Dekom v. Fannie Mae et al

Filing 223

ORDER denying 70 Motion for Reconsideration re 67 Order on Motion for TRO. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bianco on 2/1/2019. (CM to pro se plaintiff by Chambers) (Florio, Lisa)

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MARTIN DEKOM, on behalf of the little people,

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.

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FEB 012019

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LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiff,
ORDER
17-CV-2712 (JFB) (ARL)

-againstFANNIE MAE, et al.,
Defendants.

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JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

By Order dated March 14, 2018 ("The Order"), this Court denied plaintiff's "motion for
an order to show cause and a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). (ECF No. 67.) The Court
explained that plaintiffs submission was procedurally improper because it does not include a
notice of motion, nor does it include a supporting affidavit containing the factual information
necessary for the determination of the motion. (Id. at 3.) Additionally, the Court explained that
even if the submission were procedurally proper, the Anti-Injunction precludes Act precludes the
relief sought - enjoining the state court pending the adjudication of the complaint before this Court.
(Id. at 4.) On March 22, 2018, plaintiff submitted a motion for reconsideration arguing that it was

"clear error that the Court invented arguments from scratch which the defendants did not present"
(ECF No. 70 at 2.) and that the defendant subsequently admitted to the facts in the amended
complaint. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff argues that, due to the "Court alone fashioned" arguments and the
frivolous arguments of the defendants, the Court should reconsider its prior motion denying the
TRO. (Id. at 6.) For the reasons that follow, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
Motions for reconsideration may be filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
59(e) or 60(b). The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) is

"strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied." Herschaft v. N. Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 139
F. Supp. 2d 282, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted).

A motion for reconsideration is

appropriate when the moving party can demonstrate that the court overlooked "controlling
decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion ... and which, had
they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court." Id. (citation
omitted). Alternatively, the movant must demonstrate "the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice." Id. at 284 (citation omitted).
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also permits the Court to relieve a party
from an order in the event of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence,
fraud, or in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); House v. Secy of
Health & Human Servs., 688 F .2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1982). Specifically, Rule 60(b) provides that relief

may be granted for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason
that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) is "extraordinary judicial relief' and can be granted "only
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986);
accord United States v. Bank ofNew York, 14 F.3d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1994). Local Civil Rule 6.3

provides that a party moving for reconsideration must "set[] forth concisely the matters or
controlling decisions which [the party] believes the court has overlooked." "The standard for

granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in
other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court."
Shrader v. CSXTransp., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Medoy v. Warnaco Emps. 'Long
Term Disability Ins. Plan, 97 CV 6612 (SJ), 2006 WL 355137, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2006)

("The standard ... is strict in order to dissuade repetitive arguments on issues that have already
been considered fully by the Court.").
Here, plaintiff has not satisfied the standard necessary for this Court to reconsider the Order
denying plaintiffs request for a TRO. Instead, plaintiff has merely reiterated arguments from his
original motion, which the Court fully considered in its Order denying the motion. In the Order,
the Court expressly stated that the relief plaintiff sought was unavailable due to the Anti-Injunction
Act. (ECF No. 67 at 4.) This provision applies when the requested injunction would either stay
the ongoing state proceedings or prevent the parties from enforcing an order that has already
issued. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. ofLocomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,294 (1970). The
Anti-Injunction Act "is an absolute prohibition against any injunction of any state-court
proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of the three specifically defined exceptions in
the Act[,]" which are to be narrowly construed. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623,
630 (1977); see also Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988). Indeed, in
interpreting the Anti-Injunction Act, the Supreme Court has directed that "[a]ny doubts as to the
propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of
permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy."
Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 398 U.S. at 297.

As stated supra, plaintiff has failed to set forth controlling decisions or factual matters that
the Court overlooked in reaching its decision as required under Rule 59(e), or demonstrate their
entitlement to the "extraordinary judicial relief' afforded by Rule 60(b). Accordingly, it is hereby
ordered that plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is denied.

SO/©JR.'ffi:REb.
s/ Jospeh F. Bianco
E
F. BIANCO
ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated:

February l, 2019
Central Islip, NY