Pearsall v. Sposato et al
Filing
130
MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 109 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; ORDERED that Sposato's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 109) is GRANTED. Judgment is to enter accordingly and, thereafter, the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum & Order to the pro se Plaintiff and include the notation Legal Mail on the envelope. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 9/13/2023. (CV)
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 599
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------X
DIYA JAMAL PEARSALL,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
16-CV-6733 (JS)(SIL)
-againstMICHAEL J. SPOSATO, and ARMOR
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH, INC.,
Defendants.
--------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Diya Jamal Pearsall, pro se
17A1202
Five Points Correctional Facility
State Route 96
P.O. Box 119
Romulus, New York 14541
For Defendant:
Howard Richard Snyder, Esq.
Anne Marie Esposito, Esq.
Conway, Farrell, Curtin & Kelly, P.C.
48 Wall Street, 20th Floor
New York, New York 10005
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Diya Jamal Pearsall (“Plaintiff”), proceeding
pro se, filed this lawsuit against Sheriff Michael J. Sposato
(“Sposato”) and Armor Correctional Health Incorporated (“Armor”),
claiming violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
(See generally, Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Presently
pending before the Court is Sposato’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (the “Motion”) filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c).
(See generally, Motion, ECF No. 109.)
For the reasons that follow, Sposato’s Motion is GRANTED.
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 2 of 20 PageID #: 600
BACKGROUND 1
The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the
relevant factual and procedural background of this case, which is
summarized in the Court’s March 31, 2018, Memorandum & Order
granting
Armor’s
Motion
to
Dismiss
(the
“Armor’s
Dismissal
Motion”). See Pearsall v. Sposato, No. 16-CV-6733, 2018 WL 1611385
(E.D.N.Y.
Mar.
Nevertheless,
for
31,
the
2018)
(hereafter,
convenience
of
the
the
“2018
reader,
M&O”). 2
the
Court
reiterates the following.
On or about January 25, 2016, while being housed at the
Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCCC”), Plaintiff began to
suffer “a recurrence of epileptic seizures due to constant exposure
to artificial lighting in [his] cell.”
(Compl. at 7.) 3
During
the relevant time, Plaintiff alleges NCCC was “under the direct
supervision of . . . Sposato.”
that
in
January
2016,
“at
(Id.)
the
He specifically alleges
direction
of . . . Sposato[,]”
maintenance workers at NCCC began “removing manual light switches”
from all of the cells located in Plaintiff’s dorm.
(Id.)
Control
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are
assumed true for purposed of Sposato’s Motion.
All reasonable
inferences are drawn in favor of Plaintiff.
1
The Court’s Memorandum & Order is also available on the case
docket at ECF No. 41. Going forward, the Court will refer to this
case by its Westlaw citation.
2
For ease of reference, citations to Plaintiff’s Complaint are
to the ECF PDF page numbers.
3
2
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 3 of 20 PageID #: 601
of the cell lighting was given to NCCC’s Correctional Officers.
(Id. at 8.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff contends the unwritten policy
at NCCC was that cell lights were turned on sometime between 6:30
a.m. and 7:00 a.m. until lights-out at approximately 11:30 p.m.
(Id.)
Plaintiff avers that because of the “constant artificial
lighting” he began to suffer seizures which required medication.
(Id.)
On January 31, 2016, “in [an] effort to prevent a repeat
seizure,” Plaintiff covered the lighting fixture in his cell with
articles of clothing.
(Id.)
As a result, Plaintiff was given a
misbehavior report by a corporal working in Plaintiff’s dorm.
(Id.)
to
On a separate occasion, Plaintiff explained his situation
another
officer,
Sergent McMillian,
and,
after having
his
condition verified with the Medical Unit, Plaintiff contends he
was scheduled to be relocated to “D2D Medical Unit.”
(Id.)
However, while enroute to the medical unit, Plaintiff’s move was
cancelled without reason, and he was relocated to a dorm that still
had light switches in the cells.
(Id.)
Eventually however, “all
cell light switches were removed” causing Plaintiff to be subjected
to “constant artificial light” requiring the intake of seizure
medication three times per day.
(Id.)
Plaintiff avers that had
he been housed in the D2D Medical Unit, where inmates have control
and access to light switches, his condition would have improved
greatly.
(Id. at 8-9.)
3
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 4 of 20 PageID #: 602
On or about February 4, 2016, Plaintiff began filing
sick
call
requests
with
Armor
“requesting
to
be
seen
by
a
neurologist and asking to be issued protective glasses” for his
condition.
(Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff explains that his seizure
medication “had been making [him] sick.”
that
despite
submitting
numerous
(Id.)
requests
Plaintiff asserts
to
be
seen
by
a
neurologist and for protective glasses his requests were denied.
(Id. at 9-10.)
As a result of the seizures, Plaintiff suffers “blinding
headaches,
dizziness[,]
and
blurred
vision.”
(Id.
at
7.)
Additionally, Plaintiff has “suffered minor abrasion[s] to the
head and face from falls” and lives in fear that “at any moment”
he may have a seizure.
(Id.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this action on November 28, 2016,
pursuant to
28 U.S.C.
violations,
and
(2) injunctive
specialist.
Complaint.
§ 1983, 4 alleging
seeking:
relief
(1)
allowing
(Id. at 11.)
$1.5
him
constitutional rights
million
to
be
in
seen
damages;
by
an
and
outside
On April 21, 2017, Sposato answered the
(See Answer, ECF No. 13.)
Subsequently, Sposato filed
a request for a pre-motion conference (a “PMC Request”) seeking
Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on the Court’s form complaint
for Section 1983 actions.
4
4
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 5 of 20 PageID #: 603
leave to file a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).
(See Sposato PMC Request, ECF No 26.)
The Court denied
Sposato’s PMC Request, observing that he had already answered the
Complaint and, as such, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would be untimely.
(See Aug. 11, 2017 Elec. Order.)
On August 14, 2017, Armor filed its Dismissal Motion.
(See Armor’s Dismissal Motion, ECF No. 29.)
Plaintiff opposed
Armor’s Dismissal Motion.
(See Opp’n, ECF No. 32.)
the Motion was granted.
See 2018 M&O, 2018 WL 1611385, at *6.
Specifically,
the
Court
found:
(1)
Nevertheless,
Plaintiff’s
claim
for
injunctive relief was mooted after he was transferred from NCCC to
a new facility; (2) Plaintiff had not shown “Armor’s failure to
provide a particular type of treatment or medication” rose “to the
level of deliberate indifference”; and (3) “assuming Plaintiff had
adequately
alleged
a
constitutional
violation,”
Plaintiff,
nevertheless, “failed to allege that the constitutional violation
was the result of an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom”
because “[t]he Complaint d[id] not contain facts that suggested”
(i) “the existence of a policy, custom, or practice,” (ii) “any
actions taken by a government official which resulted in inadequate
medical
care,”
supervision
by
or
(iii)
Armor.”
“a
Id.
failure
at
*5.
to
provide
After
training
granting
or
Armor’s
Dismissal Motion, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an
amended complaint and cautioned Plaintiff that “should Plaintiff
5
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 6 of 20 PageID #: 604
seek
to
file
an
Amended
Complaint,
he
must
allege
Sposato’s
personal involvement in the purported constitutional violations.”
Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
To date, Plaintiff has not filed an
amended complaint and the time to do so has long since expired.
(See Case Docket, in toto.)
On December 23, 2022, Sposato filed a second PMC Request
seeking leave to file the instant Motion.
Request, ECF No. 97.)
(See
Sposato PMC
Plaintiff opposed Sposato’s PMC Request.
(See PMC Opp’n, ECF No. 104.) The Court granted in part and denied
in part Sposato’s PMC request, waiving its pre-motion conference
requirement, and setting a briefing schedule on the instant Motion.
(See Jan. 20, 2023 Elec. Order.)
February 17, 2023.
Sposato’s Motion was filed on
Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to
Sposato’s Motion within the allotted time.
toto.)
(See Case Docket, in
Consequently, on April 28, 2023, Sposato filed a motion
requesting the Court consider the instant Motion fully briefed.
(See Motion to Expedite, ECF No. 118.)
The Court granted Sposato’s
Motion to the extent it afforded Plaintiff an additional thirty
days in which to file an opposition.
Order.)
(See Apr. 28, 2023 Elec.
On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a letter in which he
claimed to have previously filed opposition to Sposato’s Motion.
(Plaintiff’s Letter, ECF No. 123.)
an order stating:
6
Consequently, the Court issued
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 7 of 20 PageID #: 605
It appears Plaintiff believes that his
opposition to Defendant's PMC Request is his
opposition to Defendant's Dismissal Motion.
Out
of
an
abundance
of
caution,
and
considering Plaintiff's pro se status, the
Court will extend the time for Plaintiff to
file a separate stand-alone document as his
opposition to Defendant's Dismissal Motion to
June 24, 2023. Otherwise, the Court shall
construe Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants
PMC Request as his opposition to Defendant's
Dismissal Motion.
(May 10, 2023 Elec. Order.)
Ultimately. Plaintiff did not file a
separate standalone opposition; as such, for purposes of this
Motion, the Court construes Plaintiff’s opposition to Sposato’s
PMC Request as his opposition to the instant Motion.
In his Motion, Sposato makes three arguments.
First,
Sposato contends Plaintiff should be precluded from relitigating
any of the Court’s prior findings made when it granted Armor’s
Dismissal Motion, to wit: (1) that the Complaint does not allege
a custom, policy or practice of a constitutional violation; (2) the
Complaint does not state a claim for inadequate medical care; and
(3) Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief was mooted by his
transfer from NCCC.
(See Support Memo, ECF No. 109-4 at 4,
attached to Motion.)
Second, Sposato argues that, regardless of
preclusion, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim must be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Plaintiff did
not file any grievances about the cell lighting.
(Id. at 5.)
Finally, Sposato argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege
7
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 8 of 20 PageID #: 606
facts
demonstrating
that
Sposato
was
personally
involved
or
deliberately indifferent to the alleged constitutional violations.
(Id. at 6-8.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standards
A. Motions Pursuant to Rule 12(c)
Rule
12(c)
provides,
“[a]fter
the
pleadings
are
closed--early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).
“The standard
for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is
identical to that for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure
to state a claim.”
Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6
F.4th 293, 301 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Lynch v. City of N.Y., 952
F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020)).
When
considering
a
motion
to
dismiss
under
Rule
12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all factual statements
alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.”
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet
Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007).
To survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must state “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Bell
A claim is
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
8
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 9 of 20 PageID #: 607
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”
662, 678 (2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
Consequently, a complaint is properly dismissed
where, as a matter of law, “the allegations in a complaint, however
true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.”
550 U.S. at 558.
Twombly,
Similarly, a complaint is also properly dismissed
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679.
Where “[a] plaintiff proceeds pro se . . . a court is
obliged
to
construe
his
pleadings
liberally.”
McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004).
must
interpret
a
pro
se
Plaintiff’s
strongest arguments that they suggest.”
McEachin
v.
As such, the Court
pleadings
“to
raise
the
Kirkland v. Cablevision
Sys., 760 F. 3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins,
14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
B. Claims Brought Pursuant to Section 1983
In pertinent part, Section 1983 provides:
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured.
9
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42 U.S.C. 1983.
“To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff
must ‘allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at
least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law
and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed
under the Constitution of the United States.’”
Pena v. Suffolk
County Police Dep’t, 21-CV-2496, 2021 WL 3848299, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 27, 2021) (quoting Rodriguez v. Shoprite Supermarket, No. 19CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020)).
“Personal
involvement
is
a
prerequisite
to
the
assessment of damages in a Section 1983 case, and respondeat
superior
is
an
inappropriate
constitutional claim.”
theory
of
liability
for
any
Marhone v. Cassel, No. 16-CV-4733, 2022 WL
4468056, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2022) (citing Wright v. Smith,
21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Randle v. Alexander,
960 F. Supp. 2d 457, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“It is axiomatic that
individual
defendants
cannot
be
liable
for
§ 1983
violations
unless they are personally involved with the alleged conduct.”)
“To establish a violation of § 1983 by a supervisor, as with
everyone else, . . . the plaintiff must establish a deliberate,
intentional act on the part of the defendant to violate the
plaintiff’s legal rights.”
Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609,
618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 132728 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch J.)); see also Graesser v. Lovallo,
No. 22-CV-0320, 2022 WL 1443914, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 2022)
10
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 11 of 20 PageID #: 609
(“Personal involvement is required for liability under section
1983”);
Shomo
Supervision,
et
v.
State
al.,
of
No.
N.Y.
Dept.
21-CV-0128,
of
2022
Corr.
WL
and
1406726,
Comm.
at
*7
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2022) (“Failing to allege that a defendant was
personally involved in, or responsible for, the conduct complained
of renders a complaint ‘fatally defective on its face.’” (quoting
Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1987))).
“The Second Circuit has held that ‘personal involvement’
under § 1983 means ‘direct participation, or failure to remedy the
alleged wrong after learning of it, or creation of a policy or
custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or gross
negligence in managing subordinates.’”
Busch v. County of Erie,
2022 WL 1460022, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 9, 2022) (quoting Black v.
Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)).
A supervisory official
may be personally involved “if, after learning of a violation
through a report or appeal, he or she failed to remedy the wrong.”
Quick v. Graham, No. 12-CV-1717, 2014 WL 4627108, at *6 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 11, 2014).
the
official
Additionally, personal involvement may exist “if
created
a
policy
or
custom
under
which
unconstitutional practices occurred or allowed such a policy or
custom to continue.”
Id. (citing Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319,
323-24 (2d Cir. 1986)).
personally
involved
if
“Finally, a supervisory official may be
he
or
she
11
[was]
grossly
negligent
in
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 12 of 20 PageID #: 610
managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event.”
Id.
II.
Analysis
As a threshold matter, the Court previously determined
that during the period constituting his incarceration at NCCC,
Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee, and so, his Section 1983
deliberate
indifference
to
medical
needs
claims
were
to
be
considered under the Fourteenth, and not the Eighth, Amendment.
See 2018 M&O, 2018 WL 1611385, at *4.
A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
A Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference
to medical needs requires a showing “(1) that Plaintiff[] had a
serious medical need . . . , and (2) that the Defendant[] acted
with deliberate indifference to such needs.”
Charles v. Orange
County, 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); and Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29
(2d Cir. 2017)).
A medical need is “sufficiently serious” where
it “contemplates a condition of urgency such as one that may
produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.”
Charles, 925 F.3d
at 86 (citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir.
1996)).
To establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff “can
allege either that the defendant[] knew [or should have known]
that failing to provide the complained medical treatment would
pose a substantial risk to his health.”
12
Id. at 87.
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 13 of 20 PageID #: 611
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege precisely
how the cell lighting policy was unconstitutional or how Sposato
was
deliberately
indifferent
to
Plaintiff’s
medical
needs.
Indeed, the sole mention of Sposato in the Complaint is that,
“within the month of January 2016[,] at the direction of [Sherriff]
Michael J. Sposato[,] maintenance [workers] began removing manual
light switches from all cells in” Plaintiff’s dorm. 5
Accepting
arguendo that Plaintiff’s condition was sufficiently serious, the
Court previously determined that, regardless, Plaintiff could not
show
deliberate
indifference
to
his medical needs because
he
conceded his medical needs were being treated with medication.
See 2018 M&O, 2018 WL 1611385, at *5.
Moreover, the Court found
that a mere “difference of opinion between a prisoner and prison
officials regarding medical treatment does not, as a matter of
law, constitute deliberate indifference.”
Id. (quoting Joyner v.
Greiner, 195 F. Supp. 2d 500, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
For the
reasons previously articulated in the Court’s 2018 M&O dismissing
Plaintiff’s claims against Armor, the Court likewise finds that
the Complaint is devoid of any facts that plausibly allege Sposato
was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs when
From the dearth in factual allegations specific to Sposato, the
Court finds Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation regarding the
lighting policy was to serve only as background information
regarding Plaintiff’s now-dismissed claims against Armor.
5
13
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 14 of 20 PageID #: 612
instituting the lighting policy, which in any event has not been
plausibly alleged to be an unconstitutional policy. 6
B. Conditions-of-Confinement
To the extent the Complaint can be read to assert that
Sposato was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s conditionsof-confinement,
Plaintiff’s
Sposato’s
personal
violation
nor
Sposato
involvement
does
acted
Complaint
with
it
plead
in
the
facts
deliberate
neither
alleged
constitutional
sufficiently
indifference
establishes
establishing
to
Plaintiff’s
conditions-of-confinement.
To
state
a
Fourteenth
Amendment
conditions
of
confinement claim:
a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective
prong and a subjective prong. The objective
prong requires ‘showing that the challenged
conditions were sufficiently
serious to
constitute objective deprivations of the right
to due process,’ while the subjective prong
requires ‘showing that [the defendant] acted
with at least deliberate indifference to the
challenged conditions.
Allen v. Stringer, No. 20-3953, 2021 WL 4472667, at *1 (2d Cir.
Sept. 30, 2021) (quoting Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29). “[T]o establish
a
claim
for
deliberate
confinement . . . the
indifference
pretrial
detainee
to
must
conditions
prove
that
of
the
Indeed, as discussed infra Part II.B.1, the Complaint does not
plead facts sufficient to allege that Sposato was even aware of
Plaintiff’s medical issues, let alone how the lighting policy
affected Plaintiff’s conditions-of-confinement.
6
14
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 15 of 20 PageID #: 613
defendant-official
acted
intentionally
to
impose
the
alleged
condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to
mitigate the risk that the condition posed.”
Darnell, 849 F.3d at
35.
1. Plaintiff’s Complaint Does Not Plausibly Allege
Sposato’s Personal Involvement in the Alleged
Constitutional Violation
As previously articulated, a prerequisite to bringing a
Section 1983 claim is the establishment of the Defendant’s personal
involvement.
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of factual
allegations showing Sposato was personally involved in the alleged
constitutional violation, other than the conclusory statement that
Sposato
directed
maintenance
crews
replace
the
manual
light
switches in Plaintiff’s cell. Indeed, Plaintiff does not plausibly
plead facts alleging Sposato was aware of Plaintiff’s complaints
other than the vague claim that Plaintiff made “several complaints
to [the] [Sherriff’s] office” and “wrote complaints.”
2.)
(Compl. at
To the extent Plaintiff relies upon the grievances annexed to
his Complaint to establish Sposato’s awareness of Plaintiff’s
complaints, the Court finds the annexed grievances do not grieve
the cell lighting conditions but instead grieve his medical care
and desire to be seen by a neurologist/specialist. 7
(See id. at
12-15, 23-28.)
For the same reasons articulated by the Court in its prior 2018
M&O, the Court finds here that it is unclear whether Plaintiff
7
15
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Nevertheless, accepting as true Plaintiff’s conclusory
assertion
that
he
wrote complaints
to
the Sherriff’s
office,
“merely writing a letter of complaint does not provide personal
involvement necessary to maintain a § 1983 claim.”
Candelaria v.
Higley, No. 04-CV-0277, 2008 WL 478408, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb 19,
2008) (collecting cases); see also Rivera v. Fischer, 655 F. Supp.
2d 235, 238 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The general rule is that if an
official receives a letter from an inmate and passes it on to a
subordinate for response or investigation, the official will not
be deemed personally involved with respect to the subject matter
of the letter” (citing Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.
1997))); Charles v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Corr. Serv’s., No. 07CV-1274,
2009
(“Basically,
personal
WL
the
890548,
cases
involvement
at
make
based
supervisor . . . depends
upon
*6
clear
on
a
the
(N.D.N.Y.
Mar.
that
determination
the
letter
contents
of
of
31,
complaint
the
2009)
of
to
letter
a
and
whether the supervisor referred the letter to a subordinate officer
or whether the supervisory official investigated and decided the
issue him or herself.”)
exhausted his administrative remedies with regard the cell
lighting issue.
See 2018 M&O, 2018 WL 1611385, at *3.
Nevertheless, even if the Court assumes arguendo that Plaintiff
did exhaust his administrative remedies, the Complaint is fatally
defective in that it neither alleges Sposato’s personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation nor does it
allege facts sufficient to establish deliberate indifference.
16
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 17 of 20 PageID #: 615
Plaintiff further alleges that he had two interactions
with staff at NCCC in which he made grievances: first, with a
Corporal who gave Plaintiff a misbehavior report for attempting to
cover up his lighting fixture; and second, with Sergeant McMillan
to
whom
Plaintiff
explained
the
situation.
(Compl.
at
8.)
Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that the Corporal or McMillan
relayed Plaintiff’s complaints to Sposato, or that they informed
Plaintiff that they would do so; nevertheless, even if they had
done so, the Complaint contains no facts that Sposato acted upon
that information.
09-CV-6660,
2010
See McNair v. Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Ctr.,
WL
4446772,
at
*13
(S.D.N.Y.
Nov.
5,
2010)
(“[M]ere notification of alleged wrongdoing does not establish
personal involvement under Section 1983.”).
Similarly, to the
extent Plaintiff argues Sposato was personally involved based
solely
upon
his
supervisory
capacity,
such
insufficient to establish personal involvement.
allegations
are
See Marhone, 2022
WL 4468056, at *4.
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint Does Not Allege Facts
Sufficient to Allege Sposato Acted with Deliberate
Indifference
to
Plaintiff’s
Conditions
of
Confinement
“[A] prison official does not act in a deliberately
indifferent manner unless that official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Morgan v. Dzurenda,
956 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37
17
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 18 of 20 PageID #: 616
F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Indeed, “the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.”
As
Id.
discussed
above,
Plaintiff
does
not
sufficiently
plead facts alleging Sposato was on notice that the lighting
policy, and the alleged constant exposure to artificial lighting,
of which Plaintiff complains, posed a substantial risk of harm to
Plaintiff.
(See
supra
Part
II.B.1.)
Moreover,
Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to allege Sposato was responsible for instituting
the unwritten policy that lights should be turned on from 6:30/7:30
a.m. to 11:30 p.m. 8
Additionally, while Plaintiff alleges cell
lighting was controlled from the Officer’s Control Area, there are
no factual allegations in the Complaint that Sposato had any
control over the cell lighting or that he directed officers in the
While courts have found constant exposure to artificial lighting
may, under certain circumstances, create conditions-of-confinement
which violate the constitution, they have done so in circumstances
different from the case at bar. Compare Holmes v. Grant, No. 03CV-3426, 2006 WL 851753, at *3, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006)
(finding plaintiff’s claim of 24-hour illumination of the SHU
during plaintiff’s 35-day confinement caused fatigue, loss of
appetite, migraine headaches, and other physical and mental
problems potentially violated the Eighth Amendment) (collecting
cases). Here, there are no allegations that the wattage of the
lighting was excessively high such that Plaintiff was deprived of
sleep. In fact, Plaintiff’s allegation he was exposed to constant
lighting from 6:30/7:30 a.m. to 11:30 p.m., tacitly implies that
from 11:30 p.m. to 6:30/7:30 a.m. the cell lighting was turned off
-- or dimmed to an acceptable level -- such that Plaintiff was not
exposed to “constant” artificial lighting.
8
18
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 19 of 20 PageID #: 617
control area to keep the lights turned on from 6:30/7:30 a.m. to
11:30 p.m..
(See Compl. at 8.)
In sum, other than the conclusory
allegation that maintenance removed light switches from the prison
cells at Sposato’s direction, there are no factual allegations in
the Complaint that Sposato had anything to do with the cell
lighting situation at NCCC whatsoever.
This sole, bald allegation
is insufficient to maintain a claim of deliberate indifference.
CONCLUSION
For
the
stated
reasons,
IT
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED
that
Sposato’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 109) is
GRANTED.
Judgment is to enter accordingly and, thereafter, the
Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that,
pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), any appeal from this Order would not be taken in
good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for
the purpose of any appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962); and
19
Case 2:16-cv-06733-JS-SIL Document 130 Filed 09/13/23 Page 20 of 20 PageID #: 618
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the Court shall
mail a copy of this Memorandum & Order to the pro se Plaintiff and
include the notation “Legal Mail” on the envelope.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: September 13, 2023
Central Islip, New York
20
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