Taveras v. Sheriffs Dept. et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM & ORDER; For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs 2 application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the Sheriffs Department and Mr. Walker for failure to sta te a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ORDER. Any Amended Complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of this Or der, shall be titled Amended Complaint, and shall bear the same docket number as this Order, No. 16-CV-7043(JS)(ARL). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and the refore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962). The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 5/12/2017. c/m to pro se pltff. (Coleman, Laurie) (Coleman, Laurie)

FILED 
CLERK 

11:59 am, May 12, 2017

U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
LONG ISLAND OFFICE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
TRISTAN TAVERAS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
16-CV-7043(JS)(ARL)

-againstSHERIFFS DEPT., MR. WALKER (inmate),

Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Tristan Taveras, pro se
17-A-1200
Downstate Correctional Facility
121 Red Schoolhouse Road
PO Box F
Fishkill, NY 12524
For Defendants:

No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On December 12, 2016, then-incarcerated pro se plaintiff
Tristan Taveras (“Plaintiff”) filed an in forma pauperis Complaint
in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against
the Sheriff’s Department, and Mr. Walker (together, “Defendants”),
accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Upon

review

of

the

declaration

in

support

of

the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fee.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is sua sponte
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b) for
failure to state a claim for relief.

BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff’s sparse handwritten Complaint, submitted on
the Court’s Section 1983 complaint form, alleges, in its entirety:
I was assaulted by Sheriffs Dept in Hempstead Courthouse
garage.
I was pulled from the van and thrown on the
ground and beaten brutally by Sheriffs officers the
officers had me cuffed during the assault he had his knee
on my chest while him and couple other officers proceeded
to punch and kick me. I received no medical treatment,
not allowed to make phone calls in the jail when I was
admitted my mugshot is the only evidence of injuries and
video on Dec 18th/2015 I spoke to Internal Affairs but
have yet to receive a docket number. I was also assaulted
Sat. Oct. 22/2016 by inmate in police custody. I pressed
charges but have yet to see anybody. I was sleep in my
cell when inmate attacked me in my sleep.2
(Compl. ¶ IV.)

In the space on the form Complaint that calls for

a description of any claimed injuries and any medical treatment
required and/or provided, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a
broken nose from the first assault and was not given medical
treatment for such injury. (Compl. ¶ IV.A.) Plaintiff also claims
that

as

a

result

of

the

second

assault,

he

sustained

an

“[indeciperable] fracture, busted lip, erupted retina, [and] blood
clots.”

(Compl. ¶ IV.A.)

Plaintiff alleges that although he was

taken to Nassau County Medical Center for treatment of his injuries
alleged sustained during the second assault, he still requires
1

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purpose of this Memorandum and
Order.
2

Plaintiff’s allegations have been reproduced here exactly as
they appear in the Complaint. Errors in spelling, punctuation,
and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
2

unspecified surgery. (Compl. ¶ IV.A.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks
to recover a monetary award in total sum of $2 million for his
“injuries and compensation.”

(Compl. ¶ V.)

DISCUSSION
I.

In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fees.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from

such

1915A(b).

relief.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination.

See id. § 1915A(b).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).

However, a complaint must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
3

1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).

While

“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III.

Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361, 132
S. Ct. 1497, 1501–02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).
under

Section

1983,

a

plaintiff

must

To state a claim

“‘allege

that

(1)

the

challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person
who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States.’”

Rae v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 693 F. Supp. 2d
4

217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53
(2d Cir. 1999)).
In order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983
against an individual defendant, a plaintiff must allege the
personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional
deprivation.

Farid v. Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010).

The

Supreme Court held in Iqbal that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is
inapplicable to . . . [section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”

556 U.S. at

676
A.

Claim Against the Sheriff’s Department
It

is

well-established

that

“under

New

York

law,

departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality
do

not

have

a

legal

identity

separate

and

apart

municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”

from

the

Davis v.

Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002);
see also Hawkins v. Nassau Cnty. Corr. Fac., 781 F. Supp. 2d 107,
109 at n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing claims against Nassau County
Jail because it is an “administrative arm[ ] . . . of the County of
Nassau, and thus lacks the capacity to be sued as a separate
entity”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Melendez
v. Nassau Cnty., 10–CV–2516, 2010 WL 3748743, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2010) (dismissing the claims against the Sheriff’s
5

Department because it lacks the capacity to be sued).

Thus,

Plaintiff’s claim against the Sheriff’s Department is not plausible
because it has no legal identity separate and apart from Nassau
County.

Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 1915A(b).

However,

given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court considers whether the
Complaint alleges a plausible Section 1983 claim if construed as
against the County.

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds

that it does not.
B.

Claim As Construed Against Nassau County
It is well-established that a municipality such as Nassau

County cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servcs. of N.Y. City, 436 U.S.

658, 690–91, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Roe v.
City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008).

To prevail on

a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show
“that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the
alleged constitutional injury.”

Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d

324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
60-61, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011)); see also
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91.

“[L]ocal governments . . . may be sued

for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental
‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”
6

Monell, 436

U.S. at 690–91.
A plaintiff can ultimately establish the existence of a
municipal policy or custom by showing: (1) the existence of a
formal policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality; (2)
actions taken or decisions made by municipal officials with final
decision-making authority, which caused the alleged violation of
plaintiff’s

civil

rights;

(3)

a

practice

so

persistent

and

widespread that it constitutes a custom of which constructive
knowledge and acquiescence can be implied on the part of the policy
making officials; or (4) a failure by policymakers to properly
train or supervise their subordinates, amounting to deliberate
indifference to the rights of those who come in contact with the
municipal employees.

Moray v. City of Yonkers, 924 F. Supp. 8, 12

(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations omitted).
Here, even affording the pro se Complaint a liberal
construction, there are no factual allegations from which the Court
could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 cause of action
against Nassau County. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
allege a plausible Section 1983 claim even when construed as
against Nassau County.
C.

Claim Against Mr. Walker
Section 1983 “constrains only state conduct, not the

‘acts of private persons or entities.’”

Hooda v. Brookhaven Nat’l

Lab., 659 F. Supp. 2d 382, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Rendell7

Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2769, 73 L. Ed.
2d 418 (1982)).

Accordingly, “a litigant claiming that his

constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that
the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Fabrikant v. French, 691
F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff pressing a claim of
violation of his constitutional rights under Section 1983 is
. . . required to show state action.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Indeed, “the under-color-of- state-law element
of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful.”

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S. Ct. 977, 985, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130
(1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Private actors, such as Mr. Walker, may be considered to
be acting under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983 if
the private actor was a “‘willful participant in joint activity
with the State or its agents.’”

Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau,

292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1606, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1970)). Section 1983 liability may also extend to a private party
who

conspires

with

a

constitutional rights.

state

actor

to

violate

a

plaintiff’s

Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323-24.

In order

to state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege:
8

“(1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to
act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an
overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”

Id.

at 324-25 (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.
1999)).
Here, Mr. Walker is alleged to be an inmate at the Nassau
County Correctional Center.

Plaintiff does not allege that Mr.

Walker, a private person, acted jointly with a state actor or
conspired

with

a

state

constitutional right.

actor

to

deprive

Plaintiff

of

some

Thus, in the absence of any state action,

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Mr. Walker is not plausible
as a matter of law.

Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 325.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Mr. Walker is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 1915A(b)(1).3
IV.

Leave to Amend
Given

the

Second

Circuit’s

guidance

that

a

pro

se

Complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless
amendment would be futile, Ashmore v. Prus, 510 F. App’x 47, 49 (2d
Cir. 2013) (citing Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.
2000)), the Court has carefully considered whether leave to amend
is warranted here.

Upon such consideration, the Court finds that

since the deficiencies noted above with regard to Plaintiff’s
3

The dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Mr.
Walker is without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing any valid state
law claims Plaintiff may have against Mr. Walker in state court.
9

claims

against

the

Sheriff’s

Department

and

Mr.

Walker

are

substantive in nature and would not be remedied if Plaintiff were
afforded an opportunity to amend his Complaint, leave to amend the
Complaint as against the Sheriff’s Department and Mr. Walker is
DENIED.
However, Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT as against Nassau County and/or the Corrections Officers
involved in the incident described in the Complaint.
does

not

know,

and

cannot

ascertain

the

If Plaintiff

identities

of

such

individuals at this time, he may identify them in the Amended
Complaint as “John Does.”

Any Amended Complaint shall be filed

within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, shall be
titled “Amended Complaint,” and shall bear the same docket number
as this Order, No. 16-CV-7043(JS)(ARL).
that

an

Complaint.

Amended

Complaint

completely

Plaintiff is cautioned
replaces

the

original

Therefore, all claims and allegations Plaintiff wishes

to pursue should be included in the Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is
sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the Sheriff’s
Department and Mr. Walker for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff is GRANTED
LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ORDER.
10

Any Amended Complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
the date of this Order, shall be titled “Amended Complaint,” and
shall bear the same docket number as this Order, No. 16-CV7043(JS)(ARL).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,

82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this
Order to the pro se Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: May
12 , 2017
Central Islip, New York

11