Matthews v. Town of Jewet et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER that defendants Town of Jewett, William Dwyer, Tal Rappleyea, and Mike Flaherty's 8 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and all claims against Town defendants are DISMISSED. That defendant Joel Sutch's 11 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and all claims against Joel Sutch are DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 7/21/2011. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________
WILLIAM A. MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff,

1:09-cv-1267
(GLS\RFT)

v.
TOWN OF JEWETT; WILLIAM DWYER,
Zoning Code Officer, Town of Jewett; JIM
BROCKET; TAL RAPPLEYEA, AttorneyAt-Law, Town of Jewett; JOEL SUTCH;
MIKE FLAHERTY, Representative of the
Town of Jewett; RICHARD TOMPKINS;
JOE DOE; and JANE DOE,
Defendants.
_________________________________
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Dechert Law Firm
1095 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
Town of Jewett, Dwyer, Brocket,
Rappleyea, Flaherty, Tompkins, and
Joe and Jane Doe
Shantz, Belkin Law Firm
26 Century Hill Drive
Suite 202
Latham, NY 12110

OF COUNSEL:

THOMAS F. MUNNO, ESQ.

FREDERICK F. SHANTZ, ESQ.

Joel Sutch
Ganz, Wolkenbreit Law Firm
1 Columbia Circle
Albany, NY 12203

ROBERT E. GANZ, ESQ.

Gary L. Sharpe
District Court Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff William Matthews commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against defendants Town of Jewett, William Dwyer, Jim Brocket, Tal
Rappleyea, Mike Flaherty, Richard Tompkins, and Joe and Jane Doe
(Town defendants), and Joel Sutch, alleging violations of his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Pending are
defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 11.) For the reasons that
follow, defendants’ motions are granted.
II. Background
William Matthews alleges that on January 12, 2006, while
incarcerated at the Clinton Correctional Facility, he was contacted by
defendant Rappleyea, attorney for the Town of Jewett. (See Compl. ¶ 13,
Dkt. No. 1.) Rappleyea’s letter informed Matthews that he was in violation

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of Town of Jewett local law regarding junk yard regulations, and that
Matthews would need to remove several junk vehicles from his property in
order to comply with the local law. (See Pl. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 1.) Matthews
appeared in Jewett Town Court on June 26, 2006, regarding these
violations. (See Pl. Ex. C, Dkt. No. 1.) In those proceedings, it was
determined that Matthews was in violation of the Jewett local law and
subject to a weekly fine of $350.00 as long as the unregistered vehicles
remained on Matthews’s property. (See id.)
Matthews alleges that in August 2009, he became aware that
sometime prior, defendants entered his property and seized his vehicles,
causing damage to his property in the process. (See Compl. ¶¶ 16-18, Dkt.
No. 1.) On November 12, 2009, Matthews commenced this lawsuit.
III. Standard of Review
The standard of review under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) is well
established and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the
standard the court refers the parties to its decision in Ellis v. Cohen &
Slamowitz, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 217-18 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
IV. Discussion
Defendants assert that Matthews’s claims are time barred because
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all of the events at issue here are alleged to have occurred before August
2006. (See Town Defs. Mem. of Law at 2-3, Dkt. No. 8:2; see also Sutch
Mem. of Law at 2-3, Dkt. No. 11:2.) Section 1983 actions are governed by
the “general or residual state statute of limitations for personal injury
actions.” Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, New York’s three-year
statute of limitations for a personal injury, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), applies to
§ 1983 actions in New York. See id. Consequently, absent any tolling of
the limitations period, Matthews’s claims would be time barred because
they were filed more than three years after the seizure of his vehicles.
Matthews asserts two bases for the statute of limitations to be tolled
in this case: mental incapacity and continuing violations. (See Pl. Resp.
Mem. of Law at 3-6, Dkt. No. 33.)
A.

“Insanity” Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208
Matthews first argues that he is entitled to a hearing to determine

whether his mental incapacity triggers the ten-year statute of limitations
provided by N.Y. C.P.L.R. §208.1 (See id. at 3.)
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N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 states: “If a person entitled to commence an action is under a
disability because of infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, and the time
otherwise limited for commencing the action is three years or more and expires no later than
three years after the disability ceases, or the person under the disability dies, the time within

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“[T]he condition of an individual’s mental capabilities is largely a
factual question ....” McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543,
548 (N.Y. 1982). The tolling of the statute of limitations is intended to apply
“only [to] those individuals who are unable to protect their legal rights
because of an over-all inability to function in society.” Id.
In support of his argument, Matthews submitted an affidavit from his
mother, Evalena Gates, as well as declarations from Caroline Hsu and Dr.
Ernest M. Enzien, Jr. (See Enzien Decl., Dkt No. 33:1; Gates Aff., Dkt. No.
33:2; Hsu Decl., Dkt. No. 33:3.) All three make conclusory statements
regarding Matthews’s potential inability to understand and protect his legal
rights. (See id.) Matthews’s mother states that her son is illiterate and is
easily confused. (See Gates Aff. ¶¶ 3-4, Dkt. No. 33:2.) Ms. Hsu states
that she spoke to Matthews by telephone on one occasion and felt that he
did not fully understand the conversation. (See Hsu Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Dkt. No.
33:3.) And Dr. Enzien only saw Matthews “for issues relating to his

which the action must be commenced shall be extended to three years after the disability
ceases or the person under the disability dies, whichever event first occurs; if the time
otherwise limited is less than three years, the time shall be extended by the period of disability.
The time within which the action must be commenced shall not be extended by this provision
beyond ten years after the cause of action accrues, except, in any action other than for
medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, where the person was under a disability due to
infancy.”

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physical health,” and not his mental or psychological competency. (Enzien
Decl. ¶¶ 2-4, Dkt. No. 33:1.) The court is not persuaded that Matthews has
presented sufficient factual evidence to support a determination that he has
an overall inability to function in society. See McCarthy, 55 N.Y.2d at 548.
The affidavit of Matthews’s mother confirms that he was in fact able to
function in society, as he was able to live on his own and, with assistance,
to participate in the sale of his property. (See Gates Aff. at ¶¶ 3, 9, Dkt.
No. 33:2.) Furthermore, Matthews was able to seek assistance in
protecting his legal rights, as he submitted a coherently dictated declaration
to the court in connection with this case. (See Matthews Decl., Dkt. No.
26.)
Although Matthews may have had difficulty understanding certain
things, the record demonstrates that his alleged illiteracy and difficulty
understanding did not wholly prevent him from functioning in society.
Furthermore, the criteria for tolling the statute of limitations is construed
narrowly by New York courts in order to prevent excessive broadening of
the class of people permitted to toll the limitations period. See McCarthy,
55 N.Y.2d at 549. Accordingly, based on the evidence submitted to the
court, Matthews’s alleged mental incapacity is insufficient to warrant a
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finding of “insanity” under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208, and thus cannot serve as a
basis to toll the three-year statute of limitations.
B.

Continuing Violations
The time when a § 1983 claim accrues is a matter of federal law.

See Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1980). “[A]
Section 1983 claim ordinarily accrues when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the harm.” Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176,
181 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The
continuing violation doctrine is an exception to the normal
knew-or-should-have-known accrual date.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). A continuing violation exists “[w]hen the claim is
based, not on a single, discrete incident, but on an allegedly continuous,
ongoing policy.” United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 992 F. Supp. 672,
676 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Ass’n Against Discrimination v. City of
Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 274-75 (2d Cir.1981)).
Matthews asserts that the defendants’ acts of charging his tax bill for
the costs involved in removing his property should constitute a continuing
violation for purposes of the statute of limitations. (See Pl. Resp. Mem. of
Law at 6, Dkt. No. 33.) Matthews argues that because these charges were
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placed on his tax bill in December 2006, this is the date from which the
three-year statute of limitations should have accrued, in which case his
complaint would be timely. (See id. at 5-6.)
The court is not convinced that the continuing violations doctrine is
applicable in this case. Specifically, the act of charging Matthews’s tax bill
does not constitute a “continuous, ongoing policy” of civil rights violations
executed by the defendants. See Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 992 F. Supp. at
676. In fact, in the context of cases involving civil rights violations based
on the allegedly illegal seizure of property, courts have uniformly held that
“the violation of one’s civil rights accrues when the property is seized.”
Johnson v. Cullen, 925 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D. Del. 1996). In other words,
the crucial date for statute of limitations accrual purposes is when the
allegedly illegal act occurred, not when the consequences manifest
themselves. See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981); see also
Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999); Yip v. Bd. of
Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y., No. 03-CV-00959C, 2004 WL 2202594, *5
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2004). Any injuries to the plaintiff arising from the
seizure of property are generally found to be “a mere consequence of the
alleged illegal seizure” and “[stemming] from the initial, single, unlawful
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act.” Johnson, 925 F. Supp. at 249 (citing Shannon v. Recording Indus.
Ass’n of Am., 661 F. Supp. 205, 211 (S.D. Ohio 1987)); see also Triestman
v. Probst, 897 F. Supp. 48, 49-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
Matthews alleges that the defendants illegally seized his personal
property in violation of his civil rights. (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) The court
views the seizure as a single, discrete incident, and not a continuing,
repetitive violation. The charge to Matthews’s tax bill does not represent a
continuous violation, but rather a consequence of the initial alleged
violation, the seizure. Accordingly, the limitations period is not tolled by
way of the continuing violations doctrine. Consequently, Matthews’s Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed as barred under the
applicable statute of limitations.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants Town of Jewett, William Dwyer, Tal
Rappleyea, and Mike Flaherty’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 8) is
GRANTED and all claims against Town defendants are DISMISSED; and it
is further
ORDERED that defendant Joel Sutch’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No.
9

11) is GRANTED and all claims against Joel Sutch are DISMISSED; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case and provide a copy of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
July 21, 2011
Albany, New York

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