Corrado v. State of New York University Stony Brook Police et al

Filing 11

ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; denying 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying 7 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth above: (1) Plaintiffs applications to proceed in forma pauperis are granted; (2) all of Plaintiffs claims in his Corrado I and Corrado II complaints are dismissed with prejudice sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii); and (3) the Corrado I Defendants motion to di smiss (15-cv-7443, Dkt. 7) is denied as moot. The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the cases bearing the index numbers 15-cv-7443 and 15-cv-7444. So Ordered by Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein on 8/5/2016. (Tirado, Chelsea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
CHRISTOPHER CORRADO,

FILED 
CLERK 

8/5/2016 2:01 pm

U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
LONG ISLAND OFFICE 

Plaintiff,
ORDER
15-CV-7443(SJF)(AYS)

-againstSTATE OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY STONY BROOK POLICE,
OFFICER JOHN DOE 1, OFFICER JOHN DOE 2, OFFICER JOHN
DOE 3, STATE OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL,
SAMUEL L. STANLEY, Individually, REUVEN PASTERNICK,
Individually,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
CHRISTOPHER CORRADO,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
15-CV-7444(SJF)(AYS)

-againstSUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE, OFFICER JOHN DOE 1,
OFFICER JOHN DOE 2, LIEUTENANT JANE DOE 1,
LIEUTENENT JOHN DOE 2,
Defendants.
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FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

On December 28, 2015, pro se plaintiff Christopher Corrado (“Plaintiff”) filed two (2)
complaints in this Court, each purporting to assert a variety of federal constitutional and statutory
claims, each relating to a mid-April 2015 arrest and subsequent state court prosecution, and each
accompanied by an in forma pauperis application. The complaint assigned docket number
15-cv-7443 (“Corrado I”) is against the State of New York University Stony Brook Police
(“SBUPD”), John Doe Officers 1-3 (“Unknown SBU Officers”), the State of New York University
Hospital (“SBU Hospital”), Samuel L. Stanley (“Stanley”) in his individual capacity, and Reuven
Pasternick (“Pasternick”) in his individual capacity (collectively, the “Corrado I Defendants”).
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The complaint assigned docket number 15-cv-7444 (“Corrado II”) is against the Suffolk County
Police (“SCPD”), John Doe Officers 1-2 (“Unknown SCPD Officers”), and Jane and John Doe
Lieutenants 1-2 (“Unknown SCPD Lieutenants”) (collectively, the “Corrado II Defendants”).
Despite the fact that nothing filed on the docket suggests that the Corrado I Defendants were
served with a complaint, on February 16, 2016 the Office of the New York State Attorney General,
having appeared on behalf of the Corrado I Defendants, filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Corrado I complaint. (Dkt. 7). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s applications to proceed in
forma pauperis are granted, but both the Corrado I and II complaints are dismissed sua sponte
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2)(B)(ii)-(iii), and the Corrado I Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
denied as moot.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Plaintiff’s History of Vexatious Litigation

Since August 2015, in addition to the instant Corrado I and II complaints, Plaintiff has
attempted to remove two (2) state court actions to this Court, both of which were remanded, and
has filed five (5) pro se, in forma pauperis complaints in this Court, each of which has been
dismissed:


Unknown Stony Brook University Police v. Corrado, 15-cv-4843 (SJF)(AYS) (pending
criminal case remanded to state court following Plaintiff’s filing of notice of removal);



D’Amico v. Corrado, 15-cv-4846 (SJF)(AYS) (pending child support dispute remanded to
state family court following Plaintiff’s filing of notice of removal);



Corrado v. Judge Freundlich, 15-cv-5389 (SJF)(AYS) (complaint against state family
court judge alleging various constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 dismissed);



Corrado v. Magistrate Lafler, 15-cv-5390 (SJF)(AYS) (complaint against state family
court judge alleging various constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 dismissed);

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

Corrado v. New York Rising et al., 15-cv-6284 (JFB)(AYS) (complaint against twelve (12)
private, state, and federal actors alleging a variety of constitutional and statutory violations
with respect to Plaintiff’s purported entitlement to compensation related to alleged losses
sustained as a result of Hurricane Sandy dismissed);



Corrado v. Bernard Cheng, 15-cv-7221 (SJF)(AYS) (complaint against state family court
judge alleging various constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 dismissed); and



Corrado v. New York Office of Temporary Disability Assistance et al., 15-cv-7316
(SJF)(AYS) (complaint against twenty-four (24) state actors alleging a variety of
constitutional and statutory violations in connection with child support dispute pending in
state family court dismissed).

In each instance, Plaintiff has sought reconsideration of the Court’s orders dismissing his
complaint or remanding the case. He has also unsuccessfully appealed this Court’s orders
remanding his pending criminal and child support cases to their respective state courts.
B.

Plaintiff’s Present Complaints

Plaintiff’s Corrado I and Corrado II complaints appear to arise out of a 2015 arrest and
ensuing state criminal prosecution pending in New York State Court, Suffolk County, First
District Court, bearing the index number 2015SU016208 – the same state criminal prosecution he
improperly attempted to remove to this Court.
1.

Corrado I

The Corrado I complaint alleges that the Corrado I Defendants “acted in complete absence
of all jurisdiction, laws, rules and authority stemming from an illegal encounter, police brutality,
detainment, imprisonment, with said police on or about April 16, 2015 while a patient against
[Plaintiff’s] will, being falsely imprisoned at Stony Brook Hospital.” (Dkt. 1 at 1-2). The fifteen
(15)-page complaint consists almost entirely of citations to and/or excerpts from various federal
statutes, constitutional provisions, cases, and international treaties; it provides the reader with no
information about the nature of the underlying conduct that Plaintiff is/was purportedly aggrieved
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by. (Dkt. 1, passim). Although Plaintiff failed to describe any acts or omissions in his
complaint, let alone acts or omissions attributable to any of the named defendants, he purports to
assert claims under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 245, 1514, 2381 and 2382, and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 12203, and seeks expungement of “all invasive privacy records” and damages
in the amount of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) from each of the Corrado I Defendants. (Dkt. 1
at 1, 13).
On February 16, 2016, Corrado I Defendants filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the
complaint. (Docket Entry Nos. 6, 7, 9). On March 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment, which was denied without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 4 of this
Court’s individual rules (i.e., the “bundle rule”). (Dkt. 8; 3/22/2016 ECF Order).
2.

Corrado II

The Corrado II complaint alleges that the Corrado II Defendants “acted in complete
absence of all jurisdiction and authority stemming from an illegal encounter, detainment,
[and] imprisonment with said police on private property on or about April 15, 2015.” (Dkt. 1 at
1). Plaintiff purports to challenge the “unlawful malicious prosecution, investigation,
detainment, and incarceration of [Plaintiff] without probable cause or lawful reason to do so.”
(Dkt. 1 at 2). As in Corrado I, Plaintiff’s Corrado II complaint consists almost entirely of legal
conclusions and references to federal statutes, constitutional provisions, and cases. (Dkt. 1,
passim). It provides no information as to who acted or failed to act, when they acted or failed to
act, or how Plaintiff was harmed by anyone’s action(s) or inaction(s). (Id.). Plaintiff’s Corrado
II complaint cites each of the statutes cited in the Corrado I complaint, and also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673
and 1675. (Dkt. 1 at 1). Similarly, Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of expungement of “all
invasive privacy records” and damages in the amount of two million dollars ($2,000,000) from

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each of the Corrado II defendants. (Dkt. 1 at 9).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

In Forma Pauperis

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s declarations in support of his applications to proceed in forma
pauperis in both Corrado I and II, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s financial status qualifies him to
commence these actions without prepayment of the filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s requests to proceed in forma pauperis are granted.
B.

Standard of Review

Under the in forma pauperis statute, a district court must dismiss a complaint if it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see
also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007).
Courts must read pro se complaints liberally, and construe them “to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.” Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015)
(quotations and citations omitted); see also Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 728
F.3d 139, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court must also assume “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory
factual allegations in the complaint to be true.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-78 (2009)).
Nevertheless, in order to avoid dismissal, a complaint must, at a minimum, comply with
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires, inter alia, “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which

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it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Moreover, a complaint
must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard “does not require
detailed factual allegations,” but it does “demand[ ] more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
C. Plaintiff’s Claims
1.

18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 245, 1514, 2381, and 2382

Plaintiff purports to assert claims against all defendants under sections 242, 245, 1514,
2381, and 2382 of Title 18 of the United States Code. However, there is no private right of action
under any of these federal criminal statutes. Hill v. Didio, 191 Fed. Appx. 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2006)
(no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242) (citations omitted); McNeil v. Aguilos, 831 F.
Supp. 1079, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 245) (citations
omitted); Canning v. Veitch, Case No. 15-cv-1215, 2015 WL 7444260, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16,
2015) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1514) (citations omitted); Nguyen v.
Ridgewood Sav. Bank, Case Nos. 14-cv-1058, 14-cv-3464, 14-cv-3989, 2015 WL 2354308, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2015) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2381 or 2382) (citations
omitted). In light of the fact there are no set of circumstances in which Plaintiff could assert
viable claims under these federal criminal statutes, his claims suggesting purported violations of
18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 245, 1514, 2381, and 2382 are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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2.

42 U.S.C. § 12203

Chapter 126 of Title 42 of the United States Code is commonly known as the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. Section 12203 of the ADA,
which aims to prohibit “retaliation and coercion,” provides:
(a) Retaliation
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual
in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or
enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other
individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this
chapter.
(c) Remedies and procedures
The remedies and procedures available under sections 12117, 12133, and 12188 of
this title shall be available to aggrieved persons for violations of subsections (a) and
(b) of this section, with respect to subchapter I, subchapter II and subchapter III of
this chapter, respectively.
42 U.S.C. § 12203.
In order to allege a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA the plaintiff must claim:
“(1) engagement in an activity protected by the ADA; (2) defendant’s awareness of that activity;
(3) action adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse action.” Bahamonde v. Shepard, Case No. 11-cv-5166, 2013 WL 2250209, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2013) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s complaints in Corrado I and II, read
charitably, have nothing to do with disability discrimination, let alone retaliation for seeking to
assert one’s rights under the ADA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims suggesting a violation of 42

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U.S.C. § 12203 are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
3.

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)

Section 362(a) of Title 11 of the United States Code, which Plaintiff references in both the
Corrado I and Corrado II complaints, provides for an automatic stay of many judicial and debt
collection actions against a debtor once a bankruptcy petition has been filed. Neither the Corrado
I complaint nor the Corrado II complaint allege that Plaintiff is a party to any bankruptcy
proceeding, so this statute is wholly inapplicable and provides no basis for relief. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claims invoking 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
4.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1675

In his Corrado II complaint alone, Plaintiff purports to assert claims under 15 U.S.C. §§
1673 and 1675, which are provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Section 1673
relates to restrictions on wage garnishments, and provides no private right of action. See Jordan
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 91 F. Supp. 3d 491, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (no private right of action
under 15 U.S.C. § 1673 claim because that section is enforced exclusively by the Secretary of
Labor) (citations omitted). Similarly, 15 U.S.C. § 1675 cannot be read to create any private right
of action.1 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Corrado II claims invoking 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673 and 1675 are
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

1

15 U.S.C. § 1675 provides:
The Secretary of Labor may by regulation exempt from the provisions of section
1673(a) and (b)(2) of this title garnishments issued under the laws of any State if he
determines that the laws of that State provide restrictions on garnishment which are
substantially similar to those provided in section 1673(a) and (b)(2) of this title.
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5.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who deprives an
individual of federally guaranteed rights ‘under color’ of state law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S.Ct.
1657, 1661 (2012). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the challenged
conduct was “committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and (2) that the conduct
“deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
“Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the
deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999).
In addition, “a plaintiff must establish a given defendant’s personal involvement in the
claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his individual capacity under § 1983.”
Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d
192, 196 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Absent some personal involvement by [a defendant] in the allegedly
unlawful conduct of his subordinates, he cannot be held liable under section 1983.”). A
complaint based upon a violation under Section 1983 that does not allege the personal involvement
of a defendant fails as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Barney, 360 Fed. Appx. 199, 201 (2d Cir.
2010).
a.

1983 Claims against the Corrado I Defendants

Plaintiff avers, without any explanation, that a variety of his constitutional rights have been
violated by the SBUPD, the Unknown SBU Officers, SBU Hospital, and/or Stanley and Pasternick
9

in their individual capacities. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI.

The Supreme

Court has made clear “that the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits
against non-consenting states.” Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003)
(citations omitted). “As a general matter, states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court, even if the claim arises under federal law.” KM Enters., Inc. v. McDonald, 518 Fed. Appx.
12, 13 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity extends “to entities considered arms of the
state, such as state agencies.” Walker v. City of Waterbury, 253 Fed. Appx. 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It also extends to suits for damages against state
officers in their official capacities, as “lawsuits against state officers acting [in] their official
capacity … are considered to be lawsuits against the state.”). McNamara v. Kaye, Case No.
06-cv-5169, 2008 WL 3836024, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2008) (citations omitted).
Absent a state’s consent to suit or an express statutory waiver, the Eleventh Amendment
bars federal court suits against the state, its agencies, and its officers in their official capacities.
See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). It is well-established that New
York State has not waived its immunity for Section 1983 suits and there has been no statutory
waiver. See, e.g., Marmot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 Fed. Appx. 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010) (“New York
has not consented to § 1983 suits in federal court”); Garcia v. Paylock, No. 13–cv–2868, 2014 WL
298593, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014) (“The State has not waived its immunity, nor has its
immunity been abrogated, for the causes of action plaintiff has asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

10

1983.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 1983 claims against the SBUPD, SBU Hospital, and the
Unknown SBU Officers are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Because Plaintiff alleges that he is suing Stanley and Pasternick in their individual
capacities, his 1983 claims against them are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However,
Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to allege the violation of any constitutional right, let alone
Stanley’s or Pasternick’s personal involvement in any such violation. Indeed, Plaintiff references
Stanley and Pasternick only in the caption of the complaint. Given the total absence of factual
allegations suggesting that Stanley or Pasternick were involved in violating Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights in any capacity, his 1983 claims against them are implausible and must be
dismissed. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 1983 claims against each of the Corrado I Defendants are
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).
b.

1983 Claims against the Corrado II Defendants

Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible 1983 claim against any of the Corrado II Defendants.
Plaintiff’s claims against the SCPD fail because this defendant is an administrative arm of Suffolk
County, a municipality, and has no independent legal identity. “In New York, agencies of a
municipality are not suable entities” because “[u]nder New York law, departments that are merely
administrative arms of a municipality have no separate legal identity apart from the municipality
and therefore cannot be sued.” Omnipoint Comm’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d
539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, because the
SCPD lacks the capacity to be sued, Plaintiff’s claims against it are dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff’s 1983 claims against the Unknown SCPD Officers and the Unknown SCPD
Lieutenants must also be dismissed, because the Corrado II complaint does not contain a single

11

allegation that any of these individuals engaged in any action or inaction whatsoever, let alone any
action or inaction that violated any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
1983 claims against the Corrado II Defendants are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV.

LEAVE TO AMEND
In light of the pleading deficiencies set forth above, the Court has considered whether

Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to re-plead. Leave to amend should be freely granted
when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “This relaxed standard applies with particular
force to pro se litigants.” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second
Circuit has emphasized that a “court should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting
leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a
valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chappius, 618 F.3d at 170. Nevertheless, “[l]eave to
amend, though liberally granted, may properly be denied for: ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility
of amendment, etc.’” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see also Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551
F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008).
The deficiencies in Plaintiff’s purported claims under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), 15 U.S.C. §§
1673, 1675, 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 245, 1514, 2382, 2382, and 42 U.S.C. § 12203, and Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claims against all Corrado I Defendants and all Corrado II Defendants are
substantive in nature, and therefore amendment would be futile. A liberal reading of Plaintiff’s

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complaints does not give any indication that a valid claim might be stated. Furthermore, given
Plaintiff’s recent history of attempting to involve the federal courts in his state court criminal and
child support disputes through vexatious and frivolous litigation, the Court finds that any
amendment would not be undertaken in good faith. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant
Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above: (1) Plaintiff’s applications to proceed in forma pauperis are

granted; (2) all of Plaintiff’s claims in his Corrado I and Corrado II complaints are dismissed with
prejudice sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii); and (3) the Corrado I
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (15-cv-7443, Dkt. 7) is denied as moot.
The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of
any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of the
Court is directed to close the cases bearing the index numbers 15-cv-7443 and 15-cv-7444.

SO ORDERED.

s/ Sandra J. Feuerstein
Sandra J. Feuerstein
United States District Judge

Dated: August 5, 2016
Central Islip, New York

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