Christin Griskie, LLC v. Samsung

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to mark this case CLOSED. Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 6/29/2015. (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
CHRISTIN GRISKIE, LLC,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-3192(JS)(AYS)

-againstSAMSUNG,

Defendant.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Christin Griskie, LLC, pro se
52 Laurel Hill Road
Centerport, NY 11721
For Defendant:

No appearance.

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On June 1, 2015, pro se plaintiff Christin Griskie, LLC,
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court against Samsung
(“Defendant”), accompanied by an application to proceed in forma
pauperis.
Upon

review

of

the

declaration

in

support

of

the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of

the

filing

fee.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1914(a);

1915(a)(1).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED.

However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is

sua sponte DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)(ii).1
1

The Court notes that Plaintiff has commenced four separate
actions against different defendants within a week’s time and the
in forma pauperis applications submitted in each action report

BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff alleges a violation of her “9h Ammendment [sic]
Right” in connection with the “multiple incidences” since October
2014 of monitoring by Defendant via her television. (Compl. ¶¶ II.
B; III. B-C.)
reporters

More specifically, Plaintiff claims that “various

from various channels can track if I am standing in

front of my T.V., multiple channels, multiple news media.” (Compl.
¶ III. C.)

Plaintiff alleges that she is the owner/CEO of

Christian Griskie, LLC, and that she has intermittently operated
her business for eleven years as a “sports logo company” doing
business as “BlackLine.”

(Compl. at 6.)

Plaintiff explains that:

[A]fter
gaining
limited
international
exposure, winning publishing awards and small
town print and televised news and experience
in the publishing industry through Operation
Appreciation Press, LLC and the Golden Soldier
Project 501(c)(3) and following 5 relocations
due to the intentional bankrupting of Detroit,
through
the
North
American
Free
Trade
Agreement, I Griskie, decided to run for
public office in 2012 as a Republican, and
inconsistent information. See 15-CV-3186(JS)(AYS), Griskie LLC
v. Big Machine Records; 15-CV-3192(JS)(AYS), Griskie v. Samsung,
15-CV-3196 (JS)(AYS); Griskie v. Disney Co.; and 15-CV-3276
Griskie LLC v. Atlantic Records. For example, the application in
the instant case reports that Plaintiff has $7,000-$10,000 in a
checking or savings account and does not report any debts.
However, the applications submitted with her other Complaints
report debts of $29,000-$30,000. In an abundance of caution, the
Court will permit Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis in this
case.
2

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purposes of this Memorandum and
Order.
2

moved into my home on 52 Laurel Hill,
Centerport, NY, changed my party to Democratic
and after many failed attempts to find
reasonable business rent on Long Island, New
York, have justified running the business of
Christin Griskie, LLC “Where ever I am.” Prior
to that the fall of 5/28/15, I lived at 34
Harbor Heights Drive, which was a location
that was easily “viewable to the pubic” for 4
years.
I decided to finally diversify my business
into multiple divisions one of which includes
a research/investigation division, as I
realize an unestimated historical amount of
money was being made off my every move,
locations, telephone calls, email, text,
letter sent in the international media
business, through stage names, movies and
songs, while I was making NOTHING. While
juggling responsibilities in the health care
industry, publishing industry, and political
industry, I have now had to evaluate which
areas of my life need to be protected, mainly
my privacy and security. “My business is where
I am.”
I am giving Samsung that information on a
personal level because, when I placed my
Samsung television in the center of my home
during the end of 2014, I did not realize much
of what I said could be heard or seen by
others in the national media or otherwise.
Due to this massive invasion of privacy and my
family and friends that wish to remain
unnamed, and given the 9th amendment and the
Bill of Rights, I should have been properly
warned prior to opening the box on this
monitor and placing it in the center of my
home
that
I
was
giving
more
of
my
international leadership skills and personal
security away to the world.
My every move has lined the pockets, of movie
stars and singers, and national news media
since 1996. However, the power of this television monitor has rivaled almost 20 years of
3

slower intel on my life. At times, the
broadcasted individual can track my movement.
(Compl. at 6.)

Therefore, Plaintiff seeks to recover “$20 Billion

in damages and 1% of all annual profits made by Samsung, its
divisions or subsidiaries, following an immediate settlement date
of June 28, 2015.”

(Compl. at 6.)

Further, if the settlement is

delayed beyond July 28, 2015, Plaintiff seeks to increase the
amount to $25 Billion and 10% of all annual profits.

(Compl. at

7.)
DISCUSSION
I.

In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fees.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from

such

1915A(b).

relief.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination.

See id. § 1915A(b).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
4

plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).

However, a complaint must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).

While

“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III.

An LLC Cannot Appear Pro Se in Federal Court
As a threshold matter, it is well-established that a

limited liability company (“LLC”) “may appear in federal court only
through a licensed attorney.”

Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137,

140 (2d Cir. 2007).

This is true even where the corporation has a

single shareholder.

Lattanzio, 481 F.3d at 140 (“a sole member of

a limited liability company must bear the burdens that accompany
5

the benefits of the corporate form and may appear in federal court
only through a licensed attorney.”).

Thus, because an LLC is the

sole Plaintiff in this action, it cannot proceed in this Court pro
se.

Accordingly, to proceed with this case, Plaintiff must retain

an attorney.

Nevertheless, the Court will at this juncture

exercise its discretion and consider whether the claims asserted by
Plaintiff are plausible.
IV.

Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Rehberg v. Paulk, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.
Ct. 1497, 1501–02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).
under

Section

1983,

a

plaintiff

must

To state a claim

“‘allege

that

(1)

the

challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person
who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States.’”

Rae v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 693 F. Supp. 2d

217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53
(2d Cir. 1999)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that her “9th Ammendment

& Right to privacy was invaded.”

(Compl. ¶ III. C.)

6

A.

The Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:

“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
U.S.

CONST.

amend,

IX.

The

Ninth

Amendment

“is

a

rule

construction that does not give rise to individual rights.”

of

Zorn

v. Premiere Homes, Inc., 109 F. App’x 475 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1983)). Thus,
the Ninth Amendment does not provide a basis for a cause of action
and Plaintiff’s claim thereunder is not plausible as a matter of
law.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Ninth Amendment claim is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B.

State Action
Section 1983 “constrains only state conduct, not the

‘acts of private persons or entities.’” Hooda v. Brookhaven Nat’l
Lab.,

659

F.

Supp.

2d

382,

393

(E.D.N.Y.

2009)

(quoting

Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2769, 73
L. Ed. 2d 418 (1982)).

Accordingly, “a litigant claiming that his

constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that
the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Fabrikant v. French, 691
F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff pressing a claim of
violation of his constitutional rights under Section 1983 is . . .
7

required to show state action.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Indeed, “the under-color-of-state-law element
of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S. Ct. 977, 985, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130
(1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Private actors, such as Defendant, may be considered to
be acting under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983 if
the private actor was a “‘willful participant in joint activity
with the State or its agents.’”

Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau,

292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1606, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1970)). Section 1983 liability may also extend to a private party
who

conspires

with

a

constitutional rights.

state

actor

to

violate

a

plaintiff’s

Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323-24.

In order

to state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege:
“(1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to
act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an
overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”

Id.

at 324–25 (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.
1999)).
Here, Defendant is a purely private entity that does not
act

under

color

of

state

law.

Nor

are

there

any

factual

allegations from which the Court could reasonably construe that
8

Defendant was a joint actor or conspired with a state actor.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Section 1983
claim against Defendant and it is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
V.

Leave to Amend
Given

the

Second

Circuit’s

guidance

that

a

pro

se

complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless
amendment would be futile, Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000), the Court has carefully considered whether leave to
amend is warranted here and concludes that it is not.
“An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in
law or fact--i.e., where it is ‘based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory’ or presents ‘factual contentions [which] are clearly
baseless.’” Scanlon v. Vermont, 423 F. App’x 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2011)
(summary

order)

(alteration

in

original)

(quoting

Neitzke

v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L. Ed. 2d
338 (1989)); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.
Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the
level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not
there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict
them.”).

Here,

Plaintiff

speculates

that

her

television

is

monitoring her and that the information gathered about her from
her television is being used for profit by others to her detriment.
9

(Compl. at 6-7.) Such allegations rise to the level of irrational,
are wholly incredible, and do not set forth any cognizable claim.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is
sua sponte DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,

82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy
of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to mark
this case CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: June
29 , 2015
Central Islip, New York

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