Rodriguez v. Nassau Police Department et al

Filing 8

ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the NC PD for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as against John Doe for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 191 5A(b)(1). Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS M&O WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM THE DATE AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Orde r would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 6/6/2018. C/M (Valle, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
JOSE RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
18-CV-00203(JS)(AKT)

-againstNASSAU COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
and JOHN DOE,

Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Jose Rodriguez, pro se
17002714
Nassau County Correctional Center
100 Carman Avenue
East Meadow, NY 11554
For Defendants:

No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:
On January 12, 2018, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Jose
Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the Nassau County Police
Department (the “NCPD”) and an unidentified police officer alleged
to work at the Baldwin Police Department (“John Doe” and together,
“Defendants”), accompanied by an application to proceed in forma
pauperis.
Upon

review

of

the

declaration

in

support

of

the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment
of

the

filing

fee.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1914(a);

1915(a)(1).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED.

However, for the reasons that follow, the Complaint is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the NCPD and WITHOUT PREJUDICE
as against John Doe for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
THE COMPLAINT1
Plaintiff’s Complaint is submitted on the Court’s Section
1983 Complaint form and is brief.

The Statement of Claim is a

total of three sentences and, in its entirety, alleges:
I can’t understand what they said and I’m
deaf. I need to have an interpreter at police
station during interrogation.
John Doe
confuse to provide interpreter.
(Compl. ¶ IV.) Plaintiff has left blank the space on the Complaint
form that calls for a description of any claimed injuries. (Compl.
¶

IV.A.)

For

relief,

Plaintiff

“want[s]

to

sue

the

police

department for discriminated failure to have an interpreter at
police station.

During interrogation they violente my due process

they not gave me the interpreter.”

(Compl. ¶ V.)

DISCUSSION
I.

In Forma Pauperis Application
Upon review of Plaintiff’s declarations in support of his

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment

1

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
are presumed to be true for the purposes of this Memorandum and
Order. Excerpts from the Complaint as reproduced here exactly as
they appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation,
and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
2

of the filing fees.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
II.

Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from

such

1915A(b).

relief.

See

28

U.S.C.

§§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination.

See id. § 1915A(b).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197,
200 (2d Cir. 2004).

However, a complaint must plead sufficient

facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. at 678; accord Wilson v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).
3

While

“‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
at

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

FED. R.

CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512,
122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002).

This short and plain

statement must be “sufficient to give the defendants fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Jones v. Nat’l Commc’ns and Surveillance Networks, 266 F. App’x 31,
32 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted) (unpublished opinion).

“The statement should be plain

because the principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules
is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so
as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.”

Salahuddin v.

Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
Under the now well-established Iqbal/Twombly standard, a
complaint satisfies Rule 8 only if it contains enough allegations
of fact to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its
face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

This

“plausibility standard” is governed by “[t]wo working principles.”
4

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670, 678; accord Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66,
71–72 (2d Cir. 2009).

First, although the Court must accept all

allegations

this

as

true,

“tenet”

is

“inapplicable

to

legal

conclusions;” thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, 557 (a pleading that offers “labels and conclusion” or “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement” does not
satisfy Rule 8).

Second, only complaints that state a “plausible

claim for relief” can survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at

679.

Determining

whether

a

complaint

does

so

is

“a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.; accord Harris, 572
F.3d at 72. “When a complaint does not comply with the requirement
that it be short and plain, the court has the power, on its own
initiative or in response to a motion by the defendant, to strike
any portions that are redundant or immaterial . . . or to dismiss
the complaint.”

Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also
requires that a pleading must contain “a demand for the relief
sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different
types of relief.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3).

When a complaint fails

to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading standard, including a demand for
relief, a district court may dismiss the complaint sua sponte.
5

France v. Nassau Cty. Jail, 14-CV-2547, 2014 WL 1871937, *5
(E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2014) (dismissing pro se complaint that, inter
alia, did not seek any relief).
IV.

Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361, 132
S. Ct. 1497, 1501–02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).
under

Section

1983,

a

plaintiff

must

To state a claim

“‘allege

that

(1)

the

challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person
who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States.’”

Rae v. Cty. of Suffolk, 693 F. Supp. 2d

217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53
(2d Cir. 1999)).
A.

Claims Against the NCPD
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the NCPD are not

plausible because it has no independent legal identity.

It is

well-established that “under New York law, departments that are
merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal
identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore,
6

cannot sue or be sued.”

Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F.

Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Hawkins v. Nassau Cty.
Corr. Fac., 781 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 at n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(dismissing claims against Nassau County Jail because it is an
“administrative arm[ ] . . . of the County of Nassau, and thus
lacks the capacity to be sued as a separate entity”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

Thus, Plaintiff’s Section

1983 claims against the NCPD is not plausible and is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b).
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status and affording his Complaint a
liberal construction, the Court has considered whether Plaintiff
has

alleged

a

plausible

Section

1983

claim

against

the

municipality, Nassau County, and finds that he has not for the
reasons that follow.
1.

Claims As Construed Against Nassau County
It is well-established that a municipality such as Nassau

County cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S.

658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Roe v.
City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008).

To prevail on

a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show
“that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the
alleged constitutional injury.”

Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d

324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
7

60, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011)); see also
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. “[L]ocal governments . . . may be sued
for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental
‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”

Monell, 436

U.S. at 690–691 (internal citation omitted).
To establish the existence of a municipal policy or
custom, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a formal
policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality, see
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359; (2) actions taken or decisions made by
municipal

policymaking

officials,

i.e.,

officials

with

final

decisionmaking authority, which caused the alleged violation of the
plaintiff’s civil rights, see Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford,
361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 57
(2d Cir. 2000); (3) a practice “so persistent and widespread as to
practically have the force of law,” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359;
see also Green v. City of N.Y., 465 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2006), or
that “was so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of
senior policy-making officials,” Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, N.Y.,
375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citations

omitted);

or

(4)

that

“a

policymaking

official

exhibit[ed] deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations
caused by subordinates.” Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (internal quotation
marks

and

citations

omitted);
8

see

also

Okin

v.

Vill.

of

Cornwall–on–Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009)
(A municipal custom may be found when “‘faced with a pattern of
misconduct,

[the

municipality]

does

nothing,

compelling

the

conclusion that [it] has acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its
subordinates’ unlawful actions.’”) (quoting Reynolds v. Giuliani,
506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007) (second alteration in original)).
Here, even affording the pro se Complaint a liberal
construction, there are no factual allegations from which the Court
could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 cause of action
against Nassau County. Indeed, “[a] single incident in a complaint
. . . does not suffice to show a municipal policy.”

DeCarlo v.

Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and
citation

omitted).

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s

Complaint,

as

construed against Nassau County does not allege a plausible Section
1983 claim.
C.

Claim Against John Doe
Here, as is readily apparent, Plaintiff’s Complaint does

not comport with the pleading requirements of Rule 8, and fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted even when read
liberally.

Plaintiff’s

sparse

submission

does

not

allege

sufficient facts such that the Court may reasonably construe any
plausible claims against John Doe. Nor does the Complaint seek any
relief as is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3).
Because a party must plead with sufficient factual detail to
9

“‘nudge[ ] [his or her] claims ... across the line from conceivable
to plausible.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at

570)),

Plaintiff’s

remaining

claims

are

DISMISSED

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1).
D.

Leave to Amend
Given

the

Second

Circuit’s

guidance

that

a

pro

se

complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless
amendment would be futile, Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000), the Court has carefully considered whether leave to
amend is warranted here. Because the defects in Plaintiff’s claims
against the NCPD are substantive and would not be cured if afforded
an opportunity to amend, leave to amend the Complaint against the
NCPD is DENIED.
However, in an abundance of caution, Plaintiff is GRANTED
leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to allege any valid
claims he may have against the municipality, Nassau County, and/or
any proper Defendant.

Any Amended Complaint shall be clearly

labeled “Amended Complaint”, shall bear the same docket number as
this Memorandum and Order (“M&O”), 18-CV-0203(JS)(AKT), and shall
be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of this M&O.
Plaintiff

is

cautioned

replaces the original.

that

an

Amended

Complaint

completely

Therefore Plaintiff must include any and

all claims against any Defendant(s) he seeks to pursue in the
Amended

Complaint.

If

Plaintiff
10

does

not

have

sufficient

information at this time to identify the police officer he seeks to
sue, Plaintiff may continue to name such individual as “John Doe”
but shall include factual allegations of conduct or inaction
attributable to him in support of Plaintiff’s claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however the Complaint is
sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the NCPD for failure
to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
1915A(b)(1).

The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as

against John Doe for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO

FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS M&O WITHIN THIRTY
(30) DAYS FROM THE DATE AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose of
any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45,

82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy
of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June
6 , 2018
Central Islip, New York

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
11