The Anderson Group, LLC et al v. City of Saratoga Springs et al

Filing 286

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That Saratoga's #279 Motion for Certificate of Appealability is GRANTED limited to the issue of standing under the FHA. That Saratoga's motion for a certificate of appealability is otherwise DENIED. Signed by Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 7/26/2011. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
THE ANDERSON GROUP, LLC and GAIL
ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs,

1:05-cv-1369
(GLS\DRH)

v.
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS; MICHAEL
LENZ; SARATOGA SPRINGS CITY COUNCIL;
THOMAS CURLEY; MATTHEW MCCABE;
THOMAS MCTYGUE; STEPHEN TOWNE;
SARATOGA SPRINGS PLANNING BOARD;
LEWIS BENTON; ROBERT BRISTOL;
ROBERT ISRAEL; WILLIAM MCTYGUE;
NANCY OHLIN; and LOU SCHNEIDER,
Defendants.
_______________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
Relman, Dane Law Firm
1225 19th Street, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
Lynch & Hetman Law Firm
111 State Street
Albany, NY 12207
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
Lemire, Johnson Law Firm
P.O. Box 2485
2534 Route 9
Malta, NY 12020

JOHN P. RELMAN, ESQ.
REED N. COLFAX, ESQ.
KATHERINE GILLESPIE, ESQ.
JAMIE L. CROOK, ESQ.
PETER A. LYNCH, ESQ.

GREGG T. JOHNSON, ESQ.
MARK J. LEMIRE, ESQ.

Gary L. Sharpe
District Court Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
On June 21, 2011, this court issued a Memorandum-Decision and
Order ruling on defendant City of Saratoga Springs’ motion pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 50 and 59, granting a new trial on plaintiff the Anderson
Group’s disparate impact and perpetuation of segregation claims under the
Fair Housing Act (FHA),1 and ordering remittitur in the alternative. (See
Dkt. No. 279.) Pending is Saratoga’s motion for a certificate of
appealability on the issues of the Anderson Group’s standing under the
FHA and whether the Anderson Group established a prima facie case of
disparate impact. (Dkt. No. 280.) For the reasons that follow, Saratoga’s
motion is granted on the standing issue but is otherwise denied.
II. Standard of Review
“It is a basic tenet of federal law to delay appellate review until a final
judgment has been entered.” Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101 F.3d

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42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.

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863, 865 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463, 475 (1978)). However, a district court may grant a party leave to
appeal a non-final or interlocutory order if it “involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal ... may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Thus, § 1292 operates
as “a rare exception to the final judgment rule that generally prohibits
piecemeal appeals ... [and] is reserved for those cases where an
intermediate appeal may avoid protracted litigation.” Koehler, 101 F.3d at
865-66 (citation omitted). Importantly though, § 1292(b) “was not intended
to open the floodgates to a vast number of appeals from interlocutory
orders in ordinary litigation, or to be a vehicle to provide early review of
difficult rulings in hard cases.” Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 238 F. Supp.
2d 596, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Accordingly, a court should “exercise great care in making a §
1292(b) certification.” Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distribution
Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1992).
“An order granting a new trial is interlocutory in nature and therefore
not immediately appealable.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S.
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33, 34 (1980); see also Compagnie Nationale Air Fr. v. Port of N.Y. Auth.,
427 F.2d 951, 954 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[A]n order granting a new trial is not
ordinarily a ‘final’ judgment from which an appeal may be taken.” (citations
omitted)); see, e.g., Morris v. Flaig, 511 F. Supp. 2d 282, 315-19 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
III. Discussion
As a preliminary matter, having reviewed the parties’ submissions,
the court is compelled to revisit and clarify its findings—implicit as they may
have been, (see Def. Reply Mem. of Law at 2, Dkt. No. 284)—regarding
the Anderson Group’s prima facie case of disparate impact. In ruling on
Saratoga’s post-trial motion, the court concluded that a retrial was
appropriate and, as a result, declined to invade the jury’s province by
weighing the evidence presented. However, though not apparent from the
June 21, 2011 Order, the court was satisfied that, drawing all reasonable
inferences in its favor, the Anderson Group presented sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. Thus, the court submitted
the claim to the jury, vacated the jury’s verdict as irreconcilably
inconsistent, and ordered that the claim be retried.
Now, as to the pending motion, the court concurs with the Anderson
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Group that the issue of whether the Anderson Group established a prima
facie case of disparate impact fails to satisfy § 1292(b)’s rigid certification
requirements. (See Pls. Resp. Mem. of Law at 3-15, Dkt. No. 282.) In
particular, Saratoga’s challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence undoubtedly implicate questions of fact that fall outside §
1292(b)’s limited sphere. Therefore, while convinced that this case as it
currently stands is ripe for review in light of the fully developed record and
the legal questions presented, which the court has attempted to resolve
with finality, the court’s authority to certify appealability is heavily
circumscribed.
In comparison, the court is confident that the standing issue qualifies
for § 1292(b) certification. Specifically, throughout this action, the court has
questioned the scope and reach of the FHA’s protections and whether an
entity in the Anderson Group’s position has standing to assert claims under
the FHA for disparate impact and perpetuation of segregation. (See Oct.
18, 2007 Hr’g Tr. at 12-14, Dkt. No. 128; June 21, 2011 Order at 7, Dkt.
No. 278.) And although the court has consistently resolved this question of
law in the Anderson Group’s favor, there undoubtedly remains substantial
ground for difference of opinion. Moreover, there can be no debate that if
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the Second Circuit were to ultimately find standing nonexistent, then this
litigation would be at an end. Consequently, because the court’s prior
rulings on the threshold standing issue trigger the provisions of § 1292(b),
Saratoga is granted limited leave to appeal.
IV. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Saratoga’s motion for a certificate of appealability
(Dkt. No. 280) is GRANTED limited to the issue of standing under the FHA;
and it is further
ORDERED that Saratoga’s motion for a certificate of appealability is
otherwise DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
July 26, 2011
Albany, New York

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