Rechler v. United Van Lines LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION & ORDER re 5 motion by the Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FED. R. CIV. P." or "Rule") 12(b)(6), seeking to dismiss Mayflower and Chipman from the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons stated above, the Defendants motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint against Chipman and Mayflower, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is granted. The Plaintiffs only claim against Chipman and May flower is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate Chipman and Mayflower as parties to this action and to amend the caption as further set forth herein. SEE ATTACHED DECISION for details. Chipman Relocation & Logistics and Mayflower Transit, LLC terminated. SO ORDERED by Judge Arthur D. Spatt on 11/26/2018. (Coleman, Laurie)
FILED
CLERK
1:55 pm, Nov 26, 2018
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------X
DEBRA RECHLER,
MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION & ORDER
2:18-cv-03960 (ADS)(GRB)
Plaintiff,
-againstUNITED VAN LINES LLC d/b/a UNITED,
MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, LLC and CHIPMAN
RELOCATION & LOGISTICS,
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES:
Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C.
Counsel for the Plaintiff
1425 RXR Plaza
Uniondale, NY 11556
By:
Jonathan C. Sullivan, Esq., Of Counsel
George W. Wright & Associates, LLC
Counsel for the Defendants
88 Pine Street
New York, NY 10005
By:
George W. Wright, Esq., Of Counsel
SPATT, District Judge:
Debra Rechler (“Rechler” or the “Plaintiff”) commenced this action against United Van
Lines LLC d/b/a United (“United”), Mayflower Transit LLC (“Mayflower”), and Chipman
Relocation & Logistics (“Chipman”) (together, the “Defendants”) after her possessions were
allegedly damaged in a long-distance move during the fall of 2016. The Plaintiff alleges that the
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Defendants are liable under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, for the damage caused
to the Plaintiff’s personal possessions.
Presently before the Court is a motion by the Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“FED. R. CIV. P.” or “Rule”) 12(b)(6), seeking to dismiss Mayflower and Chipman
from the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
For the following reasons, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the Plaintiff’s complaint, and
for the purposes of the instant motion, are construed in favor of the Plaintiff.
On October 24, 2014, Rechler signed a Bill of Lading contract (the “Bill of Lading”) to
move her personal possessions from Los Angeles, California to Sands Point, New York. The Bill
of Lading lists United as the motor carrier and Chipman as the agent. The Plaintiff paid $64,104.52
to move her property, which weighed 47,977 pounds and was valued at a combined sum of
$306,900.00. At the time of the move, the Plaintiff’s property was in good condition without
damage. United picked up the goods on October 28, 2014 from the Plaintiff’s residence and
delivered them to her new residence on or about November 5, 2014.
The complaint alleges that when her shipment arrived in Sands Point, New York, many of
her belongings were damaged, including a foyer chandelier; bedroom chandelier; marble table;
bedroom nightstand; gilt & rock crystal table; wood chest; fruitwood chair; corner consoles; rose
quarts; rock crystal sconces; dining table; dining room sideboard; antique pot; silk velvet settee;
theater chaise; armoire; mirror; coffee table base; glass sconce; boule cabinet; chinoiserie desk;
two table chairs; white silk velvet chair; floor lamp; gold gilt wall brackets; bronze crystal
chandelier; hanging lanterns; marble desk and framed print. The Plaintiff contacted United to
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inform it of the damaged objects. United conceded that it damaged all of the items-at-issue except
(1) corner consoles; (2) a marble desk; and (3) gold gilt wall brackets. For the other items, United
agreed to provide cash allowances or repair them.
The Plaintiff contends that the cash allowances offered by United are insufficient and do
not reflect the true value of the items, which she believes received damage in excess of $150,000.
At that time, United purportedly demanded that Rechler pay a balance of $17,618.00 owed to
Chipman for transportation fees. The Plaintiff was required to pay this sum for United to begin
repairs or provide cash allowances. Rechler and Chipman never signed a contract regarding the
Plaintiff’s move.
Upon information and belief, the Plaintiff claims that Mayflower and Chipman are
affiliated with United and that they were also responsible for shipping and/or packing Rechler’s
items.
II. DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW: FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6)
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the
factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the Plaintiff. See, e.g., Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng’rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d
561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016); Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013); Cleveland v. Caplaw
Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006); Bold Elec., Inc. v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 465, 469
(2d Cir. 1995); Reed v. Garden City Union Free Sch. Dist., 987 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
Under the Twombly standard, the Court may only dismiss a complaint if it does not contain
enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The Second Circuit
has expounded that, after Twombly, the Court’s inquiry under Rule 12(b)(6) is guided by two
principles:
First, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and [t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss and [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).
A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,” in order to survive a motion to dismiss. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule
8, a complaint is not required to allege “detailed factual allegations.” Kendall v. Caliber Home
Loans, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 168, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “In
ruling on a motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the duty of a court ‘is merely to assess the
legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered
in support thereof.’” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998)). The Court “[is] not bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
B. CONSIDERATION OF MATERIALS OUTSIDE THE COMPLAINT
Both parties have submitted declarations in support of their respective positions and
exhibits attached to those declarations which contain supplemental materials.
“[F]ederal courts have complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the
submission of any material beyond the pleadings offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6)
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motion.” Giugliano v. F3² Capital Partners, LLC, No. 14-cv-7240, 2015 WL 5124796, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2015) (Spatt, J.) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Halebian v.
Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 131 n.7 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting the Second Circuit has recognized “exceptions
to Rule 12(b)(6)’s general prohibition against considering materials outside the four corners of the
complaint”). In adjudicating this motion, the Court is permitted to consider:
(1) facts alleged in the complaint and documents attached to it or incorporated in it
by reference, (2) documents “integral” to the complaint and relied upon in it, even
if not attached or incorporated by reference, (3) documents or information
contained in [the] defendant’s motion papers if plaintiff has knowledge or
possession of the material and relied on it in framing the complaint, (4) public
disclosure documents required by law to be, and that have been, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and (5) facts of which judicial notice may
properly be taken under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Envtl. Servs. v. Recycle Green Servs., 7 F. Supp. 3d 260, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Spatt, J.) (quoting
In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d in part and vacated
in part on other grounds sub nom. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d
25 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 71, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 164 L. Ed. 2d 179
(2006)); accord Healthnow New York, Inc. v. Catholic Health Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-986S, 2015
WL 5673123 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2015); Oberstein v. SunPower Corp., No. 07-cv-1155, 2010
WL 1705868, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2010).
After reviewing the Complaint in conjunction with these materials, the Court finds that
these documents are either incorporated in the Complaint by reference or were relied upon heavily
in drafting the complaint and are thus “integral” to the complaint. The Plaintiff “‘relie[d] heavily
upon [these documents’] terms and effect,’ thereby rendering the document[s] ‘integral’ to the
complaint.’” DiFolco, 622 F.3d at 111 (internal citations omitted). See, e.g., Gesualdi v. Fazio,
No. 16-CV-5209, 2017 WL 8794775, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017), report and
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recommendation adopted sub nom. Pearson Capital Partners LLC v. James River Ins. Co., 151 F.
Supp. 3d 392, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The Complaint thus ‘relies on the terms and effect’ of the
[letters], rendering those documents ‘integral’ to the Complaint and appropriate for consideration
in adjudicating a motion to dismiss.” (internal citations omitted)); Johnson v. Levy, 812 F. Supp.
2d 167, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Spatt, J.) (considering letters because “they were incorporated by
reference and … integral to the complaint”).
Accordingly, the Court will consider the parties’ supporting documents for purposes of
adjudicating the instant motion.
C. THE CARMACK AMENDMENT
The Plaintiff’s only cause of action alleges liability under the Carmack Amendment, 49
U.S.C. § 14706, for the damage caused during the move. The Defendants contend that Rechler is
precluded from asserting Carmack Amendment claims against Mayflower and Chipman.
The Carmack Amendment was enacted in 1906 as an amendment to the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887. It’s intention was to provide interstate carriers with uniformity and
additional confidence in assessing their risks and understanding potential liability. Project Hope
v. M/V IBN SINA, 250 F.3d 67, 73 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving,
Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1998); Shao v. Link Cargo (Tiawan) Ltd., 986 F.2d 700, 704 (4th
Cir. 1993)). It establishes a single uniform regime for shippers to recover from interstate carriers
and preempts state and common law claims against an interstate carrier for loss or damage during
a shipment. Id. (citing Windows, Inc. v. Jordan Panel Sys. Corp., 177 F.3d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir.
1999); Ward v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 231 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 2000)). See generally Jeanne
Kaiser, Moving Violations: An Examination of the Broad Preemptive Effect of the Carmack
Amendment, 20 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 289, 294-301 (1998).
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The statute reads, in relevant part:
A carrier providing transportation or service under chapter I or III of chapter 135
shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation under
this part. That carrier and any other carrier that delivers the property and is
providing transportation or service [under this Act] are liable to the person entitled
to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this
paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by (A) the receiving
carrier, (B) the delivering carrier, or (C) another carrier over whose line or route
the property is transported in the United States.... Failure to issue a receipt or bill
of lading does not affect the liability of a carrier.
46 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). “[T]he Second Circuit has concluded that the statutory scheme provided
by the Carmack Amendment is the exclusive remedy whereby a shipper may seek reimbursement
from a carrier for damage to his or her property that occurred during shipment.” Guru Kripa
Foods, Inc. v. Inter, Inc., No. 10-CV-0229, 2012 WL 3306520, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012)
(quoting Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Forward Air, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)); see also N. Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir.
1978) (“Congress has created a broad, comprehensive scheme covering the interstate shipment of
freight, aimed at preventing preferential treatment among shippers and establishing national
equality of rates and services. This has occupied the field to the exclusion of state law.”).
The Defendants argue that as a statutory household goods agent, Chipman cannot be held
liable pursuant to a bill of lading contract under the Carmack Amendment. 49 U.S.C. § 13907
states that:
Each motor carrier providing transportation of household goods shall be
responsible for all acts or omissions of any of its agents which relate to the
performance of household goods transportation services (including accessorial or
terminal services) and which are within the actual or apparent authority of the agent
from the carrier or which are ratified by the carrier.
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49 U.S.C. § 13907(a). Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 13907, Chipman, as United’s disclosed household
goods agent has no independent liability from that of United arising out of a shipment which is
registered to ship pursuant to United’s federal interstate operating authority.
In support of its motion, the Defendants have exhibited the bill of lading signed by the
Plaintiff, which identifies Chipman as United’s agent. As a disclosed household goods agent of
United, Chipman provided booking, origin, hauling, transportation or destination services for
United’s interstate shipments, which are in accordance with a certificate of authority granted by
the Department of Transportation. The Plaintiff does not dispute the Defendants assertion that
Chipman acted as an agent of United, its disclosed principal, when transporting Rechler’s property
to New York.
As United’s agent, Chipman is not liable for any alleged breach of the bill of lading.
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U.S.C. § 13907 precludes Chipman’s liability under the Carmack Amendment as a matter of law.
See Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Dreschler, 761 F.2d 855, 860 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding
that an agent is not liable if a principal’s contract is breached because “[w]hen an agent makes a
contract for a disclosed principal, it becomes neither a party to the contract nor liable for the
performance of the contract” (citing Restatement (2d) of Agency §§ 320, 328)); Nichols v.
Mayflower Transit, LLC, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (D. Nev. 2003) (dismissing Carmack
Amendment claim against motor carrier’s agent pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 13907); Taylor v.
Mayflower Transit, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 651, 658 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (granting summary judgment
as to Defendants because “[e]ven though these ‘household goods agents’ appear to have been
primarily responsible for this debacle, federal law provides that if liability is found, Mayflower [as
the motor carrier] is liable for the acts and/or omissions of its participating disclosed household
goods agents”); O’Donnell v. Earle W. Noyes & Sons, 98 F. Supp. 2d 60, 63 (D. Me. 2000)
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(dismissing defendant from Carmack Amendment action and noting that “the courts have regularly
applied agency principles to Carmack Amendment claims”); Werner v. Lawrence Transp. Sys.,
Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 567, 568-69 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (dismissing Carmack Amendment claim because
“[n]ot only does the statutory language impose liability on a motor carrier for the acts and
omissions of the carrier’s agent, but case law holds that the agent of a disclosed principal cannot
be held liable pursuant to a duly issued bill of lading contract”); Fox v. Kachina Moving & Storage,
No. 3:98-CV-0842, 1998 WL 760268, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 1998) (dismissing defendant from
case because as an agent of the disclosed principal, there can be no liability under the Carmack
Amendment).
The Plaintiff also asserts that Mayflower is at least partially liable for her damaged
property. Specifically, Rechler alleges that Mayflower had “some involvement” in the shipment
based on a group of documents that displayed Mayflower’s logo. However, she has not alleged
any facts that allow the Court to conclude that Mayflower’s role in her shipment exceeded that of
United’s agent. Even if Mayflower assisted in some manner with shipping and/or packing the
Plaintiff’s property, Rechler does not claim that she had any agreement with Mayflower separate
from the Bill of Lading nor does she assert that Mayflower’s actions were ultra vires, or outside
its actual or apparent authority.
Rather, the complaint stipulates that United is responsible for any damages by Mayflower
pursuant to the Bill of Lading signed by the Plaintiff. Without any allegations that Mayflower’s
conduct exceeded that of the Bill of Lading, there is no basis for direct liability for its own acts or
omissions. Accordingly, any responsibility Mayflower may have for alleged damages under the
Carmack Amendment exclusively lies with United. See Werner, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 568-69
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(dismissing Carmack Amendment claim because “statutory language impose[s] liability on a
motor carrier for the acts and omissions of the carrier’s agent”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint
against Chipman and Mayflower, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is granted. The Plaintiff’s only claim
against Chipman and Mayflower is dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate Chipman and Mayflower as
parties to this action and to amend the caption as follows:
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DEBRA RECHLER,
Plaintiff,
-againstUNITED VAN LINES LLC d/b/a UNITED
Defendant.
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It is SO ORDERED:
Dated: Central Islip, New York
November 26, 2018
___/s/ Arthur D. Spatt_____
ARTHUR D. SPATT
United States District Judge
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