Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Troy Belting & Supply Company et al

Filing 288

DECISION & ORDER denying Defts Hartford+ 203 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Pltf's 254 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment & Deft Troy Belting's 261 Cross Motion for Summary Judgment w/ leave to renew; Signed by Sr. District Judge Thomas J. McAvoy dtd 9/28/2015 (cml)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.

1:11-CV-912

TROY BELTING & SUPPLY COMPANY,
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY
COMPANY, HARTFORD CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD
INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST,
and ABC COMPANIES 1 THROUGH 20,
Defendants.
--------------------------------

DECISION AND ORDER
Before the Court are motions for summary judgment by Plaintiff Pacific Employers’
Insurance Company (“Pacific Employers”), Defendant Troy Belting & Supply Company (“Troy
Belting”) and Defendant Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (“Hartford”) in this matter
involving insurance coverage for the costs of settling lawsuits related to asbestos exposure.
See dkt. ##s 203, 254, 261.
I.

Background
This case concerns insurance coverage for Troy Belting. Troy Belting is a

manufacturer incorporated in New York with its principal place of business in Watervliet, New
York. Troy Belting has been named as a defendant in lawsuits alleging bodily injury caused
by exposure to asbestos from products it allegedly manufactured. Settlements in these
lawsuits have led to insurance payments, and Plaintiff Pacific Employers and Defendant

Hartford seek repayment from Troy Belting for portions of settlements in these lawsuits that
the insurers claim they were not obligated to pay. Pacific Employers issued Troy Belting
insurance polices that covered liability for asbestos exposure from 1974 to 1984 and the
Hartford issued such policies from 1984 to 1992.
Plaintiff Pacific Employers filed a Complaint in this matter on August 3, 2011. See
dkt. #1. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 26, 2011. Pacific Employers
named as Defendants Troy Belting, Hartford Insurance Company and unidentified ABC
Companies 1 through 20. Id. The Complaint seeks declaratory relief concerning the extent
of Plaintiff’s obligation to defend and indemnify Troy Belting in connection with any asbestos
law suits. Id. at ¶ 1. Pacific Employers also seeks reimbursement for moneys paid on behalf
of Troy Belting in prior asbestos litigation. Id. at ¶ 2. Pacific Employers argues that Pacific
Employers and Hartford have funded 100% of Troy Belting’s indemnity related to asbestos
injury lawsuits during the period where Troy has been a defendant. (Id. at ¶ 14). Troy
Belting has refused to contribute to settlements on these asbestos claims. (Id. at ¶ 15).
Pacific Employers claims that Troy Belting must contribute for bodily injury claims during the
non-insured periods on a pro rata allocation methodology based on time on the risk. (Id. at ¶
16). Troy Belting has not done so. (Id. at ¶ 14). Count I of the Complaint seeks a
declaratory judgment from the Court determining the obligations Troy Belting and the
insurance company defendants to indemnify Pacific Employers for funds paid to settle
claims. Count II seeks equitable contribution from Troy Belting for any excess funds
expended by Pacific Employers to settle claims. Count III seeks a declaratory judgment on
payment of defense costs. Count IV seeks payment from Troy of these defense costs.

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Troy Belting then filed an answer to the Amended Complaint, a cross-claim against
Hartford, and a counterclaim against Pacific Employers. See dkt. #12. Hartford answered
the Amended Complaint by filing a cross claim against Troy Belting and a counterclaim
against Pacific Employers. See dkt. # 16. Troy Belting eventually obtained leave of Court to
file a Third-Party Complaint agianst a number of non-party insurers. See dkt. #40. The Third
Party Complaint named a number of insurance companies who had allegedly issued policies
to Troy Belting. See dkt. #41. Plaintiff then filed an amended third-party complaint that
named a revised group of insurers with leave of Court. See dkt. #106. Several of the
insurers named in the third-party complaint and Amended Complaint were voluntarily
dismissed from the Complaint during the course of discovery. Finally, the Hartford
Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment. See dkt. # 169. The Court
determined that this motion sought an inappropriate advisory opinion, as there was no
evidence before the Court concerning specific cases where indemnity was requested. The
Court therefore denied the motion for summary judgment, permitting the parties to file
motions at an appropriate time to address the evidence actually before the Court. See dkt. #
196.
After collecting some evidence, Hartford filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, seeking reimbursement for a portion of claims paid by Hartford on Troy Belting’s
behalf. See dkt. # 203. The parties delayed briefing the motion for nearly nine months.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff filed a motion very similar to the one Hartford filed, likewise seeking
reimbursement for a portion of the claims Pacific Employers paid out. See dkt. # 254. Troy
Belting responded to both motions, filing as well a cross-motion for summary judgment that
alleged that the Defendant had no obligation to reimburse either insurer. See dkt. # 261.
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II.

Legal Standard
The parties seek summary judgment. It is well settled that on a motion for

summary judgment, the Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, see Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999), and m ay
grant summary judgment only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ...
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). An issue
is genuine if the relevant evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the
basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that the moving party
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to a dispositive
issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant is able to establish
a prima facie basis for summary judgment, the burden of production shifts to the party
opposing summary judgment who must produce evidence establishing the existence of a
factual dispute that a reasonable jury could resolve in his favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A party opposing a properly supported
motion for summary judgment may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials" asserted in his
pleadings, Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994), or on
conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114
(2d Cir. 1998).
III.

Discussion
A. Choice of Law

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At issue in this case is the interpretation of parties’ responsibilities under various
insurance policies. The Court will apply New York law to interpreting these policies. “A
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice of law analysis of the
forum state.” Globalnet Financial.com, Inc. v. Frank Crystal & Co., 449 F.3d 377, 382 (2d
Cir. 2006). This case involves insurance contracts. “The New York Court of Appeals has
held that in contract cases, the ‘center of gravity’ or ‘grouping of contracts’ analysis is to be
applied in determining the choice of law.” Id. (quoting In re Allstate Ins. Co. (Stolarz), 81
N.Y.2d 219, 226, 613 N.E. 2d 936 (1993)). T o make this determination, the court is “to
consider a ‘spectrum of significant contracts’” and apply a number of factors, including “‘the
place of contracting, negotiation and performance; the location of the subject matter of the
contract; and the domicile of the contracting parties.’” Id. The parties do not appear to
dispute that New York law applies.
This case thus involves the interpretation of insurance contracts. In New York, “‘the
cardinal principal for the construction and interpretation of insurance contracts–as with all
contracts–is that the intentions of the parties should control.’” World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Newmont Mines Ltd. v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 1986)). Unless the parties state otherw ise,
“‘words should be given the meanings ordinarily ascribed to them and absurd results should
be avoided.’” Id. Language in insurance policies “should be examined ‘in light of the
business purposes sought to be achieved by the parties and the plain meaning of the words
chosen by them to effect those purposes.’” Id. The language used in the contract generally
controls, unless ambiguity exists in that language. Id. The Court finds ambiguity when “a
contract term ‘could suggest more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a
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reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated
agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as
generally understood in the particular trade or business.’” Id. (quoting Morgan Stanley Group
Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2000)). “T erms in a document,
especially terms of art, normally have the same meaning throughout the document in the
absence of a clear indication that different meanings were intended.” Maryland Cas. Co. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 128 F.3d 794, 799 (2d Cir. 1997). An insurer, like the Plaintif f, “has the
burden of proving it is entitled to the declarations it seeks.” Continental Cas. Co. v .
Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 60 A.D.3d 128, 135, 871 N.Y.S.2d 48, 54 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008) (“Keasbey”). To obtain a judgment that no duty to indemnify exists before trial, Plaintiff
“must demonstrate as a matter of law that ‘there is no possible factual or legal basis on which
the insurer may eventually be held liable under its policy.’” Id. (quoting First State Ins. Co. v. J
& S United Amusement Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 1044, 1046, 504 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90 (1986)).
B. The Parties’ Arguments1
Pacific Insurers and Hartford offer similar arguments in seeking summary judgment.
They admit that they are responsible for indemnifying Troy Belting for a portion of the
settlements paid out in various asbestos-related cases settled in New York. They list these
cases and explain that, together, the two insurers funded 100% of the cost of settling them.

Though the parties dispute vigorously certain facts, such as those forming the
basis for the underlying lawsuits, the parties appear to agree that Hartford and Pacific
Employers insured Troy Belting for asbestos-related injuries, and that the insurers were
obligated under the policies in question to provide some coverage for Troy Belting in
relation to the underlying lawsuits. The disagreement here is mostly over what percentage
of the settlements the insurers were obligated by the policies to pay. Because of the
nature of this opinion, the Court will not resolve any questions on particular settlements
and will not provide any detailed discussion of the facts involved.
1

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The insurers also provide evidence from each of the underlying cases concerning the date of
first exposure to asbestos of the plaintiff in that action and the date on which the case was
settled. The insurers then compare this date of first exposure and to the dates on which
each insurer provided coverage to Troy Belting. As the cumulative dates from exposure to
the end of the last Hartford policy were longer than the dates on which the two insurers
provided coverage, they contend that they are entitled to reimbursement for overpayment
during the periods when Troy Belting did not have coverage. Pacific Employers seeks
$431,110.46 for coverage paid to settle the cases in question. The Hartford seeks
$124,838.06.
Troy Belting responds by claiming that the insurers have not provided adequate
proof of the date of first exposure for the plaintiffs in the underlying cases. The company
contends that much of the evidence relied on by the insurers is hearsay and inadmissible.
Moreover, more evidence is necessary to fully establish the dates the insurers claim. Troy
Belting also contends that other insurers may be obligated to contribute to the costs of
settling the underlying cases, and that the insurers are obligated to seek contribution from
those parties before demanding repayment from Troy Belting.
After examining the parties’ arguments and exhibits, the Court has determined that
the matter is not yet ripe for disposition because the identities of various insurers and their
obligations towards the cost of settlement have not yet been established.
C. Analysis
This case involves insurance coverage for illnesses caused by exposure to
asbestos. Such cases present a particular challenge for courts because they often involve
illnesses that manifest themselves long after exposure to a dangerous product. Such long

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latency periods create difficult questions about the risk borne by insurers who provided
coverage during those periods. How much should an insurer be obligated to pay when that
insurer provided coverage only during a portion of the time that the disease developed and
then appeared? What obligation does a party that at times lacked insurance have under
those circumstances? The question presently before the Court is the amount of indemnity
each insurer was obligated to pay as a result of the settlements in the asbestos-related suits
in question when the insurers contend there were periods when Troy Belting had other
insurance or no insurance. In answering this question, the Court is required to determine the
event that triggers coverage and the means for determining the obligation of each insurer.
The Court will address each in turn.
a. Triggering Event
There appears to be no dispute among the parties as to the event that triggers
coverage. The insurers appear to accept that coverage was triggered by the underlying
plaintiffs’ exposure to asbestos. As a general matter, the event that triggers coverage in New
York is determined by the language of the insurance policy. Here, Pacific Employers is
obligated to pay coverage for “sums” an insured becomes “legally obligated to pay as
damages because of . . . bodily injury . . . to which this insurance applies, caused by an
occurrence.” An occurrence is “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, which results in personal injury.” A personal injury is a “bodily injury, sickness, or
disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period.” The Hartford
policies contain similar language.2

2

The Hartford policies contain language stating that:
(continued...)
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Pacific Employers points out that New York courts have interpreted similar policies
to find that coverage is triggered by an “injury-in-fact,” that is, when a bodily injury in fact
occurs during the policy period. In asbestos-related cases, such courts have concluded that
injury-in-fact “begins upon initial exposure to asbestos and continues through manifestation
of disease.” Pacific Employers’ Brief, dkt. # 254-2 at 8 (citing Stonewall Insurance Company
v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1198 (2d Cir. 1995) (f inding that “the
jury’s determination that injury-in-fact commences with the time of first exposure and
progresses continuously thereafter was sufficiently supported by the evidence regarding the
etiology of such cancers.”). Plaintiff notes that a recent decision from the Appellate Division
calls this standard into question. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Employers Insurance
Company of Wausau, 60 A.D.3d 128, 871 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dept. 2008) (Keasbey). Keasbey
seems to suggest that coverage is not triggered until an insured can “demonstrate actual
damage or injury during the policy period,” not just exposure. Id. at 148. The insurers do not
argue, however, that the Keasbey approach would apply. Instead, their analysis of the
amount owed is premised on the idea that coverage is triggered by exposure. Troy Belting
does not appear to dispute that the trigger event is exposure. The Court will therefore accept
date of first exposure as the event that triggers coverage, recognizing that Troy Belting

2

(...continued)

The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . bodily harm . . . to
which the insurance applies, caused by an occurrence;
and
“[O]ccurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.
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vociferously disputes that the insurers’ evidence adequately establishes such exposure dates
for the settled cases in question.
Troy Belting’s argument here is that the evidence provided by the insurers is
insufficient to grant summary judgment to the insurers. Troy Belting contends that much of
the evidence presented–which comes in the form of depositions from the underlying cases,
case summaries, and filings related to settlement of those cases, is equivocal or inadmissible
on various grounds, including hearsay. As such, the insured claims, a question of fact exists
as to the point where the exposure–and therefore the period where the pro rata shares are
allocated–begins. Because of the fact–as explained below–the parties have not yet collected
the evidence necessary to make a determination of which entities are responsible for the pro
rata shares, the Court declines to make a determination of whether sufficient evidence exists
to determine as a matter of law the date of first exposure on each of the underlying cases.
Moreover, other interested parties may have an interest and seek to participate in that
argument. If other insurers are involved, those insurers may seek to limit their liability by
establishing a later date of first exposure than that agreed to by Hartford and Pacific
Employers.
b. Insurers’ Liablity for the Settlement
If date of first exposure could be established, the next question for the Court would
be how to calculate each insurers’ responsibility for payment under New York law. In
asbestos cases, this issue is complicated by the length of time typically between exposure
and manifestation. The parties appear to agree on the general legal principle that should be
applied for determining the insurers’ share, though they disagree about Troy Belting’s
responsibility for any periods when neither insurer provided coverage. The insurers argue

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that New York law requires indemnity costs to be prorated to time on the risk under
circumstances like those in this case. Pacific Employers points to Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 98 N.Y.2d 208 (2002), for this proposition. In that case,
the court considered how to allocate payment responsibility when “an alleged harm spans
many years and thus implicates several successive insurance policies[.]” Id. at 221. The
court noted the definition of occurrence in the policies in question confined that meaning to
be events that occurred “during the policy period.” Id. at 222. The court therefore rejected
joint and several liability for insurers and instead applied the idea that each insurer w ould be
responsible for a pro rata share of the payment based on time on the risk. Id. at 224. Citing
to numerous state and federal cases in the asbestos context, Plaintiff argues that Pacific
Employers “is obligated to pay only its share of the total settlement that is proportionate to
the number of years of coverage under the PEIC Policies and the number of years of injury.”
Moreover, the Plaintiff contends, the insured, not the insurer, is responsible f or any “periods
in which the insured is self-insured, uninsured (i.e., failed to purchase insurance),
underinsured (i.e., through exhaustion of the limits of one or more polices) or insured by an
insurer that is now insolvent.” Plaintiff cites to Stonewall, 73 F.3d at1203 for the proposition
that “proration [to the insured] is appropriate as to years in which [the insured] elected not to
purchase insurance or purchased insufficient insurance, as demonstrated by the exhaustion
of its policy limits.”
Plaintiff further points out that some courts have concluded that an insured is not
obligated to pay a pro rata share for those periods where insurance for the underlying claim
was not available. Courts have in such cases ended the allocation period on the date that
coverage was no longer available. Other courts have extended the period to the earlier of

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the underlying claimant’s diagnosis, death, or filing of suit. See Sybron Transition Corp. v.
Sec. Ins., 258 F.3d 595, 599-600 (7 th Cir. 2001) (applying New York law and concluding that
the calculation of the time on the risk should not be halted at the tim e when insurance was no
longer available, but from the date of diagnosis, death or filing of suit). Following the Sybron
rule, the Plaintiff points out, would extend the allocation period to date of diagnosis for each
claimant, which was in the 2000s. The insurer’ calculations instead leave the time on the risk
at the time when the last Hartford policy expired. Troy Belting does not appear to dispute
that the expiration of the last policy should mark the end of the allocation period.
Troy Belting’s argument does not dispute that a pro rata allocation based on tim e
on the risk is appropriate in some cases with facts similar to this one. Troy Belting argues,
however, that the facts of this case, particularly the conduct of the insurers, means that no
share of the pro rata allocation should be assigned to the insured. Troy Belting points out
that Courts have not conclusively determined how to deal with periods where the insured had
no insurance or where there was a dispute regarding the existence of available coverage.
Citing to New York Ins. Dept. Liquidation Bureau v. Generali Ins. Co., 44 A.D.3d 469, 844
N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st Dept. 2007), Troy Belting argues that no proration to the insured is permitted
in this case. In that case, two insurers had provided coverage for a realty company that
exposed tenants to lead paint. Id. at 469. During much of the time period in question, the
realty company had no insurance. Id. One of the insurers and the realty company had
become insolvent by the time the case was settled. Id. The insolvent insurance company
had paid out insurance claims, while the defendant insurance company had disclaimed
coverage and refused to participate. Id. at 469-70. New York’s Insurance Liquidation
Bureau then sought reimbursement from the defendant insurer. Id. at 470. The trial court

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concluded that each insurer’s contribution should be pro-rated according to time on the risk,
and that the insurers should share responsibility for uninsured periods based on their
prorated share. Id. The appellate court, noting that the “time on the risk” formula “did ‘not
foreclose allocation among insurers by others methods’ and that ‘[time on the risk analysis] is
not the last word on proration,’” concluded that “[u]nder the particular circum stances
presented, in which plaintiff, in the face of Generali’s unjustified refusal to honor its
obligations, bore nearly the entire costs of defending and settling the underlying claim against
the defunct insured, convering lengthy periods for which there was no applicable coverage,”
the trial court properly allocated responsibility for the settlement costs. Id. at 470-71 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 98 N.Y.2d 208, 225, 774 N.E.2d 687
(2002)).
Even if the Court disagrees with that premise, Troy Belting argues that the facts
and circumstances of this case do not permit assigning pro rata shares. Troy Belting argues
that the policy language in question does not permit recovery from the insured. Moreover,
the policies gave the insurers the right to subrogate against any other insurers, and the two
companies have not done that. Finally, Troy Belting insists that the doctrines of laches
and/or estoppel bar the insurers from seeking contribution, and thus entitles them to
summary judgment. The insurers controlled the defense of the case for years and never
sought contribution from Troy Belting nor informed Troy Belting of an intention to seek
contribution. This thwarted Troy Belting’s ability to establish the relevant date of first
exposure independently and means the company lacks good evidence of when such
exposure actually occurred. That means the insurers can set a date of first exposure that
shifts much of the cost of settlement to the insured.

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The Court agrees that pro-rata shares of time on the risk generally serve as the
method for allocating responsibility for settlements in cases where several insurance policies
cover an injury that took years to develop and manifest itself. “[W]hen continuous . . .
damage takes place over a number of policy periods, the liability for that injury is allocated
over the time during which . . . damage occurred.” Olin Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 468
F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying New York Law). The Court also agrees that the way
to determine proper allocation under those circumstances depend on the facts of the case
and the conduct of the parties involved. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v.
National Union Fire Ins. Cas. Co., 21 N.Y.3d 139, 154, 969 N.Y.S.2d 808, 819 (2013) (finding
that pro rata application was appropriate when the policies did not indicate a desire to assign
liability to a single insurer and the injury could not be assigned “to particular policy periods.”).
An insured who chose to self-insure or forego insurance during some period where the risk
existed can at times be responsible for a pro-rata share based on that choice. See, e.g .,
Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1203 (finding that insured that “proration-to-the-insured” is available for
periods when the insured declined available insurance). The principle that applies under
these circumstances is that “in the absence of any policy provisions to the contrary, and with
no ability to pinpoint exactly when the insured event occurred, the most equitable means of
apportioning the liability for the losses is in direct proportion to each insurer’s time on the
risk.” Serio v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 304 A.D.2d 167, 172, 759 N.Y.S.2d 110, 115 (2d
Dept. 2003).
Here, the evidence has not yet been developed in a manner sufficient to determine
“each insurer’s time on the risk.” The parties admit that discovery has not yet determined all
insurers that had time on the risk. To answer the question of the proper allocation of

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indemnity costs, the Court needs a fuller picture of all of the parties potentially obligated to
pay, whether those parties are insurers or insured. The insurers’ motions do not provide this
information. Instead, their motions simply note the dates for which they provided coverage
and the date of first exposure, and then allocate costs based on their tim e on the risk, asking
for contribution for the remainder from their insured. The insurers make no effort to
determine whether another entity could be responsible for coverage during those periods.
Instead, they simply seek an order from the Court directing Troy Belting to reimburse them
for alleged overpayments and leave it to their insured to seek recovery from some other
parties. This method ignores the possibility that other insurance may have existed during the
relevant periods and thus ignores the legal requirements for pro-rata allocation.
Indeed, Troy Belting argues that the company had insurance from other insurers for
the period before the purchase of the first Pacific Employers policy in the 1970s, a period the
movants seek to have assigned pro rata to their insured. Troy Belting “has retained an
expert to establish the terms, conditions, and limits” of any available policies. Troy Belting
Brief in Opposition, dkt. # 261-2 at 10. Troy Belting’s brief argues that the expert deadline in
this case has not yet passed, and review of such testimony is incomplete. If such policies
existed, Troy Belting may have an argument about allocation to these insurers, rather than to
Troy Belting. Such insurers may have their own arguments about whether they should be
responsible for any portion of the settlements.
The Court must therefore find that summary judgment for any party is premature.
As the issue in this case is largely the allocation of the costs of settlement among various
parties, and not all evidence related to that issue has been collected and analy zed, more
evidence on other insurers and any obligations they have in this matter must be collected

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before summary judgment can be properly considered. The Court rejects the moving
insurers’ efforts to recover contribution from their insured before establishing all of the facts
about coverage necessary to make a determination of proper allocation. The Court will
therefore deny all the motions for summary judgment with leave to renew. The parties may
renew their motions once they can establish the identity of all additional insurers and the
periods where they provided coverage.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the motions for summary judgment of Plaintiff Pacific

Employers Insurance Company, dkt. # 254, Defendant Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company, dkt. # 203, and Defendant Troy Belting Company, dkt. # 261, are hereby DENIED
with leave to renew.

IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated:September 28, 2015

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