Blond v. The City of Schenectady et al
Filing
76
DECISION AND ORDER granting Defendants' 61 Motion for Summary Judgment; dismissing the second cause of action of Plaintiff's amended complaint; denying Plaintiff's 75 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas J. McAvoy on 8/18/2011. (amt) [Pltf served via reg. mail]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------MARK W. BLOND, JR.,
Plaintiff,
-vs10-CV-0598
THE CITY OF SCHENECTADY, et al.,
Defendants.
-------------------------------THOMAS J. McAVOY
Senior United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Plaintiff commenced the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials and
employees of the City of Schenectady alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he
was arrested and interrogated by the police. Presently before the Court is Defendants
McDonald and St. Onge’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
seeking dismissal of the Second Cause of Action.
I.
BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2008, Kasha Hudson, Plaintiff’s wife, was at the residence of Renee
Minus (her sister) at 55 Brandywine Avenue, Schenectady, NY. Plaintiff found Hudson at the
Minus residence and rammed his car into Hudson’s. An altercation ensued between Minus
and Plaintiff. The Schenectady Police were called. Officers from the Schenectady Police
Department, including Defendant McDonald, arrived to the Minus residence. Hudson
reported that Plaintiff had rammed her car and that he assaulted her with a brick the previous
day.
McDonald followed Hudson to her residence (and that of Plaintiff) at 1060
Helderberg Avenue. Hudson identified Plaintiff to McDonald stating something to the effect
of “there he is.” McDonald then arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff was charged with Attempted
Assault in the Second Degree and Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree. Plaintiff was
convicted of both charges.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action claiming, among other things, that the arrest
violated his rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. It is well settled that
on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, see Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir.
1999), and may grant summary judgment only where "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). An issue is genuine if the relevant evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for the
motion and of identifying those portions of the record that the moving party believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to a dispositive issue.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant is able to establish a prima
facie basis for summary judgment, the burden of production shifts to the party opposing
summary judgment who must produce evidence establishing the existence of a factual
dispute that a reasonable jury could resolve in his favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A party opposing a properly supported
-2-
motion for summary judgment may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials" asserted in his
pleadings, Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994), or on
conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105,
114 (2d Cir. 1998).
With these standards in mind, the Court will address the pending motion.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the claim for false arrest and a violation of Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights on the ground that his ultimate conviction demonstrates that they
acted with probable cause. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was convicted of the charges for
which he was arrested.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and false arrest claims must be
dismissed. Defendants went to Plaintiff’s residence with Hudson’s implicit permission and
consent. Accordingly, Defendants were lawfully on Plaintiff’s property.1 Based on Hudson’s
complaints, Defendants had reason to believe that Plaintiff had engaged in criminal activity.
Moreover, upon arriving at her home, Hudson pointed Plaintiff out to Officer McDonald. This
gave Defendants probable cause (or, at the very least, arguable probable cause) to arrest.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s convictions of the underlying offenses are a defense against the claims
of false arrest. Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 388-89 (2d Cir. 1986).
1
At the very least, it w as objectively reasonable for M cD onald to believe that he w as law fully on
the prem ises and, therefore, he is entitled to qualified im m unity. M oore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 215
(2d C ir. 2007).
-3-
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED (Dkt. No. 61). and the second cause of action of Plaintiff Amended Complaint is
DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 75) of the Court’s May 10, 2011
Decision and Order denying his motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED for failure
to satisfy the standards of reconsideration and for the reasons stated in the Court’s May 10,
2011 Decision and Order.
Dated:August 18, 2011
-4-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?