Hughes v. Nassau County Sheriff's Department et al
ORDER: SO ORDERED that the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, but the complaint is sua sponte dismissed without prejudice for failure to allege a plausible claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint in accordance with the guidance set forth in this Order within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff's amended complaint must be labeled as an ame nded complaint and bear the same docket number as this Order, 17-CV-4715(JMA) (SIL). Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint completely replaces the original, so plaintiff must include any allegations he wishes to pursue against the defendants in the amended complaint. Further, if plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, this case will be closed. Plaintiff's application for the appointment of pro bono counsel is denied without prejudice to plaintiff renew ing his application upon filing an amended complaint in accordance with this order, if circumstances warrant such an application. This denial is also without prejudice to plaintiffs hiring his own counsel to represent him in this matter. The Court ce rtifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. Ordered by Judge Joan M. Azrack on 1/8/2018. (cm to pro se plaintiff) (Florio, Lisa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DAVID HUGHES, #16003688,
For Online Publication Only
-againstNASSAU COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH INC.,
MARCELLE MORCOS, Medical Director,
AZRACK, District Judge:
1/8/2018 4:56 pm
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
On August 4, 2017, incarcerated pro se plaintiff David Hughes filed an in forma pauperis
complaint against the Nassau County Sheriff’s Department (“NCSD”), Armor Correctional Health
Inc. (“Armor”), and Armor’s Medical Director, Marcelle Morcos (“Morcos”), pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) alleging a deprivation of his Constitutional rights. Plaintiff also
filed an application for the appointment of pro bono counsel to represent him in this case.
Because the in forma pauperis application submitted by plaintiff was incomplete, the Court
instructed plaintiff, by Notice of Deficiency dated August 11, 2017 (“Notice”), to complete and
return the enclosed in forma pauperis application within fourteen (14) days from the date of the
Notice. On August 24, 2017, plaintiff timely filed a proper in forma pauperis application.
Plaintiff has also filed a number of letters with the Court since August 2017, none of which are
relevant to the Court’s analysis. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants plaintiff’s request
to proceed in forma pauperis and sua sponte dismisses his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b). Plaintiff’s application for the appointment of pro bono counsel is
denied without prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he received inadequate
medical care while incarcerated at the Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCC”). Plaintiff
alleges that, upon his arrival at NCC on May 28, 2016, his personal, orthopedic footwear was
exchanged for “sneakers,” which plaintiff claims “posed an unreasonable serious risk of harm
involving detainee’s health.”
(Compl. at 4.)
Plaintiff claims to suffer “from knee issues,
degenerative back, neuromuscular” problems.
Plaintiff also claims to have had an
“undiagnosed bacterial infection” on his feet that required prescription medication. (Compl. at
5.) According to the complaint, plaintiff did not receive medical treatment despite his “intense
disabling foot symptoms and pain involving discharge aside from evident abscess.”
Although plaintiff acknowledges that he was given cortisone injections in both knees “from
outside orthopedic doctor (Montero) who came here,” plaintiff seeks to recover a compensatory
and punitive damages award in the amount of $2 million for his lack of treatment. (Id. at 6-7.)
In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of plaintiff’s declarations in support of his application to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court finds that plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment of
the filing fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis is granted.
All material allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of this Order. See Rogers v. City of
Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court is
required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true).
Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to screen a civil complaint
brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and to dismiss the complaint,
either in part or in its entirety, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Similarly, pursuant to the in forma pauperis
statute, the Court must dismiss an action if it determines that it “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii)
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss
the action as soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Pro se submissions are afforded wide interpretational latitude and should be held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In
addition, the Court is required to read the plaintiff=s pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as
raising the strongest arguments it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d 165, 167 (2d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need not even plead specific facts;
rather the complainant “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”). However, a pro se plaintiff must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. While “‘detailed factual
allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and
federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979); Thomas v.
Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). In order to state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements. First, the conduct challenged must have been “committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). Second, “the conduct complained
of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.” Id.; see also Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999). In
addition, in order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983 against an individual defendant, a
plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Farid v. Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010).
Section 1983 Claims Against the NCSD
Plaintiff names the NCSD as a defendant. However, the NCSD is a non-suable entity
because it is merely an administrative arm of the municipality Nassau County. “Under New York
law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity
separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.” See Rose v. Cnty.
of Nassau, 904 F. Supp. 2d 244, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F.
Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d
463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing claim against the local police department because, as an
“administrative arm of a municipality [, it] do[es] not have legal identity separate and apart from
the municipality, and therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”). Therefore, plaintiff’s claims against
NCSD are implausible and are thus dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (B)(ii),
1915A(b)(1). However, given plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court considers next whether plaintiff
has alleged a plausible Section 1983 claim when construed as being made against Nassau County.
For the reasons that follow, plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim against Nassau County.
Section 1983 Claim as Construed Against Nassau County
It is well-established that a municipality, such as Nassau County, may be liable under
Section 1983 only if the “plaintiff proves that action pursuant to [an] official . . . policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978); see also Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004). Thus,
to impose liability on a municipality, the plaintiff must prove that a municipal policy or custom
caused a deprivation of his rights. See Wimmer v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 125, 137
(2d Cir. 1999).
To establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom, the plaintiff must allege (1) the
existence of a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality, (2) actions taken or decisions
made by an official with final decision making authority, (3) a practice so persistent and
widespread that it constitutes a custom, or (4) a failure by policymakers to properly train or
supervise their subordinates, amounting to a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of those who
come in contact with the municipal employees. Davis, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 478; Moray v. City of
Yonkers, 924 F. Supp. 8, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations omitted). “[A] single incident in a
complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy making level, does not suffice to
show a municipal policy.” DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Here, as is readily apparent, even affording the pro se complaint a liberal construction,
there are simply no factual allegations from which the Court may reasonably infer that the conduct
or inaction of which plaintiff complains was caused by some policy or custom of Nassau County.
Santos v. New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A] plaintiff must allege
facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a municipal policy or
custom exists.”). Accordingly, plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Section 1983 claim even when
construing the complaint as being alleged against Nassau County.
Section 1983 Claim Against Armor
“Armor is a private company that provides medical services for inmates at the [NCCC]
pursuant to a contract with the Nassau County Sheriff’s Department . . . .” Whitenack v. Armor
Medical, 13-CV-2071, 2014 WL 5502300, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2014) (alteration in original).
The Court assumes for purposes of this order that Armor was acting under the color of state law
in rendering medical services to plaintiff at the NCCC. See, e.g., Feder v. Sposato, 11-CV-0093,
2014 WL 1801137, at * 6 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014) (“Because Armor was hired to fulfill the state’s
constitutional obligation to provide necessary medical care for its inmates, Armor . . . [was] ‘acting
under the color of state law’ for purposes of Section 1983”). However, like Nassau County,
Armor may be liable under Section 1983 only if “the plaintiff proves that action pursuant to [an]
official . . . policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store,
Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 82 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that a
hospital was not vicariously liable for any constitutional torts that its employees may have
committed). “Although Monell dealt with municipal employers, its rationale has been extended
to private businesses.” Rojas, 924 F.2d at 409; see also Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg, 850 F. Supp.
2d 418, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that Monell has been extended to private Section 1983
defendants acting under color of state law).
Here, plaintiff’s sparse complaint does not include any factual allegations from which the
Court may reasonably infer that the conduct of which plaintiff complains was caused by some
policy or custom of Armor. Santos, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 576 (“[A] plaintiff must allege facts
tending to support, at least circumstantially, an inference that such a municipal policy or custom
exists.”). Accordingly, because plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Section 1983 claim against
Armor, such claim is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
Claim Against Morcos
Marcelle Morcos is the medical director at Armor. In order to state a plausible claim
against an individual under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of the
defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir.
2010); McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (A Section 1983 claim for
damages against an individual defendant must allege specific facts to show that each defendant
was directly or personally involved in the alleged violation of the Constitution or laws – “that is,
that there was ‘personal participation by one who ha[d] knowledge of the facts that rendered the
conduct illegal.’”) (quoting Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 2001)).
“Personal involvement” may be established by evidence of a supervisor’s direct participation in
the challenged conduct or “by evidence of an official’s (1) failure to take corrective action after
learning of a subordinate’s unlawful conduct, (2) creation of a policy or custom fostering the
unlawful conduct, (3) gross negligence in supervising subordinates who commit unlawful acts, or
(4) deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act on information regarding the
unlawful conduct of subordinates.” Hayut v. State Univ. of New York, 352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d
Cir. 2003). An “individual cannot be held liable for damages under Section 1983 merely because
he held a high position of authority.” Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365
F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir. 2004). Where a Section 1983 claim fails to allege the personal involvement
of the defendant, it fails as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d
Here, although plaintiff includes Morcos as a defendant in the caption of the complaint,
plaintiff alleges no conduct or inaction attributable to Morcos in the body of the complaint. In
the absence of any factual allegations regarding Morcos’ personal involvement, she cannot be held
liable simply because of her position as medical director. Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210
(2d Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiff’s claim for monetary damages against these defendants requires a
showing of more than linkage in the prison chain of command; the doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply.”). Accordingly, plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim for relief
against Morcos and such claim is thus dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) (B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
Leave to Amend
A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once when
a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Shomo
v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171
F.3d 794, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, a pro se plaintiff
who brings a civil rights action, “should be ‘fairly freely’ afforded an opportunity to amend his
complaint.” Boddie v. New York State Div. of Parole, No. 08-CV-911, 2009 WL 1033786, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2009) (quoting Frazier v. Coughlin, 850 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Yet while “pro se plaintiffs are generally given leave to amend a
deficient complaint, a district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”
Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the court has carefully considered whether plaintiff should be granted leave to amend
his complaint. Plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint in accordance with this
Order. Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be labeled as an “amended complaint”, bear the same
docket number as this Order, 17-CV-4715(JMA)(SIL), and must be filed within thirty (30) days
from the date of this Order. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint completely replaces
the original, so plaintiff must include any allegations he wishes to pursue against the defendants
in the amended complaint. Further, if plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the
time allowed, this case shall be closed.
Plaintiff is cautioned that, insofar as he seeks to impose liability on a defendant pursuant
to Section 1983 for inadequate medical treatment, plaintiff is advised that he “must allege ‘acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence the deliberate indifference standard.’” Johns v. Goord,
09-CV-1016, 2010 WL 3907826, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “To establish an Eighth Amendment 2 violation arising out of inadequate
medical treatment a prisoner must prove ‘deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.’”
Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); see also
Kasiem v. Switz, 09-Civ-9361, 2010 WL 3744183, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010) (examination
to address prisoner’s alleged medical condition that resulted in no treatment being prescribed did
not establish a showing of seriousness of or deliberate indifference to his medical needs).
“[T]he deliberate indifference standard embodies both an objective and subjective prong.”
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996). The objective prong requires the prisoner
to allege a “sufficiently serious” injury. Id. The Second Circuit has defined a sufficiently serious
injury as “a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.”
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The subjective prong
requires the prisoner to show the charged official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
The United States Supreme Court has
stated that the subjective element “entails something more than mere negligence [but] something
less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will
result.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
Plaintiff appears to challenge as unconstitutional the conditions of his confinement by
claiming that he was denied adequate medical care, including use of his personal, orthopedic
Although plaintiff does not allege whether he is a pre-trial detainee or a convicted inmate, such distinction is of no
consequence given that the standard for deliberate indifference is the same whether brought pursuant to the Eighth or
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the same
standard applies to claims by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment and pretrial detainees’ claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
The Constitution “forbids deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners.” Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). To
establish a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating both that, objectively, “the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care must be
sufficiently serious” and also that defendants “must be subjectively reckless in their denial of
medical care.” Id. “The Second Circuit instructs, however, that “mere disagreement over the
proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is
adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Sonds
v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Corr. Health Servs., 151 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(“[D]isagreements over medications, diagnostic techniques (e.g., the need for X-rays), forms of
treatment, or the need for specialists or the timing of their intervention, are not adequate grounds
for a Section 1983 claim.”). Indeed, inmates do not have a constitutional right to the treatment of
their choice. Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215 (2d Cir.1986).
Application for Pro Bono Counsel
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), courts may appoint an attorney to represent someone
who is unable to afford counsel. Courts possess broad discretion when determining whether
appointment is appropriate, “subject to the requirement that it be ‘guided by sound legal
principle.’” Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Jenkins
v. Chemical Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1983)). The Second Circuit set forth the principle
[T]he district judge should first determine whether the indigent’s position seems
likely to be of substance. If the claim meets this threshold requirement, the court
should then consider the indigent’s ability to investigate the crucial facts, whether
conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will be the major
proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent’s ability to present the case, the
complexity of the legal issues and any special reason in that case why appointment
of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination.
Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit also held that
these factors are not restrictive, and that “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts.” Id. at
61. A developed record assists the court in this regard. See Brooks v. State of New York, 92CV-1508, 1992 WL 320402, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1992) (denying, without prejudice,
appointment of counsel based on failure to satisfy requisite showing of likely merit).
The Court has reviewed plaintiff’s application together with the complaint. Given the
dismissal of the complaint for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the appointment of
counsel is not warranted at this stage of the litigation. Accordingly, plaintiff’s application for
appointment of counsel is denied without prejudice to plaintiff renewing the application upon
filing an amended complaint in accordance with this order, if circumstances warrant such an
application. This denial is also without prejudice to plaintiff’s hiring his own counsel to represent
him in this matter.
For the forgoing reasons, the plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted,
but the complaint is sua sponte dismissed without prejudice for failure to allege a plausible claim
for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff is granted leave to
file an amended complaint in accordance with the guidance set forth in this Order within thirty
(30) days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be labeled as an
“amended complaint” and bear the same docket number as this Order, 17-CV-4715(JMA) (SIL).
Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint completely replaces the original, so plaintiff must
include any allegations he wishes to pursue against the defendants in the amended complaint.
Further, if plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, this case will be
Plaintiff’s application for the appointment of pro bono counsel is denied without prejudice
to plaintiff renewing his application upon filing an amended complaint in accordance with this
order, if circumstances warrant such an application. This denial is also without prejudice to
plaintiff’s hiring his own counsel to represent him in this matter.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
Dated: January 8, 2018
Central Islip, New York
Joan M. Azrack
United States District Judge
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