elec. Contractors, Inc., No. 10–
CV–696 (KAM)(SMG), 2013 WL 950573,
at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013). In
particular, under Local Civil Rule 54.1, “the
party must include as part of the request ‘an
affidavit that the costs claimed are allowable
by law, are correctly stated and were
necessarily incurred,’” and “[b]ills for the
costs claimed must be attached as exhibits.”
D.J. ex rel. Roberts v. City of New York, No.
11–CV–5458 (JGK)(DF), 2012 WL
5431034, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012)
(quoting Local Civ. R. 54.1(a)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL
5429521 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2012).
Finally, the Court concludes that the 2.5
hours billed on this matter by Ms. Burke and
Ms. Marimon is a reasonable number of
hours billed, given that they appear to have
been the only attorneys involved in
preparing the instant motion and the motion
Here, the petitioners request $475.00 for
the following litigation costs: the filing fee
($400) and a service fee ($75.00). (See Pet.
¶ 32.) All costs are recoverable. See
Trustees of Empire State Carpenters
Annuity, Apprenticeship, Labor Mgmt.
Cooperation, Pension & Welfare Funds v.
Sanders Constr., Inc., No. 13–CV–5102
(JFB)(ARL), 2015 WL 1608039, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015).
Accordingly, the Court calculates the
lodestar figure to be $480.00.
The Court sees no reason to depart from
the lodestar figure in this case. See, e.g.,
Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 (noting that lodestar
figure includes “most, if not all,” relevant
factors in setting reasonable attorney’s fee).
Therefore, the Court awards the petitioners
$480.00 in attorneys’ fees.
Accordingly, the Court awards the
petitioners $475.00 in costs.
“As for costs, a court will generally
award ‘those reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred by attorneys and
ordinarily charged to their clients.’”
Pennacchio v. Powers, No. 05–CV–985
For the reasons set forth above,
petitioners’ motion to confirm the arbitration
award in the amount of $42,993.57 is hereby
granted. Further, the Court awards the
petitioners $480.00 in attorneys’ fees and
$475.00 in costs. The Clerk of the Court
shall enter judgment accordingly and close
JOSEPH F. BIANCO
United States District Judge
Dated: May 4, 2016
Central Islip, New York
Petitioners are represented by Charles R.
Virginia, Nicole Marimon, and Elina Burke,
Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, 40 Broad Street,
7th Floor, New York, New NY 10004.
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