Hankins v. Nassau County Jail et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as ag ainst the Jail and the Department for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS M&O WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM THE DA TE AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE. Alternatively, Plaintiff may pursue his state law negligence claims in state court. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and theref ore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 6/6/2018. C/M (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
WILLIAM HANKINS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
17-CV-07259(JS)(ARL)

-againstNASSAU COUNTY JAIL, and NASSAU
COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
William Hankins, pro se
17000772
Nassau County Correctional Center
100 Carman Avenue
East Meadow, NY 11554
For Defendants:

No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On December 15, 2017, incarcerated pro se plaintiff
William Hankins (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the Nassau
County

Jail

Department

(the
(the

“Jail”),

and

“Department”

the
and

Nassau

County

together,

Sheriff’s

“Defendants”),

accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Upon

review

of

the

declaration

in

support

of

the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of

the

filing

fee.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1914(a);

1915(a)(1).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED. However, for the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Section
1983 claims against the Jail and the Department are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.
THE COMPLAINT1
Plaintiff’s Complaint is submitted on the Court’s Section
1983 Complaint form and is brief.

The Statement of Claim, in its

entirety, alleges:
I was housed in Nassau County Jail in housing
unit E2F cell 41. It was raining outside and
my cell was leaking real bad. They open the
doors for showers I began to leave the cell,
and before I got out I slipped and fell before
I walked out of the cell.
Due to the rain
water dropping in the cell, the County Jail
and Sheriff Dept are grossly negligent.
(Compl. ¶ IV.)

In the space on the Complaint form that calls for

a description of any claimed injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he
has “lower back and neck pain” for which he has been given “2
different muscle relaxers and 2 different pain pills” but “none
help at all.” (Compl. ¶ IV.A.) For relief, Plaintiff requests “50
thousand dollars for negligence, physical pain and suffering.”
(Compl. ¶ V.)
DISCUSSION
I.

In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declarations in support of his

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that

1

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purposes of this Memorandum and
Order. Excerpts from the Complaint as reproduced here exactly as
they appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation,
and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
2

Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of the filing fees.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from

such

1915A(b).

relief.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination.

See id. § 1915A(b).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).

However, a complaint must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
3

Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).

While

“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III.

Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361, 132
S. Ct. 1497, 1501–02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).
under

Section

1983,

a

plaintiff

must

To state a claim

“‘allege

that

(1)

the

challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person
who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States.’”

Rae v. Cty. of Suffolk, 693 F. Supp. 2d

217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53
(2d Cir. 1999)).
A.

Claims Against the Jail and the Department
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the Jail and the

Department are not plausible because neither entity has independent
legal identity.

It is well-established that “under New York law,
4

departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality
do

not

have

a

legal

identity

separate

and

apart

municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”

from

the

Davis v.

Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002);
see also Hawkins v. Nassau Cty. Corr. Fac., 781 F. Supp. 2d 107,
109 at n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing claims against Nassau County
Jail because it is an “administrative arm[ ] . . . of the County of
Nassau, and thus lacks the capacity to be sued as a separate
entity”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Trahan
v. Suffolk Cty. Corr. Fac., 12–CV–4353, 2012 WL 5904730, *3
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012) (dismissing claims against the Suffolk
County Jail because it “is an administrative arm of Suffolk County,
without

an

independent

legal

identity.”).

Thus,

Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims against the Jail and the Department are not
plausible and are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b).

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status

and affording his Complaint a liberal construction, the Court has
considered whether Plaintiff has alleged a plausible Section 1983
claim against the municipality, Nassau County, and finds that he
has not for the reasons that follow.
1.

Claims As Construed Against Nassau County
It is well-established that a municipality such as Nassau

County cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S.
5

658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Roe v.
City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008).

To prevail on

a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show
“that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the
alleged constitutional injury.”

Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d

324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct.
1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011)); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at
690–91.

“[L]ocal governments . . . may be sued for constitutional

deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though
such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s
official decisionmaking channels.”

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–691

(internal citation omitted).
To establish the existence of a municipal policy or
custom, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a formal
policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality, see
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359; (2) actions taken or decisions made by
municipal

policymaking

officials,

i.e.,

officials

with

final

decisionmaking authority, which caused the alleged violation of the
plaintiff’s civil rights, see Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford,
361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 57
(2d Cir. 2000); (3) a practice “so persistent and widespread as to
practically have the force of law,” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359;
see also Green v. City of N.Y., 465 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2006), or
that “was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of
6

senior policy-making officials,” Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, N.Y.,
375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citations

omitted);

or

(4)

that

“a

policymaking

official

exhibit[ed] deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations
caused by subordinates.” Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (internal quotation
marks

and

citations

omitted);

see

also

Okin

v.

Vill.

of

Cornwall–on–Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009)
(A municipal custom may be found when “‘faced with a pattern of
misconduct,

[the

municipality]

does

nothing,

compelling

the

conclusion that [it] has acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its
subordinates’ unlawful actions.’”) (quoting Reynolds v. Giuliani,
506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007) (second alteration in original)).
Here, even affording the pro se Complaint a liberal
construction, there are no factual allegations from which the Court
could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 cause of action
against Nassau County. Indeed, “[a] single incident in a complaint
. . . does not suffice to show a municipal policy.”

DeCarlo v.

Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and
citation

omitted).

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s

Complaint,

as

construed against Nassau County does not allege a plausible Section
1983 claim.
C.

Leave to Amend
Given

the

Second

Circuit’s

guidance

that

a

pro

se

complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless
7

amendment would be futile, Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000), the Court has carefully considered whether leave to
amend is warranted here. Because the defects in Plaintiff’s claims
against the Jail and the Department are substantive and would not
be cured if afforded an opportunity to amend, leave to amend the
Complaint against the Jail and the Department is DENIED.

However,

in an abundance of caution, Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an
Amended Complaint in order to allege any valid claims he may have
against

the

municipality,

Nassau

County,

and/or

any

proper

Defendant. Any Amended Complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended
Complaint”, shall bear the same docket number as this Memorandum
and Order (“M&O”), 17-CV-7259(JS)(ARL), and shall be filed within
thirty (30) days from the date of this M&O. Plaintiff is cautioned
that

an

Amended

Complaint

completely

replaces

the

original.

Therefore Plaintiff must include any and all claims against any
Defendant(s) he seeks to pursue in the Amended Complaint.
Alternatively, given that it appears that Plaintiff seeks
to pursue state law negligence claims against the Defendants,
Plaintiff may pursue any such claims in state court rather than
amend his Complaint in this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is
sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the Jail and the
8

Department for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO

FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS M&O WITHIN THIRTY
(30) DAYS FROM THE DATE AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE. Alternatively,
Plaintiff may pursue his state law negligence claims in state
court.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,

82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy
of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: June
6 , 2018
Central Islip, New York

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