Griskie v. Disney Company et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to mark this case CLOSED. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 6/29/2015. C/M (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
CHRISTIN NOEL GRISKIE,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
15-CV-3196(JS)(AYS)

DISNEY COMPANY; WDC DIVISIONS:
WALT DISNEY STUDIOS, DISNEY MEDIA
NETWORKS, WALT DISNEY PARKS AND
RESORTS, DISNEY INTERACTIVE,
DISNEY CONSUMER PRODUCTS; WDC
SUBSIDIARIES: WALT DISNEY PICTURES,
WALT DISNEY ANIMATION STUDIOS,
WALT DISNEY THEATRICAL, WALT
DISNEY COMPANY INDIA, PIXAR,
MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT, and
DISNEY-ABC TELEVISION GROUP,
Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Christin Noel Griskie, pro se
52 Laurel Hill Road
Centerport, NY 11721
For Defendants:

No appearance.

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On May 28, 2015, pro se plaintiff Christin Noel Griskie
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court against the Disney
Company; WDC Divisions: Walt Disney Studios, Disney Media Networks,
Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, Disney Interactive, Disney Consumer
Products; WDC Subsidiaries: Walt Disney Pictures, Walt Disney
Animation Studios, Walt Disney Theatrical, Walt Disney Company
India, Pixar, Marvel Entertainment, and Disney-ABC Television Group
(collectively, “Defendants”), accompanied by an application to
proceed in forma pauperis.

Upon

review

of

the

declaration

in

support

of

the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of

the

filing

fee.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1914(a);

1915(a)(1).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED.

However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is

sua sponte DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)(ii).
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff alleges that she is suing the Defendants for
“invading the privacy an[d] creating profitable content in their
products, message, and images related to Harry Potter, Frozen, Dog
with a Blog, and other unnamed television shows and music.” (Compl.
at 6.) Although difficult to comprehend, it appears that Plaintiff
claims Defendants stole her ideas for the movies Frozen and Harry
Potter, among others.

According to the Complaint, the

‘Harry Potter scar’ on forehead is related to
hospital emergency room visit I witnessed of 2
of my family members that wish to remain
unnamed, in San Diego CA, 1996 (Spring). Later
during 2013 (Spring) I wrote Disney discussing
possible story lines related to “Smart Girl
Runs” my childrens autobiography, suggesting
book & movie content. This was refused in
writing which I have/had the write [sic] to
suggest/solicit as my own agent. Shortly
thereafter the movie “Frozen” was released
1

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purposes of this Memorandum and
Order.
2

with multiple suble [sic] yet obvious facts &
images & knowledge related to my multiple
relocations similar to Elsa/weather complications.
(Compl. ¶ III. C.)

Plaintiff further alleges that the “‘Iron Man’

movie references ‘Hurley’ boy name physical likeness to family.”
(Compl. ¶ III. C.)

Plaintiff claims to have “written proof of

communication with Disney just prior to the release of Frozen
specifically.

(Compl. at 6.)

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks to recover
a monetary damages award of $20 Billion to finance her campaigns
because

she

is

“seeking

the

United

States

Presidency

&

a

Congressional run prior that require funding that I do not have.”
(Compl. ¶¶ III. C, V.)

Although Plaintiff does not allege a cause

of action, she lists the “US Constitution 9th Amendment” and “Bill
of Rights section on Right to Privacy” at pages 7 and 9 of her
Complaint.

(Compl. at 7, 9.)
DISCUSSION

I.

In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fees.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to
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dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from

such

1915A(b).

relief.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination.

See id. § 1915A(b).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).

However, a complaint must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).

While

“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
4

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

III. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Rehberg v. Paulk, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.
Ct. 1497, 1501–02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).
under

Section

1983,

a

plaintiff

must

To state a claim

“‘allege

that

(1)

the

challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person
who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States.’”

Rae v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 693 F. Supp. 2d

217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53
(2d Cir. 1999)).

Here, liberally construed, Plaintiff claims

violation of her 9th Amendment right & her right to privacy.
(Compl. at 7, 9.)
A.

The Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:

“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
U.S.

CONST.

amend,

IX.

The

Ninth

Amendment

“is

a

rule

construction that does not give rise to individual rights.”

of

Zorn

v. Premiere Homes, Inc., 109 F. App’x 475 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
5

United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1983)). Thus,
the Ninth Amendment does not provide a basis for a cause of action
and Plaintiff’s claim thereunder is not plausible as a matter of
law.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Ninth Amendment claim is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B.

State Action
Section 1983 “constrains only state conduct, not the

‘acts of private persons or entities.’” Hooda v. Brookhaven Nat’l
Lab.,

659

F.

Supp.

2d

382,

393

(E.D.N.Y.

2009)

(quoting

Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2769, 73
L. Ed. 2d 418 (1982)).

Accordingly, “a litigant claiming that his

constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that
the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Fabrikant v. French, 691
F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff pressing a claim of
violation of his constitutional rights under Section 1983 is . . .
required to show state action.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Indeed, “the under-color-of-state-law element
of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S. Ct. 977, 985, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130
(1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Private actors, such as Defendants, may be considered to
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be acting under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983 if
the private actor was a “‘willful participant in joint activity
with the State or its agents.’”

Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau,

292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1606, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1970)). Section 1983 liability may also extend to a private party
who

conspires

with

a

constitutional rights.

state

actor

to

violate

a

plaintiff’s

Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323-24.

In order

to state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege:
“(1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to
act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an
overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”

Id.

at 324–25 (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.
1999)).
Here, Defendants are purely private entities that do not
act

under

color

of

state

law.

Nor

are

there

any

factual

allegations from which the Court could reasonably construe that
Defendants were joint actors or conspired with a state actor.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Section 1983
claim against Defendants and it is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
V.

Leave to Amend
Given

the

Second

Circuit’s

guidance

that

a

pro

se

complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless
7

amendment would be futile, Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000), the Court has carefully considered whether leave to
amend is warranted here and concludes that it is not.
“An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in
law or fact--i.e., where it is ‘based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory’ or presents ‘factual contentions [which] are clearly
baseless.’” Scanlon v. Vermont, 423 F. App’x 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2011)
(summary

order)

(alteration

in

original)

(quoting

Neitzke

v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L. Ed. 2d
338 (1989)); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.
Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the
level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not
there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict
them.”).

Here, Plaintiff speculates that the ideas for the movies

Harry Potter, Frozen, and Iron Man were based on her life and
events that happened to her and her family members.

Plaintiff

believes that she was targeted by Defendants because she is now and
was previously a Presidential candidate.

Such allegations rise to

the level of irrational, are wholly incredible, and do not set
forth any cognizable claim. Accordingly, the Court DENIES LEAVE TO
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
8

to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is
sua sponte DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,

82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy
of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff and to mark
this case CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: June
29 , 2015
Central Islip, New York

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