Charles v. Postupack et al

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER finding as moot 62 Letter Request, ; finding as moot 64 Letter Request, ; granting 68 Motion to Dismiss; granting 70 Motion to Dismiss; granting 73 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; gra nting 73 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 74 Motion to Dismiss; denying 76 Motion to Strike ; finding as moot 8 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 10 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; finding as moot 12 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 15 Motion to Dismiss; denying 20 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 10/19/11. (tab, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________
JEFFREY CHARLES BURFEINDT,
Plaintiff,

1:10-cv-123
(GLS\RFT)

v.
NINA POSTUPACK; HUDSON VALLEY
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION; GERALD C.
ROTH, ESQ.; MARK A. KROHN, ESQ.;
and STATE OF NEW YORK, a/k/a
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK,
Defendants.
_________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Jeffrey Charles Burfeindt
Pro Se
c/o In Tech
1830 South Road, Unit 24
Wappingers Falls, NY 12590
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
Postupack
Bailey, Kelleher Law Firm
Pine West Plaza 5, Suite 507
Washington Avenue Extension
Albany, NY 12205
Hudson Valley Federal Credit Union
and Roth

JOHN W. BAILEY, ESQ.

Stein, Wiener Law Firm
1 Old Country Road, Suite 113
Carle Place, NY 11514

PRANALI DATTA, ESQ.

Krohn
Carter, Conboy Law Firm
20 Corporate Woods Boulevard
Albany, NY 12211

MICHAEL J. MURPHY, ESQ.

State of New York
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
New York State Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224

JUSTIN C. LEVIN
Assistant Attorney General

Gary L. Sharpe
District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff pro se Jeffrey Charles Burfeindt commenced this action
against defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights in
connection with a foreclosure proceeding commenced against him. (See
Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Pending are defendants’ motions to dismiss and
Burfeindt’s motions to strike. (See Dkt. Nos. 20, 68, 70, 73, 74, 76.) For
the reasons that follow, defendants’ motions are granted and Burfeindt’s
motions are denied.

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II. Background1
This case arises out of the foreclosure of Burfeindt’s home by
defendant Hudson Valley Federal Credit Union (“HVFCU”). (See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 19-80, Dkt. No. 67.) On November 20, 2009, Justice Richard
Platkin rendered a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale against Burfeindt in
New York State Supreme Court, Ulster County. (See Dkt. No. 68, Attach.
11.) Burfeindt now alleges fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy/obstruction of
justice, tax fraud, money laundering, wire fraud, perjury and RICO claims
against the following defendants: HVFCU and its counsel, Gerald C. Roth,
Esq.; Mark A. Krohn, Esq., the court-appointed referee; Nina Postupack,
Ulster County Clerk; and the State of New York. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1318, 81-185, Dkt. No. 67.)
III. Standard of Review
The standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 is well established
and will not be repeated here.2 For a full discussion of the standard, the

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The facts are drawn from Burfeindt’s Amended Complaint and presented in a light
most favorable to him. (See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 67.) However, because the Amended
Complaint is near-unintelligible and strewn with legal conclusions, the court will summarize the
allegations contained therein. (See generally id.)
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Because Burfeindt is proceeding pro se, the court will construe his Amended
Complaint liberally. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.
2006).

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court refers the parties to its decision in Ellis v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP,
701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
IV. Discussion
Defendants’ argue that Burfeindt’s claim should be dismissed on the
bases of sovereign immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and the RookerFeldman doctrine.3 (See Dkt. Nos. 68, 70, 73, 74.) Although Burfeindt filed
two motions to strike, multiple responses, and an Amended Complaint, he
has failed to substantively counter any of the arguments raised in
defendants’ motions. (See Dkt. Nos. 20, 33, 67, 76, 81.) Despite this
failure, the court—after reviewing the defendants’ motions and the
Amended Complaint—concludes that Burfeindt’s claims are meritless.
A.

Sovereign immunity
Burfeindt’s claims against the State of New York are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. (See Dkt. Nos. 12, 73.) The Eleventh Amendment
shields states and their agencies, departments, and officials in their official
capacities from suit in federal court, regardless of the relief sought. See
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986). This immunity gives way in
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Defendants originally filed motions to dismiss in response to Burfeindt’s Complaint.
(See Dkt. Nos. 8, 10, 12, 15.) Because each has filed a new motion to dismiss which
specifically addresses the Amended Complaint, the original motions to dismiss are denied as
moot.

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only three circumstances: (1) where it is waived by the state; (2) where it
has been abrogated by Congress, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
169 (1985); and (3) where a state official is sued in her official capacity for
prospective injunctive relief, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157
(1908). Since Burfeindt’s claims do not fall within any of these recognized
exceptions, the State’s motion is granted and all claims against it are
dismissed.
B.

Quasi-judicial immunity
Similarly, Burfeindt’s causes of action against Postupack and Krohn

also fail as both are immune from suit. It is well settled that quasi-judicial
immunity is absolute if the official’s role “is ‘functionally comparable’ to that
of a judge.” See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978); see also
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985) (“Absolute immunity flows
not from rank or title or location within the Government, but from the nature
of the responsibilities of the individual official.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)); Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity are both absolute immunities.”
(citations omitted)). In evaluating whether an official’s duties are
“functionally comparable” to those of a judge, courts should consider
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several factors, including:
(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform
his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b)
the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for
private damages actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political
influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the
adversary nature of the process; and (f) the
correctability of error on appeal.
Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 200-02 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512); see also
Green v. Kadilac Mortg. Bankers, Ltd., 936 F. Supp. 108, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that a court-appointed referee was entitled to absolute
immunity); Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1997)
(extending immunity to court clerks when performing judicial functions).
Here, it is clear that Krohn, the court-appointed referee, and
Postupack, the Clerk of the court, were performing tasks that were
“functionally comparable” to those of Justice Platkin. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶
13, 16, 19-185, Dkt. No. 67); see also Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202. As
such, they are entitled to absolute immunity and all claims against them are
dismissed.4
C.

Rooker-Feldman doctrine

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In light of the dismissal of Krohn from this action, his pending motions in opposition to
Burfeindt’s requests for a stay are denied as moot. (See Dkt. Nos. 62, 64.)

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Finally, under the Rooker -Feldman doctrine, the court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction to adjudicate Burfeindt’s claims against HVFCU and
Roth. This doctrine is derived from the principle that “lower federal courts
lack jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state-court
determinations.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 21 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring). It essentially bars “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Within this Circuit, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars a claim if four
conditions are satisfied: (1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the
plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by the state-court judgment; (3)
the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment;
and (4) the plaintiff must have commenced the district court proceedings
after the state court judgment was rendered. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty.
Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005).
Here, it is clear Burfeindt “lost” in the underlying foreclosure
proceeding, and that he commenced the current action after the decision

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resulting from that proceeding was issued. (See Dkt. Nos. 1; 68, Attach.
11.) Furthermore, it is equally apparent that Burfeindt is alleging injuries
caused by, and inviting a review and rejection of, the state court decision.
(See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-185, Dkt. No. 67.) Even when viewed in a light
most favorable to Burfeindt, there can be no question that the allegations in
the Amended Complaint directly challenge and seek reversal of the
foreclosure action. Accordingly, Burfeindt’s claims against HVFCU and
Roth are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
D.

Burfeindt’s motions to strike
In response to HVFCU and Roth’s motion to dismiss, Burfeindt filed a

motion to strike. (See Dkt. No. 20.) Additionally, he filed a motion to strike
“all of the opposing Movants’ defenses” on July 5, 2011. (See Dkt. No. 76
at 1.) Having reviewed all of the materials submitted, the court discerns no
substantive or evidentiary basis for the motions.5 Therefore, Burfeindt’s
motions to strike are denied.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

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Although Burfeindt cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) as the basis for his motions, his
arguments lack merit. See Roe v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 510 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).

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ORDERED that defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 8, 10, 12,
15) are DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 68, 70, 73,
74) are GRANTED and all claims against them are DISMISSED; and it is
further
ORDERED that Burfeindt’s motions to strike (Dkt. Nos. 20, 76) are
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Krohn’s motions in opposition to Burfeindt’s request
for a stay (Dkt. Nos. 62, 64) are DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties by mail and certified mail.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
October 19, 2011
Albany, New York

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