Lencin v. New York Court of Appeals et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis and complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to the prose plaintiff at her last known address and to clo se this case. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal.. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bianco on 8/29/2016. (Bollbach, Jean)cm by chambers to pro se by fcm on 8/29/16

*

/Ncle4~ e 0

U.s. 0/SiRIC;~~OFF/Cf:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------------------------------------------)(

MELINDA LENCIN,

URT Ei.O.N. Y.

AU629 2016

LONGt
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
16-CV-3703 (JFB)(A YS)

-againstNEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, APPELLATE
COURT, SECOND DIVISION, FAMILY COURT,
Defendants.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------)(
JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:
On June 24, 2016,pro se plaintiff Melinda Lencin ('"plaintiff') filed an in forma pauperis
complaint against the New York Court of Appeals, the "Appellate Court, Second Division", and

the Family Court (collectively, "defendants"). Accompanying the complaint is an application to
proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs application to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
DISCUSSION

I.

*

SLANo OFFICE

The Complaint
Plaintiff's brief complaint is submitted on the court's general complaint form. Plaintiff

seeks redress here for alleged deprivations of due process in the New York State Family and
Appellate Courts. In its entirety, plaintiff's Statement of Claim alleges:
I was denied my right to a fair hearing because the New York Court of Appeals and
the Appellate Court, Second Division, denied my court appointed attorney access
to the in-camera interview of my daughter; which my attorney needed to
adequately defend me.
Compl. ,-r III. For relief, plaintiff "request[s] that this Court throw out the ruling made by the
Appellate Court, Second Division because I was denied a fair hearing. As a result of the

Appellate Court, Second Division's ruling, I remain without parental rights. I continue to be
excluded completely from my child's life. My only contact with my child remains 2 supervised
five minute phone calls a week. This has been in place for 3 years. I have unjustly lost all that
time with my child." Compl., IV.
II.

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Upon review of plaintiff's declaration in support of her application to proceed in forma

pauperis, the Court determines that plaintiff's financial status qualifies her to commence this
action without prepayment of the filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l ). Therefore, plaintiffs
request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
III.

Application of28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
(B)(i-iii). The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination.
See id.
It is axiomatic that prose complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and the Court is required to read the plainti:tr s pro se complaint liberally,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106,97 S. Ct. 285,50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d

162, 170 (2d Cir. 201 0), and to construe them "'to raise the strongest arguments'" suggested.
Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010)).

Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of"all
well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch

2

Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).
However, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to "'state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,267 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer
possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully." ld. at 678; accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch &

Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011). While "detailed factual allegations" are not required,"[ a]
pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.'" ld. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff's factual allegations must
also be sufficient to give the defendant "fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and
must show that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas A G v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574,583,119 S. Ct. 1563, 143 L. Ed.2d 760 (1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction
to adjudicate plaintiff's claims. "Federal courts must determine that they have jurisdiction before
proceeding to the merits." Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437,439, 127 S. Ct. 1194, 167 L. Ed. 2d
29 (2007). Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded prose litigants, federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if they lack subject matter
jurisdiction. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000).
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time by a party or by
3

the Court sua sponte. !d. If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.
Id. at 700-01; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1.

Rooker-Feldman

It is well settled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over claims that seek to "collaterally attack"-- i.e. reverse or modify-- a
state court judgment. See Lipko v. Christie, 94 F. App'x 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,415-16,44 S. Ct. 149,68 L. Ed. 362 (1923) and D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,482 n. 16, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed.2d 206 (1983)); Davis v.
Baldwin, 12-CV-6422, 2013 WL 6877560, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2013) (applying Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to review "collateral attack" of Family Court Order); Anghel v. NY State Dep 't ofHealth,
947 F. Supp. 2d 284 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013) (Rooker-Feldman "mandates that a federal district
court may not review collateral attacks upon a state court determination.")
The Second Circuit has delineated four requirements for Rooker-Feldman to apply: (1)
''the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court"; (2) "the plaintiff must complain of
injuries caused by a state-court judgment"; (3) "the plaintiff must invite district court review and
rejection of that judgment"; and (4) "'the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced." Hoblock v. Albany County Bd ofElecs., 422 F .3d 77, 85
(2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Here, plaintiff complains, inter alia,
that she has been deprived of due process in an underlying state Family Court child custody case
and appeals therefrom. Plaintiff invites this court to review and reject the underlying state court
decisions resulting in the custody arrangement about which plaintiff complains in her complaint in
this Court. Although plaintiff does not provide the specific dates of the challenged orders, she
alleges that the present custody arrangement, presumably as a result of those orders, was set over
4

three years ago. Thus, the challenged state court orders occurred well before plaintiff
commenced the instant action on June 24,2016. Thus, the requirements of Rooker-Feldman are
met, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs claims. See MacPherson v. Town of

Southampton, 738 F.Supp,2d 353, 365 (E.D.N.Y,2010) (holding that plaintiffs action was barred
by Rooker-Fe/dman where "a finding by this Court that Defendants' conduct violated Plaintiffs'
due process rights would necessarily involve a review of the state court's determination .... ");

Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that due process
and equal protection claims were inextricably intertwined with the Family Court's detenninations
regarding child support and could have been raised in state court, either in the Family Court or on

appeal); see also Bernstein v. New York, No. 06 Civ. 568l(SAS), 2007 WL 438169, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (where plaintiff attempted to avoid the application of Rooker-Feldman by
''present[ing] his claim as independent from his appeal of the state court ... order by stating that he
... was denied due process in the course of, and not as a result of, the judicial proceedings that led
to the state court judgment," holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nevertheless barred
plaintiff's claim because "[i]fth[e] Court were to declare that [plaintiff] was denied due process
during the state court proceedings, it would effectively be reversing a judgment of the state court")

(emphasis in original); Wu v. Levine, No. 05 Civ. 1234(NG), 2005 WL 2340722, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
June 7, 2005) (holding that where "plaintiff's claims of constitutional and civil rights violations
arise from the state court proceedings," plaintiff"cannot circumvent the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
by recasting her claims as a federal civil rights violation"), aff'd, 314 F. App'x 376 (2d Cir. 2009).
Because lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in "cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

5

judgments," Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280,284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L.
Ed. 2d 454 (2005), review of final state court judgments may be sought in the United States

Supreme Court since it alone is vested under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 with jurisdiction over appeals from
final state court judgments. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at482;Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Locomotive

Engrs, 398 U.S. 281,286, 90S. Ct. 1739, 26 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1970) ("While the lower federal
courts were given certain powers in the [Judiciary Act of 1789], they were not given any power to
review directly cases from state courts, and they have not been given such powers since that time.
Only the Supreme Court was authorized to review on direct appeal the decisions of state courts.").
Accordingly, plaintiffs Section 1983 claims against the defendants are barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because the Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff's
complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

B.

Immunity
Even if plaintiff's claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, they could not

proceed here because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI. "The reach of the Eleventh Amendment has ... been interpreted to extend
beyond the terms of its text to bar suits in federal courts against states, by their own citizens or by
foreign sovereigns." State Emples. Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71,95 (2d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Western Mohegan Tribe & Nation v. Orange Cty., 395 F.3d 18,20 (2d Cir.
2004)). Absent a state's consent to suit or an express statutory waiver, the Eleventh Amendment
bars federal court claims against states. Will v. l!Jich. Dep 't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66
6

(1989). "Sovereign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to monetary liability or even
to all types of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity from suit." FMC v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766 (2002).
Here, plaintiff names three state courts as defendants, all of which are part of the New York
State Unified Court System, and, as such are arms of the State ofNew York. See generally,
Gol/omp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366-67 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[E]very court to consider the question
of whether the New York State Unified Court System is an ann of the State has concluded that it is,
and is therefore protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity."); New York Courts,
http:// www.nycourts.gOv/Admin/NYCourts-JnlroGuide.pdf(last visiled Aug. 17, 2016)
(providing background information regarding the roles of the Family Court, the Appellate
Division, Second Department. and the Court of Appeals in the New York State court system).
Plaintiff has asserted no claims under which it could be found that the State has waived sovereign
immunity. Accordingly, this Court lacksjurisdietion to hear plaintiffs claims against the
defendants and such claims are dismissed with prejudice.
IV.

Leave to Amend
In light of the pleading deficiencies set forth above, the Court has considered whether

plaintiff should be given an opportunity to re-plead. Leave to amend should be freely granted
when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "This relaxed standard applies with particular
force to prose litigants." Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second
Circuit has emphasized that a "court should not dismiss [a prose complaint] without granting
leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a
valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chappius, 618 F.3d at 170. Nevertheless, "[l]eave to
7

amend, though liberally granted, may properly be denied for: 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility

of amendment, etc."' Ruotolo v. City ofNew York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227,9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962)); see also Burch v.
Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008).
Here, the deficiencies in plaintiffs claims are substantive in nature and, as such, cannot be
remedied by amendment. Accordingly, the court declines to grant plaintiff leave to file an
amended complaint.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted and her complaint is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)(iii) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a
copy of this order to the prose plaintiff at her last known address and to close this case.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of

any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21
(1962).
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

ll"

Jose
Uni

Augu~t.;li , 2016
Central Islip, New York

8

F.-Bianco
States Dtstnct Judge