Cabrera v. Stephens et al
ORDER denying DE 31 , Motion to Strike, and granting in part and denying in part DE 22 , Motion to Certify FLSA Collective Action. For the reasons set forth in the attached written order, the Court grants in part and denies in part, Plaintiffs' ; Motion for Conditional Certification as follows: (1) Conditionally Certifying this case as a collective action including any and all of Defendants' current and former non-managerial employees who were employed from 2/20/2014 through to the pre sent at any of Defendants locations; (2) Order Defendants, within sixty days of the Court's Order, to produce a computer-readable data file containing the names, last known mailing addresses, last known home and mobile telephone numbers, last kn own email addresses, work locations, and dates of employment, of all potential collective action members who worked for Defendants at any point from 2/20/2014 to the present; (3) The notice of this action, in the form submitted, will be in English an d Spanish, and sent via regular mail as well as text message and e-mail; (4) Defendants will post the Notice and Reminder Notice in English and Spanish in a place where employees are likely to view it all 7-Eleven store locations owned and/or operate d by Defendants for the entire opt-in period; (5) Plaintiffs will send the proposed reminder notice in both English and Spanish to the potential collective members thirty days after sending the initial notice, via regular mail, text message and e-mai l; and (6) The FLSA statute of limitations is tolled from the date of filing of this motion, until the date of the issuance of this order. Additionally, Plaintiffs' motions to strike and preclude the Affidavits and Declarations are denied in their entirety. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Steven I. Locke on 9/28/2017. (Perri, Anthony)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
INES CABRERA on behalf of herself,
individually, and on behalf of all others
16-CV-3234 (ADS) (SIL)
doing business as 7-Eleven;
LOCKE, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Ines Cabrera (“Cabrera”) commenced this action against Defendants
Christopher Stephens (“Stephens”), doing business as 7-Eleven and Attaullah Khan
(“Khan”) (collectively, “Defendants”), on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated individuals (collectively “Plaintiffs”), seeking to recover unpaid minimum
and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29
U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), N.Y. Lab. Law § 190, et
seq. See Complaint (“Compl.”), Docket Entry (“DE”) . 1 Presently before the Court,
on referral from the Honorable Arthur D. Spatt, is Plaintiffs’ motion for an order
conditionally certifying this action as an FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b), authorizing dissemination of a proposed notice and consent to sue form (the
“Notice and Consent Form”) to potential opt-in plaintiffs, and providing other related
On November 7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a consent to join the collective action signed by Ivan
Sinchi. See DE . On June 2, 2017, Erika de Leon also joined as an opt-in party. See DE .
Case 2:16-cv-03234-ADS-SIL Document 44 Filed 09/28/17 Page 2 of 32 PageID #: 553
relief (“Motion for Conditional Certification”). See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional
Certification (“Pl. Cert. Mot.”), DE . Defendants oppose conditional certification
as well as certain aspects of the proposed Notice and Consent Form. See Defendants’
Opposition to Conditional Certification (“Def. Cert. Opp.”), DE .
While the Motion for Conditional Certification was pending, Plaintiffs filed a
letter motion to strike (“Motion to Strike”) the affidavits submitted with Defendants’
opposition to the Motion for Conditional Certification and Defendants’ opposition to
a separate motion to compel. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (“Pl. Strike Mot.”), DE
. The Motion to Strike, which Defendants opposed, is also presently before the
Court on referral from Judge Arthur D. Spatt.
See Defendants’ Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (“Def. Strike Opp.”), DE [33-35]. The Court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Strike with respect to whether any of the
affidavits or declarations at issue were obtained in bad faith through coercion or
misrepresentations. See DE [38-40]. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs’
motion for conditional certification is granted in part and denied in part, and
Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is denied.
A. Summary of Relevant Facts
Defendant Stephens owns and operates several 7-Eleven convenience stores on
Long Island and employs a staff of non-managerial hourly employees, such as
assistant managers, cashiers, and store clerks. Compl. ¶¶ 28-32; Declaration of Ines
Cabrera (“Cabrera Decl.”), DE [22-5], ¶¶ 1-3; Declaration of Ivan Sinchi (“Sinchi
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Decl.”), DE [22-6], ¶¶ 1-3. One of Defendants’ principal places of business is 653
Montauk Highway, Montauk, Suffolk County, New York (“Montauk Store”), and,
with respect to this store, Stephens and Khan make all of the managerial and
employment decisions regarding the hourly employees. See Compl. ¶¶ 28-30; Cabrera
Decl. ¶¶ 1-2; Sinchi Decl. ¶¶ 1-2. According to Cabrera, Defendants other 7-Eleven
stores are located in East Patchogue and Smithtown. Declaration of Muhammad
Anwar, (“Anwar Decl.”), DE [22-11], ¶ 9.
From approximately October 1, 2010 until October 24, 2013, Cabrera worked
as an assistant manager at Defendants’ Montauk Store. Compl. ¶ 31; Cabrera Decl.
¶ 1. Cabrera was required to clock in and out at the start and end of each shift;
however, it is alleged that Defendants routinely altered Cabrera’s timesheets in order
to make it appear that Cabrera worked fewer hours. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 43-5; Cabrera Decl.
¶¶ 5-7. The purpose of these reductions was to maintain an ideal sales-to-salary
ratio, presumably to ensure a certain level of profitability. See Anwar Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.
As a result, Defendants are alleged to have failed to pay Cabrera for all of her hours
worked in compliance with the federally mandated minimum wage. Pl. Cert Mot. at
4-5. Additionally, it is alleged that Defendants failed to pay Cabrera the mandated
overtime premium for any hours that she worked over forty per week. Cabrera Decl.
According to Plaintiffs, other employees were similarly underpaid. Cabrera
Decl. ¶¶ 7-11; Anwar Decl. ¶ 10; Sinchi Decl. ¶¶ 3-10. Opt-in Plaintiff Ivan Sinchi
(“Sinchi”) claims to have worked for Defendants as an assistant manager and store
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clerk at the Montauk Store from April 2010 through October 2013 during which time
he alleges that Defendants also altered his timesheets, refused to pay him for all
hours worked, and denied him overtime at the statutory rate. Sinchi Decl. ¶¶ 1-7.
Cabrera and Sinchi claim that approximately thirteen other named employees at the
Defendants’ Montauk Store were all similarly mistreated. Cabrera Decl. ¶ 10, Sinchi
Decl. ¶ 9. Muhammad Anwar previously brought suit against Defendants under the
FLSA and NYLL, raising similar allegations, which settled. See Anwar v. Stephens
et al., 2:15-cv-04493., ECF # 27 (Feb. 2, 2017).
Plaintiffs also contend that the wage violations carried out at the Montauk
Store, occurred at Defendants’ other locations. In support, Plaintiffs cite to Khan’s
confirmation that the same scheme to reduce pay to maintain a certain salary-tosales ratio was applied to all of Defendants’ employees regardless of their location.
See id. ¶¶ 7-9 (“Khan instructed [Anwar] to reduce virtually every employees’ hours
to avoid paying them overtime for their hours worked over forty…pay was limited
based on a uniform policy that applied to all of Defendants’ employees.”).
B. Present Motions
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification
Plaintiffs argue that they have satisfied the low evidentiary burden applicable
to conditional certification of a collective action under the FLSA by submitting
declarations identifying putative opt-in plaintiffs and substantiating a factual nexus
between the wage violations that Plaintiffs allegedly suffered and those potentially
suffered by other similarly situated employees. See Pl. Cert. Mot. at 11-13.
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affidavits of Cabrera and Sinchi provide the names of specific individuals who are
alleged to be similarly situated potential opt-in plaintiffs: Jorge Alvarez, Muhammed
Anwar, Luz Guanga, Maria Guanga, Ximena Jarrin, Rodrigo Taturi, “Ali,” “Dorine,”
“Erika,” “Ibrahim,” “Jarira,” “Marva,” and “Patricia” (collectively, “Opt-In Plaintiffs”).
See id. Further, Plaintiffs seek notice to be sent to all current and former employees
who worked for Defendants at all locations owned and operated by Stephens, not
simply the Montauk Store at which Cabrera and Sinchi worked, and that the notice
should be sent to all individuals who were employed during the last six years in light
of the NYLL violations alleged in the Complaint. See id. at 14-16. They seek to
distribute notice and reminder notices by electronic and traditional means, in
Spanish and English, and by posting them at each of Defendants’ stores. See id. at
17-21. Finally, Plaintiffs petition the Court to toll the FLSA statute of limitations
from the date of the filing of the Complaint until the deadline that the Court grants
certification. See id. at 22-23.
Defendants oppose arguing that Plaintiffs cannot show an unlawful common
policy because they have only submitted sworn statements of two employees that are
primarily composed of boilerplate conclusory language. See Def. Cert. Opp. at 4-5.
Additionally, any allegations contained in those statements concerning other
employees are anecdotal, inadmissible hearsay. See id. Defendants further assert
that Cabrera’s own overtime claim is contradicted by the paystub that she provided,
which shows that she was compensated at the applicable overtime rate in that
instance. See id.
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Were the Court to grant certification, Defendants argue that notice should be
limited to the Montauk Store as Plaintiffs have failed to make any factual allegations
related to any other named employee at another location, and as each of the 7-Eleven
stores owned by Stephens are operated independently of one another. See id. at 5.
Further, Defendants request that the Court limit notice to a three-year period based
upon the lack of viable federal claims extending beyond this time frame, see id. at 11,
and they seek to prevent notice from being posted at any of Stephens’ stores, as all
current employees would be covered by notice served by mail. See id. at 12. Finally,
Defendants dispute the form of and deadlines related to the notice and any tolling of
the statute of limitations as Plaintiffs have failed to plead any extraordinary
circumstances warranting such relief. See id. at 13-15.
C. Plaintiffs’ Motions to Strike
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to strike the affidavits that were
submitted with Defendants’ opposition to the Motion for Conditional Certification
and other affidavits submitted in opposition to a separate subsequent motion to
compel (collectively, the “Affidavits”). See DE [25-1, 28]. 2 Plaintiffs argue that the
affidavits should be stricken due to the bad faith and the coercive manner in which
they were obtained. See Pl. Strike Mot. 1. Secondarily, Plaintiffs move for the
Affidavits to be precluded for a failure to disclose the identities of the individual
witnesses in Defendants’ initial disclosures and responses to interrogatories
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (“Rule 26”). See id. at 2-3.
motion to compel was granted in part and denied in part at a motion hearing held before
this Court on May 15, 2017. See DE .
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Defendants oppose the motion to strike arguing that there was no prohibition
on pre-certification communications with potential opt-ins and that Plaintiffs had
failed to show that Defendants had committed any bad faith acts or coercion as would
justify an order being imposed by the Court.
See Def. Strike Opp. 1 at 1-2.
Additionally, there was no violation of Rule 26 and no possibility of prejudice as
Defendants learned of the affiant’s identities through Plaintiffs’ conditional
certification motion, and, in any event, discovery is still open and ongoing, so there is
no prejudice. See id. at 2-3.
After the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the issue of possible bad
faith conduct in Defendants’ dealings with potential opt-in plaintiffs, Defendants
submitted a series of twenty nine declarations from employees that they obtained
through their counsel wherein the declarants stated that they were aware of the
pending litigation and the underlying allegations, that Defendants fairly
compensated them for all hours that they worked, and that they had no interest in
pursuing the matter by opting in to the collective action (collectively, the
See DE [35-1-29].
In response, Plaintiffs also submitted an
additional affidavit of a former employee in support of their motion. See DE .
After the hearing was concluded, both sides submitted additional legal
argument regarding the motion to strike. See Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support (“Pl. Strike
Mot. 2”), DE ; Defendants’ Response (“Def. Strike Opp. 2”).
In their reply,
Plaintiffs broaden their motion to strike to include striking and/or precluding all of
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the Declarations on fundamentally the same bases as their initial motion, and
Defendants again opposed. See Pl. Strike Mot. 2; Def. Strike Opp. 2.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR CERTIFICATION
The FLSA provides a private right of action to recover unpaid overtime
compensation and/or minimum wages. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 216(b); Bifulco v.
Mortg. Zone, Inc., 262 F.R.D. 209, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). An action pursuant to section
216(b) may be brought as a collective action, that is, by “one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29
U.S.C. § 216(b).
“Although the FLSA does not contain a class certification
requirement, such orders are often referred to in terms of ‘certifying a class.’” Bifulco,
262 F.R.D. at 212 (internal quotation and citations omitted). Courts in the Second
Circuit use a two-step approach to determine whether an FLSA collective action
should be certified. See Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 554-55 (2d Cir. 2010).
For the first step, also known as conditional certification, the court determines
whether the proposed opt-in members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs
“with respect to whether a[n] FLSA violation has occurred.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555.
If the plaintiffs meet this burden, the court conditionally certifies the class as a
collective action, and potential members are notified and provided with the
opportunity to opt-in.
“At the second step, after discovery, the court will determine whether the
plaintiffs who opted-in are indeed similarly situated to the named plaintiff[s]; if they
are not, the collective action may be decertified.” Bijoux v. Amerigroup New York,
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LLC, 14-CV-3891, 2015 WL 5444944, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.15, 2015); see also Rubery
v. Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 334, 336 n. 1 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (if discovery
does not support the finding that plaintiffs are similarly situated, “the court will
decertify the class, the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs will be dismissed without
prejudice, and the class representatives may proceed to trial on their individual
claims”). The current motion before the Court concerns only the first step – whether
the proposed class members are similarly situated such that conditional certification
should be granted.
“Because certification at this first early stage is preliminary and subject to
reevaluation, the burden for demonstrating that potential plaintiffs are similarly
situated is very low.” Romero v. H.B. Auto. Grp., Inc., 11 Civ. 386, 2012 WL 1514810,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This
low burden is consistent with the broad remedial purpose of the FLSA.” Pippins v.
KPMG LLP, 11 Civ. 0377, 2012 WL 19379, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3 2012) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). At this stage, “the court does not resolve factual
disputes, decide substantive issues going to the ultimate merits, or make credibility
determinations.” Rosario v. Valentine Ave. Discount Store, Co., 828 F. Supp. 2d 508,
514 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Lynch v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 491 F. Supp. 2d 357,
368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
To succeed, Plaintiffs “need only make ‘a modest factual showing sufficient to
demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common
policy or plan that violated the law.’” Doucoure v. Matlyn Food, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d
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369, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)). The Court does not require proof of an actual FLSA violation, “but
rather that a ‘factual nexus’ exists between the plaintiff’s situation and the situation
of other potential plaintiffs.” Sobczak v. AWL Indus., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 354, 362
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Wraga v. Marble Lite, Inc., 05–CV–5038, 2006 WL 2443554,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2006)). All prospective class members need not have the
same duties to be similarly situated; rather, the question is whether “they were all
similarly situated with respect to being subject to the same policy of being denied
overtime compensation.” Cano v. Four M Food Corp., 08–CV–3005, 2009 WL
5710143, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.3, 2009) (emphasis in original). The determination that
the potential opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated may be based on the pleadings as
well as supporting affidavits or declarations submitted by Plaintiffs. See Sharma v.
Burberry Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 3d 443, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Sexton v. Franklin First Fin.,
Ltd., 08-CV-4950, 2009 WL 1706535, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 16, 2009).
DISCUSSION ON MOTION TO CERTIFY
A. Conditional Certification
The Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification with respect to
all of Defendants’ 7-11 stores. Plaintiffs have substantiated through their pleadings
and affidavits the requisite factual nexus between the named Plaintiffs’ claims –
Defendants failing to make minimum wage and overtime payments as required under
FLSA and NYLL – and the potential claims of similarly situated employees.
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Conditional certification is regularly granted based upon a complaint and one
or two affidavits that collectively demonstrate the requisite nexus. See, e.g., Juarez,
v. 449 Restaurant, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y 2014) (“In assessing the
adequacy of a plaintiff’s showing, district courts look to pleadings, affidavits, and
declarations, but often authorize notice based solely on the personal observations of
one plaintiff’s affidavit.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Doucoure,
554 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (finding that plaintiff’s “well-pleaded allegations,” and nothing
more, were sufficient to justify mailing notice to potential collective action members).
Further, the Court notes that there is no minimal number of employees required to
opt-in before conditional certification of an FLSA action as a collective is appropriate.
See, e.g., Enriquez v. Cherry Hill Market Corp., 10-CV-5616, 2012 WL 440691, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2010) (citing Delaney v. Geisha NYC, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 55, 59
(S.D.N.Y. 2009)) (granting conditionally certification with only one opt-in plaintiff
submitting an affidavit); Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The single named Plaintiff here has met his burden by successfully
demonstrating that there are other workers who are similarly situated to him, and
that is enough for this matter to move forward.”); Patton v. Thomson Corp., 364 F.
Supp. 2d 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding conditional class certification with no affidavits
from opt-ins); Zhao v. Benihana, Inc., 2001 WL 845000, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2001)
(finding one affidavit based on plaintiff’s “best knowledge” enough to grant
certification). Instead of waiting for a critical mass of opt-ins, “courts regularly grant
motions for approval of a collective action notice based upon employee affidavits
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setting forth a defendant’s plan or scheme to not pay overtime compensation and
identifying by name similarly situated employees.” Sobczak, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 362
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cano, 2009 WL 5710143, at
*6 (finding that plaintiffs’ affidavits containing “statements setting forth defendants’
common denial of overtime pay, the named plaintiffs’ personal knowledge of and the
names of other coworkers who were allegedly subject to the same denial of overtime
pay” demonstrated a “sufficient factual basis” that the named plaintiffs and the
potential plaintiffs were similarly situated); Wraga, 2006 WL 2443554, at *2
(granting motion to certify collective action based on plaintiff’s affidavit alleging
failure to pay overtime based on personal conversations establishing that at least
eighteen other employees were similarly situated).
Cabrera declares that she and other non-managerial employees, several of
which are identified by name, had similar duties, were subject to the same pay
practices, and were also compensated at a rate below the minimum wage and in
violation of the overtime requirements with respect to all the hours that they worked
per week. See Cabera Decl. ¶¶ 6-11. Additionally, the affidavit of opt-in Plaintiff
Sinchi corroborates Cabrera’s allegations of the same or similar unlawful practices
taking place at the Montauk Store. See Sinchi Decl. ¶¶ 4-9. Further, the additional
sworn declaration from Anwar, a former employee of Defendants, on its face confirms
the allegation that the Defendants’ wage violations extended beyond the Montauk
Store to Defendants’ other locations as part of a common scheme to regulate the pay
practices of the stores to promote a certain cost-to-sales ratio. See Anwar Decl. ¶¶ 8-
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10. Conditional certification is thus appropriate not only with respect to the Montauk
Store but also Defendants’ other locations. See Lamb v. Singh Hospitality Grp., Inc.,
2013 WL 5502844, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (adopting report and
recommendation conditionally certifying class of workers at all of defendants’
locations where there was an undisputed allegation of a common payment system
and declarations alleged that the named plaintiffs “spoke to coworkers who had
worked at … other restaurants and that they complained of policies applied to
employees at Defendants’ other restaurants as well”); Agudelo v. E & D LLC, 2012
WL 5426420, at *1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2012) (conditionally certifying the FLSA
collective premised on common control and common pay policies); Garcia v. Pancho
Villa’s of Huntington Village, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(conditionally certifying collective at all three restaurant locations based upon payroll
for all three restaurants being processed at one location and testimony that there was
common ownership of all implicated locations).
Defendants counter that Plaintiffs fail to provide sufficient evidence to
establish a “common policy of failure to pay overtime.” Def. Cert. Opp. at 9. However,
as explained above, the particularized showing that Defendants seek is not required
under the FLSA for first stage, conditional certification and notice. Instead, Cabrera
through her declaration and the declarations of Sinchi and Anwar set forth the
requisite nexus between Plaintiffs’ allegations of improper compensation and the
Defendants’ policy of limiting all of their 7-Eleven’s employees’ wages in an effort to
keep salaries proportional to Defendants’ overall weekly sales. See Pl. Cert. Mot. at
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12; Anwar Decl. ¶¶ 7-10 (“Defendants would not pay their employees either minimum
or overtime wages whenever a store’s total payroll costs exceeded a certain
percentage of that store’s sales.”). Defendants cite to several inapposite cases where
the employee plaintiff failed to put forth any specific factual basis for the nexus
beyond “anecdotal hearsay” or the conclusory allegation of the plaintiff that they
“know that [other employees] were not paid for all hours.” See Def. Cert. Opp. at 11.
However, here Plaintiffs present more than mere anecdotal hearsay, as Anwar’s
declaration lays out the alleged methods and goals of a scheme to deprive employees
of their earned wages including Khan’s statement made directly to Anwar, which
would be admissible as a party admission. Compare Anwar Decl. ¶¶ 7-9 with Fed. R.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that conditional certification is appropriate
as Plaintiffs have satisfied their minimal burden and established a factual nexus
supporting the contention that individual Plaintiffs and the putative collective
members are similarly situated. See Fasanelli v. Heartland Brewery, Inc., 516 F.
Supp. 2d 317, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding conditional class certification appropriate
“where all putative class members are employees of the same restaurant enterprise”).
B. Scope of Conditional Class
Anticipating the Court’s determination in favor of Plaintiffs on the issue of
conditional class certification, Defendants argue that the class should be limited to
include only those employees at the Montauk Store where Cabrera, Anwar, and
Sinchi worked. Def. Cert. Opp. at 14.
The Court disagrees.
In support of their
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position, Defendants rely on their competing factual evidence to defeat Plaintiffs’
proffer of a factual nexus by asserting that Khan only supervised Montauk Store
employees and could only have manipulated the pay of employees at that location.
See Def. Cert. Opp. at 6-7. The Court notes that Defendants do not deny Plaintiffs’
reasonable assertions that all of Defendants’ 7-Eleven locations utilize the same
timekeeping and payroll systems to pay the same types and classes of employees. See
Def. Cert. Opp. Khan’s testimony, in fact, arguably confirms these facets of Plaintiffs’
proposed nexus discussing employees at the other locations and a common policy of
sending payroll information to 7-Eleven’s headquarters. See Khan Decl. ¶¶ 10-18.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that it is not dispositive that Cabrera herself does
not identify by name putative class members at Defendants’ other locations. See
Lamb v. Singh Hospitality Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 5502844, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2013) (finding class certification premised upon “some interrelation of operations and
alleg[ation of] some common management”). Here, Plaintiffs identify common store
ownership through Stephens and common pay practices dictated by a central
corporate reporting requirement which together warrant expanding the class to the
similarly situated employees at the other 7-Eleven locations. Additionally, as already
stated, Plaintiffs have submitted evidence in the form of Anwar’s declaration that
Khan, a manager, was aware of Defendants’ percentage-of-sales pay policy applying
to all employees at all of Stephens’ stores. See Anwar Decl. ¶¶ 6-8. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that the class shall include all employees at all of Defendants’
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C. Time Frame for Conditional Certification
Next, Defendants argue that, should the Court grant Plaintiffs’ motion for
conditional certification, the applicable timeframe for the notice should extend back
only three years from the date Plaintiffs filed Cabrera’s Complaint, as opposed to the
six years Plaintiffs seek. See Def. Cert. Opp. at 16. The FLSA has a two-year statute
of limitations except in the case of willful violations, for which the statute of
limitations is three years. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). “At the conditional certification
stage, allegations of willful conduct are sufficient to apply the three-year statute of
limitations for purposes of certifying the class.” Jie Zhang v. Wen Mei, Inc., 14-CV1647, 2015 WL 6442545, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2015) (citing Summa, 715 F. Supp.
2d at 388; Francis v. A & E Stores, Inc., 06-CV-1638, 2008 WL 2588851, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2008)) (noting that at the preliminary stage, “plaintiff’s allegations
of willful conduct ... are sufficient to support defining the class based upon the threeyear statute of limitations”), adopted as modified, 2008 WL 4619858 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
16, 2008)); see Patton v. Thomson Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding allegation of willful violation justified notice based on a three-year statute of
limitations period); see also Alvarez v. IBM Restaurants, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 580,
587-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The Plaintiffs have alleged willfulness in their Complaint
... and the Defendants deny these allegations. Courts in this circuit have generally
held that where willfulness is in dispute, a three-year statute of limitations applies
at the conditional certification stage.”).
Accordingly, as the Complaint contains
allegations of willful conduct by Defendants, See Compl. ¶ 1, the Court finds it
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appropriate to apply the three-year statute of limitations under the FLSA at this
stage of the proceedings.
Plaintiffs, nevertheless, urge the Court to apply the six-year statute of
limitations set forth in the NYLL, see N.Y.L.L. §§ 663(1), (3), for the Notice and
Consent Form premised upon the supplemental jurisdiction the Court presently
exercises over Cabrera’s state law claims. Although some courts of this Circuit have
approved six-year notice periods citing judicial economy, the confusion this causes in
notifying plaintiffs who potentially have two separate claims with different statutes
of limitations, along with the inefficiency of providing notice to plaintiffs whose claims
may well be time-barred, weighs against granting such an extension of the notice
coverage period for collective certification of an FLSA opt-in class to include the
period allowed under NYLL. Trinidad v. Pret A Manger (USA) Ltd., 962 F. Supp. 2d
545, 563-64, (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Lujan v. Cabana Management, Inc., 10-CV-755,
2011 WL 317984, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)) (“Authorizing notice for a time period twice
the length of the maximum FLSA limitations period would not serve the efficiency
goal.”). Accordingly, the Court orders that the timeframe for notification be based on
the three-year period applicable to Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.
With respect to the calculation of the three-year limitations period, Plaintiffs
move the Court to toll the statute of limitations through and including the deadline
for prospective plaintiffs to opt in, from the filing of the Complaint through the
Court’s decision on the Motion for Certification. Defendants oppose any tolling, citing
a lack of any extraordinary circumstances that would justify an equitable remedy.
Case 2:16-cv-03234-ADS-SIL Document 44 Filed 09/28/17 Page 18 of 32 PageID #: 569
See Def. Cert. Opp. at 14.
The Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’
Unlike Rule 23 class actions, in an FLSA collective action, the
limitations period continues to run for each plaintiff until he or she files written
consent with the court to join the lawsuit. See 29 U.S.C. § 256(b). Therefore, a district
court may toll the limitations period to avoid inequitable circumstances, “giving due
consideration to whether the plaintiffs have acted with reasonable diligence in
pursuing their claims and whether the circumstances are extraordinary enough to
warrant equitable relief.” Jackson v. Bloomberg, L.P., 298 F.R.D. 152, 170 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (citing Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability Plan, 288 F.3d
506, 512 (2d Cir. 2002)). The delay required to decide a conditional certification
motion in an FLSA collective action has itself been accepted as an extraordinary
circumstance warranting tolling. See, e.g., Yahraes v. Rest. Assocs. Events Corp., 10
CV 935, 2011 WL 844963, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (finding equitable tolling
appropriate as of the dates of service and refiling of conditional certification motion);
Jackson, 298 F.R.D. at 170-71 (equitable tolling as of date of filing of conditional
certification motion which took seven months to decide); McGlone v. Contract Callers,
Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 438, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying equitable tolling as of date
of filing of conditional certification motion which took four months to decide and
declining to do so from the filing of the complaint as plaintiffs requested). Plaintiffs
moved for conditional certification within months after filing the Complaint in
accordance with the scheduling order that was jointly proposed by the parties and
adopted by the Court. See DE [17-19]. Absent tolling of the limitations period, a
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substantial number of class members may now be time-barred through no fault of
counsel or the class representative. “While plaintiffs wishing to pursue their rights
cannot sit on them indefinitely, those whose putative class representatives and their
counsel are diligently and timely pursuing the claims should also not be penalized
due to the courts’ heavy dockets and understandable delay in rulings.” McGlone, 867
F. Supp. 2d at 445. Accordingly, the Court tolls the statute of limitations period for
the time period from the filing of the motion through to the entry of this Court’s order
granting conditional certification – a total of 220 days.
D. Proposed Notice
Plaintiffs also move for an Order authorizing dissemination of the Proposed
Notice and Consent to Join. See DE [22-7]; Pl. Cert. Mot. at 13. Neither the FLSA,
nor other courts, have specifically outlined what form a court-authorized notice
should take or what provisions the notice should contain. Moore, 276 F.R.D. at 58
(quoting Fasanelli, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 323). However, it is well-established that
“[c]ourts have broad discretion to craft appropriate notices that effectuate the
overarching policies of the collective suit provisions and provide employees with
accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that
they can make informed decisions about whether to participate.” Hernandez v.
Immortal Rise, Inc., 11-cv-4360, 2012 WL 4369746, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.24, 2012)
(internal quotation omitted).
Defendants’ only substantive objection to the form of the notice is demanding
that their counsel’s contact information be included along with that of Plaintiffs’
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counsel. See Def. Cert. Mot. at 14-15. A defense counsel’s contact information is not
required to render a form notice fair, however, and is likely to create confusion
rendering distribution or collection of consent forms less effective. See Chhab v.
Darden Restaurants, Inc., 11 CIV. 8345, 2013 WL 5308004, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,
2013) (“Only plaintiffs’ counsel can potentially represent the individuals to whom the
notice is mailed, and only they should be privy to certain sensitive information that
may otherwise fall within the attorney-client privilege.”). Accordingly, Defendants’
application is denied.
Defendants also request a meet and confer regarding the notice yet fail to
articulate any other issues or objections to its form or contents. The Court has
otherwise reviewed the Proposed Notice. Upon its review, the Court considers it
sufficient and appropriate to provide accurate and timely notice of the pendency of
this action once the employment time frame for potential opt-in plaintiffs is adjusted
from six to three years with that statute of limitations period tolled for the pendency
of this motion. Accordingly, Defendants application for a meet and confer is denied
and, within sixty days of this order, Defendants are to provide Plaintiffs’ counsel with
all relevant contact information regarding potential opt-in plaintiffs.
E. Posting of Notice
Next, Plaintiffs request that the Court order Defendants to post a notice of
lawsuit, along with consent forms, in conspicuous locations in each of Defendants’ 7Eleven stores so as to better provide effective notice to prospective opt-in plaintiffs.
Defendants object on the grounds that such a posting is redundant and unnecessary
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in light of the fact that Plaintiffs will have contact information for current employees
and may contact them through mail and other means. “‘Courts routinely approve
requests to post notice on employee bulletin boards and in other common areas, even
where potential members will also be notified by mail.’” Rosario v. Valentine Ave.
Discount Store, Co., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 2d 508, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Whitehorn
v. Wolfgang's Steakhouse, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). Defendants
do not proffer an explanation as to how such a posting would be overly burdensome
or present an undue hardship in this case in contrast to other cases where it has been
consistently ordered. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request is granted; Defendants will post
the notice at each of their locations in an area where covered employees are likely to
F. Plaintiffs’ Other Notice-Related Requests
Plaintiffs also seek leave to distribute notices and reminder notices in English
and Spanish and to utilize electronic means in addition to first class mail, including
text messaging and email. See Pl. Cert. Mot. at 2. Practical requests such as these
reasonably further the purpose of notice of a collective action under the FLSA. See
Martin v. Sprint/united Mgmt. Co., 15-CV-5237, 2016 WL 30334, at *19 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 4, 2016) (citing Bhumithanarn v. 22 Noodle Mkt. Corp., 14 Civ. 2625, 2015 WL
4240985, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2015)) (allowing distribution via text message and
email over defendant’s objection where “the nature of the employer’s business
facilitated a high turnover rate among employees”); Chhab, 2013 WL 5308004, at *16.
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2013) (authorizing reminder notice over defendant’s objection);
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Valerio v. RNC Indus., LLC, 314 F.R.D. 61, 76, (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Generally, courts
permit notice to be “translated into the mother tongue of non-English speaking
groups of potential plaintiffs.”); Bittencourt v. Ferrara Bakery & Cafe Inc., 310 F.R.D.
106, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Jackson, 298 F.R.D. at 169-70) (identifying delivery
by mail, e-mail and posting by employer in conspicuous place where putative
plaintiffs are employed as methods of delivery common in wage and hour actions)).
Defendants have offered no opposition to these requests and multiple potential optin plaintiffs are no longer employed with Defendants. See Cabrera Decl. ¶ 1, Anwar
Decl. ¶ 4, Sinchi Decl. ¶¶ 1-7. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ applications,
and Defendants are to produce last known phone numbers, email addresses, and
mailing addresses as to all covered current and former employees.
MOTIONS TO STRIKE
Plaintiffs’ motions to strike the Affidavits and Declarations are denied in their
entirety because they are moot. The Court did not rely on them in determining
Plaintiffs’ motion seeking conditional certification as an FLSA collective action,
because they do not bear on whether Plaintiffs have made the “modest factual
showing” required at this stage of the litigation. See Amador v. Morgan Stanley, 11CV-4326, 2013 WL 494020, at *3, 8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013). Indeed, at this first
procedural step, as “a court should not weigh the merits of the underlying claims in
determining whether potential opt-in plaintiffs may be similarly situated,” courts in
this Circuit have found that competing declarations should not be considered. See id.
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(“[S]tatements gathered by an employer from its current employees are of limited
evidentiary value in the FLSA context because of the potential for coercion. In any
event, Plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to depose these declarants, and courts
in this Circuit regularly conclude that such declarations do not undermine the
plaintiffs’ showing in the first stage of the conditional certification process.”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); Hernandez v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 11 Civ.
8472, 2012 WL 1193836, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2012) (“[W]eighing the affidavits
submitted by employees on both sides of the action – i.e., affidavits from the named
plaintiffs as well as affidavits from employees submitted on defendants’ behalf –
would require the Court to determine the facts, determine the credibility of the
affiants, and resolve legal contentions, all of which the conditional certification and
potential later decertification process is structure[d] so as to avoid.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks and omitted). Accordingly, the Affidavits and Declarations
have not been considered in deciding Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification.
See Valerio v. RNC Industries, LLC, 314 F.R.D. 61, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“It is not
appropriate at the conditional certification stage of FLSA collective action for the
court to judge the merits of plaintiffs’ claims because they are irrelevant to the
collective action inquiry, so long as plaintiffs assert a plausible basis for their claim.”)
(citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b)); Cohen v. Gerson Lehrman Group, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d
317, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[I]t would be inappropriate to rely on defendants’ affidavits
at an early stage of litigation, prior to the affiants’ availability for deposition.”).
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As the Court has not relied on the Affidavits in arriving at its determination
that conditional certification is appropriate at this time, striking the Affidavits is
unnecessary. See Callari v. Blackman Plumbing Supply, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 261,
293 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding motion to strike moot when the court did not consider
the declaration and found that it would not have impacted the court’s determination
regardless) (citing Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, 04 CIV. 6958, 2009 WL
2601389, at *1 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009) aff’d, 396 F. App’x 734 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“The Court need not strike or otherwise disregard the declarations submitted by
Plaintiff and his counsel in order to reach this conclusion. Consequently, Defendants’
motion to strike all or part of these declarations is moot.”); Loughman v. Unum
Provident Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d 371, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[W]e need not address
plaintiffs’ motions to strike the Affidavits of  and the Declaration , which were
offered to support [the] proposed interpretation of the Policies. The subject Affidavits
and Declaration, which address the negotiation and pricing of the Policies, were not
relied upon by the Court, which has based its determination solely on the plain
language of the Policies.”). Further, as a result of the Court finding the Motion to
Strike the Affidavits moot, the motion to strike the Declarations is also moot, as
Defendants submitted the Declarations in support of Defendants’ initial opposition
to Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Affidavits. See DE  at 1. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
motions to strike the Affidavits and Declarations are denied in their entirety as moot.
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B. No Evidence of Actual Coercion, Misrepresentations, or Bad
Even were the Court to consider Plaintiffs’ motions to strike on the merits, they
would be denied as, even after an evidentiary hearing, Plaintiffs have failed to put
forth any evidence of actual coercion, misrepresentation, or other bad faith acts by
Defendants as would justify the Court’s intervention. Although district courts do
retain the inherent power to regulate and restrict communications to prevent
manifest injustices and to preserve the integrity of their proceedings, the courts “may
not exercise th[ose] power[s] without a specific record showing … the particular
abuses by which [the moving party] is threatened.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S.
89, 101, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 2200 (1981). “As a general matter, employers are free to
communicate with unrepresented prospective class members about the lawsuit and
even to solicit affidavits from them concerning the subject matter of the suit.”
Longcrier v. HL-A Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1226 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (noting that such
powers “must be used sparingly because of the substantial First Amendment
considerations triggered by any such restraints.”) (citing Gulf Oil Co., 452 U.S. at
102, 101 S. Ct. at 2201). Accordingly, any order restricting such communications
“should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the
need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.”
Gulf Oil Co., 452 U.S. at 101, 101 S. Ct. at 2200. “[T]he mere possibility of abuses
does not justify the routine adoption of a communications ban….” Id. at 104, 101 S.
Ct. at 2202; see Christensen v. Kiewit–Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206, 213 (2d Cir.
1987), cert denied 484 U.S. 908, 108 S. Ct. 250 (1987) (no impropriety in defendants’
Case 2:16-cv-03234-ADS-SIL Document 44 Filed 09/28/17 Page 26 of 32 PageID #: 577
negotiation of settlements with potential members of a class); Brown v. Mustang
Sally’s Spirits & Grill, Inc., 12-CV-529S, 2012 WL 4764585, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,
2012) (“District courts thus must not interfere with any party’s ability to
communicate freely with putative class members, unless there is a specific reason to
believe that such interference is necessary.”) (internal citation and quotation
On this question of whether Defendants committed any acts of bad faith that
may have misrepresented the present litigation or coerced potential witnesses and
opt-in plaintiffs, the Court held a three-day evidentiary hearing. See DE [38-40]. All
of the employee-witnesses called testified credibly that they were not coerced or
misinformed by Defendants in any way. Concerning the Affidavits, the affiants met
with Kahn in his office, understood that Plaintiffs were suing Defendants, were read
the Affidavits, were aware of Plaintiffs’ basic claims, and understood that by signing
the affidavits they were also affirming that Defendants had not undercompensated
them. See, e.g., Hearing Transcript (“Tr.”) 29:21-24, 34:3-38:25, 68:24-70:12, 72:473:20, 77:2-10, 78:6-10, 102:13-16, 118:1-7, 130:1-132:12, 151:25-159:23, 231:24237:18, 250:1-259:17. Regarding the obtaining of the Declarations, the testimony
elicited from the employees supported the conclusion that Defendants’ counsel
identified himself, met with the declarants in a back office at the Montauk Store in
small groups without Khan or Stephens present, and explained the nature of the
pending claims and the contents and implications of the Declarations. See, e.g., Tr.
20:1-21:25,58:1-62:25, 160:7-23, 162:10-167:23, 180:16-20, 181:3-188:25, 200:12-
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201:1. The employees were given an opportunity to review the Declarations before
choosing whether to sign them and told not to sign the statements if they did not
agree with the truthfulness of their contents.
See, e.g., id.
themselves also fairly and accurately summarized Plaintiffs’ present claims and the
employees’ rights regarding the present lawsuit. See Declarations. There was no
misrepresentations, or retaliation on the part of Defendants.
In urging the Court to grant their motion to strike, nonetheless, Plaintiffs rely
on what they themselves characterize as the “potentially coercive environment” that
Defendants and their counsel meeting with putative class members necessarily
entails. See Pl. Strike Mot. at 5-6 (emphasis added). However, Plaintiffs cite only to
a “risk” that misinformation was given or coercion took place at these meetings rather
than any particularized acts of bad faith by Defendants.
See id. Concerning the
Affidavits, Plaintiffs emphasize that Khan met with most of affiants while he was
still their supervisor and that Khan did not affirmatively disclose that the Affidavits
were being obtained for litigation purposes. See id. at 5. Id. One affiant, Donovan
Scott claims that he signed his affidavit without reading it, and another, John
Guanga testified that Khan said to him that Khan believed Cabrera’s allegations
were false. Id. Plaintiffs also point to the fact that Khan accompanied the affiants
to the notary and that prior to their signing Defendants did not provide
documentation regarding employees past pay or explain their control over the payroll
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With the respect to the Declarations, Plaintiffs argue that they must also be
stricken primarily due to the same employer-employee relationship that surrounds
them. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs emphasize that the employees met individually with
Defendants’ counsel in a back room, that some of the meetings were brief, and that
none of the declarants were given copies of the Complaint or other documentation
related to their pay. See id. Plaintiffs also cite to the fact that Defendants’ counsel
did not explain the legal distinctions between an FLSA collective action and a Rule
23 class action. See id.
Even assuming all of the facts and evidence put forth by Plaintiffs to be true,
it substantiates only a potentiality that cannot, as a matter of law, justify sanctions
or Court regulation of Defendants’ interactions with unrepresented putative class
members. Although defendant employers must be honest and fair, they are not
required to be wholly neutral in their dealings with potential class members in an
FLSA collective action. Compare Wright v. Adventures Rolling Cross Country, Inc.,
C-12-0982, 2012 WL 2239797, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2012) (finding Rule 32 order
warranted when communications by Defendants included emphasis that joining class
would subject opt-in plaintiffs to “searing scrutiny” and baseless derogatory
statements regarding class counsel); Romano v. SLS Residential Inc., 253 F.R.D. 292,
297 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding sanctions appropriate where defendants “provided class
members with patently false and misleading information” including that, were they
to remain in the class, their private medical and mental health histories would be
publicized) with Austen v. Catterton Partners, 831 F. Supp. 2d 559, 565 (D. Conn.
Case 2:16-cv-03234-ADS-SIL Document 44 Filed 09/28/17 Page 29 of 32 PageID #: 580
2011) (holding “ex parte communications between defense counsel and putative class
members – even ex parte settlement negotiations – are not abusive communications
that warrant limitations absent indications in the record of the need for limitations.”);
Kerce v. W. Telemarketing Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1366 (S.D. Ga. 2008) (denying
motion to strike where plaintiff was only able to show that communication was
“unauthorized, and possibly coercive or misleading”) (citing Gulf Oil Co., 452 U.S. at
101, 101 S. Ct. at 2200) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is
also denied on the merits.
C. Motion to Preclude.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that the Declarations and Affidavits should
be precluded for violating the disclosure requirements of Rule 26. The Court again
disagrees. Rule 26 provides that parties must disclose “the name and, if known, the
address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable
information – along with the subjects of that information – that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for
impeachment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). When a party does not make such
disclosures in a timely manner, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 (“Rule 37”)
provides a remedy in the form of a preclusion “unless the failure [to disclose] was
substantially justified or harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c); see Design Strategies, Inc.
v. Davis, 228 F.R.D. 210, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). However, the Second Circuit has
deemed preclusion an “extreme sanction[,]” advising that district court judges “should
inquire more fully into the actual difficulties which the violation causes, and must
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consider less drastic responses.” Sprayregen v. A. Gugliotta Dev., Inc., 166 F. Supp.
3d 291, 295, (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Outley v. City of N.Y., 837 F.2d 587, 591 (2d
Cir. 1988)); Hinton v. Patnaude, 162 F.R.D. 435, 439 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that
preclusion is a “drastic remedy” that should be considered only “in those rare cases
where a party’s conduct represents flagrant bad faith and callous disregard of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). “‘Despite the mandatory nature of Rule 37, the
Second Circuit has held that preclusion is still a discretionary remedy, even if the
trial court finds that there is no substantial justification and the failure to disclose is
not harmless.’” Leong v. 127 Glen Head Inc., CV 13-5528, 2016 WL 845325, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (quoting Pal v. New York Univ., 06-CV-5892, 2008 WL
2627614, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2008)).
Defendants have reasonably proffered that the witnesses who signed the
Affidavits and Declarations only became relevant upon reading Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Conditional Certification that named or effectively identified them as potential optins. See Def. Strike Opp. 1. at 2; compare Pl. Cert. Mot. at 10 with Def. Cert. Op. Exs.
A-C; Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Exs. 1-8. Additionally,
as these witnesses were first identified by Plaintiffs and as discovery is still open and
ongoing, with no depositions of these witnesses noticed, the Court finds no prejudice
as would warrant preclusion. See Temple v. City of New York, 06-CV-2162, 2010 WL
3824116, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010) (denying defendant’s motion to preclude
despite technical Rule 26 violation, when relevance of unnoticed plaintiff’s witness
only became apparent through defendant’s own testimony, undercutting any
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argument of prejudicial unfairness); Blake v. City of New York, 05 CV 6652, 2007 WL
1975570, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007) (denying motion to strike and preclude where
opposing party was put on notice of possible relevance of witness and had an
opportunity to depose him prior to close of discovery despite arguable violation of Rule
26). Accordingly, there being no substantial prejudice to Plaintiffs even were the
Court to find a violation, Defendants motion to preclude is denied.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part,
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification as follows:
(1) Conditionally Certifying this case as a collective action including any and
all of Defendants’ current and former non-managerial employees who were
employed from 2/20/2014 through to the present at any of Defendants’
(2) Order Defendants, within sixty days of the Court’s Order, to produce a
computer-readable data file containing the names, last known mailing
addresses, last known home and mobile telephone numbers, last known
email addresses, work locations, and dates of employment, of all potential
collective action members who worked for Defendants at any point from
2/20/2014 to the present;
(3) The notice of this action, in the form submitted, will be in English and
Spanish, and sent via regular mail as well as text message and e-mail;
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(4) Defendants will post the Notice and Reminder Notice in English and
Spanish in a place where employees are likely to view it all 7-Eleven store
locations owned and/or operated by Defendants for the entire opt-in period;
(5) Plaintiffs will send the proposed reminder notice in both English and
Spanish to the potential collective members thirty days after sending the
initial notice, via regular mail, text message and e-mail; and
(6) The FLSA statute of limitations is tolled from the date of filing of this
motion, until the date of the issuance of this order.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ motions to strike and preclude the Affidavits and
Declarations are denied in their entirety.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
September 28, 2017
/s/ Steven I. Locke
STEVEN I. LOCKE
United States Magistrate Judge
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