Woodard v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That CSX's 41 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. That this case is deemed trial ready and the court, in due course, shall issue a trial scheduling order. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 2/10/2012. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________
P. WAYNE WOODARD,
Plaintiff,

1:10-cv-753
(GLS/ATB)

v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Hacker, Murphy Law Firm
7 Airport Park Boulevard
Latham, NY 12110-0104
Moody, Strople Law Firm
P.O. Box 1138
500 Crawford Street
Suite 300
Portsmouth, VA 23705-1138
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
Eckert, Seamans Law Firm
10 Bank Street
Suite 1061
White Plains, NY 10606
Office of Thomas M. Smith
845 West End Avenue #11F
New York, NY 10025
Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge

JAMES E. HACKER, ESQ.
THOMAS D. BUCHANAN, ESQ.

MICHAEL R. DAVIS, ESQ.
WILLIAM J. MOODY, JR., ESQ.

LAWRENCE R. BAILEY, JR., ESQ.

THOMAS M. SMITH, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff P. Wayne Woodard commenced this action under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act1 (“FELA”), alleging that he was injured as a
result of defendant CSX Transportation, Inc.’s (“CSX”) failure to comply
with the Federal Railroad Safety Act2 (“FRSA”) and the Federal Safety
Appliance Act3 (“SAA”). (See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10, Dkt. No. 1.) Pending is
CSX’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Woodard’s SAA
claim. (Dkt. No. 41.) For the reasons that follow, CSX’s motion is denied.
II. Background4
On November 8, 2008, Woodard, a stevedore for CSX, was allegedly
injured while unloading vehicles from multi-level railcars at CSX’s Selkirk,
New York train yard. (Def.’s Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”) ¶¶ 1-3,
14, Dkt. No. 41, Attach. 8.) At the time of the accident, Woodard was
unloading railcar TTGX 961404 (the “Railcar”), which arrived at Selkirk just

1

See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60.

2

See 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20120.

3

See 49 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20306.

4

The facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

2

after midnight that same day, on Receiving Track #1. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4, 6, 8; Dkt.
No. 42, Attach. 2 ¶ 6.) In addition to being “blue-flagged,” “the de-railers
were in place on Receiving Track #1”; the handbrakes on each of the
railcars were engaged; and “there were no locomotives attached to the
train.” (Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 10-13.)
III. Standard of Review
The standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is well established
and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the standard, the
court refers the parties to its decision in Wagner v. Swarts, No. 1:09-cv652, 2011 WL 5599571, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011).
IV. Discussion
CSX argues Woodard’s SAA claim should be dismissed because the
Railcar was not “in use” at the time of the accident. (Dkt. No. 41, Attach.
10 at 4-9.) In response, Woodard acknowledges the “in use” inquiry is a
question of law, but counters that the Railcar was “in use” at the time he
was injured. (See Dkt. No. 42 at 5-13.) The court agrees with Woodard.
Although the SAA does not create an independent cause of action,
an employee injured as a result of a violation thereof may commence an
action under FELA. See Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 395
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U.S. 164, 166 (1969). In that action, the employee need only prove the
existence of a statutory violation; neither the common law principle of
proximate causation nor “the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk” are applicable. Id. (internal citations omitted). Stated
another way, an SAA violation constitutes negligence per se in a FELA suit.
See Philllips v. CSX Transp. Inc., 190 F.3d 285, 288 (4th Cir. 1999).
However, before strict liability attaches, the court must decide, as a matter
of law, if the rail vehicle was “in use.” See Paul v. Genesee & Wyo. Indus.,
Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315-16 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal citations
omitted).
To determine whether a railcar5 was “‘in use,” courts analyze the
following “primary” factors: “(1) the activity of the injured party and (2) the
location of the vehicle at the time of the accident.” Kobe v. Canadian Nat’l
Ry. Co., Civ. No. 06-3439, 2007 WL 2746640, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept. 18,
2007). In so doing, the court is mindful of the SAA’s purpose—i.e., “to

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In Underhill v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-196-TS, 2006 WL 1128619, at *5 (N.D.
Ind. Apr. 24, 2006), the court highlighted the distinction between cases involving trains and
independent rail vehicles. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Erie
R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 402, 407-08 (1915), Underhill aptly stated—and this court agrees—that
“cases deciding whether a train was in use have limited relevance” in cases, such as this one,
dealing with independent railcars. Underhill, 2006 WL 1128619, at *4. Accordingly, CSX’s
reliance on cases discussing whether a train is “in use” is unpersuasive. (See Dkt. No. 41,
Attach. 10 at 6-9; Dkt. No. 43 at 2-9.)

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protect railroad workers from injury and death.” Underhill, 2006 WL
1128619, at *6 (citing United States v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 361
U.S. 78, 82-83 (1959)). And despite the need to construe the SAA liberally,
see Seaboard Air Line, 361 U.S. at 83, the so-called “in use” limitation was
intended “to give railcar operators the opportunity to inspect for and correct
safety appliance defects before” the SAA imposes strict liability, Philllips,
190 F.3d at 288. As such, “injuries directly resulting from the inspection,
repair, or servicing of railroad equipment located at a maintenance facility”
are not covered by the SAA. Angell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 618
F.2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1980).
Here, it is undisputed that Woodard was unloading the Railcar on
Receiving Track #1 at the time he was injured. (Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 2-3, 8.)
While these facts, standing alone, are sufficient to establish the Railcar was
“in use,” it is the absence of any proof that Woodard was inspecting,
repairing, or servicing railroad equipment anywhere in the train yard that is
fatal to CSX’s argument.6 See Angell, 618 F.2d at 262. Accordingly, the
court concludes the Railcar was “in use” when Woodard was injured. It

6

The use of blue flags, de-railers, and/or handbrakes are, in this case, irrelevant given
Woodard’s role as a stevedore and the loaction of the train on the receiving track. (Def.’s SMF
¶¶ 2, 8-13.)

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follows that CSX’s motion is denied.7
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that CSX’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No.
41) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that this case is deemed trial ready and the court, in due
course, shall issue a trial scheduling order; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 10, 2012
Albany, New York

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At trial, Woodard must still prove that CSX violated the SAA before strict liability
attaches. In addition, his claim under the FRSA has not been addressed by either party.
(Compl. ¶ 8.) Because the dispositive motion deadline has passed, the court deems this case
trial ready and will issue a trial scheduling order in due course.

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