Butler v. Faraci et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; granting 11 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis: Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs applications to proceed IFP (DE 2, 9) are granted. However, complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case. The Clerk of the Court shall also mail a copy of this Order and the judgment to the pro se Plaintiff at his address of record with Legal Mail noted on the envelope and shall record such mailing on the docket. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SEE ATTACHED ORDER FOR FURTHER DETAILS. So Ordered by Judge Gary R. Brown on 3/26/2024. (JC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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TIMOTHY BUTLER, #309172,
Plaintiff,
-against-

FILED 
CLERK 

3:20 pm, Mar 26, 2024

U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
LONG ISLAND OFFICE 

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
24-0036(GRB)(ARL)

FARRAH J. FARACI, JENNIFER BASILE,
JAMES EHLERS, JODI THOMLINSON,
Defendants.
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GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:
Before the Court are the applications to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by pro se
plaintiff Timothy Butler (“Plaintiff”) while incarcerated at the Suffolk County Correctional
Facility (“Jail”) in relation to his amended complaint against the defendants, each of whom is
alleged to have played a role in an underlying state court child neglect case pending in family
court. (Docket Entry “DE” 2, 9, 11.) 1 The defendants are Assistant County Attorney Farrah J.
Faraci, Esq. (“Faraci”), Jennifer Basile, Esq. (“Basile”), who is alleged to be the attorney for the
children, the Director of Suffolk County Child Protective Services (“SCCPS”) James Ehlers
(“Ehlers”), and the Assistant Director of SCCPS Jodi Thomlinson2 (“Tomlinson” and
collectively, “Defendants”). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
applications to proceed IFP and finds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claims alleged in the amended complaint. Thus, the amended complaint is
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff filed an IFP application (DE 2) together with his original complaint (DE 1) and then filed another IFP
application (DE 11) with his amended complaint (DE 9).

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Plaintiff has appended exhibits to his amended complaint that reflect that this defendant’s sur name is spelled
“Tomlinson” and Plaintiff also uses this spelling at page 3 of the complaint. See DE 9 at 3, 7, 14, 16. Accordingly,
the Court refers to this defendant as “Tomlinson” hereafter

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BACKGROUND
1. Summary of the Amended Complaint 3
Plaintiff’s brief amended complaint is submitted on the Court’s general civil complaint
form with an additional ten pages of attachments. See DE 9. Plaintiff has checked the box on
the form to allege that this Court’s diversity subject matter jurisdiction is invoked. Id. ¶ II.
However, Plaintiff has not provided responses to any of the questions on the form that ask where
each of the parties, including himself, is a citizen. Id. ¶ II B.1-2. Rather, he has drawn a
diagonal line across each such space. Id. In the space that asks for the amount in controversy,
Plaintiff alleges that he has “incurred $18,000 in legal fees and $100,000 in punitive damages for
causing an interruption of contact with my 12 & 13 year old daughters.” Id. ¶ II B.3.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s “Relief” section seeks a total award of $118,000. Id. ¶ IV.
In its entirety, Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” alleges:
1 – Abuse of Process
2 – Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress
4 – Intentional Conscious Avoidance of Issues 4
5 – Conspiracy
Id. ¶ III. However, Plaintiff also wrote “See Attached” and has annexed four handwritten pages
and three pages of exhibits. Id. ¶ III and at pages 7-16. There, Plaintiff elaborates on each of the
items listed in his Statement of Claim:
1) Abuse of Process – Notes dated 6/21/23 by Author Kristen Salcedo states that ACA
Farah Faraci contacted CPS and asked them to amend the neglect petition so it
would not be dismissed. The notes on 6/23/23 authored by Jodi Tomlinson shows
Excerpts from the complaint are reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling,
punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.

3

4

Although Plaintiff included a third item, he has crossed it out and has not renumbered this list. Id. ¶ III.

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notes of a conference with Director James Ehlers. Director Ehlers wished to
withdraw the petition without prejudice but the County Attorney ACA Basile
interfered (Exhibit B).
2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The interference described above and
the documents provided show that the County Attorney was interfering to satisfy a
witness in a criminal case (Exhibit A) in order to not have me the Father have direct
communication with my daughters at the witness’s request. This is causing
emotional and physocolgical harm to me and my children.
3) Intentional Conscious Avoidance of Issues On 6/23/23 Director James Ehlers
directed that the Agency (CPS) should dismiss the petition without prejudice. The
decision for CPS regarding wether or not to dismiss a petition comes solely from
the case workers and the Director. Director Ehlers allowed the County Attorney
Jennifer Basile to change the decision of his agency. (Exhibit B)
4) Conspiracy- A motion to dismiss a neglect petition was denied because the County
Attorney had an agreement with their witness in the criminal charges (Danae Butler
– my wife). Th used there influence to change the decision of a secondary agency
(CPS) in order to satisfy a third party. (Exhibit C)
Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff next alleges, in its entirety:
My name is Timothy Butler. I am currently incarcerated at the Yaphank
Correctional Facility in Yaphank, NY. Prior to incarceration, I lived at 9 Peri
Avenue in Holbrook, NY 11741.
I was arrested Nov. 13, 2022 for multiple crimes. They all revolve around an
allegation of Domestic Violence by my wife Danae Butler. The domestic violence
charge generated a neglect charge by family court (CPS) although our children were
not home at the time of the alleged incident.
I hired a Family Court attorney by the name of Karyn Villor. I had to let her go
after receiving a bill for $18,000 without anything being accomplished.
I was notified of the Neglect Petition by Senior Case worker Robyn Reyes in a
letter dated December 6, 2022. We had multiple conferences. On 6/14/23 my
attorney Karyn had filed a motion to dismiss. The Case Notes essentially had
enough information to contradict the entire petition.
The Case Notes also showed clearly that for months the petitioning agency CPS
had wanted to dismiss the petition without prejudice but another agency the County
Attorneys asked them to come up with something else so the petition would not be
dismissed. This is because they had an agreement with the sole witness in my
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criminal charges my wife Danae Butler. You will see that she was having a
conversation with case workers and the case workers informed Danae that Judge
Iliou had granted me permission to mail letters through the childrens attorney and
Danae clearly states shes supposed to be consulted with prior to any changes in any
contact I have with my children.
Id. at 9-10. Finally, Plaintiff has annexed three typed pages as Exhibits A-C that appear to be
excerpts from case worker reports. Exhibit A is numbered as page 19, Exhibit B is numbered as
page 36 and Exhibit C is numbered as page 32 and each exhibit is entitled “Family Service
Progress Notes.” Id. at 12, 14, 16.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The Second Circuit has established a two-step procedure wherein the district court first
considers whether plaintiff qualifies for in forma pauperis status, and then considers the merits of
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d
Cir. 1983).
I.

In Forma Pauperis
Upon review of the IFP applications, the Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence these actions without the prepayment of the filing fees. Therefore,
the applications to proceed IFP (DE 2, 9) are granted.
II.

Sufficiency of the Pleadings
As Judge Bianco summarized,
A district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The Court is required to dismiss the action as
soon as it makes such a determination. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally,
see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
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U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010), and to
construe them “‘to raise the strongest arguments that [they] suggest [ ].’” Chavis,
618 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir.
2010)). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume
the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, --U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s pro se status, a complaint must plead sufficient facts
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128
(2d Cir. 2011). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). Plaintiff’s factual allegations must also be sufficient to give the defendant
“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Patrick v. Bronx Care, No. 14-CV-7392 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 7476972, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
31, 2014).
DISCUSSION
I.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if they lack subject matter
jurisdiction. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 01 (2d Cir.
2000). A plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in federal court must establish that the court has
subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir.
2009) (citing Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2008)). If a district court lacks
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subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); see also
Lussier,
- 211 F.3d at 701. This Court has an obligation to examine its subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte. See Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff seeks to invoke diversity subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332 which requires both diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding
$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Emiabata v. Farmers Ins. Corp., 848 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2021)
(summary order); Perry v. Robles, 23-CV-7492(LTS), 2023 WL 6881993, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.

16, 2023) (“To establish the court’s diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first show that he and
the defendants are citizens of different States. . . . The plaintiff must also allege to a ‘reasonable
probability’ that his or her claims are in excess of the sum or value of $75,000, the statutory
jurisdictional amount.” (citing Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221
(2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up) (additional citation omitted).
To establish diversity jurisdiction, there must be complete diversity of citizenship
between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545
U.S. 546, 553 (2005); Emiabata, 848 F. App’x at 29. This means that a plaintiff cannot be a
citizen of the same state as any of the defendants. Emiabata, 848 F. App’x at 29 (citing Pa. Pub.
Sch. Emps.’ Retirement Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Section
1332 requires that all plaintiffs must be citizens of states diverse from those of all defendants.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply,

409 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Diversity is not complete if any plaintiff is a citizen of the same
state as any defendant.”). Courts evaluate diversity “by examining citizenship as of the time
suit is commenced,” Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 926 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1979), and “[a]n
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individual’s citizenship, within the meaning of the diversity statute, is determined by his
domicile.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000). In this context,
domicile “is defined as the place where a person ‘has his true fixed home . . . and to which,
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Corio, 232 F.3d at 42 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, a prisoner “retains his pre-incarceration
domicile,” and the Court must therefore look to that state when evaluating whether diversity
exists between the parties. Poucher v. Intercounty Appliance Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 251, 253
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Blumatte v. Quinn, 521 F. Supp. 2d 308, 312 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining
that there is a rebuttable presumption that a prisoner retains his or her pre-incarceration
domicile).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that, pre-incarceration he resided in Holbrook, New York. DE 11
at 9. As for the Defendants, Plaintiff alleges only that they each work in Suffolk County, New
York. DE 11 at 2-3, 7-8, 10. These allegations do not establish that the diversity requirement is
met because “residence alone is insufficient to establish domicile for jurisdictional purposes.” Van
Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Leveraged Leasing Admin.
Corp. v. PacifiCorp Cap., Inc., 87 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)); accord Canedy v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 126 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is well-established that allegations of residency alone
cannot establish citizenship . . . .”).
Given that Plaintiff has not provided facts regarding his or any of the Defendants’ domicile,
and because allegations of residency alone are insufficient to establish diversity jurisdiction,
Plaintiff has not properly invoked this Court’s diversity subject matter jurisdiction. SBL
Enterprises LLC v. Keystone Cap. Corp., No. 21-CV-4459, 2021 WL 2000365, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
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May 19, 2021) (collecting cases) (Jacobs v. Patent Enforcement Fund, Inc., 230 F.3d 565, 567 (2d
Cir. 2000) (finding that plaintiffs failed to allege diversity in complaint because “they had alleged
only the residence, and not the citizenship (or domicile), of the parties”); Sekiguchi v. Long, No.
3:13-cv-01223 (CSH), 2013 WL 5357147, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2013) (“[W]hile Plaintiff as
alleged each party’s residency, Plaintiff has not established any party’s citizenship . . . .”); Jordan
v. Verizon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6414(GEL), 2008 WL 5209989, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2008)
(finding that plaintiff did not properly allege diversity of citizenship where she “d[id] not make a
proper allegation as to her own citizenship” and “allege[d] only residency - not citizenship”);
Fagan v. Deutsche Bundesbanki, No. 05 CV 10114 (CSH), 2005 WL 3534764, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 22, 2005) (alteration omitted) (“Allegations of residence are insufficient to establish diversity
jurisdiction. It is well-established that when the parties allege residence but not citizenship, the
court must dismiss the suit.” (quoting Held v. Held, 137 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1996))).
Further, although Plaintiff alleges that the amount in controversy is $118,000, (DE 9, ¶ II.
B.3), there are no facts alleged in support of that amount. See DE 9, generally. Rather, Plaintiff
alleges that he spent $18, 000 in “legal fees” in the underlying state proceedings and the balance
sought is for punitive damages. (Id., ¶ II.B.3.) “‘[E]ven where [the] allegations leave grave
doubt about the likelihood of a recovery of the requisite amount, dismissal is not warranted.’” GW
Holdings Grp., LLC v. U.S. Highland, Inc., 794 F. App’x 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order)
(quoting Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1982); also citing
Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Where the
damages sought are uncertain, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff’s pleadings.”)).
However, as the Second Circuit recently reiterated, the allegations must establish a “reasonable
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probability that the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied.” Agoliati v. Block 865 Lot 300
LLC, No. 22-51, 2023 WL 405769, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 2023) (quoting Pyskaty v. Wide World
of Cars, LLC, 856 F.3d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and additional citation
omitted)). Given that Plaintiff has not satisfied the diversity of citizenship requirement, the Court
need not reach the amount in controversy question at this time. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction
does not lie in this Court. 5
A.

Domestic Relations Exception to Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Even if Plaintiff had properly invoked this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, this Court
would be divested of such jurisdiction under the domestic relations exception. Demuth v.
Chenango Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., No. 18-CV-0767, 2018 WL 5114175, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Demuth v. Chenango Cnty. Dept.
of Soc. Servs., No. 18-CV-0767, 2018 WL 5113132 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (“There exists,
however, a judicially recognized exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction in matters
involving domestic relations.”) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701-04 (1992)
(add’l citation omitted)). “Domestic relations is “an area of law that federal courts and Congress
leave almost exclusively to state law and state courts.” Khalid v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 129, 133
(2d Cir. 2018). “Federal district courts must abstain from exercising federal question
jurisdiction of claims involving domestic relations issues, so long as those claims may be fully
and fairly determined in the state courts.” Dixon v. Hahn, No. 1:23-CV-5424 (LTS), 2023 WL

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status and in an abundance of caution, the Court has considered whether the complaint
plausibly alleges a federal question such that subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 could be
invoked. Even upon a liberal construction, the Court discerns no such claim. Further, even if the Court construed
such a claim (which it does not), the Court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction by the domestic relations
exception.
5

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5103162, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2023). “Although the domestic relation exception is narrow,
“‘it applies generally to issues relating to the custody of minors.” Varricchio v. Cnty. of Nassau,
702 F. Supp. 2d 40, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Bianco, D.J.) (quoting Mitchell-Angel v. Cronin, No.
95-7937, 1996 WL 107300, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1996)); see also Washington v. Williams, No.
19-CV-00289, 2019 WL 1876787, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2019) (the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims that the state court judge violated her rights during
custody and neglect proceedings). The Second Circuit instructs that, where, like here, tort
claims “begin and end in a domestic dispute,” state courts are better suited to adjudicate the
claims. See Schottel v. Kutyba, No. 06-1577, 2009 WL 230106, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2009)
(affirming, based on the domestic relations exception, the district court’s dismissal of a
complaint alleging, inter alia, that the defendants “fraudulently misrepresented to the court the
former couple’s residence in order to file divorce proceedings in New York,” and, as a result,
plaintiff was “deprived of custody and visitation rights”).
Here, as is readily apparent, Plaintiff’s tort claims are inextricably entwined with his ongoing state family court proceedings involving access to his children. Given that the state cases
cited by Plaintiff in his complaint are on-going, Plaintiff can pursue such claims there. Indeed,
Plaintiff has not alleged that these issues cannot be fully and fairly determined in the state court.
Accordingly, for this additional reason, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
this complaint. “It is axiomatic that federal courts must ‘verify the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.’” Emiabata v. Farmers Ins. Corp., 848 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d
Cir. 2021) (summary order) (quoting Singh v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 878 F.3d 441, 445 (2d
Cir. 2017)). In the absence of subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons set forth above, the Court does

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not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep’t, 758 F. App’x 205,

206-07 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (explaining, where a court dismisses a complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, the court does “not have the power to reach the merits and dismiss
the claims against the defendants for failure to state a claim . . . .”) (citing Carter v. HealthPort
Technologies, LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2016)).
III.

Leave to Amend
A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once when

a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Shomo
v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). However, leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,
657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
Here, for the reasons set forth above, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims and such circumstance could not be cured with better pleading.
Accordingly, leave to amend the complaint would be futile and is thus denied. However, Plaintiff
may pursue any valid claims he has against the Defendants in state court.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s applications to proceed IFP (DE 2, 9) are granted.
However, complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h)(3). The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case. The Clerk
of the Court shall also mail a copy of this Order and the judgment to the pro se Plaintiff at his
address of record with “Legal Mail” noted on the envelope and shall record such mailing on the
docket.
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The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

/s/ Gary R. Brown
_______________________
Hon. Gary R. Brown
United States District Judge

March 26, 2024
Central Islip, New York

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