Madison Aquisition Group, LLC v. Local 259, United Auto Workers, AFL-CIO et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER; Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 8) is DENIED. Further, within ten days of this Memorandum & Order, the parties shall advise the Court, in writing, how they intend to proceed in this action, including whether Defendants intend to renew their request to file a motion to dismiss this action. So Ordered by Judge Joanna Seybert on 11/18/2021. C/ECF (Valle, Christine)
Case 2:21-cv-05685-JS-JMW Document 23 Filed 11/18/21 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 199
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
MADISON ACQUISITION GROUP, LLC,
Plaintiff,
-againstLOCAL 259 UNITED AUTO WORKERS,
AFL-CIO and INTERNATIONAL UNION,
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA, UAW,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
21-CV-5685(JS)(JMW)
Defendants.
-----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Christopher A. Smith, Esq.
Scott P Trivella, Esq.
Trivella Forte & Smith, LLP
1311 Mamaroneck Avenue, Suite 170
White Plains, New York 10605
For Defendants:
Jeremy E. Meyer, Esq.
Cleary, Josem & Trigiani LLP
325 Chestnut Street, Suite 200
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
SEYBERT, District Judge:
On October 20, 2021, to preserve the status quo, this
Court issued an Order temporarily restraining Defendants from
compelling arbitration under the parties’ collective bargaining
agreement and ordering Defendants to show cause why a preliminary
injunction should not enter.
Upon consideration of the parties’
submissions, and the arguments made at the show cause hearing held
on November 16, 2021, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
meet its burden to obtain a preliminary injunction pursuant to
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1
Accordingly, for
Case 2:21-cv-05685-JS-JMW Document 23 Filed 11/18/21 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 200
the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for
a preliminary injunction.
BACKGROUND
I.
Factual Background
Madison Acquisition Group, LLC d/b/a BMW of Southampton
(“Plaintiff” or “MAG”) owns an auto dealership located at 35
Montauk
Highway,
Southampton,
New
York
11968-4122
(the
“Southampton Dealership”) that employs mechanics, technicians, and
service shop employees represented by Local 259 UAW, AFL-CIO
(“Local 259”). 1
(Smith Petition, Ex. D, ECF No. 8-4, ¶ 2, attached
to Mot. for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 8.)
Local 259
also represents employees at two other dealerships -- the “Jaguar
Dealership” and the “Chrysler Dealership” -- that Local 259 claims,
together with the Southampton Dealership, “constitute a family of
companies” under the “common control” of Jonathan Sobel, although
it concedes that it “does not know the precise corporate structure
between the various entities and holding companies.” (Defs. Opp’n,
ECF No. 13, at 3; Schneck Aff., Ex. A, ECF No. 13-1, ¶ 4, attached
to Defs. Opp’n.)
at
the
Jaguar,
According to Defendants, the Local 259 employees
Chrysler,
and
Southampton
participate in the same 401(k) plan.
Dealerships
all
(Defs. Opp’n at 3; Schneck
Plaintiff also names as Defendant the International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW.
1
2
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Aff. ¶ 9.)
The
technicians
terms
and
and
mechanics
conditions
at
the
of
employment
Southampton
for
the
Dealership
are
governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between
Local 259 and MAG.
Opp’n.)
(CBA, Ex. A, ECF No. 13-2, attached to Defs.
Central to the parties’ dispute is Article 36 of the CBA,
which states as follows:
The Employer [MAG] shall provide a 401(k) Plan
on behalf of all unit employees.
Such plan
shall provide for unit employee contributions
only. Notwithstanding however, in the event
the Employer were to make contributions on
behalf of any non-bargaining unit employee or
any other employee in another bargaining unit
employed by the Employer equal contributions
shall be made on behalf of all Local 259
bargaining unit employees enrolled in the
plan. Upon written request by the Union, the
Employer shall provide any and all payroll
documentation (i.e., payroll register) for an
in-camera review by a party to be determined
by the Union, to determine compliance with
this Article.
(CBA, Ex. A, Art. 36.)
Thus, under Article 36, MAG must provide
each of its Local 259 employees with a 401(k) plan to which that
employee can make contributions.
However, in the event MAG “were
to make contributions” to its non-union employees or other union
employees, 2
it
would
be
obligated
to
make
equal
employer
contributions to its Local 259 employees.
According to the testimony of Jay Decker, General Manager of the
Southampton Dealership, MAG does not employ members of any other
union at the Southampton Dealership.
2
3
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Further, Article 9 of the CBA contains a grievance and
arbitration procedure that applies to “[a]ny dispute concerning
the interpretation or application of the terms of the [CBA] or any
dispute between the parties.”
(Id. at Art. 9.A.)
Pursuant to
Article 9, in the event the parties are unable to resolve the
dispute
internally,
“the
dispute
shall
be
submitted
to
arbitration,” and if the parties cannot agree to an arbitrator,
then “the matter shall be submitted to the American Arbitration
Association,”
whose
“findings,
decisions
and
awards
shall
final, binding, and conclusive on both of the parties.”
Art. 9.B.1.)
be
(Id. at
Article 9 further provides that “[n]o arbitrator
shall have any power to add to, subtract from, alter, change, or
modify any term of this Agreement.”
(Id. at Art. 9.B.2.)
II. Procedural History
Sometime in August 2021, it came to the attention of
Brian Schneck, Local 259’s President, that the contracts governing
its members’ employment at the Jaguar and Chrysler Dealerships
committed those employers, not MAG, to make contributions to their
Local 259 employees’ 401(k) plans.
Local 259 conferred with
Plaintiff’s counsel and expressed its position that this fact
triggered
Plaintiff’s
contributions
to
the
obligation
Local
259
under
Article
employees
at
the
36
to
make
Southampton
Dealership. Unable to resolve the dispute internally, on September
21, 2021, Local 259 notified Plaintiff of its intent to schedule
4
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an arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (the
“AAA”) to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding the scope of
Plaintiff’s obligations to contribute to the 401(k) plan pursuant
to the CBA.
to
Defs.
(Not. Intent to Arb., Ex. D, ECF No. 13-5, attached
Opp’n.)
In
response,
Plaintiff
sought
a
temporary
restraining order in New York State Court enjoining Defendants
from
compelling
arbitration
of
the
matter;
application was denied for insufficient notice.
however,
that
(See State Action
Order to Show Cause, Ex. E, ECF No. 8-5, attached to Mot. for
Temporary Restraining Order.)
After removal, 3 on October 20, 2021, this Court issued
a temporary restraining order and accompanying order to show cause,
which
temporarily
enjoined
Defendants
from
proceeding
to
arbitration “relating to the issues raised in the Notice of Intent
to Arbitrate or relating to any request for an arbitrator to
determine the bargaining unit issues or status of employment of
any individuals other than the workers located at the Southampton
Auto Dealership.”
(Order, ECF No. 11.)
Notably, the Court found
Plaintiff had shown likelihood of success on its claim that the
dispute involves bargaining unit composition issues over which the
National
Labor
Relations
Board
(“NLRB”)
has
exclusive
jurisdiction, rendering arbitration under the CBA inappropriate.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 185.
3
5
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(Order at 3.)
As directed, the parties submitted briefs and appeared
for an in-person hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.
(See Min. Entry, ECF No. 22.)
Defendants also filed
a pre-motion conference request seeking leave to dismiss the case,
which remains pending.
(ECF No. 16.)
STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
“A
plaintiff
seeking
a
preliminary
injunction
must
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that
he
is
likely
to
suffer
irreparable
harm
in
the
absence
of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008);
Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108,
114 (2d Cir. 2006); Jefferson v. Soe, No. 17-CV-3273, 2017 WL
2881138, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2017).
is
“an
extraordinary
routinely granted.”
and
drastic
A preliminary injunction
remedy
which
should
not
be
Jefferson, 2017 WL 2881138, at *2 (quoting
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568, 569 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
As a result, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the
movant must make carry its burden by a “clear showing.”
Id. at *3
(quoting Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 408 F.3d 506, 510
(2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)).
6
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APPLICATION
To begin, it is important to clarify what this case is
not about.
The issue in this case is not whether Plaintiff’s Local
259 employees are entitled to employer contributions to their
401(k) plans.
Rather, the only issue before the Court is whether
that question must be submitted to the AAA pursuant to Article 36
of the CBA.
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 649–50 (1986) (“[T]he union’s claim that the employer
has violated the collective-bargaining agreement is to be decided,
not by the court asked to order arbitration, but as the parties
have agreed, by the arbitrator.
The courts, therefore, have no
business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether
there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there
is particular language in the written instrument which will support
the
claim.
arbitration,
The
agreement
not
merely
is
those
to
submit
which
the
all
grievances
court
will
to
deem
meritorious.” (citation omitted)); see also Henry Schein, Inc. v.
Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019).
With this in mind, the Court turns to whether Plaintiff
makes
a
“clear
showing”
that
the
requirements
to
obtain
a
preliminary injunction have been established.
I.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Whether Plaintiff can demonstrate likelihood of success
on the merits of its claim that this dispute is not subject to
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arbitration under the CBA must be resolved according to wellsettled principles regarding arbitration disputes.
The Court
first sets forth these principles before addressing the parties’
arguments.
A.
Applicable Law
First, under federal law, “arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”
Republic of
Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 648).
Thus, the Court first
“resolve[s] ‘the question of the very existence’ of the contract
embodying the arbitration clause.” Id. (quoting Specht v. Netscape
Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Second, absent a clear and unmistakable indication to
the contrary in the arbitration agreement, the Court, not the
arbitrator,
agreement
must
creates
resolve
a
particular grievance.”
duty
“whether
for
the
a
collective-bargaining
parties
to
arbitrate
AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649.
gateway
however.
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83
Under
controlling
of
arbitrability”
caselaw,
gateway
are
These
so-called
(2002).
“questions
the
“limited,”
questions
of
arbitrability include “whether the parties are bound by a given
arbitration clause as well as disagreements about whether an
arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a
8
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particular type of controversy.”
393
(quoting
Howsam,
537
Republic of Ecuador, 638 F.3d at
U.S.
at
84).
At
the
same
time,
“‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on
its final disposition” are not questions of arbitrability. Howsam,
537
U.S.
at
84;
Republic
of
Ecuador,
638
F.3d
at
393-94.
Accordingly, procedural questions, such as “allegations of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability,” are “presumptively not
for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.”
Howsam, 537
U.S. at 84 (first quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); and then quoting John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (2002)).
Last, the Court must address the arbitrability of this
dispute “with healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.”
Republic of Ecuador, 638 F.3d at 393 (quoting Moses
H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.)
Such a presumption is particularly
applicable where the clause is as broad as the one employed in
this
case,
which
provides
for
arbitration
of
“any
dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the terms of the
[CBA] or any dispute between the parties.”
475 U.S. at 650.
disputes
“This presumption of arbitrability for labor
recognizes
arbitrators
in
Cf. AT&T Techs. Inc.,
the
greater
interpreting
institutional
competence
collective-bargaining
of
agreements,
‘furthers the national labor policy of peaceful resolution of labor
disputes
and
thus
best
accords
9
with
the
parties’
presumed
Case 2:21-cv-05685-JS-JMW Document 23 Filed 11/18/21 Page 10 of 13 PageID #: 208
objectives in pursuing collective bargaining.’”
Id. (citations
omitted).
B.
Application
Applying the foregoing principles, the Court finds that
Plaintiff cannot establish likelihood of success on the merits.
To begin, there can be no dispute that the parties signed
a CBA that contains a valid arbitration agreement.
MAG is a party
to the CBA with Local 259, and Article 9 of the CBA contains a
grievance and arbitration procedure that applies to “any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the terms of the
[CBA] or any dispute between the parties.”
The parties do not
raise any issue as to contract formation.
To the contrary,
according to the record, the CBA was the product of arms-length
negotiations between two sophisticated parties.
Plaintiff argues that “[t]here is a gateway question for
the Court to decide,” namely, “whether the parties agreed to submit
to arbitration the issue of whether employees at the Jaguar and
Chrysler dealerships are the Plaintiff’s employees.”
at 2.)
(Pl. Reply
Essentially, Plaintiff asks the Court to interpret Article
36 of the CBA -- according to Plaintiff’s interpretation, the fact
that Local 259’s employers at the Jaguar and Chrysler dealerships
make employer contributions does not trigger MAG’s contribution
obligations under Article 36.
(Id.)
Rather, MAG’s employer-
contribution obligations under Article 36 are triggered only where
10
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MAG, and not a separate employer owned by a different corporate
entity, makes contributions to its non-union employees.
(Id.)
The Court disagrees that there are any gateway questions
of arbitrability for it to decide here.
In the first instance,
Plaintiff’s request would entangle the Court in the merits of this
dispute, where it “ha[s] no business.”
Henry Schein, Inc., 139
S. Ct. at 529; AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 650.
As noted supra,
“even if it appears to the court to be frivolous, the union’s claim
that the employer has violated the collective-bargaining agreement
is to be decided, not by the court asked to order arbitration, but
as the parties have agreed, by the arbitrator.” AT&T Techs., Inc.,
475 U.S. at 650-51.
Second, to the extent argued, there are no alter ego
issues before the Court.
It is true that whether a party is an
“alter ego and therefore bound by the arbitration clause contained
in [its alter ego’s] CBA is exactly the type of ‘gateway’ issue
that is a ‘question of arbitrability’ for this Court to decide.”
Loc. Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO v.
A&M Heating, Air Conditioning, Ventilation & Sheet Metal, Inc.,
314 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Truck Drivers
Local 807, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of Am. v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 88 (2d Cir.
1987)).
However, unlike in A&M Heating, where the union sought to
arbitrate a dispute with a distinct company that was allegedly the
11
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alter ego to the CBA signatory, here, MAG is a signatory to the
CBA. 4
Last,
consistent
with
the
federal
policy
favoring
arbitration, the Court must resolve “any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues . . . in favor of arbitration, whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language
itself . . . .”
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25; accord Hartford
Accident & Idem. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219,
226 (2d Cir. 2001).
This is especially true here given (1) the
breadth of the arbitration provision at issue in this case, and
(2) the fact that it involves a labor dispute.
See AT&T Techs.
Inc., 475 U.S. at 650. 5
Plaintiff also points to the limiting language contained in
Article 9 of the CBA, which provides that “[n]o arbitrator shall
have any power to add to, subtract from, alter, change, or modify
any term of this Agreement.”
Although parties may, by clear
intention, “exclude[e] certain claims from the scope of their
arbitration agreement,” the cited language falls short of a
“positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Hartford
Accident & Idem. Co., 246 F.3d at 227 (quoting AT&T Techs. Inc.,
475 U.S. at 650). Whether this provision limits the arbitrator’s
authority to adopt Defendants’ interpretation of Article 36 is for
the arbitrator to decide.
4
Plaintiff also asserts that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction
over this dispute, arguing Defendants’ attempt to apply the CBA
between Local 259 and the owners of the Chrysler and Jaguar
Dealerships
to
MAG’s
Local
259
employees
constitutes
a
“representational matter.” (Pl. Reply at 4.) At this juncture,
the Court is unable to agree.
In support of this argument,
Plaintiff cites one case: Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 322
NLRB 877 (1997). But in that case, the employer attempted to apply
the parties’ CBA to two non-unit employees. Id. at 878. However,
5
12
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II.
Irreparable Harm & the Public Interest
Because
the
Court
has
concluded
that
Plaintiff
has
failed to establish likelihood of success on the merits, it finds
it unnecessary to reach the issue of irreparable harm or whether
an injunction is in the public interest.
Sadowsky v. City of New
York, 732 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Tait v. Accenture
PLC, No. 18-CV-10847, 2019 WL 2473837, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 13,
2019).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s
motion
for
a
preliminary
injunction (ECF No. 8) is DENIED.
Further, within ten days of this Memorandum & Order, the
parties shall advise the Court, in writing, how they intend to
proceed in this action, including whether Defendants intend to
renew their request to file a motion to dismiss this action.
SO ORDERED.
_/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT _____
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: November _18_, 2021
Central Islip, New York
here, all employees are Local 259 members, and Local 259 is not
endeavoring to extend its jurisdiction to represent some other
group of employees.
13
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