Trustees of the Northeast Carpenters Health, Pension, Annuity, Apprenticeship, and Labor Management Cooperation Funds v. MM Lakeside Construction Incorporated

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. For the reasons set forth herein, petitioners' motion to confirm the arbitration award in the amount of $11,877.78 is granted. The Court also awards petitioners prejudgment interest (from the date of the arbitration award through the date of judgment) at a rate of nine percent per year, $678.00 in attorney's fees, and $553.86 in costs. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. SO ORDERED. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bianco on 10/5/2018. (Kuhn, Alyssa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
No 17-CV-5965 (JFB)(GRB)
_____________________

TRUSTEES OF THE NORTHEAST CARPENTERS HEALTH, PENSION, ANNUITY,
APPRENTICESHIP, AND LABOR MANAGEMENT COOPERATION FUNDS,
Petitioners,
VERSUS

MM LAKESIDE CONSTRUCTION INC.,
Respondent.
___________________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
October 5, 2018
___________________

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:
Trustees of the Northeast Carpenters
Health, Pension, Annuity, Apprenticeship,
and Labor Management Cooperation Funds
(“petitioners” or “the Funds”) commenced
this action to confirm an arbitration award
obtained against MM Lakeside Construction
Incorporated (“respondent” or “MM
Lakeside Construction”). Petitioners also
moved to recover attorney’s fees and costs
in connection with this action. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court confirms
the arbitration award and grants petitioners’
motion for fees and costs.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The Court takes the following facts from
the Funds’ amended petition to confirm an

arbitration award (“Am. Pet.”)
accompanying exhibits. (ECF No. 8.)

and

At all relevant times, MM Lakeside
Construction was bound to a collective
bargaining agreement (“the CBA”) with the
Northeast Regional Council of Carpenters
(“the Union”). (Am. Pet. ¶ 7; Exs. A, B.)
Under the CBA, employers such as MM
Lakeside Construction are required to make
contributions to the Funds for all work
performed within the Union’s trade and
geographical jurisdiction. (Am. Pet. ¶ 8; Ex.
B.) The CBA provides that “[f]ailure on the
part of the Employer to make the required
contributions . . . shall make the Employer
liable for all contributions due, all collection
costs including auditing and attorney fees,
20% of total due each Fund as liquidated
damages, plus interest,” and that “[t]he
Employer agrees to comply with the
collections policy enacted by the governing

arbitration award through the date of
judgment, and attorney’s fees and costs
associated with this motion.

body of the designated recipient.” (Am. Pet.
Ex. B art. 16(b).)
The Funds established a Joint Policy for
Collection of Delinquent Contributions (“the
Collection Policy”). (Am. Pet. ¶ 11; Ex. C.)
If an employer is found delinquent in its
contributions, the Collection Policy awards,
in addition to the delinquent contributions,
interest, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees,
arbitration fees, and audit costs. (Am. Pet.
¶¶ 12, 13, 16; Ex. C. arts. 2.1(C), 6.1, 6.2,
6.3.)
The Collection Policy subjects
disputes relating to an employer’s failure to
remit contributions to arbitration before the
Funds’ designated arbitrator. (Am. Pet.
¶ 15; Ex. C art. 2.2.)

B. Procedural History
On October 12, 2017, petitioners filed a
petition in this Court, seeking confirmation
of the arbitrator’s award, as well as
attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the
instant action. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioners
served respondent that same day. (ECF No.
7.) On December 11, 2017, petitioners filed
an amended petition.
(ECF No. 8.)
Petitioners served respondent on December
12, 2017.
(ECF No. 10.)
To date,
respondent has not filed a response or
otherwise appeared in this action.

Petitioners initiated arbitration under the
Collection Policy and mailed MM Lakeside
Construction a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate
Delinquency dated June 20, 2017. (Am. Pet.
¶ 17; Ex. D.) The arbitrator thereafter held a
hearing, found that MM Lakeside
Construction had violated the CBA by
failing to make the required contributions to
the Funds between January 1, 2014 and
December 31, 2016, and ordered MM
Lakeside Construction to pay the Funds
$28,220.73 (representing $16,342.95 in
deficiencies, $4,999.19 in interest, $3,268.59
in liquidated damages, $1,960.00 in audit
costs, $900.00 in attorney’s fees, and
$750.00 for the arbitrator’s fee). (Am. Pet.
¶¶ 18-19; Ex. E.)

II. CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD
A. Standard of Review
A motion to confirm an arbitral award
should be “treated as akin to a motion for
summary judgment.” D.H. Blair & Co. v.
Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir. 2006).
The standard of review at the summary
judgment stage is well settled. A court may
grant a motion for summary judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) only
if “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d
149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). “The moving party
bears the burden of showing that he or she is
entitled to summary judgment.” Huminski v.
Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005).

In November 2017, respondent paid
petitioners $16,342.95, representing the
principal deficiency amount. (Am. Pet.
¶ 20.)
Respondent has failed to pay
petitioners the amounts awarded for interest,
liquidated damages, audit costs, attorney’s
fees, and the arbitrator’s fee.
(Id.)
Accordingly, the Funds seek the remaining
balance, interest from the date of the

A party asserting that a fact cannot
be or is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by: (A) citing
to particular parts of materials in the
record,
including
depositions,

2

omitted). Thus, “the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties
alone will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment.”
Id. at 247-48. The nonmoving party may
not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or
denials but must set forth “‘concrete
particulars’ showing that a trial is needed.”
R.G. Grp. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d
69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting SEC v.
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33
(2d Cir. 1978)). Thus, it is insufficient for a
party opposing summary judgment “merely
to assert a conclusion without supplying
supporting arguments or facts.” BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77
F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d at
33).

documents, electronically stored
information,
affidavits
or
declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the
motion
only),
admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or (B) showing that the
materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A court “is not to
weigh the evidence but is instead required to
view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party, and to eschew
credibility assessments.” Amnesty Am. v.
Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122
(2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101
F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986) (summary judgment
unwarranted if “evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party”).

B. Discussion
“Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1994) provides federal courts with
jurisdiction over petitions brought to
confirm labor arbitration awards.” Local
802, Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y.
v. Parker Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 85, 88
(2d Cir. 1998). “Confirmation of a labor
arbitration award under LMRA § 301 is ‘a
summary proceeding that merely makes
what is already a final arbitration award a
judgment of the Court.’” N.Y. Med. Ctr. of
Queens v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare
Workers
E.,
No.
11-CV-04421
(ENV)(RLM), 2012 WL 2179118, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012) (quoting N.Y.C.
Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v.
E. Millennium Constr., Inc., No. 03-CV5122 (DAB), 2003 WL 22773355, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2003)).

Once the moving party meets its burden,
the opposing party “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he
nonmoving party must come forward with
specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298
F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (alterations in
original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986)). As the Supreme Court
stated in Anderson, “[i]f the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations

The Supreme Court has recognized that
the LMRA expresses a “federal policy of

3

2016. The Collection Policy entitles the
Funds to recover $16,342.95 in deficiencies
(which the Funds recovered), as well as
$11,877.78 for interest, liquidated damages,
attorney’s fees, the arbitrator’s fee, and audit
costs (which is still outstanding). Finally,
nothing in the record suggests “that the
arbitrator’s award was procured through
fraud or dishonesty or that any other basis
for overturning the award exists.” Trs. for
the Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare
Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund &
Training Program Fund v. Odessy Constr.
Corp., No. 14-CV-1560 (GHW), 2014 WL
3844619, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2014)
(granting unopposed motion for summary
judgment under LMRA). Accordingly, the
Court confirms the arbitration award and
awards petitioners $11,877.78.

settling labor disputes by arbitration,” which
“would be undermined if courts had the final
say on the merits of the awards.” See United
Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL–CIO v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1987)
(quoting Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
Accordingly, “the courts play only a limited
role when asked to review the decision of an
arbitrator.” Id. at 36; see also, e.g., Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey,
532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001); First Nat’l
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale &
Chain Store Food Emps. Union Local 338,
Affiliated with the Retail, Wholesale &
Dep’t Store Union, AFL–CIO, 118 F.3d 892,
896 (2d Cir. 1997); Local 1199, Drug, Hosp.
& Health Care Emps. Union, RWDSU,
AFL–CIO v. Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d 22,
24-25 (2d Cir. 1992). In this limited role, a
court must confirm an arbitration award as
long as it “‘draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement’ and is not
the arbitrator’s ‘own brand of industrial
justice.’” First Nat’l Supermarkets, 118
F.3d at 896 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36).
“Courts are not authorized to review the
arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite
allegations that the decision rests on factual
errors or misinterprets the parties’
agreement.”
Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 532 U.S. at 509. Indeed,
“serious error,” and “improvident, even
silly, factfinding do[ ] not provide a basis for
a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the
award.” Id. (citations omitted).

The Court also awards petitioners
interest from the date of the arbitration
award through the date of judgment, at a rate
of nine percent per year. “Whether to award
prejudgment interest in an action to confirm
an arbitration award is in the discretion of
the trial court, but there is a ‘presumption in
favor of prejudgment interest.’” N.Y.C.
Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Gen-Cap
Indus., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 8425(JMF), 2012
WL 2958265, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 20,
2012) (quoting Waterside Ocean Navigation
Co. v. Int’l Navigation, Ltd., 737 F.2d 150,
154 (2d Cir. 1984)). Although the interest
rate is also a discretionary decision, “[t]he
‘common practice’ among courts within the
Second Circuit is to grant interest at a rate of
nine percent per annum—which is the rate
of prejudgment interest under New York
State
law,
N.Y.
C.P.L.R.
§§ 5001-5004—from the time of the award
to the date of the judgment confirming the
award.” Id. (quoting E. Millennium Constr.,
Inc., 2003 WL 22773355, at *3). In light of

Here, the Court concludes that the
arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the
CBA and that it was based on
uncontroverted evidence that MM Lakeside
Construction had failed to pay $16,342.95 in
contributions to the Funds for the period
January 1, 2014 through December 31,

4

Abondolo v. Jerry WWHS Co., 829 F. Supp.
2d 120, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); accord TNS
Mgmt. Servs., 2014 WL 100008, at *4; Dejil
Sys., 2012 WL 3744802, at *4.

the presumption in favor of prejudgment
interest, the Court concludes, in its
discretion, that petitioners are entitled to
such interest at a rate of nine percent per
year.

Nonetheless, “because a court may, in
the exercise of its inherent equitable powers,
award attorney’s fees when opposing
counsel acts in bad faith, attorney’s fees and
costs may be proper when a party opposing
confirmation of arbitration award ‘refuses to
abide by an arbitrator’s decision without
justification.’” E. Millennium Constr., Inc.,
2003 WL 22773355, at *2 (quoting Int’l
Chem. Workers Union (AFL-CIO), Local
No. 227 v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 774 F.2d
43, 47 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also, e.g., TNS
Mgmt. Servs., 2014 WL 100008, at *4
(collecting cases).

In sum, the Court awards petitioners
$11,877.78, as well as prejudgment interest
at a rate of nine percent per year from the
date of the arbitration award through the
date of judgment.
III. PETITIONERS’ ENTITLEMENT TO
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
Petitioners also assert that they are
entitled to attorney’s fees and costs incurred
in prosecuting this action.
“The general rule in our legal system is
that each party must pay its own attorney’s
fees and expenses.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex
rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010).
Neither LMRA § 301 nor the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
authorizes the award of attorney’s fees in an
action to confirm an arbitration award. See,
e.g., Trs. of N.Y.C. Dist. Council of
Carpenters Pension Fund v. TNS Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., No. 13-CV-2716 (JMF), 2014
WL 100008, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2014);
Trs. of N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters
Pension Fund v. Dejil Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV005 (JMF), 2012 WL 3744802, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012).
Moreover,
although Section 502(g) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)
requires an award of attorney’s fees to a plan
that prevails in an action to recover
delinquent contributions under a collective
bargaining agreement, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(2)(D), “this does not necessarily
mean that a successful party is also entitled
to its costs and attorney’s fees in bringing a
petition to confirm an arbitration award,”

Here, the Court need not decide whether
respondent refused to abide by the
arbitrator’s award without justification
because the Collection Policy obligates
employers who fail to make timely
contributions to the Funds to pay attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in recovering the
delinquent contributions. (See Am. Pet. Ex.
C arts. 1.1(C)(4), 6.2, 6.3.) This agreement
is a sufficient basis upon which to award
attorney’s fees and costs. See N.Y.C. Dist.
Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v.
Dafna Constr. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 238,
242 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Whether [the
defendant] had no justification in refusing to
comply with the arbitrator’s ruling is
irrelevant, however, because the Agreement
itself requires [the defendant] to pay
attorneys’ fees incurred by the Trustees in
seeking confirmation. . . . Since the parties
bargained for the awarding of attorneys’ fees
in this precise circumstance, the Court
respects their agreement and orders [the
defendant] to pay the costs incurred by the

5

is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to
submit sufficient evidence to support the
hours worked and the rates claimed.” Hugee
v. Kimso Apartments, LLC, 852 F. Supp. 2d
281, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

Trustees in seeking confirmation of the
arbitrator’s award.”); see also Trs. of N.Y.C.
Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund,
Welfare
Fund,
Annuity
Fund,
&
Apprenticeship, Journeyman Retraining,
Educ. & Indus. Fund v. Alliance Workroom
Corp., No. 13-CV-5096 (KPF), 2013 WL
6498165, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013)
(holding that CBA authorized award of
attorney’s fees and costs in action to confirm
arbitration award). Accordingly, the Court
concludes that petitioners are entitled to
recover attorney’s fees and costs.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
A “reasonable hourly rate” is “‘what a
reasonable, paying client would be willing
to pay,’ given that such a party wishes ‘to
spend the minimum necessary to litigate the
case effectively.’” Bergerson v. N.Y. State
Office of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y.
Psychiatric Ctr., 652 F.3d 277, 289 (2d Cir.
2011) (quoting Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009)).
This Court follows the Second Circuit’s
“forum rule,” which “generally requires use
of the hourly rates employed in the district
in which the reviewing court sits in
calculating the presumptively reasonable
fee.” Id. at 290 (quoting Simmons, 575 F.3d
at 174). In Arbor Hill, the Second Circuit
also instructed district courts to consider the
factors set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),
abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). See 522 F.3d
at 190. The twelve Johnson factors are:

A. Attorney’s Fees
The Court uses the “lodestar figure,”
which is determined by multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended on a
case by a reasonable hourly rate, to calculate
reasonable attorney’s fees. See Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see
also Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111,
115 (2d Cir. 1997). “Both [the Second
Circuit] and the Supreme Court have held
that the lodestar . . . creates a ‘presumptively
reasonable fee.’” Millea v. Metro–North
R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens
Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany,
522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). “[T]he
lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of
the relevant factors constituting a
‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee.” Perdue, 559
U.S. at 553 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del.
Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546, 565-66 (1986)).
Thus, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “the
lodestar method produces an award that
roughly approximates the fee that the
prevailing attorney would have received if
he or she had been representing a paying
client who was billed by the hour in a
comparable case.” Id. at 551. “The burden

(1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the level of skill
required to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of
employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the
attorney’s customary hourly rate;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) the time limitations
imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount
involved in the case and the results
obtained; (9) the experience,

6

reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the “undesirability”
of the case; (11) the nature and
length
of
the
professional
relationship with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases.

employee benefit plans in ERISA litigation”
(id. ¶ 26). Ms. Marimon also avers that the
requested hourly rate is “similar to or lower
than the rates typically charged by attorneys
of commensurate skill and experience in
similar actions [in the district].” (Id. ¶ 28.)

Id. at 186 n.3 (quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at
717-19).
“The burden rests with the
prevailing
party
‘to
justify
the
reasonableness of the requested rate.’”
Hugee, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 298 (quoting
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11
(1984)).

In light of the prevailing hourly rates in
this district and all other factors set forth in
Arbor Hill and Johnson, the Court concludes
that the hourly rate of $225 is too high,
given that Ms. Marimon and Ms. Vinyard
graduated from law school in 2014. Given
their current level of experience, the Court
concludes in its discretion that Ms.
Marimon’s and Ms. Vinyard’s time shall be
compensated at $200 per hour.

Courts in this district have concluded
that approximately $200 to $325 is a
reasonable hourly rate for senior associates,
and that $100 to $200 is a reasonable hourly
rate for more junior associates. See, e.g.,
Pall Corp. v. 3M Purification Inc., Nos. 97CV-7599
(RRM)(ETB),
03-CV-0092
(RRM)(ETB), 2012 WL 1979297, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (collecting cases).
Of course, “the range of ‘reasonable’
attorney fee rates in this district varies
depending on the type of case, the nature of
the litigation, the size of the firm, and the
expertise of its attorneys.” Siracuse v.
Program for the Dev. of Human Potential,
No. 07-CV-2205 (CLP), 2012 WL 1624291,
at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012).

Petitioners also request an hourly rate of
$100 per month for the work performed by
legal assistants. (Id. ¶ 27.) Petitioners do
not identify the legal assistant(s) for whom
fees are sought, but upon review of the
invoice submitted by petitioners’ counsel, it
appears that the entries relating to work
performed by individuals identified with the
initials “MM” and “EC” were performed by
legal assistants. (See id. Ex. F.) In light of
the prevailing hourly rates in this district and
all other factors set forth in Arbor Hill and
Johnson, the Court concludes that $90 per
hour, instead of $100 per hour, is a
reasonable rate for the legal assistants who
worked on this case. See Trs. of Empire
State Carpenters Annuity v. C.R. Edwards
Constr. Co., No. 15-CV-5232 (JFB)(ARL),
2016 WL 6875969, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
22, 2016) (awarding $90 per hour for legal
assistant). Accordingly, the time for “MM”
and “EC” shall be compensated at $90 per
hour.

Here, petitioners request an hourly rate
of $225 for Virginia & Ambinder, LLP
associates Nicole Marimon and Claire
Vinyard.
(Am. Pet. ¶¶ 25-26.)
Ms.
Marimon is a 2014 graduate of Fordham
University School of Law and Ms. Vinyard
is a 2014 graduate of New York University
School of Law. (Id.) Ms. Marimon avers
that she “has handled the prosecution of
several ERISA collection actions” (id. ¶ 25)
and that “Ms. Vinyard’s primary practice
area is the representation of multiemployer
7

shows that Ms. Marimon, Ms. Vinyard,
“MM,” and “EC” billed 4.6 hours on this
matter. (Id.)

2. Reasonable Hours
Having determined a reasonable hourly
rate for petitioners’ counsel and legal
assistants, the Court must determine the
reasonable number of hours expended by
petitioners’ counsel in this litigation.

At the outset, the Court concludes that
the
invoice
printout
satisfies
the
contemporaneous records requirement.
Courts accept the printout of an invoice that
provides “a clear description of the work
performed, the time spent on the respective
matter, the attorney who rendered services,
and the date the services were performed.”
Big R Food Warehouses v. Local 338
RWDSU, 896 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D.N.Y.
1995); see also, e.g., Home Loan Inv. Bank,
F.S.B. v. Goodness & Mercy, Inc., No. 10CV-4677 (ADS)(ETB), 2012 WL 1078963,
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL
1078886 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012); Fuerst
v. Fuerst, No. 10-CV-3941, 2012 WL
1145934, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012);
New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. v. St. Pierre, No.
02-CV-981 (FJS)(RFT), 2007 WL 655603,
at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007); Boster v.
Braccia, No. 06-CV-4756 (JG)(RER), 2007
WL 4287704, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4,
2007).
The time record submitted by
petitioners provides this information in
sufficient detail, as it includes a description
of the work performed, the initials of the
individual who performed the work, the
dates on which the work was performed, and
the amount of time spent on the various
projects (Am. Pet. Ex. F), and Ms. Marimon
avers that it is a contemporaneous time
record (id. ¶ 24).

“The party seeking attorney’s fees also
bears the burden of establishing that the
number of hours for which compensation is
sought is reasonable.” Custodio v. Am.
Chain Link & Const., Inc., No. 06-CV-7148
(GBD) (HBP), 2014 WL 116147, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2014) (citing Cruz v.
Local Union No. 3 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1160 (2d Cir.
1994)). “Applications for fee awards should
generally
be
documented
by
contemporaneously created time records that
specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours
expended, and the nature of the work done.”
Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173
(2d Cir. 1998). “Hours that are ‘excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,’ are to
be excluded, and in dealing with such
surplusage, the court has discretion simply
to deduct a reasonable percentage of the
number of hours claimed ‘as a practical
means of trimming fat from a fee
application.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 434; then quoting N.Y. Ass’n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d
1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also Lunday
v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.
1994) (“We do not require that the court set
forth item-by-item findings concerning what
may be countless objections to individual
billing items.”).

In addition, the Court concludes that 4.6
hours is a reasonable number of hours billed,
given the description of the tasks performed
and the fact that the motion was unopposed.
Accordingly, the Court calculates the
lodestar figure to be $678.00.

Petitioners have submitted a printout of
an invoice sent by Virginia & Ambinder,
LLP to the Funds for professional services
rendered in connection with the instant
action. (Am. Pet. Ex. F.) This invoice

8