Davis v. Cuomo et al
Filing
32
DECISION and ORDERED, that Defendants Motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 25) is GRANTED. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on March 15, 2012. (sas)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ROBERT DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
-against-
No. 1:10-cv-0221 (LEK/RFT)
ALBANY HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
___________________________________
DECISION and ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Robert Davis commenced the instant action against Defendant Albany Housing
Authority (“Defendant AHA”), claiming that he was discriminated against on account of his religion.
Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Presently before the Court is Defendant AHA’s Motion for summary
judgment. Dkt. No. 25 (“Motion”). Plaintiff does not oppose the Motion.
BACKGROUND1
II.
On June 9, 2009, Plaintiff applied for housing with Defendant AHA. Def.’s Statement of
Material Facts (Dkt. No. 25-2) (“DSMF”) ¶ 1. At the time he applied for housing, Plaintiff was
unemployed and disabled. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff’s application was processed and he was placed on a
waiting list, but was afforded priority because he was unemployed due to a disability. Id. ¶ 3-4. In
August 2009, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant AHA stating that he was on the waiting list and
that, if he wished to remain on the list, he needed to complete and return an attached form. Id. ¶ 8.
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Many of the following facts are taken from Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts
submitted pursuant to N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3). Because Plaintiff has not filed a responsive
statement of material facts, those facts set forth in Defendant’s Rule 7.1(a)(3) statement that are
supported by record are deemed to be true. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3).
Plaintiff completed and submitted the required form. Id. ¶ 9. As of the date Defendant AHA filed the
present Motion, Plaintiff was one hundred and tenth on the waiting list and remains eligible for
housing. Id. ¶ 7.
By Summons and Complaint dated February 24, 2010, Plaintiff commenced the instant
action against Defendant AHA, claiming discrimination on account of his religion. Compl. at 3.
Although the application form for public housing does not ask for or otherwise identify an individual’s
religion, Plaintiff alleges that the desk attendant, “who would not reveal her name,” but who “knew
that [he] practices the Islamic faith,” told him that he would not get public housing because of his
religion.2 Id. at 2.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs a court to grant summary judgment
if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c). Although “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary” will not
preclude summary judgment, “summary judgment will not lie if . . . the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1991). However, if the
moving party has shown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to demonstrate “the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleged that, on February 21, 2010, he was ejected from the
Albany Rescue Mission by staff members because he would not attend church services. Compl. at
2. The Albany Rescue Mission was dismissed from this action on October 7, 2010, by
Memorandum-Decision and Order of the Court. Dkt. No. 17.
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(1986). This requires the non-moving party to do “more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986). At the same time, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000); Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Court’s duty in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is “carefully limited” to finding
genuine disputes of fact, “not to deciding them.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22
F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
alleged violations of his civil rights. “[To] hold a [municipality] liable under § 1983 for the
unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1)
an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right.” Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he was denied a constitutional or federal statutory right.
While Plaintiff applied for housing benefits and remains on the waiting list, the record reflects that
Plaintiff was given priority treatment by Defendant AHA because of his disability. Moreover, Plaintiff
has adduced no evidence to establish that he was denied any benefits or treated less favorably than any
other similarly situated applicants. Nor has Plaintiff set forth any evidence indicating that, beyond his
Complaint’s allegations of the desk attendant’s statements, any actions were taken against him on
account of his religion.
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Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff could establish a violation of his federal constitutional or
statutory rights, he has failed to demonstrate that any of the factual allegations in his Complaint were
the result of a municipal custom or policy. There is no indication that the unidentified “desk attendant”
who told Plaintiff that he would not get housing on account of his religion was a final policymaker.
Nor has Plaintiff provided any evidence of a municipal policy or custom of discriminating against
persons on account of their religion or widespread instances of religious discrimination evidencing
deliberate indifference to ongoing constitutional violations. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385
(1989); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120-121 (1992). For all of the
foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant has met its burden and is entitled to summary
judgment in its favor.
V.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 25) is GRANTED;
and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 15, 2012
Albany, New York
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